An Unbearable Price: War Casualties and Warring Democracies

Israeli society has changed its attitude to the sacrifice of life in war, a change that is reflected in the bereavement discourse. Attitudes have shifted from the unquestioned justification of military losses prior to the First Lebanon War (1982) to the emergence of an antiwar bereavement discourse after the war and during the South Lebanon war of attrition that followed it. More recently, following the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Second Lebanon War (2006), a discourse that accepts losses has emerged. While the retreat from the hegemonic discourse prior to the First Lebanon War is explained by the changing attitudes to military sacrifice among the social elites, the latter shift took place in parallel with the alteration of the social composition of the Israeli Defence Force. It is argued that the social composition of the military affects the level of sensitivity to losses. While secular upper-middle class groups tend to show a high level of sensitivity to war losses, which they then translate into a subversive bereavement discourse, religious and peripheral groups with a hawkish agenda are more tolerant of military losses, or, alternatively, may seek to avoid excessive casualties by improving the military’s performance or the quality of the political directives.

The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism

This article examines Israel's attempts to weaken and defeat the Lebanese Hizballah. It reviews Hizballah's rise after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah's successful effort to force Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, the 2006 war, and Israeli attempts to deter Hizballah. The article argues that Israel has largely failed to defeat Hizballah militarily and politically. Israel's experience offers lessons for how terrorist groups learn, the effectiveness of terrorist attrition strategies against casualty-sensitivity states, the difficulties in coercing terrorist groups, and the importance of an information strategy. Finally, Israel's clash with Hizballah indicates the importance of thinking of groups that are large and multi-faceted from a counterinsurgency paradigm.     

Terrorism and Beyond: a 21st Century Perspective

Abstract

This study examines trends in the incidence of international hostage‐barricade terrorism (HBT) since the late 1960s, the concurrent development of elite hostage rescue units (HRUs), and the relative effectiveness of American, Soviet, West European, Israeli, and other Third World responses—using dialogue or force—to HBT actions. Although HRUs have scored some dramatic rescues, three major hostage massacres in Third World countries in 1985–1986 and other bloody HBT incidents in 1988 demonstrated the high cost of using force prematurely and ineptly to resolve HBT crises. Focusing on these and other HRU failures, this study questions the American and Israeli “no‐ransom, no‐negotiation” policies in HBT situations and concludes that a more flexible approach of patiently “talking down” and “wearing down” the hostage‐takers through basic hostage‐negotiation techniques—even if only as a delaying tactic—is vital for maximizing the chances for rescuing hostages safely, whether through dialogue or force. Conversely, if authorities quickly resort to military action, hostages are far more likely to suffer casualties than to be rescued safely.     

Know thy enemy: Hizbullah, ‘terrorism’ and the politics of perception

The labelling career of the Lebanese armed group and political party Hizbullah is an interesting case with which to investigate the epistemological consequences of the politics of naming. Having found itself since its inception in the mid-1980s on the receiving end of mainly US and Israeli policy makers' and analysts' scorn for being an archetypical terrorist organisation, Hizbullah has been surprisingly successful in achieving its stated aims and in enduring the verbal and military onslaught against it. Although it is not the intention here to reduce explanations for Hizbullah's durability to discursive politics, this article suggests that both the labelling of Hizbullah as terrorist and, conversely, its identification as a ‘lebanonised’ political force that is about to make its conversion into an unarmed political party are misleading and incapable of grasping this organisation's complexities. In fact, both ‘terrorist’ and ‘lebanonised’ labels produce a quality of knowledge inferior to that produced by Hizbullah's own conceptualisation of its enemies. But most importantly, the debate on Hizbullah's alleged terrorist nature has obscured several of its traits that many should register before passing judgement on it. Our analysis shows that the variety of institutions Hizbullah has been carefully elaborating and readapting over the past two decades in Lebanon operate today as a holistic and integrated network which produce sets of values and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework—that of the wilayat al-faqih. These meanings are disseminated on a daily basis among Shi'a constituencies through the party's institutionalised networks and serve to mobilise them into ‘the society of the Resistance’ (mujtamaa’ al-muqawama), which is the foundation of the hala al-islamiyya (Islamic sphere) in Lebanon. Accordingly, any prospect of Hizbullah's transformation away from armed ‘resistance’ should be firmly placed in an analysis of its hegemony among the Shi'a of Lebanon and of the tools it uses to acquire and sustain this status.     

Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case

This article examines the degree of efficacy of Israel's antiterror policies and ability to cope with terrorism using seven parameters that fall into seven parameters: reduction in civilian casualties among Israelis and Palestinians, Israel's ability to cope economically, Israeli social cohesion, the status of international and domestic support for the Israeli government and the extent of weakening of international and domestic support for the Palestinian leadership. The article concludes that based on most of these parameters, Israel has been successful in coping with terrorism, although greater security must be attained through a change in Palestinian policies.     

The Benefits of Globalization: Why More for South Korea than Mexico?

ABSTRACT

This article examines the arguments for globalization and analyzes Mexico’s “maquiladora experience,” which indicates that globalization alone does not bring about a higher standard of living. The primary reason that Mexico has not benefitted as much as might be expected from globalization has to do with the poor quality of its governance, referring especially to public administration. This assertion is supported by a comparison of Mexico and South Korea. In explaining South Korea’s greater success, Political Elasticity (PE) theory is introduced, suggesting that political power needs to become elastic in two meanings of this word: a “rubber band” meaning (referring to the ability of leaders to delegate power without losing or diminishing it) and “a balloon meaning” (having to do with the ability of leaders to reliably influence the behavior of the general public). Based upon studies of rural and industrial development, South Korea is shown to be more politically elastic than Mexico. This article concludes by examining the lessons that Mexico can learn from Korea’s experience.     

A Challenging State of Affairs: Public Administration in the Republic of Lebanon

ABSTRACT

This article highlights Lebanon’s administrative challenges and reform efforts, since the end of its Civil War (1975–1990). In recent years, Lebanon and international donors have worked to improve transparency, promote modern management techniques, and encourage the use of information technology throughout the public sector. Despite these efforts, Lebanon’s public institutions remain constrained by the centralization of power, corruption, outdated bureaucratic structures, and deficiencies in administrative knowledge. The success of future reform efforts will depend on whether the Lebanese bureaucracy can overcome the challenges created by regional political tensions, its Syrian refugee crisis, and an increasingly indifferent Lebanese public.     

Federal set-asides policy and minority business contracting: understanding the adarand decision

In Adarand Constructors v. Pena ⁽¹⁾, the Supreme Court ruled that federal affirmative action preference programs must undergo the “strict scrutiny” standard. A program subject to strict scrutiny is one that cannot pass muster under the Constitution's “equal protection” mandate unless there is a “compelling government interest” in its objectives and the program is “narrowly tailored” to meet the objectives. This paper reviews the Adarand decision and discusses the implications of the decision for minority business federal contracting.     

Ethno‐political activity and the psychology of terrorism

Abstract

Studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused either on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for environments in which generalization appears to be feasible. This paper focuses on one such environment. Its principal goal is to highlight the theoretical connections between a society's ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno‐political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning of institutions in “democratic” and “non‐democratic” societies. A related objective is the identification of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno‐political activity and an assessment of their potential efficacy. These points are illustrated by examining a small ethnic group, the South Moluccans in Holland, which would appear to have had little motivation to engage in violence or terrorism, but some of whose members nevertheless did.     

The Timing of Split-Ticket Voting Decisions in Mixed Systems: Evidence from South Korea

Abstract

Although two-vote mixed legislative systems have proliferated globally, the factors contributing to split-ticketing in these cases remains poorly understood. Using survey data regarding South Korea's 2008 National Assembly election, this article addresses two questions: Is ticket-splitting in two-vote legislative systems influenced by the timing of one's vote decision and are late deciders more or less rational in their decision to ticket-split than early deciders? Empirical analysis finds that split-ticket voting under various specifications is more likely to be carried out by late deciders. Among split-ticket voters, however, late deciders are more likely to irrationally split their vote.     

Public contracting,policy preferences and minority business enterprises

About three years ago a Special Issue of the International Journal of Public Administration focused on the topic “Government Set-Asides, Minority Business Development, and Publi Contracting.”^(l) Much of the discussion in the issue addressed race conscious government set-aside programs in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. ⁽²⁾ The decision declared unconstitutional a local government minority business set-aside provision designed to help minority business enterprises (MBEs) obtain government contracts. At the time, the decision was applicable only to state and local governmental jurisdictions.⁽³⁾ Government set-asides involve the practice of providing minority contractors and subcontracting a certain percentage of a public jurisdiction's contract dollars.

In 1995 the Supreme Court in Adarand v. Pena ⁽⁴⁾ extended the Croson ruling to include set-aside programs in federal agencies. This Special Issues examines and discusses the Adarand decision and the developments that have followed. The first article by Mitchell F. Rice, “Federal Set-Asides Policy and Minority Business Contracting: Understanding the Adarand Decision,” reviews the Adarand decision and discusses the implications of the decision for minority business development. The next article by Audrey L. Mathews and Mitchell F. Rice, “Adarand v. Pena: Turning Challenges Into Opportunities,” uses a case study of two public preference programs to suggest how Adarand requirements may be successfully utilized to maintain set-aside preference programs.

