The Clash of Civilizations and Resolutions

The clash of civilizations is essentially the conflict among individuals from different civilizations. Individuals struggle for access to survival resources, and the scarcity of resources is the fundamental issue. When it becomes difficult to access resources alone, individuals tend to organize themselves in certain ways, and civilization could be one of these ways. However, the conflicts among different civilizations do not arise as easily as Huntington imagines, and the existence of buffer zones between civilizations is one of the factors that constrain conflict. Buffer zones appear with the emergence of civilization boundaries and are clearly visible in macro-and micro- cross-sections. The buffer zones are the concrete expression of knowledge shared by civilizations, and their formation is driven by many factors, such as economy and trade, cultural exchange, interracial neighborhoods, mixed marriages and so on.     

"文明冲突"论

一、亨廷顿其人及其理论背景 文明冲突论是美国哈佛大学教授、该校约翰·奥林战略研究所主任、哈佛国际和地区问题研究所所长、曾担任卡特时代的国家安全委员会主任和美国政治学会主席塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿(Samuel Hunting-ton)首先提出的。1993年夏,他在美国《外交事务》双月刊(Foreign Affairs)上发表了题为《文明的冲突?》(The Clash of Civilizations?)一文。此文以阴郁低沉的笔调为西方人描述了一幅后冷战时代的世界图景,从而在全世界引起了一场大辩论。     

Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict

Huntington's (1993a, 1993b, 1996) clash of civilizations thesis suggests that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to become involved in conflict with one another. To evaluate the empirical accuracy of Huntington's claims, we examined the relationship between civilization membership and interstate war between 1816 and 1992. We find that civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of interstate war during the Cold War era (1946–1988), which is consistent with one aspect of Huntington's thesis; however, we also find that for the pre–Cold War period (1816–1945) states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other than were those of different civilizations, which contradicts Huntington's thesis. Most importantly, our analysis reveals that during the post–Cold War era (1989–1992), the period in which Huntington contends that the clash of civilizations should be most apparent, civilization membership was not significantly associated with the probability of interstate war. All told, our findings challenge Huntington's claims and seriously undermine the policy recommendations that devolve from his clash of civilizations thesis.     

国家民族主义情结,文化民族主义焦虑--评塞缪尔·亨廷顿新著《我们是谁?-美国国家精神面临的挑战》

塞缪尔·亨廷顿是大名鼎鼎的美国哈佛大学教授,哈佛大学国际和地区问题研究所所长。他勤于笔耕,有大量学术著作和论文问世。代表作有《变化社会中的政治秩序》、《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》、《孤独的超级大国》等。亨廷顿以深刻的观察力和敏锐的洞察力著称。其著作评论如潮,名声鹊起,成为美国政治学和国际政治学界一代名家。《我们是谁?——美国国家精神面临的挑战》是他最新推出的又一力作,在美国国内和国际学术界引起广泛的争议与批评。     

The Clash in Public Opinion between Europe and China： What, How and Why

Recent years have seen a tension between Europe and China in public opinion, which began in 2006 and climaxed in 2008 when the Tibet riots and the Beijing Olympics put China under the global spotlight. Europeans and Chinese view each other more negatively than in ＂the good old days＂ and there is a growing perception gap regarding the Chinese government. The media （including the Internet） and public opinion leaders （scholars, human rights activists, dissidents, politicians and diplomats） have played a part in causing this both in Europe and in China, and this paper examines their roles. This paper also identifies three reasons behind the clash of viewpoints： First, lack of common values has exacerbated Europe＇s fear of a rising China; second, both Europe and China use this hostility to help redefine their self-identity; third, different development needs in China and Europe have nurtured very different mindsets. In the future, the European public＇s interest in China will continue to grow and Europe＇s and China＇s perceptions of each other will gradually stabilize. In the long run, whether Europe will accept a rising China depends on China＇s ability to develop a ＂Chinese thinking＂ which suits both China＇s and the world＇s development needs.     

Mexico, the PRI, and López Obrador: The Legacy of Corporatism

Although differences between the Mexican and U.S. political systems have narrowed of late, a huge gulf continues to separate the two systems. At the heart of this disparity lies the phenomenon of corporatism, a social concept that is virtually absent in U.S. political discourse and traditions. This article considers the intellectual origins of corporatism, why it meshes so well with Ibero-Hispanic society, and how Mexico City's former mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, fashioned his own brand of corporatism to confront the administration of Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, who defeated him in the July 2006 presidential race.     

