论裁判文书说理的积极修辞及其限度

裁判文书中运用积极修辞技术进行说理以此达致说服听众的效果,目的在于得出更为合理和更具可接受性的判决。我国裁判文书说理以消极修辞为主,但并不排除积极修辞的运用,司法裁判的情理要求使积极修辞成为必要。最高人民法院指导性案例中对积极修辞技术的运用较少;而地方法院裁判文书中对积极修辞的运用进行了大胆尝试。我国可以根据自身的实际情况,借鉴英美法系法官裁判说理的有益方面,注重语言技术知识与司法实践活动相结合,从而增强裁判文书的说理性;同时鼓励法官在说理时引述指导性案例,将法学理论与司法实践紧密结合,促进法官修辞说理的常态化,从而提高判决的可接受性。虽然运用积极修辞技术可以增强裁判文书的情感论证,保持司法领域与社会公众的有效沟通,但是需要给裁判文书说理中的积极修辞设定合理性界限,即逻辑的形式理性限度和可接受的价值理性限度,以防过度修辞或者滥用修辞导致负面影响。     

融贯论的可能性与限度——作为追求法官论证合理性的适当态度和方法

法律领域一般有三种融贯论：法律论证中的融贯论、法律体系内的融贯论、法律融贯主义。结合此三种理论可以很好地分析法官审判实践中的论证标准。融贯论的运用必须区分叙述性融贯和规范性融贯。叙述性融贯保持认识论的基本原则，规范性融贯则是与法官的实践理性相关。叙述性融贯中基础融贯论为法官认定事实提供了形式标准；而在规范性融贯中，解释的融贯论揭示了法官的基本立场以及价值取向，它不是庸俗化的实用主义，而是一种有效地实现关于法律命题完整集合的方法。在这两个层面上，法官的论证可以趋向认识上的合理性以及价值判断上的合理性。     

法官在刑事司法解释体制中的应然地位

确定法官在刑事司法解释体制中的应然地位,是一个事关中国司法现代化的重大问题.本文在论证法官在刑事司法解释体制中的应然地位之合理性的基础上,结合中国国情和司法解释的法学理论,构建了具有相对合理性的刑事司法解释权配置模式,以期通过该模式实现法官在刑法司法解释体制中的"应然地位".     

司法修辞方法在社会正义实现中的作用

人们关于社会正义的认识是多元的,这要求居间作出的司法判决应当经得起理性论证的检验,以防范法官选择正义立场时的任意。经得起理性检验的判决又必须借助修辞方法的使用,才能使其为判决不利方接受。在社会正义的司法实现过程中,修辞具有重要的方法论作用,但它必须在法律论证框架下使用,才符合其秉承善意而加以应用的本质。     

司法调解中的法官修辞及其对司法公信力的影响简

在当前社会矛盾凸显时期,司法调解在纠纷解决机制中占有越来越重要的地位。作为言辞说服艺术的调解,离不开修辞技巧的使用。法官在司法调解中合理使用各种修辞方法,既能够有效说服当事人顺利接受调解结果,又能够有效执行法院的社会治理功能,有助于司法公信力的提高。但法官掌握调解和修辞技巧的能力,只是影响纠纷能否有效解决的一方面因素,更重要的影响因素是法官运用修辞调解纠纷的主观姿态。当务之急是加强法官职业道德教育,提升法官人格,确保每个法官都能秉承善意运用修辞调解纠纷,才能真正有助干司法公信力的提高。     

司法调解中的法官修辞及其对司法公信力的影响

在当前社会矛盾凸显时期,司法调解在纠纷解决机制中占有越来越重要的地位。作为言辞说服艺术的调解,离不开修辞技巧的使用。法官在司法调解中合理使用各种修辞方法,既能够有效说服当事人顺利接受调解结果,又能够有效执行法院的社会治理功能,有助于司法公信力的提高。但法官掌握调解和修辞技巧的能力,只是影响纠纷能否有效解决的一方面因素,更重要的影响因素是法官运用修辞调解纠纷的主观姿态。当务之急是加强法官职业道德教育,提升法官人格,确保每个法官都能秉承善意运用修辞调解纠纷,才能真正有助于司法公信力的提高。     

刑法解释中的合理性诉求

从真实性标准转向合理性标准是现代理论范式转型的体现。合理性诉求是刑法解释学中的根本性论题,它是基于对正义的向往,根据真实的事实和材料做出的符合刑法规范的目的的法律论证,并且它大体上可以为当前社会所接受。在合理性诉求的实践中,必须根据法官、起诉者、被告人之间的三角关系,建立一种对话式的论证模式,谋求事实共识,达成规范目的的合意。     