The third article by Shelton Rhodes, “Mirmative Action Review ‘Report’ to the Presidents: Implications of Military Affirmative Actions Programs to Current and New Millennium Affirmative Action Programs,” reviews the Affirmative Action Review: Report to the President which was ordered by President Clinton soon after the Adarand decision. Rhodes considers the implications of the possible applicability of the successes of affirmative action and equal opportunity in the military, which is highlighted in the Report, to other public and private organizations. The final article by Wilbur C., Rich, “Presidents and Minority Set-Aside Policy: Race, Gender and Small Opportunities,” analyzes the impact of presidential leadership on minority set-asides policy and shows how politicians use set-asides to facilitate exchanges and cooperation with the business elites.     

From reorganizing to reinventing: sixty years and “we still don’t get it”

Sixty years ago the “Brownlow Committee Report” was written by some of the most prominent members of the emerging field of public administration. Its recommendations had serious consequences for the way both our democratic republic and the field of public administration have evolved. In developing principles in which to anchor the recommendations, Luther Gulick, who was both the intellectual and political force behind the committee, contributed to a confusion of the concepts of organizations and the polity and those of management and governance.

Some of the story of how the concepts promoted by Gulick and the Papers on the Science of Administration led to a misconception, which became public administration's living legacy is told in this article. We then discuss the Brownlow Committee Report as something which changed: our very conception of the Constitution; Gulick's rationale for cooperation with Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Report as a misplacement of organizational concepts upon a polity; the dimensions of constitutional change in the report; and the staying power of Gulick's and the Committee's ideas. In conclusion, we contend that if we are to move beyond Gulick's legacy, that the field must learn and act upon the distinctions between organizations and the polity and management and governance.

“The charge that the Brownlow Committee set in train the development of the “imperial presidency” can be advanced only by those who have not read the Committee's report.”

James Fesler, former staff member of the Brownlow Committee Public Administration Review (July/August, 1987)

“How interesting it is historically that we all assumed in the 1930s that all management, especially public management, flowed in a broad, strong stream of value-filled ethical performance. Were we blind or only naive until Nixon came along? Or were we so eager to ‘take politics out of administration’ that we threw the baby out with the bathwater?”

Luther Gulick, member of the Brownlow Committee From Stephen K. Blurnberg, “Seven Decades of Public Administration: A Tribute to Luther Gulick” Public Administration Review (March/April, 1981)

was as old in American politics as it was popular. Yet, before the end of his second term, Roosevelt, with the help of Charles Merriam, Herbert Brownlow, and Luther Gulick, would use such hoary symbolism towards ends that would fundamentally alter our perceptions of the constitutional order, the nature of the presidency, and public administration. How did this come to pass? Barry Karl says that “He (Roosevelt) had continued as President to look at reorganization through the eyes of those who saw in it a means of saving money, balancing the budget, and thereby giving security to the nation's economy.” But Karl adds, “By 1936, this viewpoint had undergone drastic revision.”⁽⁶⁾ The revision in his thinking replaced “saving money” with “managerial control” as the principal aim of reorganization. “Managerial control” by the president would enable him not only to manage New Deal programs but protect them against potential Republican counterattacks, i.e., in short, to strengthen his hand as president.

The impetus for this change apparently came directly from the President's experiences in seeking to administer the government's burgeoning and increasingly chaotic Executive Branch. Roosevelt was a skilled, intuitive, and flexible administrator. But, according to Karl, his experience in seeking to administer the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act with a loose arrangement, quickly dubbed “the five ring circus,” taught the President several lessons. First, “it demonstrated the growing dependence of the President on official staff, other than cabinet members, working exceedingly close to the President's own sphere of daily operation. “⁽⁷⁾ Second, the problems of administering the Act raised questions among the participants themselves as to whether or not the President could “administer and control so complex an operation as federal relief given the inadequate machinery in his possession.”⁽⁸⁾ In other words, the effort was not simply a “five ring circus” because of FDR's famed flexible and informal style, but also because of the inadequacy of the available structures. Karl notes that “despite the problems inherent in the fiscal machinery as it stood, a continued development of governments within governments could only lead to a dangerous chaos over which the President would have no control whatsoever.”⁽⁹⁾ The questions raised suggested to the President that perhaps there was some merit to the position of those urging that emergency agencies be absorbed into the existing framework. This could meet a very practical question by “placing agencies within the purview of budget and accounting procedures already in existence.”⁽¹⁰⁾

