The Priority of Politics and Procedure over Perfectionism in Penal Law, or, Blackmail in Perspective

Criminal law theory concerns itself with the justification of punishment. Conflicting moral theories of punishment will be held in liberal democracies. The positive law therefore neither will nor should reflect exclusively a single moral theory of punishment. Like the institutions for making law, the institutions for enforcing it will cause punishments imposed to deviate from what pure moral theory might prescribe. These claims are illustrated by the debate over blackmail prohibition. The best rationale for prohibition is not the moral argument that blackmailers culpably cause harm, but the political argument that blackmailers threaten the state’s claimed monopoly on punishing crime.     

Public Reason and the Need to Identify State-Relevant Desert

Plausible retributivist justifications for punishment assert that the commission of a moral wrong creates a pro tanto reason to punish the person who committed it. Yet there are good case-based and theoretical reasons to believe that not all moral wrongs are the proper subjects of criminal law or that they are within the proper domain of the state. This article provides these reasons, which suggest that a plausible retributivist justification for punishment must make distinctions between state-relevant and non-state-relevant moral wrongs and (consequently) state-relevant and non-state-relevant desert. The article makes the case for Rawlsian public reason as a plausible method for making these distinctions.     

Self-Defense, Punishing Unjust Combatants and Justice in War

Some contemporary Just War theorists, like Jeff McMahan, have recently built upon an individual right of self-defense to articulate moral rules of war that are at odds with commonly accepted views. For instance, they argue that in principle combatants who fight on the unjust side ought to be liable to punishment on that basis alone. Also, they reject the conclusion that combatants fighting on both sides are morally equal. In this paper, I argue that these theorists overextend their self-defense analysis when it comes to the punishment of unjust combatants, and I show how in an important sense just and unjust combatants are morally equal. I contend that the individualistic and quid pro quo perspective of the self-defense analysis fails to consider properly how the international community, morally speaking, ought to treat combatants, and I set forth four elements of justice applicable to war, which, together, support the conclusion that in principle the international community should not take on the activity of punishing combatants solely for fighting on the unjust side.     

Proportionality and Self-Defense

Proportionality is widely accepted as a necessary condition of justified self-defense. What gives rise to this particular condition and what role it plays in the justification of self-defense seldom receive focused critical attention. In this paper I address the standard of proportionality applicable to personal self-defense and the role that proportionality plays in justifying the use of harmful force in self-defense. I argue against an equivalent harm view of proportionality in self-defense, and in favor of a standard of proportionality in self-defense that requires comparable seriousness and takes into account the wrong, as opposed simply to the harm that the victim is fending off. I distinguish the standard of proportionality in self-defense from proportionality in circumstances of necessity, and I discuss whether proportionality is an internal or an external constraint on the right of self-defense.     

Punishment Goals of Crime Victims

Research on subjective punishment goals has focused on the perspective of third-party observers of criminal offenses and neglected the perspective of victims. This study investigates punishment goals among 174 adult crime victims (rape and nonsexual assault) for each participant's real criminal case. Scales measuring support for punishment goals are constructed by factor analysis of an 18-item list. Results show that 5 highly supported goals can be distinguished: retaliation, recognition of victim status, confirmation of societal values, victim security, and societal security. Analysis of relations between punishment goal scales and personal variables, situational variables, and demanded punishment severity corroborates the view that the punishment goals revealed can be classified according to the two independent dichotomies of moral versus instrumental goals, and micro versus macro goals.     

The triumph of vengeance over retribution: the United States Supreme Court and the death penalty

In this article the author uses a review of Welsh S. White'sThe Death Penalty in the Nineties as a framework for analyzing recent trends in the United States Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. Since 1976 the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment at least in part on the notion that the death penalty serves the useful social purpose of retribution. This article, however, contends that it is imperative to distinguish between retribution and vengeance as rationales for criminal punishment. Modern retributive theory calls for punishments to be guided by considerations of proportionality, fairness, and equality. Vengeance-based punishments, on the other hand, are aimed at satisfying the victim's and society's desire for retaliation and are not limited by the retributive principle that punishment must be proportionate to the severity of the crime and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The article analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that are not examined inThe Death Penalty in the Nineties-decisions that allow the introduction of victim-impact evidence into capital sentencing proceedings and permit the death penalty to be imposed on 16-year-old offenders, mentally retarded defendants, and those who neither kill nor intend to kill. These decisions, it is argued, demonstrate that the contemporary Court has bestowed judicial approval on vengeance as an acceptable justification for capital punishment.     

