俄乌冲突的余波：美国对台政策的“乌克兰化”及其局限

俄乌冲突对美国各界的对台政策认知形成了重大冲击，对台政策辩论日益呈现“乌克兰化”的危险趋势，这为美国政府趁势推动对台政策的“乌克兰化”提供了某种契机。为了预防和应对潜在的台海危机，美国对台政策的新动向包括：加速迈向战略与战术双重清晰、更重视助台打造“非对称战力”与提升美台军事安全合作、持续深化与盟友伙伴国家的对台政策协调。美国将随着俄乌局势的变化而动态调整其对台政策，短期内势必对台海局势、中美关系以及亚太国际关系造成一定的负面影响，但从中长期来看，俄乌冲突对美国对台政策的影响仍然是有限的。     

美国对台政策的新调整与新动向

随着布什政府对美国全球战略调整重大举措的陆续出台,对华政策的相对成型,布什对美国政府的对台政策也开始进行重大调整,使其呈现出新的政策动向。布什政府对台新政策的问世及实施,将对中美关系和台海局势产生重大的影响。     

美国台海政策的调整趋势初探

美国的台海政策归根结底是为美国的国家利益服务的。美国在台海上的双重利益使其在台海局势上常常处于两难困境。同时美国在台海政策上则表现为矛盾性、模糊性、波动性和脆弱性四大特点。冷战后，国际形势发生重大变化，台海局势也正在变动之中。美国如何适应变化了的形势以维护其国家利益的最大化，是本关注的焦点。     

美国台海政策走势探析

美国因素是影响台海局势的关键外部因素,未来美国台海政策的变化将对台海局势产生重大的影响。为了探究未来美国台海政策的变化,我们有必要先回顾美国台海政策的历史过程,并把握其中的规律。英国一贯的台海政策及其特点二战后到20世纪60年代末,出于美苏对抗和冷战的需要,美国始终支持台湾当局为其冷战服务,干涉中国内政,破坏中国统一。20世     

美国台海危机管理：结构模式与现实困境

长期以来，美国在处理台海问题的实践中逐渐形成了以其国内法律为框架、模糊战略和“维持现状”策略的台海危机管理结构模式。冷战结束后。台湾岛内政治生态的演变特别是“台独”分裂活动，不仅对台海局势造成了重大的战略险情，也给美国长期坚持的“维持现状”政策带来了冲击，使美国的台海危机管理面临着越来越严重的战略困境。当前，两岸关系和平发展的态势正在不断形成，这对美国的两岸政策及其台海危机管理模式都将带来重大挑战。美国长期坚持“以台制华”的冷战思维无疑是严重制约其台海危机管理效能充分发挥的瓶颈所在。     

台海怒潮与统一之路

8月3日，陈水扁的“一边一国”论再次引发台海怒潮。未来的台海局势到底会如何发展？我对台的政策与底线到底有没有改变呢？     

透视美国总统候选人在台海政策上的异同

台海政策历来都是美国总统参选人相互攻击、争取选票的工具。随着美国总统大选白热化以及台海局势日趋紧张,美国民主、共和两党的台海政策成为众所瞩目的焦点。那么,共和党总统候选人布什、民主党总统候选人克里的台海政策     

中美关系的发展与两岸关系

中美高层会晤在台湾问题上达成的共识不仅有助于中美关系的进一步发展,而且有助于维护台海局势的稳定。目前,中美高层会晤已在台湾产生积极影响。中国国民党中央政策会副执行长兼大陆部主任张荣恭就表示,胡锦涛主席提议和美国一道维护台海和平,但台湾当局无力也无心突破两岸政治僵局,台湾在台海局势中正在被边缘化,这对“台独”政治人物鼓吹的所谓“台湾主体性”,是严重讥讽。     

以中美日关系为背景处理好两岸关系

近年来,台湾问题日益成为中美日关系中的核心议题。李登辉、陈水扁上台后,“台独”势力的分裂活动一度十分猖獗。“以台遏华”是美国一以贯之的台海政策。美国的台海政策基本可以总结为:“不统、不武、不独”,这是因为美国的台海政策是从美国自身的国家安全利益出发的。为此,美国积极充当两岸的“调停人”,避免自身的损失,寻求利益的最大化。随着“9?11”后美国全球政策的调整,一方面美国推动美日同盟重新定义,鼓励日本在东亚发挥更大的作用,使日本成为介入台海可能发生冲突的前线国家;另一方面,美国加速对台军售,这既满足了美国军工复合体…     

