The Butterfly Effect and the Making of 'Ping-Pong Diplomacy'

With the aid of the 'butterfly effect' theory, this article investigates the role of ordinary individuals, both Chinese and American, in the formulation, implementation and promotion of 'Ping Pong Diplomacy', which brought about the US‐China rapprochement in the early 1970s. Through examining the twists and turns in the process of 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' making, this study intends to bring one's attention to a number of seemingly less significant historical episodes and their long-term impact on US‐China relations. Like small butterflies whose spontaneous actions can generate unexpected climatic changes, the various individuals in this study, including players and officials of the table-tennis teams, low-ranking diplomats and journalists, played an indispensable part in bringing forth a dramatic transformation in US‐China relations, which in turn altered the Cold War climate in general.     

Chinese Perceptions of US Return to Southeast Asia and the Prospect of China's Peaceful Rise

This article systematically examines the perceptual dimension of US–China–ASEAN relations. It specifically focuses on Chinese perceptions of American intentions in Southeast Asia, Chinese perceptions of the impact on China of the US's return to Southeast Asia, and suggestions of the Chinese scholarly community as to how China should respond to the US's return. Chinese scholars believe that the US returns to Southeast Asia for a variety of reasons and one of the most important is to manage the rise of China, and that the US's return has both positive and negative impacts on China's interests and the negative impact outweighs the positive. Overall, Chinese perceptions of the US return, especially Chinese scholars’ suggested response, indicate that Chinese scholars have internalized the strategy of peaceful rise which would give us added confidence that China is seriously committed to this strategy. If both the US and China stick to their relevant commitments, the rise of China, unlike that of most great powers in the past, would quite likely be peaceful.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China‐United States Relations: A Chinese perspective

At the early stage of the post-Cold War era, Chinese scholars put more attention into the study of US international standing than to the study of US global strategy. Around the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious for Chinese scholars that the power structure in the post-Cold War era was 'yi-chao-duo-qiang' (one super-power and several big powers). People realized that the leading position of the US would be unshakable and its comprehensive national power would be unparalleled by any single country in the foreseeable future. Since then, Chinese scholars have paid more attention to the study of US global strategy. Chinese scholars tend to agree that the Bush Administration's strategy was a transitional one, and that the US global strategy in the post-Cold War era came into being in the middle of President Clinton's first term. It is symbolized by the appearance of so-called 'engagement and enlargement strategy'. At the very beginning of his Administration (January 1993), President Clinton set forth that 'economy, security and democracy' would be the three pillars of US foreign policy. This greatly changed the traditional 'security first' strategy. The new strategy reflects some new features in the international and domestic contexts of the post-Cold War era. It has very important influences on Sino‐US relations.     

Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese perceptions of the engagement policy debate in the United States

This paper argues that now, more than at any other time, the way that China‐US relations evolve will shape each country's interests and affect the development of global politics. Thus, at this critical point, it is important that the two countries develop a mutually beneficial relationship. In this respect Chinese views of US intentions matter because these views translate into policies; policies that influence US domestic politics and shape relations between the two countries. It is ironic, then, that while Chinese understanding of US domestic politics has never been better and its response to it has never been more sophisticated, the criticisms of China in the US have never been stronger than at any time since rapprochement in the early 1970s. And, pointing specifically to the debate in the US since 1994 over the Clinton Administration's engagement policy, Jia analyzes this as a key source of current Chinese frustrations.     

Impact of the US Credit Crunch and Housing Market Crisis on China

Similarities between the US, the UK and the Chinese housing markets, including the movements of interest rates and house prices, and the exposure of some Chinese banks to the US mortgage securitization market, have triggered concern about whether China could experience a US-style credit and housing market crisis. Significant differences between China and Western economies make that unlikely in the near future. China's booming house market has been supported by fast economic growth, rapid urbanization and high domestic savings. Chinese banks have also been less exposed to mortgage defaults than their Western counterparts. However, the relative underdevelopment of the financial system—credit monitoring and asset securitization—may expose China to domestic mortgage lending-related crises.     

