联合国对朝制裁的效果及其制约因素

朝鲜不顾国际社会的反对从2006年到2016年先后进行了五次核试验.联合国安理会为阻止朝鲜核开发多次出台对朝制裁决议.各国对制裁决议的执行使朝鲜的政府财政、经济增长率、贸易与投资等都大幅缩减,但并未因此改变朝鲜的拥核决心与核、导发展计划.联合国对朝制裁远未达到迫使朝鲜弃核的目的,制裁效果受制于下列诸多因素,如朝鲜经济具有抗打击与修复能力,政府善于利用制裁加强内部团结,地下经济活跃,绕开制裁的能力不断加强,对外经济萎缩,制裁方企业因为逐利而致“自律缺失”,主要相关方对朝核问题及其解决方案的认识分歧等.国际社会相关各方应认清制裁的效力与前景,将制裁、威慑与“伸手外交”结合起来,才有可能打破朝鲜核导试验导致联合国对其制裁、制裁又使其变本加厉地推进核导试验的螺旋式恶性循环.     

韩国“三轴作战系统”力量建设解析

朝鲜核、导问题是朝鲜半岛最热点问题之一,直接影响半岛局势,牵动东北亚战略均衡.文在寅政府上台后,开展对话与强军并行路线:一方面提倡继承“阳光政策”,主张加强与朝鲜交流合作,打开南北对话局面;另一方面,强调以国防力量的绝对优势实现朝鲜半岛和平.文在寅多次表示要整合陆海空精锐兵力,加快部署包括“杀伤链(Kill Chain)”系统、“韩国型导弹防御系统(Korea Air and Missile Defense,KAMD)”及“大规模惩罚报复(Korea Massive Punishment&Retaliation,KMPR)计划”在内的“三轴作战系统”以应对朝鲜日益加剧的核、导威胁.     

核困境中朝鲜的“外交突围”

近几个月来,由于朝鲜不顾联合国和国际社会的强烈反对,继续进行核试验及远程导弹试射,招致国际社会的严厉制裁,外交上陷于空前孤立.     

二次核试后的朝核危机:六方会谈与“强制外交”

朝鲜第二次核试验让六方会谈陷入了比2006年朝第一次核试验之后更大的僵局。朝此次核试验是在六方会谈于2007年通过了两个共同行动计划之后出现的,结合其国内政治近期的新动向,朝鲜为了"政权安全"而想拥核的意图已经暴露无疑。在目前危机有可能继续升级的情况下,恢复六方会谈十分困难。打破朝核问题僵局,一要看朝鲜国内政治的变化,二要看国际社会是否能协商出一致的办法。本文认为,保障联合国安理会1874号决议的有效实施需要某种程度的"强制外交",朝核问题已经到了要么依托朝鲜内部变量耐心等下去、要么寻求通过某种形式的"强制外交"影响朝鲜局势的艰难选择关头。     

朝鲜二次核试验及其影响

朝鲜第二次核试验既有其稳定体制、为三子接班积累业绩及用核成就弥补经济缺憾的国内政治需要，又有突破与美关系和展示自身核能力的原因。朝鲜核试可能给中国东北带来生态污染，同时，美日利用核危机推进地区导弹防御系统、核试验有可能引发东北亚军备竞赛，这些都使中国处于“被挟持人质”的困境，因此中国有必要反思以往的对朝政策。联合国对朝鲜制裁决议出台后，朝鲜有可能继续试爆核武器或重回谈判桌，美国可能考虑军事应对，半岛也有发生局部战争的可能。     

朝鲜核行为预测:变化无常 还是有章可循

学界普遍默认朝鲜对外政策难以预测，因此大量研究始终停留在“事后”诠释的水平，缺乏预判性、前瞻性研究。作者挑战了这一成见，建立了关于朝鲜核试验和导弹试验行为的短期预测模型。通过以2006～2018年朝鲜媒体国际新闻报道为数据集，以每月的数据作为一个数据样本，通过构建最优特征集，应用朴素贝叶斯方法，建立了朝鲜核行为的预测模型。经过测试，模型对朝鲜历史行为的“预测”整体准确率超过80%。预测效果良好，且模型具有稳健性。根据统计结果建立的预测朝鲜核行为的预警指标体系，可以从长期、中期和短期三个时段实时监测朝鲜核动向。为解决报道搜集相对滞后的问题，运用SARIMA时间序列分析方法，模拟补全出未来六个月的特征集数值，估算数据在统计上具备可信性，预测准确率高。研究发现，朝鲜核行为远非外界印象中那样无章可循，事实上，朝鲜在相当长时间段内的核行为呈现出高度稳定的模式化倾向。即使像朝鲜这样信息极度封闭的国家，采用适当方法仍然可以对其行为做出较准确的预测。这种建模方法能够为发展关于国家行为预测的一般方法提供启发。     

