Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

The European Union has since 2003 developed both a security and a Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy, and it has become the primary interlocutor of Iran in the dispute related to Iran's nuclear development. These are signs of significant policy progress. However, the fact that four years of nuclear diplomacy have brought few results invites a critical appraisal of EU strategy. This essay undertakes this appraisal, arguing that the EU is notably ambivalent regarding its underlying conception of international order. The EU wishes to be pluralist (in the tradition of sovereign equality), but is also anti-pluralist (in the liberal–democratic tradition). The essay lays out how the EU has coped with pressures for reform—arising notably from the United States—within the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this has made the EU problem apparent. The essay finally suggests that to salvage its policy of effective multilateralism the EU must acknowledge its anti-pluralist bias and promote a common transatlantic approach to nuclear non-proliferation.     

The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War

This article argues that militant clients should be understood as a pillar of Iran's grand strategy and an extension of its military power. The article examines why Iran has relied on militant clients since the 1979 revolution and the benefits and costs of its client approach. In evaluating these issues, it identifies five main areas where Iran has gained from its client strategy: 1) maintaining independence from the West; 2) successfully exporting its religio-political worldview; 3) extending its military reach and power; 4) reducing political costs of its foreign activities; and 5) establishing needed regional allies. It further identifies five main dangers that Iran faces by continuing its strategic behavior: 1) increased pressure from the United States and a broader US military regional footprint; 2) more unified regional adversaries; 3) the risk of unintended escalation with the United States and regional adversarial states; and 4) enduring regional instability and insecurity     

Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Is Regional Proliferation Inevitable?

The past year has seen a steady rise in tensions with regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's economy is being crippled by far-ranging sanctions and the threat of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities looms large on the horizon. Yet the country's nuclear programme marches on, stoking fears that Iran may indeed be seeking to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. In this context, it is timely to consider how key regional players would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran. Many argue that an Iranian bomb would prompt a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. However, a closer examination of the drivers for key regional players shows that this is not necessarily the case. There is a range of non-proliferation tools that could be applied by the West and others to offset this risk.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Iran's perception of Western Europe: A study in national and foreign policy articulation

Acts of public communication cannot be isolated from other features of a political process. In fact, a study of public policy articulation can provide a valuable framework of national perceptions, demands and expectations through which a nation's evolving position in the international system may be analyzed. Iran offers a valuable opportunity in this regard because its policy articulation occurs through a limited number of communication channels‐one of which is the newspaper Kayhan. Kayhan has been chosen because of its clear capacity to reflect accurately the perceptions of Iran's political elite in regard to general national development and foreign policy objectives. This paper will concentrate on two reference periods‐one pre‐1973 and one post‐to analyze in terms of selected variables, Iran's evolving elite perceptions of its traditional relationship to Western Europe. Editorials and policy statements have been keyed to selected variables representing various channels of Iran's perceptions and then analyzed to chart shifting policy priorities among Iranian elites. The results indicate a radically altered self‐perception of both national development objectives and Iran's self‐perceived role in global power relationships.     

Exporting Iran's Islamic revolution: Steering a path between Pan‐Islam and nationalism

This article focuses on the question of whether Iran's foreign policy over the period 1979–94 was a pure reflection of the clerical regime's millenarian crusade and its stated doctrine of exporting the Islamic revolution worldwide. Taking, inter alia, the controversy surrounding Iran's takeover of the island of Abu Musa in 1992, the article argues that Iran's actions were determined by a persistent sense of nationalism which was not less potent than its pan‐Islamic vision. Iran's nationalist tradition has been able to survive as a major force in Iranian political culture, its sometimes ‘Islamicized’ form notwithstanding.     

Iran's Hezbollah Model in Iraq and Syria: Fait Accompli?

This essay argues the wars in Iraq and Syria are not over. Iran has used the war against the Islamic State, and, more generally, the instability in Iraq and Syria, to successfully spread and legitimize its influence. If the U.S. intends to challenge Iran's influence in Syria and Iraq, it needs to demonstrate its long-term commitment to its local partners, and it needs to work with its partners to secure and stabilize eastern Syria and western Iraq. Countering Iran's influence in Iraq and Syria is a long-term project, and creating viable alternatives to Iranian influence in Damascus and Baghdad is the best way to prevent them from becoming long-term Iranian dependencies.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Learning to Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from India’s Nuclear Tests

This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's final term in office (1980–84) had on four “national” social groups, namely the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry, and the poor. The study argues that the Congress (I) chose the former two as its major allies, while the rich peasantry and the poor were relegated to a secondary position. In the process, the focus of India's strategy of development shifted from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and from the rural to the urban world.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal

During the 2016 United States presidential election campaign, Donald Trump promised to “renegotiate” the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The deal does not prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons and in some ways actually makes it easier for Iran to go nuclear in the future. The mere continuation of the current deal could undermine America’s interests in the Middle East and its global non-proliferation policy. How then can the Donald Trump Administration work to renegotiate the deal? This analysis provides a strategy that the Trump Administration can follow to improve American policy toward Iran, namely do what Iran is doing to the United States: abide by the strict terms of the agreement, whilst competing in all of the ways not covered in the deal. From an American perspective, increasing pressure on Tehran will constrain Iran’s destabilising influence in the region. Over time, Washington can leverage the pressure to force Iran back to the table to strike a renegotiated agreement that eliminates, not just delays, the Iranian nuclear and missile threat.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.     

