From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists' Achilles Heel

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to uncover a primary source of vulnerability in the global Jihadist terrorist network. It offers a critical examination of the traditional money lead for countering global Jihadist terrorism, and concludes that in this case, it is not the most effective method. Rather, the concept of transnational mobility, both as it relates to socialization into and professionalization within the Jihadist network, is identified as the lifeblood of the network, and thus an arguably more appropriate focus for countering strategies. Issues surrounding travel document security are analysed within an overarching dichotomous framework of offensive/defensive counter-terrorism strategies, emphasizing the need for active penetration by intelligence forces into the terrorist networks and relevant mobility-related realms.     

Politicians,Experts and Democracy. Civil–Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Bulgaria

Abstract

Central and Eastern European countries have made significant progress in their efforts to democratize postcommunist civil–military relations. Appointing civilian ministers of defense, improving institutional arrangements and asserting legislative oversight over the armed forces have been key priorities. Problems still abound and levels of reform vary in the region even after NATO's second enlargement since 1989. Challenges remain concerning competent democratic civilian management, and effective defense reform planning and implementation. This article argues that the lack of an integrated Ministry of Defense, the low level of civilian interest in defense matters, the reform-deterrent attitude of political and military elite, and ambiguous institutional lines of authority are factors that still hamper civil–military relations in Bulgaria. I assert that the domestic political environment and international factors together facilitate democratic civilian control over the armed forces.     

Problems of maintaining defense security in today's world

This article addresses critical problems relating to Russian defense requirements in the first decades of the twenty‐first century. In the modern system of defense security two interrelated problems come clearly into view. On the one hand, political‐diplomatic, economic, informational and other non‐military means are necessary to resolve antagonisms, prevent conflicts, and provide for the national defense. On the other hand, when all these capabilities are exhausted, one must be ready to use military force. The author discusses the international environment confronting Russia, the threats facing the state, the organization of national defense, force structure, the nature of possible armed conflicts and the ways in which the armed forces and other troops may be used, and military training and education of personnel.     

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the ottoman empire

For more than three decades Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played a crucial role in the development of military relations between the German and Ottoman Empires. He trained and advised the Ottoman army, and commanded Ottoman troops in the First World War. He was a firm believer in the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's political and military revival, this belief reflecting his own conservative, militarist ideology. From 1898 onwards he was also a firm advocate of a German‐Ottoman alliance in a future war against Britain, arguing that Ottoman expeditionary forces sent against Egypt and India could deal mortal blows to Britain's world power.     

Defensive development,combative contradictions: towards an international political sociology of global militarism in Africa

ABSTRACT

Drawing on international political sociology, this article shows how the merger of development and security has become part of the ideational architecture that facilitates a new ‘feel-good’ militarism in Africa. Contemporary international reform efforts are designed to restrain military power in the name of development, democracy and civilian oversight, but also to strengthen the coercive capacities of African security institutions and make them more efficient in the global fight against violent extremism. Such defensive development efforts have implications for the historically problematic relationship of the African state with modern forms of organised force, reconfiguring and recalibrating relations and dynamics between the state, military forces and external actors. The article concludes that defensive development is fraught with combative contradictions and risks becoming the handmaiden not only of increased militaristic violence, but also of oppression and the restriction of freedom and democracy.     

The Panama invasion and the laws of war

This article considers the conduct of armed parties in the invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989 by United States forces, in relation to the standards established by the international laws of war and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The article confines itself to the conduct of US and Panamanian armed forces from the commencement of hostilities, and does not consider arguments for or against the invasion itself. The authors, on behalf of the US‐based Americas Watch, a human rights monitoring organization, visited Panama in January 1990, and collected information contained in the article. The article concludes that US forces failed in their Geneva Convention obligations with respect to the detentions of Panamanian POWs and civilians. It also concludes that US forces failed to exercise precautions to minimize collateral civilian casualties in the attack on the Panamanian military headquarters. It finds that Panamanian forces put non‐combatant civilians at risk by dressing in civilian clothes and firing from civilian‐occupied structures. It estimates the number of Panamanian civilian dead at approximately 300. The article further considers protection of human rights under the new Endara government, and the plight of refugees left homeless by the invasion.     