External Contradictions of the Chinese Development Model: export-led growth and the dangers of global economic contraction

China's development model faces an external constraint that could cause an economic hard landing. China has become a global manufacturing powerhouse, and its size now renders its export-led growth strategy unsustainable. China relies on the US market, but the scale of its exports is contributing to the massive US trade deficit, creating financial fragility and undermining the US manufacturing sector. These developments could stall the US economy's expansion, in turn triggering a global recession that will embrace China. This is the external constraint. These considerations suggest that China should transition from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth. This requires growing the economy's demand side as well as its supply-side. To avoid stalling the US economic expansion, which is critical to China's growth, China should significantly revalue its currency as part of a generalized East Asian upward currency revaluation. Longer term, China should raise wages and improve income distribution. Under export-led growth, higher wages undermine employment. Under domestic demand-led growth, they support it. The challenge is to raise wages in an efficient decentralized manner. History shows that this requires independent democratic trade unions. However, such unions are currently unacceptable to the Chinese political leadership. Creating a domestic demand-led growth regime therefore requires solving this political roadblock.     

Discussion of 'International Political Economy from a Chinese Angle'

According to Zhu Wenli, Chinese scholars of political economy have been examining many of the same issues as their American counterparts, but have reached quite different conclusions. Chinese scholars accept the importance of globalization, but do not believe that globalization is making the nation-state less relevant or international regimes more powerful. They concede that economic and other transnational issues are becoming increasingly salient in international affairs, but conclude that they are simply altering the ways in which nations compete for power rather than making the international system more cooperative. They agree that much of today's world order is rooted in American hegemony, but do not consider that US foreign policy can be characterized as 'benign'. These conclusions have troubling implications for US‐China relations. They suggest that China will not agree to be integrated into an international community led by the United States, and that the relationship between Beijing and Washington is more likely to be competitive than cooperative.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

Discussion of 'China: A responsible great power'

Professor Xia seeks to answer the question of whether or not China will become a 'responsible great power' in the twenty-first century by examining the domestic and foreign factors which will influence that outcome in the decades ahead. Some of the most interesting and useful insights of his work come as much from what the paper does not say as from what it does say. While it does not expressly say so, this paper amply demonstrates two important points about what appears to be an idealistic Chinese worldview. First, we see how the Chinese worldview is 'conflicted' and uncertain. Second, we see how China's current and future situation are said to be determined by what others do to China. Four important policy-related ramifications result from the worldview described in Xia Liping's paper. First, the more Chinese foreign policy promotes a worldview packaged largely in ideals, the more outsiders will suspect that Chinese leaders are trying to hide their actual intentions. Second, it should be recognized that in many ways the views espoused in the paper fundamentally call into question certain principles which others view as critical to their national security (the stabilizing nature of alliances, for example). Third, the worldviews described by Xia Liping portray a largely inward-looking, self-absorbed, vulnerable and aggrieved power that may be prone to 'irresponsibility'. The paper implies that under such circumstances, it is up to the outside world to prevent China from acting on its sense of injured vulnerability. Finally, such an approach to the world may leave the impression that Chinese views are out of touch or unable to operate effectively within the current global structure. Such an impression might lead others to dismiss or discount Chinese points of view as simplistic at best or consciously obstructionist at worst. Either way limits Chinese aspirations to become a 'responsible great power'. In the end, a nuanced and realistic set of understandings about the world, which articulates not only the country's ideals, but acknowledges its contradictions, interests, contributions, and its regional and international impact, would more pragmatically support China's ascendance to responsible great power status.     

Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics

As an atmosphere conducive for scientific inquiry and research improves in China, many Chinese scholars are optimistic about the future development of International Relations (IR) studies. A younger generation of IR scholars has started to pay more attention to IR theory and begun to research issues like national sovereignty and China's national interests. This paper reviews the development of IR theory in China and the basic arguments among Chinese scholars on theory building, especially concerning the attempt to build an IR theory with 'Chinese characteristics'. It examines the reasons for the continuing challenges, amid progress, of IR theory in China and looks into the prospects in the near future.     