China's New Silk Road: Linking Commerce,Cultures, Civilizations

正From their beginnings——in the glory days of the Han Dynasty in the East and the Roman Empire in the West—the linkages between our countries and even those of parts of Africa had ranged beyond the exchange of material goods.COMMERCE,CULTURE,CIVILIZATION From the beginning,East-West trade transcended the limits of commerce.From the beginning,it     

全球主义思潮和民族国家意识的碰撞--浅论跨国公司的是与非

跨国公司被誉为“把先进技术带给穷国,把低成本产品带给富国”的机制,是“进步的力量”及 “各国间的和平力量”,但在风起云涌的反全球化运动中它却首当其冲。这是为什么?有时,跨国公司又被斥为“资本主义的幽灵”,从事“世界范围的财富掠夺和劳动剥削”,然而发展中国家却趋之若骛。这又是为什么?     

美欧冲突及其启示

美国与法国、德国在最近的伊拉克战争问题上发生了严重冲突。伊战虽已结束,但这种冲突并未消除。美欧冲突的根源与核心不是相互政治文化差异和经济利益争夺,而是其战略安全利益的歧异。只要美国坚持和强化基于独超强势地位的单边主义政策,美欧之间的矛盾和冲突就不会止息,且可能进一步上升与发展。这对美国的全球战略、美欧联盟和整个大国关系势必产生深远影响。美欧冲突的深刻启示是:国际政治的根本驱动力不是经济利益,而是政治战略利益;大国之间的根本矛盾是政治权力之争;一个国家的经济力量不会自动转化为军事力量,更不能替代军事力量;美欧的矛盾冲突不会形成全面对抗,但也具有一定的不可调和性质。     

Civilizations and the twenty-first century: some theoretical considerations

Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has become the centralphenomenon in world politics. Civilizations, once geographically based,are now loosened from fixed space, as migration of peoples andof ideas has accelerated. A focus on the dimensions of intersubjectivitywill give some understanding both of differences among civilizationsand on transformations of civilizations. Attention is thus givento different forms of substantive economies, to historical dominanceand subordination of civilizations and to the reawakenings ofcultures; to what Sorokin called the sensate and ideationaltypes of consciousness and to different forms of spirituality,and to relative orientations toward time and space. Two propositionsare implicit in a concern for civilizations: (i) that thereare alternatives for the human future, and (ii) that if differentcivilizations do coexist, the problem of mutual comprehensionbecomes paramount for the maintenance of world order. The implicationsfor a research program are to study civil societies as the sourcesof intersubjective meanings, the maintenance of the biosphereas the basic material condition of existence of all civilizations,and world governance as the modus vivendi of a plural world.     

The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations(UNAOC)

正The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations(UNAOC)was established in 2005,as the political initiative of Mr.Kofi Annan,former UN Secretary General and co-sponsored by the Governments of Spain and Turkey.UNAOC aims to improve understanding and cooperation among nations and peoples across cultures and to     

The Homegrown Threat: State Strength,Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism

Scholars maintain that, similar to insurgency, terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism, while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for antistate violence, as nonstate actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time that measures to improve state capacity are enacted.     

Machiavelli's Legacy: Domestic Politics and International Conflict

Research examining the effect of regime type on conflict has focused on the democracy/autocracy continuum expounded in the political philosophies of liberal thinkers such as Kant and Schumpeter. While this concentration has yielded impressive results (democratic peace), it seems plausible that other conceptions of regime type may yield similar success. This paper examines the philosophy of Machiavelli and develops a measure of his "imperial regimes." These states, which can either be democratic or autocratic, should exhibit an increased propensity to initiate international conflict. Testing this contention in Renaissance Italy (1250–1494) and the modern international system (1920–1992), this paper finds strong empirical support. Machiavelli's views illuminate key differences between democracies and autocracies that have been previously overlooked. Thus, it deepens rather than replaces our conception of how domestic institutions affect international conflict.     

Countering Aggressive Rising Powers: A Clash of Strategic Cultures

The United States has to contend with rising powers ranging from the prc, which is already an economic and political great power and potentially a military threat, to Al Qaeda and the network of Islamist terror organizations, whose means to power remain limited but whose will to power and aggression are great. In the middle are states that already or may soon possess nuclear weapons. Each of these powers has its own “strategic culture” that affects its decision-making, and attention needs to be paid to how the strategic habits of today's rising and aggressive powers might intersect with U.S. strategy.