Compensatory Constitutionalisation: A Comparative Perspective

Legal scholars argue that there is an emerging global compensatory constitution. This denotes a set of compatible supranational and national institutions that fulfil functions hitherto fulfilled by national constitutions. Thus, de-constitutionalisation at the national level, which, as this strand of literature argues, has been brought about by forces such as globalisation, is compensated for. There are strong hints that such constitutionalisation takes place in a formal sense: there is an increasing number of norms which could be seen as elements of a new global constitutional order. But it is far from clear whether these norms make a difference. In this paper we ask whether states comply with this presumably new constitutional order. We distinguish between three types of rights which are granted by a constitution—political, economic and social rights. In this paper we focus on the economic and social components of the emerging global constitution, which have been neglected in previous research. We study compliance with International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms. The ILO is the major source of a global social constitution; the WTO is the major source of a global economic constitution. We show that compliance is very uneven. Whilst formally a global constitution may be in the making, it makes little difference for citizens.     

The leadership deficit in Europe

The emerging global order is challenging multilateralism in the sense that power is becoming situational: centres of gravity are overlapping and transient, and the transnational interdependence that characterises this ‘polypolar’ world challenges small and great powers alike. Emerging powers are forming a ‘new middle', straddling the North-South divide with dynamic new multilateral formations, and prioritising economic self-interest. South Africa is at risk of being relegated to a new global periphery if it gives priority to political solidarity with the global South rather than economic pragmatism in its multilateral strategies. Its comparative advantage in the diplomatic arena is its middle power credentials. If it rationalizes its multilateralism to focus on diplomatic niche areas it can enhance its political influence in global governance institutions, despite its small economic stature.     

Democratic Hegemony and American Hegemony

The emergence of an ‘American democratic empire’, rising from the global informational and transportation revolution, that has its epicentre situated on the territory of the United States (US), has produced a profound metamorphosis in world affairs. National power elites, including those in America, are confronting a dilemma. They are compelled to accept, favour and even defend the so-called globalisation process in order to avoid further erosion of their economic and political power. On the other hand, this process is also directly threatening this same power. The paradox is that the US is the main promoter and defender of last resort of the new global ‘order’, which at the same time is restricting its own margins for sovereign action. The ‘democratic empire’ is thus fostering the rise of a democratic hegemonism at the expense of a ‘US hegemonism’. This democratic hegemonism is a gradually rising—and fragile—consensus on a proliferating set of perceptions and values, stressing individual freedom, responsibility and political and social activism. This consensus arises from the material possibilities of a more individualistic way of life and the increasing capacity of single individuals or organised groups to participate in global and local political decision-making processes. This is a process that favours the empowerment of interest groups whose reference is no longer solely the nation-state. Hence, traditional power elites are progressively losing their ability to present themselves as the ultimate embodiment of a national ‘general interest’. The irony of the seemingly intractable contradiction between US hegemonism and democratic hegemonism is that the actual spreading of the logic of the latter is closely dependent on US power and willingness to defend its own national interest. The greatest challenge for the coming decades will be the construction of supranational governance institutions under democratic hegemony, so as to avoid a classic imperial self-isolation of the US—a situation that would trigger the inevitable demise of democratic hegemonism and, for the time being, of any order as such.     

Globalisation and the Restructuring of State Power in the Arab World

The dynamics of change in the Arab world today are part of a much larger global process–the neo-liberal phase of globalisation–that started in the 1980s and engendered a process of state power restructuring, both for peripheral “weak” states and core industrialised countries. Beyond national differences, the restructuring of the Arab states has implied the consolidation of neo-authoritarian political regimes characterised by fragmentation of the power structure and by an increase in informal modes of government (neo-patrimonialism, corruption), accompanied by the parallel political and economic marginalisation of large sectors of society. These less centralised and more elitist regimes are likely to be more dependent and vulnerable than their predecessors to external pressures and foreign influence.     

Homo Nationis: The Psycho-social Infrastructure of the Nation-state Order

The central argument of this article is that the global expansion of sovereign nation- states has been accompanied by the emergence of a particular type of modern individual, homo nationis. The general significance of this argument lies in the fact that this personality type, which is either taken for granted (untheorised) or ignored, constitutes an integral component of modern social order. That is, in addition to the constitutional and institutional foundations of the state and its political economy, the nation-state has a psycho-social foundation--a "national habitus". The concepts of homo nationis and national habitus underscore the notion that modern individuals are historical individuals, i.e. they have personality structures that are unlike those of individuals in other historical epochs, and that they should be explicitly conceptualised as such, rather than as a transhistorical homo oeconomicus or homo sociologicus. Many fundamental social processes, including those discussed under globalisation, can be better explained with such a conception. The historical- structural context for homo nationis is the world order of nation-states that has only recently finished formally incorporating all other social formations from tribes to the remnants of empires, as well as the specific state-society to which the individual belongs. The article notes the interest that Durkheim and Weber had in habitual behaviour and draws on the exemplary work of Norbert Elias on national habitus to sketch its conception of homo nationis. The article then assembles further evidence for the existence and significance of national habitus by perusing a diverse set of scholarly literatures, including national culture in business studies, national economies and economic nations, nationalism, comparative sociology, and normative political theory.     

