From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

Economic interdependence and political divergence: The emerging pattern of relations across the Taiwan Strait

Economic interactions between Taiwan and mainland China have grown at an astounding speed since the Taipei government began to relax restrictions on indirect trade with the mainland in the late 1980s. A growing flood of cross‐border investment and trade has created an economic interdependence. However, intensified economic exchanges have not spilled over into political recognition of the legitimacy to each other or even ameliorated hostility across the Taiwan Strait. Growing economic interdependence has been a function of political power and political choice. This paper examines the emerging pattern of the relations across the Taiwan Strait and attributes the discrepancy between economic and political relations to significant disparities across the Taiwan Strait, which has worked as both integrative and disintegrative forces.     

开放性厦-金自由经济区：两岸经济一体化的一个现实选择

两岸经济制度性一体化是当前两岸经济发展形势的呼唤,但受到当前两岸政治关 系的严重约束。两岸应在遵守WTO规则基础上积极探索能够突破政治僵局约束的一体化路径。 借鉴近年来国际上次区域经济合作的成功经验,在“小三通”等现实基础条件上,两岸先行共 建开放性厦-金自由经济区,既可顺应经济全球化与一体化深化发展的趋势与要求,更是当前 两岸经济制度性一体化的一个现实选择。     

A “greater China“?

This paper sees “Greater China” as a would‐be reunited China that includes the present PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. The coming into being of a “Greater China” hinges on future domestic politics in the PRC and Taiwan and among the triangle of Beijing‐Taipei‐Hong Kong. It also hinges on American, British, and Japanese policies addressing the current trends of economic integration and political accommodation among the three Chinese entities. Of the external variables, future U.S. politics toward the PRC, and toward the evolution of political exchanges on the Beijing‐Taipei trajectory will be the most decisive. Economic and political developments in the past fifteen years have brightened the prospect of Chinese reunification, but national reunification remains a complicated and protracted process.     

Constructing Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making.     

美国因素在两岸关系和平发展进程中的影响

美国对两岸和谈的政策立场,是出于维系台海“不统、不独、不战”局面的战略考虑,以保证自己在台海地区的最大战略利益。美国既不希望两岸举行统一谈判又希望两岸达成和平协议的复杂心态,表现在一方面希望两岸进行谈判,降低敌对状态,另一方面又长期对台提供军售,使其增加与大陆相抗衡的资本。此一“双轨政策”对两岸和平关系的构建,有着不同方向的影响,往往起了互相抵消的作用。由于中国政府对台湾当局谋求“法理台独”的强烈反应以及台海紧张局势的升高,美国政府在20世纪90年代后期开始对两岸政治谈判采取较为积极的态度,反对台湾单方面改变现状。美国的上述战略考虑,在反对台湾“独立”、维系两岸和平这一点上,与中国政府的立场有相通之处,客观上为构建两岸关系和平发展框架提供了较好的外部条件。     

海峡经济区竞争性区域体系构建研究

竞争性区域是拥有独特“地方品质”的区域，以创新和知识作为其发展的催化剂，成为国家乃至全球最具发展活力的区域。竞争性区域的构建过程集中体现为提升区域竞争力的战略政策要点和与此相配套实施的多级治理措施的高效统一。从竞争性区域构建理论视角考察，海峡经济区作为两岸经济整合的独特区域，其基础设施网络连接性、产学研互动合作、产业集群培育、城市经济协同发展方面亟待推进，竞争性区域特质尚不发育。今后应从基础设施的协调与衔接、区域产业分工协作体系建立、厦金特区和福马特区创建、经济运行机制衔接、台湾海峡城市联盟缔结、开展以政府政策协调为中介的公私合营等方面着力推进，以构建海峡经济区竞争性区域配套体系，推动海峡经济区迅速崛起成为中国乃至世界新兴的竞争性区域。     

Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New challenges and opportunities

Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared 'civilian governance' between Taiwan and mainland China. WTO entry will provide opportunities as well as challenges for cross-Strait economic relations. In anticipation of this dynamic, the new government in Taiwan is attempting to design a new national security web to guarantee Taiwan's 'economic security' in coping with Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on mainland China. As one key agent of globalization, economic cooperation in the urban areas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may potentially improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As decentralization and privatization on mainland China proceed, major cities have developed closer interaction and systems of accountability with the civil society. From a prudent perspective, developing functional cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China at the urban level could be a first substantial step to confidence building between these two economies.     

以“中国领土和主权完整”说辞替代“一中原则”可行性之探讨

大陆方面与台北当局固然在宪政与法理上均主张两岸之间只有一个国家的存在，但是台北在过去十多年始终对北京所提出的“一中原则”感到顾虑重重。未来双方展开政治接触之时，大陆可不可以避免使用台湾方面感到困扰的“一中原则”，与台北共同使用“中国领土主权完整”这一概念，以体现双方的有重叠与契合的精神与立场？从两岸双方发表过的重要文件与谈话，以及双方学界论辩的结果，证明用“中国领土和主权完整”的说辞作为双方都便于接受的“一中原则”表述的替代性方案，在理论上应是可以被接受的，而且双方更容易在政治上达成共识。     

The origins of conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The problem of differences in perceptions

In 1995 and 1996, the Taiwan Strait became an area of considerable tension. Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated as a result of perceptions by leaders in the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was moving toward independence, especially after President Lee Teng‐hui made a widely publicized trip to the US in the summer of 1995. An assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, are instructive. The author looks at five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive: the history of Taiwan (especially its ties with the mainland), Taiwan's legal status, views of the ‘Taiwan issue’ espoused by Beijing and Taipei, current relations between Beijing and Taipei, and the stance of the international community and the nature and structure of international politics. Scenarios are presented regarding the future of the conflict.     

