Competing conceptions of Taiwan's identity: The irresolvable conflict in cross‐strait relations

Supporters of unification and Taiwan independence advocates view Taiwan's status through radically different logical frameworks. Unification supporters are guided by historical determinism. They believe that because Taiwan was part of China in the past, and because the island's residents have ancestral ties to mainland China, Taiwan is therefore an unalienable part of Chinese territory that must be brought under the control of the mainland Chinese state. In contrast, advocates of Taiwan independence are guided by the logic of pragmatism. In their view, cultural identity does not dictate political identity, and decisions about Taiwan's status should be guided by the will of the island's people, rather than by an abstract notion of historic destiny. Both of these approaches are rooted in long‐standing concepts of Chinese identity. Chinese ethnicity has long included both a hereditary and a cultural component. In the past, the cultural component allowed China to absorb populations on its periphery. Today, it serves as an outlet for Taiwan independence supporters seeking to redefine Taiwan as a political entity separate from the mainland Chinese state.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

Comparing Jiang Zemin's Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989–2012

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’.     

The political economy of Taiwan's mainland policy

The emerging patterns of the cross‐strait interaction present a perplexing duality, revealing both the trends toward closer economic convergence and greater political divergence. Taiwan's mainland policy is both the manifestation and the catalyst of the two contradictory processes. It is the locus of confrontation of the various economic, social, and political forces that propels the two concurrent processes. It has been propelled by the epic changes in the global political economy, the market‐oriented reform in China, and Taiwan's economic restructuring process. It has also been prompted by the perceived challenges and opportunities brought about by the transition to the post‐Cold War era, the unraveling of structural conflicts between a status‐quo power (i.e., the US) and a rising power (i.e., the PRC) and by the politics of political succession within the CCP. In more immediate terms, it has been driven by the power struggle over political succession within the KMT, the bureaucratic process, the interest group politics, the partisan politics in both the electoral and legislative arenas, and the unfolding of the national identity crisis during Taiwan's recent transition to democracy.     

Lost in revolution and reform: The socioeconomic pains of China's red guards generation, 1966–1996

This paper examines why the socioeconomic life of China's Red Guards generation has been difficult in both Mao's time and in the post‐Mao reform era. It shows that Mao's Cultural Revolution destroyed the normalcy of society and prevented this generation from securing the life they expected. When reform moved China toward a market economy, their past misfortunes produced their present disadvantages. Their limited education disqualified them from the opportunities of employment and career promotion; their protracted sent‐down to the countryside postponed their marriage and normal social life; and their longtime economic hardships debilitated their market competitiveness. Mao's revolution made them ill‐prepared for the coming economic liberty, yet the post‐Mao reform, instead of compensating them for their distress, left them behind when it pursued market efficiency.     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New challenges and opportunities

Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared 'civilian governance' between Taiwan and mainland China. WTO entry will provide opportunities as well as challenges for cross-Strait economic relations. In anticipation of this dynamic, the new government in Taiwan is attempting to design a new national security web to guarantee Taiwan's 'economic security' in coping with Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on mainland China. As one key agent of globalization, economic cooperation in the urban areas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may potentially improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As decentralization and privatization on mainland China proceed, major cities have developed closer interaction and systems of accountability with the civil society. From a prudent perspective, developing functional cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China at the urban level could be a first substantial step to confidence building between these two economies.     

Bringing the local state back in: the political economy of public health in rural China

Contrary to what most alarmist reports would imply, China has not witnessed a measurable decline in the overall public health status. What explains the continuous improvement in some important domains of public health despite the pertinacious pricing, financing and institutional‐behavioral problems in China's health system change? This study provides a political economy analysis of the role the local Chinese state played in rural public health provision during the reform era. Through comparative case studies, statistical analysis, and formal modeling, the study shows that state capacity is a principal factor setting the parameters for rural public health in China. It also suggests that the post‐Mao reforms, while generating strong disincentives for the provision of public services, unleashed forces that lay down the institutional bases for sustained state engagement in the health sector.     

Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: opportunities and challenges

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the ‘one China’ principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability.     

A “greater China“?

This paper sees “Greater China” as a would‐be reunited China that includes the present PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. The coming into being of a “Greater China” hinges on future domestic politics in the PRC and Taiwan and among the triangle of Beijing‐Taipei‐Hong Kong. It also hinges on American, British, and Japanese policies addressing the current trends of economic integration and political accommodation among the three Chinese entities. Of the external variables, future U.S. politics toward the PRC, and toward the evolution of political exchanges on the Beijing‐Taipei trajectory will be the most decisive. Economic and political developments in the past fifteen years have brightened the prospect of Chinese reunification, but national reunification remains a complicated and protracted process.     

Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy in the United States: the case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy.     