调解中的法官修辞

从修辞学的角度来说,司法案件当事人争议的问题充满了或然性,这种或然性的存在为修辞提供了发挥作用的空间。从这一意义上来说,司法调解的过程就是法官运用修辞方法说服当事人的过程。站在修辞主体的立场上,说服的有效性依赖于法官的个体性因素、法官对作为修辞出发点的共识的选择以及采用的修辞方法是否恰当,这些为修辞提供了技术性支持,也是提高修辞效果的途径和契机。法官修辞的运用可以提升司法过程的民主性,帮助法官更好地解决纠纷,但也可能削弱司法权威。法官修辞只是帮助法官适用法律的一种有效形式,不能替代法律成为影响司法过程的核心要素。     

“凶宅”类案件中的法律论证评析

不同的法官对"凶宅"案件的认识意义不同,以致在实务判决中出现了支持"凶宅"诉求与不支持"凶宅"诉求的两种相反判决方向。从方法论上去检讨发现,法教学义的论证思路虽然能实现合法性证立,但其判决结果与社会期待的正义相背;以诚实信用原则为基础的论证思路是可取的论证进路,实现了规范正义与社会正义的统一,但增加了法官的合理性论证负担。通过后果主义检校发现,法教义学方法在解决此类案件中不符合理性目的,从而确立了诚实信用论证路径在此类案件中的排他性地位。     

审判实践中法官的论证技艺

法官面对具体的案件必须作出裁决,其裁决具体体现在法官给出的裁决书、裁定书、决定书、调解书、通知书等司法文书之中(为了简便起见,往后我们将这类司法文书约定为"法官文书")。无论在英美法系还是大陆法系中,每一份法官文书中都包含着一个法律论证(同样为了简便,我们往后将这种论证称为"法官论证")。其裁决结果就是法律论证的结论,其裁决的法律依据便是法律论证的规范前提,     

What There is Left and How It Works: Ancient Rhetoric and the Semiotics of Law

The present paper examines three parts of ancient school rhetoric: the issues, the topics, and the questions of style from the perspective of legal semiotics. It aims (1) to demonstrate the roles these have played and can play in the interpretation of legal discourses; and (2) to summarise what insights have been and can be gained from this classical tradition by contemporary legal research. It is argued that the promise of legal semiotics for rhetorical investigations is that it may help to make sense of the functioning of the system of ancient rhetoric, and contribute to our understanding of how rhetorical tradition works, while the research of ancient rhetoric can explore a range of semiotic devices essential for lawyerly thinking, resulting in the knowledge of a richer framework of interpretation.     

案件事实，还是叙事修辞?——崔英杰案的再认识

作为审判依据的案件事实并非纯然得自证据,而是一种在修辞中完成的故事。证据所能得出是零散的、片段化的事件,事实则是情节化、戏剧化的全景叙事,根据相同的证据和已经获得确认的事件,可以形成不同的事实文本和判决结果。崔英杰案提供了一个细致的实例,展示出解释、挑选等修辞手段在案件审理中形态和作用,以及最终的情节化、戏剧化的案件事实如何得来。更进一步,修辞并非仅仅是语言的装饰或者说服的手段,实际上修辞本身就是事实的建构,而不同的叙事文本背后又隐含着修辞者的立场抗衡。     

试论中国传统司法裁判中的修辞意蕴及其演进

源于司法实践需要的中国古代司法裁判文书,在不同的历史时期展现出了不同的修辞意蕴,自唐代之后,体现在司法裁判文书中的修辞技巧并不仅仅是制判者体现自己文章水平的文体性修辞手法,而且也存在着以强化判词受众接受和自觉服从为目的的说理性修辞。而且自南宋以来,这种说理性的修辞手法更趋丰富,既有论证判决结论合法、合理的修辞技巧,又存在着实现教化与整合伦理规范为目标的修辞手法。     

'An Unfortunate Coincidence': Jews and Jewishness in Twentieth-century English Judicial Discourse

This paper explores the neglected area of representations of Jews and Jewishness in English legal cases. In considering judicial knowledge of ‘the Jew’, I ask three primary questions. First, how do English judges understand and represent ‘the Jew’ and in relation to what material factors do these understandings and representations change? Second, how do English judges construct racial knowledge, what rhetorical technologies are fashioned and deployed? Third, are the effects of contemporary judicial racializations of Jewishness different in substance from earlier ones? The purpose of this paper is to study the encounter between English judges and ‘the Jew’ in the twentieth century, eschewing a reading that centres ‘antisemitism’ or ‘discrimination’ in favour of one that focuses on the complex and contradictory narratives in these judgments and the kinds of work these narratives do.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Law,Fact and Narratives in Ancient Rhetoric: The Case of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">causa Curiana</Emphasis>

The present article examines the role of narratives in rhetoric and jurisprudence, trying to understand the ancient system of ‘issues’ (staseis), an essential part of the rhetorical curriculum in antiquity, with the help of some basic notions of legal semiotics. After a brief reconstruction of the doctrine, I argue that narratives are essential to classical rhetoric, that the basic types of issues correspond to particular stories in and of the trial, and finally that the system of ancient rhetorical theory is capable of giving an account of the narrativisation of the pragmatics of the trial. Then I turn to a cause célèbre of Roman law, the causa Curiana, trying to show that not only the trial itself but also subsequent (ancient and modern) debates concerning the case were shaped by some grand narratives, and that stories about the trial are likely to return to the court, where they may become part of the story of the trial.     