Gendering the Cult of the Offensive

Theorists of the offense-defense balance frequently note that perceptions of technology, as well as military doctrine, play a role in states' perception of offense dominance or the “cult of the offensive.” I argue that gender may constitute the missing link in explaining this misperception and suggest three possible areas of investigation. First, the perceptions and uses of technologies are dependent upon gendered ideologies which encouraged disastrous strategies in the First World War. Second, gender is an integral part of nationalism that promotes offensive policies by defining masculinity in terms of heroic service to the nation. Third, gendered discourses of protection use the language of defense to legitimate offensive policies. By analyzing the roots of perceptions of offense dominance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale.     

Political linguistics and events research

In an early study of the impact of defense spending on economic growth in Latin America, it was suggested that the military burden hampered growth (Lieuwen, 1962). Recent studies, however, have found the relationship to be positive (Biswas and Ram, 1986; Frederiksen and Looney, 1983). The present study differs from those by considering the relationship between “guns and growth” over time, and by looking at both the overall and externality effects of military spending. The findings demonstrate that defense spending has both positive and negative impacts on economic growth in Latin America, but that there is no net positive effect. This finding will be obscured by research designs which do not disaggregate the effects of military spending into both its size and externality components.     

The Nato enlargement debate in the media and civil‐military relations in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

This article links the NATO enlargement debate to the course of civil‐military relations in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. After a general analysis of civil‐military relations and the media, it looks at the NATO membership issues discussed across seven dimensions and their impact on relations between civil society and the military. It concludes that a gap existed between the governing elite and the public in both countries.     

Norms and Military Power: nato's War Against Yugoslavia

Norms are fundamental constitutive elements of modern military power. Because norms influence military behavior and force structure, contemporary Western military power is produced only by interaction of normative and material factors. Two norms—the civilian casualty avoidance norm and Western societies' demand that their military forces take minimal casualties, or the force protection norm—more strongly influenced the origin, conduct, and outcome of nato's 1999 war against Yugoslavia than the material disparities of mismatched adversaries. Many actors, including the Yugoslav government and the Kosovo Liberation Army, notice the linkage of norms to Western military force structures and operational behavior and therefore strategically use norms instrumentally against states that adopt them. Such strategies generate technological and tactical responses, leading in turn to counter-responses—a dynamic interaction of material and normative factors that increasingly influence military operational outcomes.     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

The Trouble with Targeted Killing

Students of comparative military organizations have advanced three hypotheses to explain when armed forces adopt more liberal manpower policies: when a major security threat looms, when the military professionalizes, or when the surrounding society grows more tolerant of difference. This article argues that all three are theoretically and empirically problematic: they potentially have much to contribute, but only in conjunction with a perspective that is more appreciative of the centrality of political processes. Enduring reform of the military's participation policies is more productively viewed through the lens of the struggle over national and communal identity. To illustrate the power of this alternative approach, this article reconsiders cases commonly cited in support of the existing hypotheses: the racial desegregation of the U.S. military, the integration of the Druze into the Israel Defense Forces, and the imperial and independent Indian armies' policies with respect to what the British termed “class.”     

Coup Risk,Counterbalancing, and International Conflict

Contrary to the literature on rallies-around-the-flag, this article argues that, in some circumstances, leaders may use international conflict to promote domestic divisiveness. More specifically, the threat of a military coup generally prompts leaders to divide their militaries (a practice known as counterbalancing), and even to engage in international conflict to ensure that various branches of their own armed forces remain distrustful of one another. Two empirical tests of these claims are offered: a large-N statistical analysis that examines whether coup risk leads to counterbalancing, and whether counterbalanced nations engage in more low-level military conflict (controlling for other causes of conflict); and a case study of Georgia shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both empirical studies support the arguments advanced by the authors.

     

Managing the ‘Expert Problem’ in Civil‐Military Relations

Samuel Huntington once defined ‘the modern problem of civil‐military relations’ as managing the relationship between military experts and civilian ministers. The expert/minister problem arises not simply because senior military officers and defense officials hold a monopoly on technical and operational expertise, but also because they are charged by governments to execute policy, a duty that invites their interpretation of those policies. This paper seeks to examine two critical questions: what kind of continuing relationship between experts and ministers best serves liberal democracies in the long run and what strategies and instruments best allow ministers of defense to control defense policy outcomes and the activities of armed forces.     