Globalisation or ‘glocalisation’? Networks,territories and rescaling

This paper argues that the alleged process of globalisation should be recast as a process of ‘glocalisation’. ‘Glocalisation’ refers to the twin process whereby, firstly, institutional/regulatory arrangements shift from the national scale both upwards to supra‐national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body or to local, urban or regional configurations and, secondly, economic activities and inter‐firm networks are becoming simultaneously more localised/regionalised and transnational. In particular, attention will be paid to the political and economic dynamics of this geographical rescaling and its implications. The scales of economic networks and institutional arrangements are recast in ways that alter social power geometries in important ways. This contribution, therefore, argues, first, that an important discursive shift took place over the last decade or so which is an integral part of an intensifying ideological, political, socioeconomic and cultural struggle over the organisation of society and the position of the citizen. Secondly, the pre‐eminence of the ‘global’ in much of the literature and political rhetoric obfuscates, marginalizes and silences an intense and ongoing socio‐spatial struggle in which the reconfiguration of spatial scale is a key arena. Third, both the scales of economic flows and networks and those of territorial governance are rescaled through a process of ‘glocalisation’, and, finally, the proliferation of new modes and forms of resistance to the restless process of de‐territorialisation/re‐territorialisation of capital requires greater attention to engaging a ‘politics of scale’. In the final part, attention will be paid to the potentially empowering possibilities of a politics that is sensitive to these scale issues.     

They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia

ABSTRACT

This article explores how societal actors in Somalia take part in a transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarisation. We argue that the transnational politics of CVE represents an extension of global militarism by some states, institutions, donors and brokers. CVE works to adapt global militarism and to reconfigure the global-local relationships that sustain it. We explore the roles and influence of local ‘CVE brokers’ in deradicalisation efforts in South-central Somalia. They inadvertently merge the counter-terrorism approach to Somali people, values and territory with non-military means. We show that their key practices – co-ordination, translation and alignment – advance, but also disrupt, alter and transform CVE policy objectives.     

How democratic decentralisation facilitates,sustains, and interrupts market-driven development in India

Democratic decentralisation has emerged as an instrument to implement market-driven development, and elected bodies now extend commercial inputs for commodity production and link households to firms. However, the nature of market-driven development under this condition is understudied. This article focuses on an Indian case where, while access to market inputs was shaped by political capital with elected leaders, narrowing market participation, leaders – now market intermediaries – fostered trust in firms, helping sustain market participation. Conflicts over electoral politics interrupted market production. Markets rely on state institutions and are intertwined with politics, contrary to market proponents’ claims that markets stand above society and are unmediated spaces of exchange.     

Are lions democrats? The impact of democratization on economic growth in Africa, 1980–2010

If we look back at the past two decades, timing seems to point to a close connection between democratic reforms and economic growth in sub-Saharan states. Most countries in the area introduced multiparty politics and made dramatic – if incomplete – democratic progress between 1990 and 1994. Quite strikingly, it is exactly from 1994 to 1995 (and particularly from 2000) that the region began to undergo a period of significant economic progress. Because of the undeniable temporal sequence experienced in the region – that is, first political reforms, then economic growth – some observers pointed to a nexus between democratic progress and economic performance. But is there evidence in support of a causal relationship? As of today, no empirical research has been conducted on the democracy–growth nexus in the early twenty-first century's so-called “emerging Africa”. To fill this gap, we discuss the different arguments claiming an economic advantage of democracies, we present our theoretical framework and carry out an empirical analysis of the growth impact of political regimes in 43 sub-Saharan states for the entire 1980–2010 period. Our findings confirm that African countries, many of which had long suffered the combination of authoritarian rule and predatory practices, derived some economic dividends from democratic progress.     

China,the Interdependent Giant,and the Global Economic Crisis

The global economic crisis revealed China to be an interdependent giant, one whose ‘rise’ was undeniable but also one whose deepening participation in transnational production sharing and network trade made it highly susceptible to an external shock. China weathered the storm relatively well – avoiding a recession, in particular – not because it had ‘decoupled’ from the G7 economies but because its stimulus measures were unusually swift and powerful. One cost, however, has been a worsening domestic imbalance between investment and consumption that carries a heightened risk of asset price inflation, non-performing loans and destabilising levels of local government debt. Meanwhile, China’s ties to the world economy have not fundamentally changed since the crisis began. Despite stirring leader rhetoric and summit declarations, the BRICS have made only modest progress in meeting their goals. East Asia, North America and Europe remain China’s principal trade partners, and cross-border production chains connecting these regions remain the dominant mode of China’s incorporation into the world economy.     