According to Gulick, FDR told Brownlow and him at a November 14, 1936, meeting “that, since the election, he had received a great many suggestions that he move for a constitutional convention for the United States” and observed that “with Coughlin and other crackpots about there was no way of keeping such an affair from getting out of hand. But,” he said, “there is more than one way of killing a cat, just as in this job I assigned you.”⁽¹¹⁾ Gulick also quotes FDR as specifically telling the Committee, “We have got to get over the notion that the purpose of reorganization is economy. . . . The reason for reorganization is good management.”⁽¹²⁾ Of course FDR meant management as in “presidential management.”

So it was that President Roosevelt by 1936 was prepared to do something quite beyond “abolishing useless offices” in the words of his 1932 speech--something significantly more constitutional in nature. His other aim was no doubt to strengthen his hand significantly to protect the New Deal programs from Republican counterattack. But whatever his aim, the practical effect was to treat the executive branch as a hierarchical organization headed by a chief executive of corporate or city management conception. In so doing, the delicate constitutional balance among branches was altered. Recommending the reorganization of the executive branch as they did inevitably led to reorganization of the larger whole, the government, which was not an organization, but something qualitatively different.⁽¹³⁾     

United nations resolutions against international terrorism

Abstract

Nine years after the Munich Massacre of 11 Israeli athletes and after a request by the Secretary‐General for the General Assembly to act on the problem, the General Assembly reached a general consensus on a terrorism resolution. The resolution endorses a UN committee's recommendations to refrain from assisting terrorism in any way and to cooperate in the final elimination of terrorism. Negotiation of the resolution was difficult because third world countries did not want to weaken opposition to “colonial, racist, and alien regimes,” and they have held back from approving an international convention that would require trying or extraditing those accused of terrorist crimes. Problems of constitutional protection to individuals in democracies and of political asylum also stand in the way of an overall convention. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolution has been useful in promoting cooperation among states to eliminate terrorism and in encouraging support for conventions against specific types of terrorism such as hijacking, taking of hostages, attacking diplomatic targets, and supporting nuclear terrorism.     

Portrait of a Leader? George Bernard Shaw's Saint Joan

Abstract

Characteristics of leadership, as they are discovered—or created—in scholarly research on the subject, will sometimes turn upon themselves. That is, positive qualities lead somewhat readily to negative qualities. An arena in which one might find this illustrated, surprisingly perhaps, is that of dramatic literature.

Looked at one way, this is not so surprising, as drama depends upon conflict, and conflict is inevitable when any leader's positive qualities take that negative turn. This essay chooses to pursue these ideas by looking at the treatment of one of history's most controversial “leaders,” Joan of Arc, by one of literature's most controversy-loving playwrights, George Bernard Shaw. Toward that end, the essay will put together a composite of the most widely acknowledged characteristics of a “leader,” then investigate the ways in which Shaw attributes those characteristics—and their negative corollaries—to his compelling and tragic portrait of Saint Joan.     

Exploring “North” and “South” in post-Soviet Bishkek: discourses and perceptions of rural-urban migration

In this paper we explore, through the narratives and perspectives of “old residents” in post-Soviet Bishkek, the dominant discourse which has emerged towards rural migrants arriving to the city from other areas of Kyrgyzstan from the late Soviet period onwards. We investigate the existence of a primarily “antagonistic” discourse in relation to the migrants and analyze this in detail to understand how it illuminates wider concerns amongst residents about what is occurring in their city, and about wider processes of social change in Kyrgyzstan. The paper provides a revealing insight into the processes of urban change in post-Soviet Central Asia, and demonstrates the ways in which confrontation with the everyday harsh realities of post-Soviet transformation can lead to the negative “othering” of one group of urban residents by another. We also demonstrate how the “old residents'” perceptions of migrants reveal important insights into emerging notions and constructions of identity in the post-Soviet period, related in this case to understandings of “North” and “South'1 The terms “North” and “South” are used here to denote the “North” and “South” of Kyrgyzstan. Talas, Naryn, Issyk-Kul' and Chuy regions (where the regional and national capital Bishkek is located) are usually taken as “North”, whereas Osh, Batken and Dzhalal-Abad regions are taken as “South.” View all notes and related concepts of what is “urban” and what is “Kyrgyz”.     