Self-Defense as Claim Right,Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-Relative Prerogative

This paper is not so much concerned with the question under which circumstances self-defense is justified (I use the term self-defense to include other-defense), but rather with other normative features of self-defense as well as with the source of the self-defense justification. I will argue (as has been done before) that the aggressor’s rights-forfeiture alone – and hence the liberty-right of the defender to defend himself – cannot explain the intuitively obvious fact that a prohibition on self-defense would wrong victims of attack. This can only be explained by conceiving of self-defense also as a claim-right. However, I will also argue (more innovatively) that a claim-right cannot ground the self-defense justification either. Rather, what grounds the self-defense justification and its particular strength and scope is the fact that self-defense is an act-specific agent-relative prerogative: a defender is allowed to give particularly grave weight to his interest in engaging in self-defense, which distinguishes self-defense from most other acts. This is not the same as saying that he has a right or a liberty to engage in self-defense. Thus, self-defense, understood as a normative concept, is a claim-right, a liberty-right, and an act-specific agent-relative prerogative.     

Self-Defense,Retaliation, and Gender: Clarifying Motivations for Physical Partner Violence

The motivations behind intimate partner violence (IPV) have been a controversial topic. It has been suggested that women’s use of IPV mainly occurs in the context of self-defense (Saunders 1986). However, men also report perpetrating IPV in self-defense (Harned 2001; Makepeace 1986). This article differentiates self-defense from retaliation and reviews findings regarding these motives for perpetrators of IPV. Self-defense motives are common among battered women; however, undergraduates and arrested perpetrators often report other motives. Women do not consistently report using violence in self-defense more than men do. Clinical and research implications are discussed and existing self-defense measures are critiqued.     

康德的惩罚观:公正优先兼顾功利——读《法的形而上学原理》

学界通常认为康德是一个极端报应论者,但实际上康德并不否认惩罚的功利价值,只是主张公正是惩罚正当性的首要根据,认为惩罚是国家的完全义务,与罪行相适应的惩罚是比例惩罚,被惩罚的主体应是责任主体。康德对赦免权利、死刑、善良违法和比例惩罚等问题的认识有自相矛盾之嫌。鉴于经验的复杂性,康德没有构建一个惩罚理论。马克思对康德的惩罚思想进行了批判,康德报应论的症结在于片面追求惩罚的形式正义,忽视了实质正义。     

What Should We Say We Say about Contrived ‘Self-Defense’ Defenses?

Imagine someone who deliberately provokes someone else into attacking him so that he can harm that person in defending himself against her attack and then claim “self-defense” when brought to court to defend himself for what he has done to her. Should he be allowed to use this defense, even though it’s clear that he has deliberately manipulated his attacker into attacking him precisely in order to be able to harm her with impunity (assuming he were allowed to use the defense and thus escape legal penalties)? This question is the focal point in the paper that follows. I argue first that the case described above is indeed an instance of an “actio libera in causa,” albeit arguably one at the margins of this controversial class of cases. Then, using a view about the justification of self-defense that I have defended elsewhere, I show why I believe that, while the manipulator should not be deprived of the legal right to defend his self-defensive actions in such cases by claiming they were a legitimate matter of self-defense, there is good reason to enact laws that will allow him to be prosecuted, independently of his “self-defense” defense, for manipulating his attacker as he did, thus allowing him to harm her in self-defense and then defend his actions as purely a matter of “self-defense.”     