Fragile states

Since the 1990s, states that lack the capacity to discharge their normal functions and drive forward development have been referred to as ‘fragile states’. This article focuses on Africa, which not only has the largest concentration of prototypical fragile states, but has been the focus of attention for scholars, international development agencies, and practitioners. The author reviews competing analyses of the post-colonial African state and concludes that its characteristics of weak institutions, poverty, social inequalities, corruption, civil strife, armed conflicts, and civil war are not original conditions, but are rooted in specific historical contexts. It is essential to understand both the external and internal factors of fragility if such states are to get the assistance and empowerment that they need – not only for the benefit of their impoverished citizens, but also for the sake of global peace, prosperity, and security. Ultimately, it is the citizens of the countries concerned who are responsible for determining when states are no longer fragile – not ‘benevolent’ donors and the international community, whose prime motivation for interventions supposedly to strengthen the state is to ensure that fragile states find their ‘rightful’ places in the hegemonic global order.     

Taking production relations seriously: the role of defence firms in armaments cooperation

ABSTRACT

Coordinating defence-industrial relations towards harmonising and facilitating procurement policies, production processes and the joint operability of their member-states’ national defence sectors, International Armaments Organisations (IAOs) play an important role in armaments cooperation. How can we explain their institutional development? Existing literature tackles this question using International Relations theories to mid-range theories of institutions and integration. However, they adopt overly state-centric viewpoints, assume actor interests as given, and disregard the changes in the global economic landscape that constitute the backdrop of armaments cooperation. In response, we shift the focus onto a key group of actors: the defence firms. Using a Neo-Gramscian Historical Materialist approach, we investigate how the globalisation of the defence market has created a transnational defence-industrial class in Europe, and demonstrate how its economic interests have fundamentally shaped the institutional frameworks of European IAOs. We focus on the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to illustrate our argument. Our conclusions have implications for the study of armaments cooperation, particularly highlighting how the economic nature of this policy domain necessitates a closer look at the global and regional production relations, and the agency of the defence firms.     

Two dimensions of democracy and the economy

Does democracy influence economic policymaking and outcomes? Our study investigates the implications of Dahl's two dimensions of democracy (‘polyarchy’): contestation/competition and inclusion/participation. We hypothesize that increases in democratic competition inspire policy incrementalism, thus lowering growth volatility and generating fewer deep crises. Meanwhile, increases in substantive democratic inclusion – genuine political voice, or democratic participation in the presence of a minimum of contestation – should increase the political weight of relatively poor voters, who have a differentially strong aversion to deep growth crises. A statistical analysis of 149 countries for 1961–98 finds greater democracy associated with fewer years of sharply negative growth (‘crisis’), with both democratic contestation and substantive inclusion contributing to this outcome. Our conclusions question the wisdom of designing economic policy institutions that are intentionally insulated from the democratic process.     

Civil society,the state,and the limits to global civil society

Just as domestic civil society is widely regarded as serving the greater common good of a national democratic political community, global civil society is also promoted as a vehicle through which a host of humanity's ills may be remedied. This article argues that the pinning of such high hopes on global civil society is mistaken, for its proponents have failed to recognise that global civil society is insufficiently analogous to domestic civil society for it to be a similarly positive force. At the national level, civil society functions in a balanced interdependence with the state. At the global level there is no equivalent of the state to provide the necessary scrutiny and regulation that at the national level prevents constituents of domestic civil society from committing injustices.     

The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate Social Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?

In recent years, questions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have developed into a global policy issue. Multinational corporations, as high-profile representatives of economic transnationalisation and globalisation, have come under ever closer scrutiny in regard to their actual development impact, especially in Third World countries. The UN Global Compact as an example for evolving “complex multilateralism on a global level” aims at solving two problems at once, namely the implementation of minimum standards of “good corporate conduct” and socio-economic development, especially of poor countries. In a paradigmatic policy shift, the United Nations has fostered close partnerships with global business to promote CSR and socio-economic development, thereby opening the UN system to private business interests. This shift has been criticised by many civil society actors. Despite its remarkable achievements, the Global Compact reveals many problems of contemporary global governance related to its understanding of globalisation, the implementation and control of its core norms and rules as well as in regard to issues of transparency and democratic legitimacy. Finally, the Global Compact serves to illustrate how international institutions try to adapt to the growing complexity of development and economic governance issues and the larger influence of non-state actors in the global political economy.     

The historical and contemporary representation of Africa in global media flows: Can the continent speak back for itself on its own terms?