Images of China in the American Print Media: A survey from 2000 to 2002

American society's images and perceptions of China have had several recurring themes over the years. In the past, some of these have included the perception of China as a potential market for American goods and as a potential supply of converts for American missionaries. These images changed during the years of diplomatic isolation of the Cold War, turning the Chinese into a vast horde of 'reds', a faceless, invincible mass that threatened all of Asia. In the post-Cold War world, Sino-US relations face an uncertain future. The time is not far off when there will again be two superpowers, and there is the potential for conflict between them. In this new era, it is interesting to examine what images of China have emerged in contemporary American society. The goal of this paper is to do just that. By examining articles about China in four major American daily newspapers, over a three-year period, a rough sketch emerges of how China is perceived to the 'average' reader of these four publications. These images, while interesting in their own right, also provide a valuable benchmark for the direction of Sino-US relations. Overall, it seems that, just as in past periods of rivalry, negative images of China overwhelm the positive. But, before we can conclude that the current relationship is also one of competition, there are also some significant images of a country whose future lies entwined with the US in a partnership, not a battle. If we can take the articles of this study as a representative slice of American society at large, the general trend seems to be one in which, although China is sometimes viewed in a harsh and critical light, there is still hope for the two countries to come together--or even for China to become more like the United States.     

Nationalistic feelings and sports: The incident of the overseas Chinese protest against NBC's coverage of the centennial Olympic games

In NBC's coverage of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games Opening Ceremony, Bob Costas’ remarks about Team China invited furious and persistent protests from the overseas Chinese. The protests, which were chiefly based on situational ethics, garnered an extensive grassroots support and continued for weeks after the Atlanta Olympics had finished. Under pressure from the protestors, NBC made a public apology. In response to the protests and NBC's apology, the US media expressed strong discontent. The arguments were basically supported by political correctness. Thus, situational ethics collided with political correctness. Although the protest against NBC appeared to be an accidental incident, a careful review of the incident and the opinions voiced by both sides reveals that the anger of the overseas Chinese with NBC, which justified itself in a number of ways, bears a variety of social and political implications, and that the US media's position has also been justified by the norms that have been formed over the past few years and accepted by the media and the majority of the American public alike. An explanation for the causes of the protest incident begs an in‐depth analysis of broad social and political factors.     

The impact and clash of ideologies: Sino‐US relations from a historical perspective

Sino‐US relations over the last 100 years have been heavily affected by the ideological and cultural traditions of both sides; but the impact of ideas on each other has by no means been an even interaction. At the turn of the century when China and the US encountered each other, their destinies took opposite trajectories. While the US saw its dream of national greatness fulfilled with the continuous rise of its national power, China witnessed the sharp downfall from the peak of its self‐perception as the great central kingdom. Ever since then, all progressive intellectuals and reformers took inspiration from western ideas of democracy and freedom, while struggling at the same time against oppression and exploitation by western powers. These two aspects constitute the basic aspirations of the Chinese nation as a whole, which was summed up as ‘anti‐feudalism and anti‐imperialism’. One of the basic urges of Americans of all sorts in dealing with China throughout the years was to influence, educate and change China to its like. However, in front of Chinese revolutionary movments with democratic rights as part of their aims, the US government policies more than often favored the conservative or reactionary rulers. Meanwhile, the development of China takes its own course beyond the control of the US. Yet, under different circumstances, neither side could help placing hopes on the other. As for rulers of different Chinese adminstrations, they wavered between seeking American support in China's economic development and diplomacy on the one hand, and fear and resentment of American cultural influence on the other. Anti‐communism entered the US foreign policy thinking ever since the Russian Revolution. But US relations with the Chinese Communist Party have not been hostile all the way through but have undergone twists and turns. The period of best relationship between the US and the PRC took place in the 1980s and underwent a sharp turn after the events of 1989. Leaving aside other factors, the age‐long cultural paradigm of unrealistic hopes on each other, hence drastic disappointment, played a certain role. At present, The mentality of the bulk of Chinese including young students have also undergone a great change from the pre‐1989 period. The admiration for the US has receded and a certain degree of resentment of American pressure on China is on the rise. The pursuit of a strong and prosperous China remains the common and deep‐rooted national aspiration prevailing among Chinese of all ages and social strata and in this they identify themselves more with the government vs. foreign pressure, whatever their views on other subjects. The ideological aspect of difficulties in Sino‐US relations is not likely to go away in the foreseeable future and much wisdom is needed to handle it properly.     