Justifying Punishment: A Response to Douglas Husak

In ‘Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content?’, Douglas Husak argues that an analysis of the justifiability of the criminal law depends upon an analysis of the justifiability of state punishment. According to Husak, an adequate justification of state punishment both must show why the state is permitted to infringe valuable rights such as the right not to be punished and must respond to two distinct groups of persons who may demand a justification for the imposition of punishment, namely, individuals subjected to punishment and the society asked to support the institution of punishment. In this discussion, I analyse Husak’s account of the right not to be punished with an eye to showing that the parameters of that right do not extend to the cases that would make it controversial. I also consider two other distinct groups of persons who have equal standing to alleged offenders and society to demand justification for the imposition of state punishment, namely, direct victims of crimes and criminal justice officials.     

Desert,retribution, and corporate criminality

The role of commensurate deserts in the punishment of corporations and their agents has received little attention to date. Those who have written on desert and corporate crime dismiss it on the grounds that retributive rationales, which incorporate notions of desert, are not applicable to corporate offenses and because desert, with its focus on the moral opprobrium attached to criminal conduct, is not fitting for offenses which are regulatory and thus “morally neutral.” This essay argues that although retribution is a viable justification for corporate punishments, it need not be the only or even the primary justification for punishment for desert to be applicable in the distribution of corporate sanctions. It also questions the position of moral neutrality, citing empirical evidence of the public's perceptions of the seriousness of corporate criminal activity.     

The Hurried Justification of Sanctions

In this paper I try to see how the Derridean aporias of the law of the urgency of legal decisions (the law interrupts the input of knowledge in the decision-making process) and the épokhè of the rule (justice can never be done in the present) are revealed in the context of the justification of sanctions. I argue that sanctions can only be justified in a purposive manner in the last instance. They can only be means to an end of punishment which has been opted for, and which can be justified on grounds of principles, or an authoritative calculation of incommensurable entities. I argue against theories, which advocate the internal connection of law and morality, because if such a connection could be established, the aporia of the hurried and unjustified action would obviously disappear. In particular my target is discourse theory as formulated mainly by Robert Alexy with his Sonderfallthese(Special Case Thesis). My objection is that, because of their instrumental nature, sanctions cannot be justified on moral grounds. I also consider some objections that could be raised from Klaus Günther's theory of appropriateness and Habermas' distinction between the moral, ethical and pragmatic employments of practical reason. I am argue that the former, which would become relevant at the stage of application, that is sentencing, does not resolve the justificatory problem of sanctions, and the latter confirms rather than falsifies my claim that punishment can never be said to be just.     

Revisionism and Desert

Revisionists claim that the retributive intuitions informing our responsibility-attributing practices are unwarranted under determinism, not only because they are false, but because if we are all “victims of causal luck”, it is unfair to treat one another as if we are deserving of moral and legal sanctions. One (moderate) revisionist strategy recommends a deflationary concept of moral responsibility, and that we justify punishment in consequentialist rather than retributive terms. Another (strong) revisionist strategy recommends that we eliminate all concepts of guilt, blame and punishment, and treat dangerous criminals as we treat people with contagious diseases. I argue against both strong and moderate revisionism that (1) it is not unfair to hold persons desert-entailingly responsible (in a weaker sense of ‘desert’) insofar as they take an interest in being treated as appraisable, and (2) that it is unfair to persons not to treat them as desert-entailingly responsible (in this weaker sense) contrary to their interests in being treated as such. The interest-based argument, I conclude, give us a justification for communicating retributive attitudes, but may still require a weak revision of our retributive practices, in the direction of a communicative theory of punishment.     