History,Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino–Japanese Conflict

Anti-Japanese popular nationalism is rising high in China today. Little evidence to date proves that it is officially orchestrated. Nonetheless, Chinese popular nationalism still has deep roots in the state's history propaganda which has implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory. Fueling mistrust and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, popular nationalism could be a catalyst for future Sino–Japanese conflict over the Taiwan problem, island disputes, and maritime resource competition. The increasingly liberalized but often biased Chinese media, the role of nationalist sub-elites, and the government's accommodation have all contributed to the strength of anti-Japanese nationalism, which cannot be mitigated by bilateral economic interdependence. To rid bilateral relations of the negative historical legacy, the two countries need the vision and determination to remove nationalistic myths and promote a shared history through mutual critique and self-reflection in transnational historians' dialogues.     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

History,Tradition and the China Dream: socialist modernization in the World of Great Harmony

How will China influence world politics in the twenty-first century? Many people answer this question by looking to Chinese history, and particularly to traditional models of Chinese world order. This essay seeks to complicate this question by asking which history, and which tradition? While it is common to look at China's pre-modern history as ‘tradition’, this essay argues that we also need to appreciate how ‘socialism’ is treated as a tradition alongside Chinese civilization. It does this by examining how China's public intellectuals appeal to two seemingly odd sources: Mao Zedong's 1956 speech ‘Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions’, and the ‘Great Harmony’ passage from the two millennia-old Book of Rites. It will argue that these two passages are employed as a way of salvaging socialism; the ideological transition thus is not from communism to nationalism, but to a curious combination of socialism and Chinese civilization. This new socialist/civilization dynamic integrates equality and hierarchy into a new form of statism, which is involved in a global competition of social models. Or to put it another way, what these two passages have in common is not necessarily a positive ideal, but a common enemy: liberalism, the West and the United States.     

A dangerous game: Deng and the intellectuals

This article examines one aspect of China's “second revolution” led by Deng Xiaoping: the relationship between the post‐Mao leadership and the intellectuals, who were the most persecuted during the “Cultural Revolution.” When Deng took power in 1978, one tough challenge was to mobilize China's well‐educated men and women for the nation's modernization. New policies toward them were introduced to rekindle their enthusiasm in creative and critical academic activities. The anticipation of a new period of cooperation between the authorities and the intellectuals was, however, dashed by the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Why did Deng, who sought the support of Chinese intellectuals for his modernization program, side with the Party's hard‐liners to order the military crackdown on pro‐democracy demonstrations? Will China's post‐Mao leadership no longer need the intellectuals’ help? This article argues that the Communist Party of China has been playing “a dangerous game of cooperation” with the intellectuals. Despite the tragic events, the game is likely to continue as long as the CCP proceeds with its modernization program and the intellectuals maintain their sense of mission. What remains uncertain is how the next round of game will be played out and who will emerge as the winner.     

The impact of reform on the party and ideology in China

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the monolithic organization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its unchallenged official ideology, Mao Zedong Thought, used to be the two mighty pillars sustaining Communist rule during Mao's era. Since the late 1970s, however, these two pillars have been shattered by a series of post‐Mao economic and political reforms under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. As the result of a drastic decline in the standing of the party leadership and its official ideology, the ruling methods and foundation of the current regime have also changed. How did the reforms significantly affect the party and the official ideology? How did the changes in the roles of the party and ideology, in turn, redefine the nature and ruling methods of the current Communist regime? What do these changes imply for the future of this regime and the course of ongoing political and economic modernization? These questions, which are crucial for our understanding of the nature of sociopolitical transition in China, will be addressed in this article.     

Identity,Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing's responses to offshore Chinese democracies

Investigating how the PRC responds to democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this paper argues that the Chinese Communist leadership has mainly developed three strategies in managing the complicated crises, including Beijing's own legitimacy crisis and the integration crisis of the Chinese nation, caused by the rise of offshore Chinese democracies. These strategies are: identity politics, sovereignty politics, and economic penetration. With ‘identity politics’, Beijing identifies ‘identification with the Communist leadership’ as the sole Chinese national identification, and utilizes the nationalistic passions of mainland and even overseas Chinese people against democrats in Taiwan and Hong Kong, by labeling the latter as ‘separatists’ or ‘national traitors’. Further, Beijing defines ‘sovereignty’ in a way in which the ‘central’ government monopolizes all possessions of the nation, and excludes ‘people's sovereignty’ from the politics of national reunification or the ‘one country, two systems’ model actualization. While appealing to both ‘soft power’ based in ‘patriotic nationalism’ and ‘hard power’ embedded in national sovereignty, however, the Chinese regime also mobilizes business resources and opportunities provided by China's growing economic power and China's dominance in Greater Chian economic integration for its political purposes of curbing offshore Chinese democracies.