Can She Say No to Zhang Ailing? Detail,idealism and woman in Wang Anyi's fiction

This article is a study of aesthetic idealism that characterizes the fictional works written by the contemporary Chinese writer Wang Anyi during the 1990s. I start with a comparison of Wang Anyi with Zhang Ailing, arguing that Wang's ambivalence towards Zhang's aesthetics of details is translated into a dilemma the former faces in her own writing. On the one hand, Wang Anyi appreciates Zhang's passion for life's details. Wang's own works show a high penchant for details. On the other hand, Wang is critical of Zhang's aesthetic leap from the sensuous (detail) to the nihilistic (meaning). Wang's anxiety over the ultimate value of detail can be attributed to her ideological allegiance to a May Fourth leftist tradition as well as to her awareness of the derogatory association of detail with women's writing in China. So in what way can Wang Anyi say no to Zhang Ailing? How does she try to steer clear of the danger of ‘materialistic’ trivialization that she sees lurking in details? I observe that in Wang's fiction there is neither a full embrace of idealism nor a total rejection of detailed realism à la Zhang Ailing. Instead, Wang Anyi treasures the use of details as a signifying practice to embrace her idealism.

In her 1990s' fictional works, Wang Anyi's effort to circumvent the dichotomy between detail and idea is complicated by her attempt to use details to reconstruct pictures of the past. There are several aspects to this issue. First, although nostalgic details in Wang Anyi's ‘memory stories’ help to give expression to idealistic longings of the author, they also tend to conspire with the official ban on the discourse of the traumatic socialist past. Second, while details are regarded as important in sum total, they are actually relegated by the writer to a secondary place as mere constructing materials to serve the function of bringing out the larger idea. In terms of actual narration, the highly ‘authoritative’ voice often suppresses the depth of individual subjects in her fiction. Third, Wang's ambiguity with regards to details and ‘feminine materials’ affects her characterization of women. A reading of Wang's two fictional works, The Song of Everlasting Sorrow (Changhen ge) and Fu Ping (Fu Ping), demonstrates that the writer's instrumental approach tends to render female characters stranded between allegorical figures and individual subjects.     

'Focus' ( Jiaodian Fangtan ) and the Changes in the Chinese Television Industry

As China changes, so the Chinese television industry changes. Once exclusively supported and supervised by the Communist government, Chinese television channels have been granted increased autonomy in the past two decades as China has pursued a policy of economic liberalization. This paper will outline the significant structural changes in the Chinese television industry over the past several years, particularly at China Central Television (CCTV). It will focus on the phenomenon of a highly popular program, 'Focus', (jiao dian fang tan) as a case study to analyse the impact of changing television programs on Chinese politics and society.     

An Emerging Consensus on the US Threat: the United States according to PLA officers

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.     

The Hong Kong Policy of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1997

China's policy toward Hong Kong in the period 1949-1997 was primarily driven by utilitarian calculations of national interests and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hong Kong policy of China, as an integral part of its foreign policy, was distinctive in that ideological fervor and nationalist passions had limited influence. The goals to be achieved by the Hong Kong policy remained unchanged throughout the period; the strategies adopted, however, changed in accordance with the changing international situation and the national interests as defined by the Chinese leaders. The primary goals of the Hong Kong policy were to secure a less threatening external political environment for China and to make calculated use of Hong Kong for China's economic development. By tolerating Hong Kong as a British colony, China also depended on Britain to control the potentially threatening anti-Communist Chinese population there. The 'over-dependence' on the British to control the Chinese people in Hong Kong on the eve of Hong Kong's reversion to China, however, alienated the Hong Kong people as well as impeded the formation of local political leaders in the territory. As a result, the acquisition of Hong Kong by China in 1997 has not been accompanied by political rapport between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong people, thus sowing seeds for lingering friction between them.     

Discussion of 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'

In a response to Yan Xuetong's paper, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes', Ted Osius (writing in August 1999) discusses Dr Yan's perspective on Chinese history and the question of whether China's rise will be peaceful. Mr Osius argues that, while we cannot know for certain what China's future holds, the Clinton‐Gore Administration has been clear in its goal of integrating China into the leadership ranks of the world community.