The Legitimacy of Judicial Responses to Moral Panic: Perceived vs. Normative Legitimacy

In some instances, the criminal justice system is affected by a moral panic; that is, by an exaggerated social reaction to an assumed threat to moral values. When influenced by moral panic, courts demonize defendants and aggravate punishments. Are such responses legitimate? This article argues that by contrast to legitimate condemnation of criminal conduct, demonizing defendants ought never be legitimate. The legitimacy of aggravating punishment requires distinguishing between the sociological concept of legitimacy (“perceived legitimacy”) and the moral concept (“normative legitimacy”). Aggravation of punishment in response to moral panic might be perceived as legitimate since it expresses public perceptions about the severity of the threat to a social value, even when these perceptions are exaggerated; however, punishments that are proportionate to such a perceived, exaggerated, threat to a social value are unjust and unfair, and therefore are normatively illegitimate. When the panic subsides, courts tend to return to lower levels of punishment. The subsidence of the panic enables one to realize that a gap between perceived and normative legitimacy has been created during the panic. Should and can the gap be bridged retroactively in order to gain full legitimacy? One way to bridge the gap is to grant clemency that will reduce the punishment of defendants whose sentences were exaggerated unduly during the panic. The article proposes a more radical mechanism that allows for sentence re-evaluation in cases of moral panic.     

Neurobiology of excess self-defense use. Case report with summary of neuroscientific principles

"Excess of self-defence", from the forensic-psychiatric point of view, is a hybrid between a crime of passion and a spontaneous retaliation. The Criminal Code puts under threat of penalty exceeding actions of self-defence, but it grants exemption from punishment to a person exceeding the limits in an excusable state of excitement. Going out from a case report, the author elucidates the problem of determining the degree of diminished responsibility. In order to do so, he points out the alternative pathways of affect-driven information-processing in the human central nervous system according to today's neuroscientific state of knowledge.     

20世纪罚金刑的兴盛机理与制度化发展趋势

20世纪以来,随着商品经济日益发达,刑法理念和财产刑发生了巨大的变化,以报复与威慑为特征的古代刑罚因其残酷与野蛮的特质已为现代社会所抛弃,刑罚的轻缓化改革和罚金刑地位的逐步提升成为刑罚历史发展的必然路径.回顾20世纪其理念与制度的变革轨迹,探寻其发展趋势,能够为我国罚金制度的建全与完善提供必要的理论启示.     

Punishment,Liberalism, and Public Reason

The article argues for a conception of the justification of punishment that is compatible with a modern, politically liberal regime. Section I deals with what some have thought are the obvious social interests society has in punishing criminals, and tries to develop those possible interests somewhat sympathetically. Section II suggests that many of those reasons are not good ones if punishment is regarded (as it should be) from the perspective of political philosophy. Social responses to bad things happening to people cannot be grounded in controversial metaphysical views about what is good for people or what people deserve, but many reasons proffered for punishment are in fact grounded in such views. This constraint, accordingly, limits what individuals can expect in terms of a societal response to crime. Section III develops the appropriate reasons for punishment in a modern, liberal regime. Here the article relies on a—largely undefended—conception of public reason as the most plausible theory of what reasons for punishment are available to liberals. Section IV offers some closing thoughts on why people might adopt a politically liberal view about punishment as their own, personal view about how they should relate to others.     

Can punishment morally educate?

Over the past ten years or so, there has been a renewed interest in the moral education theory of punishment. The attractions of the theory are numerous, not least of which is that it offers hopes for a breakthrough in the apparently intractable debate between deterrence theorists and retributivists. Nevertheless, I believe there are severe problems with recent formulations of the theory. First, contemporary educationists all place great emphasis on autonomy, yet fail to show how continued respect for autonomy is compatible with achievement of their stated punitive goals. Second, educationists have, and possibly must, take incarceration as the best available punitive sanction. Yet it is unclear how morally educative such a punishment will be. Third, contemporary educationists view punishment as a benefit to be conferred on an offender. But educationists have not succeeded in arguing that society is obligated to confer such benefits, nor have they adequately defended the Platonic moral psychology necessary to show that moral education is always a benefit to justly punished offenders. Fourth, contemporary educationists are hopeful that an indeterminate sentencing policy can be avoided, but I argue that such a policy is an ineliminable component of an educationist justification of punishment. Finally, I raise some doubts about the scope that educationist goals ought to have in any comprehensive theory of punishment.