朝鲜核试验与东北亚安全形势

一、美国把朝鲜逼上悬崖歧途朝鲜继今年7月试射导弹之后于10月9日又进行了首次核试验。这一行动使东北亚乃至亚太地区的安全形势骤然紧张起来,世界各国特别是美国、日本和周边国家立即做出强烈反应,联合国安理会在美日的极力敦促下通过了制裁朝鲜的决议。这一切似乎都是理所当然的,是必然的结果。然而,人们不禁要问:朝鲜核问题怎么会恶化到这个地步?这是我们在评析朝鲜核试验对东北亚安全形势的影响时必须首先搞清楚的问题。据韩国《朝鲜日报》9月15日报道,韩国前总统金大中最近在接受法国《外交世界》杂志专访时明确地说:美国布什政府“不…     

维护朝鲜半岛无核化处于成败关键期

朝鲜进行第三次核试验目的是多重的,既有加速其核武器实用化进程的需要,也有令有关国家摊牌,迫使之承认其核国身份的用意。这是朝鲜实现其"做永久核大国"战略目标关键一步。维护朝鲜无核化正处于成败岔道口。朝鲜半岛无核化遭到破坏,包括朝鲜人民在内,各方皆是输家,其中尤以朝鲜的近邻中国受害为甚。     

卢武铉对朝政策“变化”的影响分析

5月中旬 ,在国际社会密切关注美国如何应对朝鲜提出的“一揽子”提案之际 ,卢武铉访问美国 ,并就朝鲜核问题与美国达成共识 ,双方一致强调“绝不容许朝鲜拥有核武器”、“朝韩交流与合作将视核问题的进展情况进行”、“朝鲜半岛和平与稳定一旦受到威胁 ,将协商采取追加措施”。①对此 ,国际社会评称“韩国对朝鲜政策出现重大变化” ,担心北京会谈后一度平缓的朝鲜核问题将因此而再度恶化。其实 ,卢武铉此次访美的目的很明确 :弥合韩美裂痕 ,游说美国放弃对朝制裁。卢武铉就任韩国总统后 ,表示要建立“互惠平等、成熟的韩美关系”② ,拟修改…     

冲突管理与朝核问题

朝核问题陷入僵局并呈现恶化的势头.先是美朝双方在落实《共同声明》的具体步骤上出现争议和美国对朝鲜实行金融制裁,使得第五轮六方会谈第二阶段会议迟迟未能召开;2006年7月5日,朝鲜导弹试射加大了六方会谈复会的难度;10月9日,朝鲜进行的地下核试验更是一石激起千层浪,朝核问题的严重性和紧迫性进一步凸现.     

From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: nuclear impasse or diplomatic opportunity?

The recent death of Kim Jong Il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un, as Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leaves the Northeast Asian region at a crossroads. Given the younger Kim’s lack of political experience, it is reasonable to believe that his priority will be on consolidation of his political and military power base in Pyongyang. More recently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has sent mixed signals with regard to its intentions. On the one hand, North Korea has agreed to a moratorium of its nuclear activities and has even invited the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities; at the same time, however, the DPRK has also announced its plan to launch a satellite in mid-April, using technology derived from the Taepodong missile. Set against this backdrop, we underline and comparatively assess the importance of the USA, the Republic of Korea, and China, all of which will be going through a political transition in 2012. We conclude that Seoul and Beijing are in the best position to reopen the process of dialogue with the DPRK.     