美国重返亚太对台海局势的影响

近年来，美国的战略重心逐步向亚太地区转移，遏制和围堵中国的力度明显加大。在此背景下，台湾对于美国的多重战略价值日益凸显。面对两岸关系和平发展的趋势，美国不断通过强化美台关系以平衡两岸关系，对两岸关系、台海局势造成了一定影响。美国重返亚太的背景与进程,     

美国因素在两岸关系和平发展进程中的影响

美国对两岸和谈的政策立场,是出于维系台海“不统、不独、不战”局面的战略考虑,以保证自己在台海地区的最大战略利益。美国既不希望两岸举行统一谈判又希望两岸达成和平协议的复杂心态,表现在一方面希望两岸进行谈判,降低敌对状态,另一方面又长期对台提供军售,使其增加与大陆相抗衡的资本。此一“双轨政策”对两岸和平关系的构建,有着不同方向的影响,往往起了互相抵消的作用。由于中国政府对台湾当局谋求“法理台独”的强烈反应以及台海紧张局势的升高,美国政府在20世纪90年代后期开始对两岸政治谈判采取较为积极的态度,反对台湾单方面改变现状。美国的上述战略考虑,在反对台湾“独立”、维系两岸和平这一点上,与中国政府的立场有相通之处,客观上为构建两岸关系和平发展框架提供了较好的外部条件。     

新时期的美国涉台关系及其制约因素

中美关系与两岸关系的大格局,决定了美国涉台关系的变化趋势.在政治上,美国乐见国民党连续执政和两岸关系的和平发展,但对于台湾被迫走向统一,存有疑虑,希望及时把握两岸和谈的具体进程.美方对台湾在“国防”、“外交”等领域予以多方面支持的目的,从短期看是同步强化美台关系,维护美国在台海地区的既有利益;从长期看则是增加台湾在两岸谈判中的筹码,谋取美国在台湾问题最终解决方案上的主动权.     

Southeast Asia and cross‐strait relations: The policy of separation of politics and economics

During the periods of July‐August 1995 and mid‐March 1996, China initiated a series of missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland for many was considered responsible for the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait. But, Southeast Asian countries held Taiwan responsible for stimulating the mainland's military actions because of the island's claim for independence. Why? There are three different theoretical arguments on this issue, i.e. those of political primacy, economic determinism, and the separation of politics and economics. This paper contends that the principle of separation of politics and economics is the policy that Southeast Asian countries pursue in developing their relations with the PRC and the ROC, i.e. maintaining official and full‐scale relations with the PRC, but keeping unofficial and economic links with Taiwan. Therefore, for Southeast Asian countries, the PRC's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait were a political and not an economic problem, and one between the mainland and Taiwan. This is the key factor in explaining attitudes in Southeast Asian nations toward the Taiwan Strait crisis.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

The Taiwan strait crisis of 1996: Implications for US security policy

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 was the greatest challenge to Sino‐American relations in several decades. This study examines the crisis and its implications for US security policy. It outlines US policy toward the defense of Taiwan, discusses the US response to Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan and analyzes several of the major lessons gleaned from the crisis. The paper suggests that, while China's aggressive behavior should not lead to a dramatic shift in the American position toward Taiwan's defense, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

The origins of conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The problem of differences in perceptions

In 1995 and 1996, the Taiwan Strait became an area of considerable tension. Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated as a result of perceptions by leaders in the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was moving toward independence, especially after President Lee Teng‐hui made a widely publicized trip to the US in the summer of 1995. An assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, are instructive. The author looks at five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive: the history of Taiwan (especially its ties with the mainland), Taiwan's legal status, views of the ‘Taiwan issue’ espoused by Beijing and Taipei, current relations between Beijing and Taipei, and the stance of the international community and the nature and structure of international politics. Scenarios are presented regarding the future of the conflict.     

Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New challenges and opportunities

Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared 'civilian governance' between Taiwan and mainland China. WTO entry will provide opportunities as well as challenges for cross-Strait economic relations. In anticipation of this dynamic, the new government in Taiwan is attempting to design a new national security web to guarantee Taiwan's 'economic security' in coping with Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on mainland China. As one key agent of globalization, economic cooperation in the urban areas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may potentially improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As decentralization and privatization on mainland China proceed, major cities have developed closer interaction and systems of accountability with the civil society. From a prudent perspective, developing functional cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China at the urban level could be a first substantial step to confidence building between these two economies.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?