Britain and Kashmir, 1948: “The Arena of the UN”

The Jammu and Kashmir dispute of 1947–1949 between India and Pakistan became the first inter-state conflict to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council. This analysis looks at the views of the government and the delegation of Great Britain, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, on Kashmir through the year of 1948. It argues that the British attitude was determined more by Imperial and Commonwealth strategic and ideological imperatives in South and Central Asia and the Middle East and less by the merits of the cases of the disputants. Operating within the twin backdrop of decolonisation and the Cold War, the British official mind juggled Kashmir's accession to India, India's complaint of aggression against Pakistan, and Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir with an eye to their own hopes and fears in a region that it understood as the key vantage on Communism and Islam.     

The rise and fall of Spain's ‘nuclear exceptionalism’

The present article looks at the evolution of Spanish views on deterrence and non-proliferation. Like every member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Spain is covered by the US nuclear umbrella and has accepted the logic of deterrence, while at the same time maintaining a denuclearised status and committing to the goal of disarmament enshrined in the non-proliferation treaty. This article explores the background of Spain's apparently contradictory situation as a denuclearised member of NATO and how it positions itself in regard to the nuclear question in the current security context. It concludes that while Spanish nuclear ‘exceptionalism’ originally rested on the reluctance of the political elites to alter the precarious compromise that once allowed for Spain's accession to NATO as a denuclearised member, it gradually withered away to give way to a close alignment with Alliance policies driven by a desire to preserve strong security links with its partners.     

A ‘pivot’ that never existed: America’s Asian strategy under Obama and Trump

This article argues that Donald Trump’s Asian strategy hardly marks a radical transformation from Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. This is because the ‘pivot to Asia’ never really existed. Although Obama was successful in building legitimacy for the strategy through international norms, he failed to translate his lofty rhetoric into practice. Much of his original pivot components (building a constructive relationship with China, coordinating with Asian allies and multilateralism in the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership) has either failed or did not live up to expectations. Donald Trump was adamant that the Asian pivot was a bad strategy and that he would not follow it. But although he completely discarded Obama’s legitimization of the rebalance (as Trump speaks pragmatically and does not care about international norms), in actuality he has followed many of Obama’s policies, and even improved on some of them. That being said, Trump’s ‘pivot actions’ appear to be erratic, pragmatic short-term actions rather than a meticulously planned long-term strategy similar to Obama’s rebalance (which did not materialize). Thus, while Obama failed to transform the pivot into an effective strategy, neither is Trump’s effectiveness backed by a coherent Asian strategy.     

Saudi Arabia Walks the Tightrope

Saudi diplomacy seems more active than ever. This has to do with three recent major regional developments: the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah in the occupied Palestinian territories, and the Iraqi quagmire. In each of these, the role of Iran is difficult to overlook and this is troubling Riyadh. Yet Saudi Arabia has difficulty in responding to Iran's assertiveness: it wants to contain Tehran's ambitions, but at the same time it cannot allow itself to clash with it. As a result, it is treading a fine line.     

Iran and nuclear ambiguity

A comparison between Iran's current nuclear efforts and those of the pro-Western regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi shows that Iranian ambitions for a full-fledged civilian nuclear programme have remained relatively constant for nearly half a century. Today, fuel cycle technology provides Iran with a latent nuclear weapon's potential. However, US concerns about an Iranian bomb, which began in the early 1970s and aggravated after the Iranian Revolution, long predate Teheran's uranium enrichment programme. Thus, Iran is a specific case of the general problem presented by the inherent potential of nuclear technology to both civilian and military ends. Approaches to dealing with a long-term, ambiguous, latent nuclear weapon threat, whether Iranian or other, are suggested.     

Managing the Hegemon: nato under Unipolarity

The shift to unipolarity has introduced new dilemmas for America's allies. Their level of strategic uncertainty has increased, largely because under unipolarity, allies' threat perceptions are more likely to diverge across time or issue areas and are not shaped as much by structural systemic factors. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security arrangements as a means of managing the rising uncertainty, allies need to deal with the dual concern of either being trapped into the hegemonic partner's policies, or being abandoned by the hegemon. These two concerns—the alliance security dilemma—may become more or less prominent given the nature of the divergence in threat perceptions on different issues and at different times. To deal with this dual threat, allies employ two strategies: using the pre-existing alliance as a pact of restraint, and developing a division of labor with the hegemon. Both the dilemmas and the strategies used to mitigate them are examined here in the context of the European behavior within nato following the Gulf War, the nato involvement in Kosovo, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.     

“A Projected New Trusteeship”? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo-American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo-American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo-American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

伊朗核强硬政策的逻辑分析

自核问题爆出以来,伊朗一直坚持核强硬政策。其逻辑来源首先在于,伊朗认为本国在核不扩散问题上实现了权利与义务的统一,因而其核活动具有合法性。其次,伊朗的核强硬政策,是民族独立和民族自强的体现,保持与伊朗国家利益的一致性。再次,伊朗的核强硬政策有坚持的必要性和成功的可能性。必要性来自伊朗对其历史经验的总结和对当前安全状况的考虑;可能性来自伊朗对自身地缘政治地位和战略资源的自信,以及对当前大国间微妙关系的乐观评估。     

An appreciation of Alvey Adee

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo–American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo–American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo–American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.