Not Whether,But When? Governments’ Use of Militias in War

Abstract

Although government use of militias during civil conflict can ultimately undermine state authority, governments still use militias for battlefield assistance. This paper examines the selectivity of government decisions to use militias by disaggregating civil conflict to the level of battle phases. Civil-conflict battles typically consist of four phases: preparation, clear, hold, and build. I argue that governments decide to use militias based on the strength of government security forces, operational advantages of militias, and the type of battle phase. Governments will limit the use of militias during key battle phases that are likely to receive increased media attention unless a victory secured by government security forces is unlikely or militias hold an operational advantage. A comparative analysis of the offensive operations in Tikrit and Ramadi during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lends initial support to this theory.     

竞争时代日本多维度联合防卫力战略构建及其影响

日本新防卫战略把日本的防卫力量从传统的海陆空领域扩展至多维度的太空、网络以及电磁波等新领域,重视各领域之间的彼此融合防卫。作为一个综合性防卫战略,它强调从平时到"有事"各阶段之间、自主防卫与日美同盟及多层次安保合作之间、"前方战场"和"后方体制"之间的综合防卫。为实现"跨领域作战",日本提出了优先项目和强化重点,侧重在太空、网络、电磁波等新领域内获得并强化相关防卫能力。同时日本也加强提升传统领域内的海空能力、导弹防御及防区外打击能力,并对自卫队的体制进行相应调整。新防卫战略与"印太构想"融合,进一步深化了日本立体跨域防卫体系。日本"多维度联合防卫力量"新战略具有深刻的竞争时代背景,为配合美国军事战略调整并强化日美同盟、对竞争时代安全情势的判断与主动应对、积极加入全球军事变革下新领域内的激烈竞争、更好地应对岛屿争端及加强海洋防卫等现实问题,这是日本谋求构建新防卫战略的深刻动因。该日本新防卫战略产生的影响包括:日本的防卫自主或更难实现、进一步改变战后日本的安全战略基点、在新安全领域引发竞争及不利于构建良好的中日建设性安全关系等。对此,中国需进一步增强本国综合性实力,积极推动日本对华安全释疑,扩大中日防卫交流与安全对话,增进两国的安全互信。     

A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror

The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the Islamist terrorist threat is relatively undeterred by the U.S. military presence abroad, and U.S. forces abroad, particularly those deployed in Muslim countries, may do more to exacerbate than to diminish the threat. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading the terrorist network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations.     

Comment on ‘terrorism and democracy’

The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 raises an important legal problem for decision‐makers contemplating retaliation against such acts of terrorism. Conceivably, retaliation could conflict with and help erode international norms of self‐defense. Counter‐terrorist experts and government officials espousing the use of force have minimized, if not ignored, this potential conflict and its negative impact on world order. On the other hand, the 1986 US raid on Libya and the 1985 Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia reveal that under limited circumstances force would be deemed appropriate. The informal adjudication of these incidents by relevant international actors suggests a tolerance for the resort to force in the US case and ambivalence in the Israeli case. The US and Israeli cases guide a subsequent discussion of the conditions under which the use of force against terrorist bases in response to terrorist attacks could be legitimated. The resort to force against such activity, it is argued, would have to meet the test of necessity, including: (1) a previous and ongoing series of terrorist attacks, and demonstrated responsibility for those attacks by the actor, state or non‐state, against whom force is used; (2) immediately expected or imminent terrorist attacks endangering human life; and (3) the absence of non‐forcible remedies effective in terminating the terrorist threat. In addition the amount of force would have to be proportional, limited to targets responsible for specific terrorist activity and limited by the objective of terminating that threat.     

Geopolitical perceptions of the world today

Abstract

This article is based on the author's study of geopolitical perceptions of the power of nations made during the last decade.

He describes the thinking of scholars, especially Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman, as they have related geopolitics to international affairs.

He cites the Soviet domination of Afghanistan as one of the primary current examples of a classical geopolitical objective of the USSR to obtain access to territory opening the way eventually to the Indian Ocean.

He points out that the Soviet Union, dominating much of the landmass of Eurasia, the Mackinder “Heartland,” has polarized world politics and military security alignments because of its totalitarian political system and its expansion into other crucial areas of the world.

For fifty years, the author explains, the United States has been forced to take defensive measures against totalitarian states, in recent times principally the USSR, to prevent their domination of the economic resources and peoples of the world.

The author proposes that the United States, destined geopol‐itically to be a sea power, must have sufficient military strength to develop and protect global maritime and trading links with other seafaring nations on the periphery of Eurasia and in the Southern Hemisphere. The U.S. forces would constitute a peacetime constabulary of the sea to insure the security and prosperity not only of Americans but of their friends and allies.