The Effects of Blaming Others for Legislative Inaction on Individual and Collective Evaluations

Legislators commonly blame others for gridlock. We posit that legislators may engage in this type of rhetoric to minimize the individual reputational risks associated with legislative inaction or to boost the relative standing of their party. In a series of six survey experiments, we find that blaming others for inaction undermines voters’ evaluations of individual legislators who engage in this rhetorical strategy. This effect is particularly pronounced among out-partisans and independents. However, blaming rhetoric can also enhance the standing of the blamer’s party relative to the opposing party across all groups (including out-partisans), in large part by undermining the reputations of these other actors. Ultimately, we show that when an individual legislator engages in blaming rhetoric, the immediate net electoral effects are null. This suggests that coordinated efforts by a party to blame opponents may improve the party’s relative standing, while imposing few costs on those engaged in blaming.     

Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord Hoffmann and the Belmarsh Detainees Case

This article examines styles of judicial reasoning under the Human Rights Act. It uses Lord Hoffmann's short speech in the Belmarsh Detainees case as a springboard from which to explore some important developments. The first part of the article examines the way in which some judges are 'turning to the local' by using historical examples as a means of countering powerful lines of argument run by the government in defence of its anti-terrorist policies. Later in the article, I turn to investigate the use of strategic decision-making by judges when applying the HRA. I conclude by asking whether the introduction of the HRA might lead to the development of a strange counterpoint between internationalist and nationalist rhetoric in judicial decision-making.     

从制度修辞视角看法律信仰

法律能否被信仰?这是国内法学界近二十年来持续关注的一个重要理论争点。尽管法律信仰的理论有演化为意识形态的倾向,但法律信仰论自身是一种严谨的理论论述。法律信仰的论述理据,不应仅仅是伯尔曼所强调的法律与宗教在某种意义上的契合性或相似性,而且还在于即便完全不受宗教影响的、世俗化的法律,作为一种价值体系、传统、"事物规定性"的规范表达以及舍此无他的利益获取机制的内在禀赋。法律在实质上是基于价值、事实以及与此相关的利益的博弈结果或博弈的规范表述,是一种制度修辞。人们对一种制度修辞抱持不尽的热忱和追求,恰如人们虔信、又热忱地追求同样是一种修辞预设的上帝一样。所以,从制度修辞视角看法律信仰,饶有兴味——法律、法治本身是信仰的事业。     

Judicial Summation: The Trial Judge's Version of the Facts or the Chimera of Neutrality

This paper analyses some of the rhetorical and linguistic features of two judges' summations to two different juries in a criminal case that was tried twice in the Tasmanian Criminal Court. In the first trial, the jury failed to reach a verdict upon a number of counts in the indictment. In the second trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The purpose of this paper is to cast light upon how the linguistic and rhetorical features observed in the summations lent colour or weight to a particular interpretation of the events tried. The paper argues that the judge's summing up is part of the persuasive process of the criminal trial and that judges do present a version of the facts to the jury, deploying various language strategies to construct and communicate that version. The analysis focuses solely upon the judges' summing up of the evidence and the facts. It does not deal with directions or determinations concerning the law. Three major differences between the summations are considered: their distinct thematic approaches to the factual issues, the disparate levels of assistance they provide to the jury in assessing the evidence and their relative comprehensibility. The different thematic approaches produced disparate choices concerning the evidence -- its selection for consideration and its evaluation. The approach in the first summation resulted in an analysis of the evidence that favoured the accused. In the second summation, the thematic approach facilitated a more critical appraisal of the accused's case and a more favourable assessment of the complainant's version of events. The summations also provide differential levels of assistance and achieve differential levels of comprehensibility. The first summation provides relatively little guidance to the jury in evaluating significant items of evidence. In contrast, the second trial summation gives a more directional appraisal. It also achieves a greater level of clarity in the communication of key ideas than the first summation. Both distinctions are attributed to the discourse structures of the summations and to the second summation's reliance upon such organisational and rhetorical devices as repetition, enumeration and rhetorical questions. They are also attributed in part to the comparative syntactic simplicity of the second summation's sentences. It is the conclusion of this paper that the trial judge's linguistic, discourse construction and rhetorical skills are central to the clarification or obfuscation of the facts and issues in a case. How judges say what they say is significant at two levels of sense construction -- at the level of what Bernard Jackson calls signification and at the level of communication.