THE THIRD SECTOR AND IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION: LESSONS FROM THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE

This paper deals with the role of two third sector organizations in immigrant absorption in Israel during the mid-1980s through 1993. The Jewish Agency, a non-governmental, voluntary, non-profit “public institution” funded by Diaspora Jewry had responsibility for immigrants during their first year in the country. It represented world Jewry and Israeli political parties. A second third sector institution, the quasi-public party controlled state religious school system played a significant role in the education of Ethiopian immigrant children.

The paper evaluates their impact on the absorption of immigrants. To what extent did these third sector agencies pursue their own agendas and or serve the immigrants? The paper also examines the influence of Israel's political-administrative systems on the third sector. How unique is the Israeli experience? Hopefully the findings will shed new light on the politics of collaboration with the third sector in contemporary Israel.

Evidence presented here suggests that third sector absorbing agencies often pursued their own interests at the expense of the immigrants. The paper also reveals the complexity of the political and administrative character of Israel's third sector. Finally, the analysis shows the importance of political-administrative systems for understanding third sector collaboration in Israel.     

A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence,WMDs, and “Virtual Jihad”)

Intelligence estimates based on models keyed to frequency and recency of past occurrences make people less secure even if they predict most harmful events. The U.S. presidential commission on WMDs, the 9/11 commission, and Spain's comisión 11-M have condemned the status quo mentality of the intelligence community, which they see as being preoccupied with today's “current operations” and tactical requirements, and inattentive to tomorrow's far-ranging problems and strategic solutions. But the overriding emphasis in these commissions' recommendations is on further vertically integrating intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Such proposals to further centralize intelligence and unify command and control are not promising given recent transformations in Jihadist networks to a somewhat “leaderless resistance” in the wake of Al Qaeda's operational demise. To defeat terrorist networks requires grasping novel relations between an englobing messianic moral framework, the rootless intellectual and physical mobility of immigrant and diaspora communities, and the overarching conceptual, emotional, and logistical affordances of the Internet. Britain's WWII experience provides salutary lessons for thinking creatively with decentralized expertise and partially autonomous approaches.     

“I Teach Them Correct Principles and They Govern Themselves”: The Leadership Genius of the Mormon Prophet Abstract

Abstract

In an age characterized by “strong-man” or “leader-centered” leadership styles, Joseph Smith, the Mormon Prophet, set himself apart by leadership behaviors that centered in the conviction that the world of human interaction is governed by interpersonal and moral laws in just the same sense that the physical world is governed by the laws of nature. If one could identify these correct or “fixed principles,” and live in harmony with them, one would thereby gain leadership power and influence. From this belief grew his leadership dictum, “I teach them correct principles, and they govern themselves.” Specifically, we note Smith's emphasis on integrity as a foundation for leadership interaction, both in truth-telling and in living in harmony with the correct principles one knows. In addition, Smith underscored the importance of unleashing the creative talent of followers by trusting them with sizeable responsibilities (empowerment, in today's terms), in demonstrating love for followers, and in having the courage to think and act independently of mainstream thought and practice. His chief concerns in selecting a leadership team included his focus on character, building an organizational structure which would institutionalize over time the principles he taught, and then motivating followers in pursuit of challenging goals.     

The leadership environment of public sector executives

Olshfski uses critical incident methodology to describe the leadership environment of state cabinet officials. The rich data set offers insight into how state executives (1) learn about their jobs, (2) exercise discretion to determine their policy agenda, and (3) operate in the political environment of state administration. She concludes by pointing out discrepancies in our understanding of leadership and offers suggestions for leadership, research, and teaching.

Somerset Maugham is said to have begun all his lectures by saying there are only three things that one must know in order to be a good writer: the only problem being that no one knows what those three things are. The same might be said of leadership research. For example, Stogdill's survey of leadership research contains over 3,000 references and Bass's revision documents over 5,000 references.⁽¹⁾ The preface to Stogdill's survey assesses the status of leadership research: “four decades of research on leadership have produced a bewildering mass of findings…. The endless accumulation of empirical data has not produced an integrated understanding of leadership. “⁽²⁾ A more pithy evaluation is offered by Bennis and Nanus, “never have so many labored so long to say so little.”⁽³⁾ Yet, most people still vigorously believe in the importance of the leader and leadership research.⁽⁴⁾

Recognizing the confusion in the field of leadership research, this study attempts to describe the context within which public executives operate. It is assumed that the executive's operating environment determines the extent to which leadership is possible. Critical incident methodology is used to illustrate how public sector executives conceptualize their environment and how they operate based on that conceptualization. This research is driven by two questions: What is the leadership environment of the state cabinet executive? Secondly, how does the leadership literature facilitate the understanding and interpretation of executive leadership in the public sector?