Hong Kong's policy possibilities and directions toward the mainland‐Taiwan conflict

On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was returned from British colonial rule to Chinese rule under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The change in political status of Hong Kong has great impacts on the triangular relationship between Hong Kong, the mainland and Taiwan, in which the mainland and Taiwan are still in a state of intense political conflict and competition. This paper examines the policy possibilities and directions for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in handling its relations with Taiwan. It argues that both Beijing and Taipei want to preserve the existing Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations for political and practical purposes but at the same time will try to avoid being forced into a suspected political trap—for Beijing the recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity and for Taipei the subordination of Taiwan to PRC sovereignty. Between these two baselines, the paper points out that Hong Kong should pursues its own Taiwan policy built upon the interests of Hong Kong and depoliticization of Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations.     

两岸关系和平发展的社会机制探析

基于两岸关系的政治与社会互动逻辑,两岸关系和平发展存在着权力制衡、权利规范和社会支撑等多种构建机制,而社会机制是构建两岸关系和平发展的重要路径之一和基础组成部分.社会机制的内容分析涵盖社会动力、激励、整合、协调及保障等几个方面.两岸关系和平发展的社会机制为当前两岸关系提供了诸多启示:应确立两岸关系的多元主体多维定位,深化两岸交流沟通范围和层次,注意各项社会运行机制的深化与协调,注重社会资本的积累.     

Southeast Asia and cross‐strait relations: The policy of separation of politics and economics

During the periods of July‐August 1995 and mid‐March 1996, China initiated a series of missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland for many was considered responsible for the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait. But, Southeast Asian countries held Taiwan responsible for stimulating the mainland's military actions because of the island's claim for independence. Why? There are three different theoretical arguments on this issue, i.e. those of political primacy, economic determinism, and the separation of politics and economics. This paper contends that the principle of separation of politics and economics is the policy that Southeast Asian countries pursue in developing their relations with the PRC and the ROC, i.e. maintaining official and full‐scale relations with the PRC, but keeping unofficial and economic links with Taiwan. Therefore, for Southeast Asian countries, the PRC's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait were a political and not an economic problem, and one between the mainland and Taiwan. This is the key factor in explaining attitudes in Southeast Asian nations toward the Taiwan Strait crisis.     

两岸对“和平协议”的立场与前瞻

台海和平环境的建立，是两岸当局与人民自1949年内战之后一直的期待。两岸对和平远景的期待可以理解，但从理想走向实际却需要一段漫长而且曲折的过程。本文共分五个部分，包括前言、两岸创议“和平协议”的历史背景介绍、两岸终止敌对状态协议设计与推行、两岸对“和平协议”解读的相互冲突，以及两岸“和平协议”签署的展望，来解析两岸对此一问题的立场与要求，并整理出双方对此事件的不同解读，以及彼此尚无法“跨出门槛”的症结所在。     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

National security vs. economic interests: reassessing Taiwan's mainland policy under Chen Shui‐bian

Having finished its first term, the Chen Shui‐bian Administration has found itself in deep water in the troubled cross‐Strait relations. Not only has Chen himself been making contradictory remarks, the Cabinet has been indecisive over issues related to China. The most difficult and irritating case for the DPP government has been the handling of the call made by high‐tech industries to allow them to invest in the mainland. The controversy seems to highlight a dilemma for Taiwan: while it needs the mainland market to save it from the current economic doldrums and create yet another potential ‘miracle’ of becoming a global economic powerhouse, it is worried that further economic engagement with its former rival may pose new kinds of threats to its national security. The debate over whether to allow an eight‐inch wafer foundry, the crown jewel of Taiwan's economy, to invest in the mainland market is but one case, albeit a highly significant one, of the difficult relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.     

Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei manages the cross-strait relations

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July‐21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999‐18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March‐20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June‐present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.     

台湾当局亚太经济战略的演变、动因及影响——基于“一个中国”框架视阈的分析

自上世纪90年代以来,台湾当局的亚太经济战略均以减缓两岸经贸关系发展、挑战＂一个中国＂框架为主轴。马英九上台后,以＂黄金十年＂愿景为蓝图,在＂壮大台湾、连接亚太、布局全球＂的总战略下＂通过大陆走向世界＂,以＂战略平衡＂、＂同步多轨＂、＂官民结合＂等方式推动对外签订双边经济合作协议（ECA）及加入TPP、RCEP等多边经济合作机制。这一战略虽给大陆维护＂一个中国＂框架带来新课题,但总体上保持两岸政经良性互动,稳住两岸关系和平发展大局,并对未来两岸关系发展产生深远影响。     

Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations: a punctuated equilibrium model

Relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced several cycles over the last 60 years. Tension and crisis seem to come and go, followed by periods of peace and stability. What explains the cyclical pattern of change and stability? How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship? This article examines the last 60 years of cross-Strait relations in light of an interpretative framework of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Cross-Strait relations are complex, consisting of actors at the domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. With a high degree of economic interaction, the cross-Strait relationship can be characterized as economic integration cum political impasse. This article analyzes the cyclical changes through three causal factors: (a) the role of issue cycles in cross-Strait relations; (b) the impulsive drivers for change; and (c) the structural constraints dampening change.     

台湾经济“四化”问题与两岸经济合作

新世纪初期,在全球化、区域化大发展背景下,在两岸经济合作日趋紧密而政治对立不见缓和的矛盾纠结中,台湾对外经济层面凸现出"出口导向产品单一化"、"新产业空洞化"、"经济边缘化"、"发展战略泛政治化"等问题.文章对上述"四化"问题的现象和成因加以探讨,重点分析大陆经济成长对其产生的客观影响,进而阐明深化两岸经济合作对解决台湾经济"四化"问题的重要性.