Abstract

For decades (perhaps, centuries) global media outlets have framed and represented Africa in a negative light. These media representations have tended to overlook the diverse political, economic, social and cultural experiences of individual African countries – a situation that has led to the uncritical lumping together of African nations under the appellation of ‘Africa’. When this happens, the specific and unique conditions of her 55 nations are squeezed into a one-size-fits-all media frame. Historical and ideological forces, both from within and outside the continent, have conspired to impose this fate on Africa. The philosophies of negritude and the Organisation of African Unity were among the complicit internal forces helping to sustain such views. To evaluate this phenomenon, this essay examines the underpinnings of the framing and representation of ‘Africa’ in global media through a review of the literature, and seeks to answer the question of whether the continent can speak for itself, using four country-specific examples. Current media practices within the African continent, enabled by local media policies and infrastructure, have tended to rhetorically position countries primarily in accordance with their national identities, while attributing the African appellation as a secondary frame of representation.     

Economic foundations of subnational authoritarianism: insights and evidence from qualitative and quantitative research

A growing body of subnational comparative research on democracy has focused attention on ‘subnational authoritarianism’, in tandem with increasing interest in local politics across the developing world. Unsurprisingly, this evolving field of study has been characterized by a diversity – if not a dichotomy – of approaches, with quantitative and qualitative research proceeding along parallel and sometimes intersecting tracks. But scholars working in diverse contexts and with diverging approaches have begun to converge on a set of explanations for the patterns of variance observed in subnational authoritarianism within and across national settings. Drawing on studies of Russia, the United States, southern Italy, Argentina and West Africa, this article shows how scholarship has identified the underlying economic foundations of subnational authoritarianism. Combining the findings of recent qualitative and quantitative studies with the author's own research in the Philippines, this article spells out a set of hypotheses which may help to explain patterns of variance in subnational authoritarianism. Variance in subnational authoritarianism, it is suggested, stems from varying local economic conditions and possibilities for accumulation and maintenance of control over local economies. Further ‘mapping’ of subnational authoritarianism thus requires local fieldwork to complement the strengths – and overcome the limitations – of quantitative research.     

Globalisation as a Problem of Political Analysis: Restoring Agents to a 'Process without a Subject' and Politics to a Logic of Economic Compulsion*

Globalisation, in both the popular and academic vernacular, is presented as a non-negotiable external economic constraint, which must simply be accommodated. Consequently, it is a process whose content, nature and consequences are not amenable--either in practice or in principle--to political, far less democratic, deliberation. It is not at all surprising, then, that the invocation of globalisation should be associated with the logic of economic compulsion and the absence of political choice. This paper argues that the perception of the non-negotiable character of globalisation is both misleading and, at the same time, intimately connected to its depiction as a causal 'process without a subject'. For it is only by failing to specify the mechanisms of complex change, in which agents are necessarily implicated, that generic and agentless processes such as globalisation acquire their necessitarian, non-negotiable and apolitical character. Restoring subjects to the process of globalisation and assessing the extent to which their behaviour is informed by constructions of globalisation are urgent challenges for critical political analysts. They are crucial to the broader task of demystifying globalisation, of holding it open to democratic political scrutiny and, in so doing, of challenging its perceived logic of no alternative. If we are to do this, we must develop an account of globalisation capable of acknowledging and incorporating a dynamic understanding of the relationship between conduct and context, and the material and the ideational. In short, if the character, content and consequences of the process of globalisation are to be held to account, we must first restore agents to this process without a subject and politics to this logic of economic compulsion.     

The Dominican Republic and Central America Free Trade Agreement with the USA: some concerns

This article examines the role of free-trade agreements that integrate profoundly asymmetrical economies in simultaneously benefiting the more powerful nation and exacerbating inequalities within and between the countries involved. The latest in a series of such agreements in the Americas, the Dominican Republic and Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR–CAFTA), opens up the economies of these small nations to US investment and exports, as multinational companies are able to take advantage of lower production costs and weak labour legislation. In the global economy, South–South trade agreements offer a far better alternative for countries with weak institutions and little economic or political leverage.     

Constructivism and globalisation: from units to encounters in international affairs

In this article I argue that there is a link between constructivism and globalisation, and it is a strong one. Constructivism evolved as part of a more general trend in international relations scholarship, a trend that has seen a shift from the study of the relationship between assumed fixed, given units, nation‐states, to the study of encounter between political entities. The study of the encounter, however, affects a subtle but significant change in the assumed spatial context in which international relationships are taking place. The underpinning image of the geographical space, the envelope in which international relationships take place, has shifted from an image of a divided space made of separate and isolated nation‐states to an image of a global space, an arena that give rise to problems of encounters between social units. Encounter theories, of which constructivism in all its variations is a good example, are predicated, in other words, on an assumed global world (however ambiguous and inchoate this notion of global might be), and in that sense they advance, unwittingly, a theory of globalisation.