中国与朝鲜经贸关系转型中的困境及对策

新世纪以来,中朝经贸关系保持快速发展态势。其中的重要转变是从过去以战略安全为主导的经贸关系逐步转向以市场为主导的经贸关系,这一转变预示朝鲜正处于向市场经济转型的初始阶段。而在中朝经贸关系持续发展过程中,中国和朝鲜各自存在的问题影响、甚至阻碍着双边经贸关系的进一步发展,为了超越障碍、抓住朝鲜亟须外部支持之时机,中国有必要从重新确定双边经贸关系战略地位等方面入手,积极推动中朝经贸关系深入发展。     

Korean unification in light of the German experience

A well-known concept puts much hope on a desired gradual and reconciliatory unification of Korea. It disregards, however, that the base of unification lies in unity at the interconnected levels of the nation and of the state system, which would therefore require a systemic conversion in North Korea. This, however, cannot be achieved through evolutionary changes. Several internal reasons speak for a longer continuation of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Because the contrasting state systems of the Koreas are not reconcilable, they should decide for rapprochement through normalised interstate relations until a chance for a democratic get-together dawns.(Retired professor and former GDR ambassador to North Korea)     

特朗普政府对朝核问题的危机管理及前景研判

2017年的朝核危机实质上是特朗普政府实施边缘政策而带来的一场危机,即,通过极限施压迫使朝鲜在战争和让步之间做出选择,以推动半岛无核化进程。然而,特朗普政府对朝核问题的危机管理因朝鲜的外交对冲、美国国内政治因素的制约以及国际合作的缺失使双方谈判陷入僵局,美国国内甚至出现是否会默认朝鲜有核的争论。若要真正推动朝鲜半岛无核化取得实质性进展,特朗普政府的现实方案仍是设定有限目标,并由联合国安理会制定可逆条款,约束美朝不信守承诺的行为,以国际社会的担保减少美朝互信缺失带来的消极影响,加快推进半岛无核化的和平进程。     

Threading on thin ice? Conflict dynamics on the Korean Peninsula

Asia Europe Journal - In 2018, both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of their separate...     

Nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula: strategic adaptation,the Abe administration and extended deterrence in the face of uncertainty

Abstract

In the wake of two nuclear tests in 2016, an additional test in 2017 and a series of missile launches by North Korea in 2016–17, Japan's government is facing a critical set of security challenges. These require adaptation and careful planning by the Abe administration and raise important questions about the future of Japanese defence policy, alliance relations with the United States, and cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The following article considers both the history and current state of relations between Tokyo, Washington and Seoul, the relationship between elite and public opinion within Japan, and the character of Prime Minister Abe's leadership at a time of acute strategic risk. While the danger of conflict in northeast Asia should not be minimized, the gravity of the current crisis potentially offers an important opportunity for policy innovation for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).     

朝核问题与东北亚安全合作框架前景

朝核问题已呈现长期化趋势 ,为在建立东北亚安全合作新框架方面抢得先机 ,美、日、韩等国相应做出政策调整。美国加大了“谈”、“压”的力度 ,但尚未将朝鲜作为战略打击的主要对象。日本对朝政策向右摇摆 ,并寻求在建立东北亚多边安全框架方面发挥独自影响。韩国努力增加美韩联盟的平等色彩 ,谋求在解决朝核问题中发挥主导性作用。抓住朝核问题 ,推动建立东北亚“多极”主导多边安全合作机制 ,中国可以大有作为     

韩国对美国“印太战略”的认知与政策

韩国认为,特朗普政府提出的"印太战略"深受日本安倍政府的影响,其主要目的在于拉拢从太平洋到印度洋区域内的国家共同围堵中国。由于这个反华企图,再加上特朗普政府推行"美国优先"政策等,导致该区域内其他国家不愿完全追随美国,所以特朗普任内很难落实"印太战略"。在此认知和判断下,2017年5月上台的文在寅政府开始明确拒绝支持"印太战略"。随着美国白宫、国防部和国务院相关报告的出台,美国推进"印太战略"的意志日益强烈,要求韩国参加"印太战略"的压力也越来越大。与此同时,韩国越来越需要美国协助解决朝核问题和调解韩日矛盾,再加上中韩关系逐渐恢复,所以韩国最终决定用其"新南方政策""对接"美国的"印太战略"。韩国一再强调,此举不是"加入印太战略",而是以东盟为中心,仅围绕经济、治理以及非传统安全领域进行合作。这在很大程度上反映了文在寅政府的"均衡外交"理念和扮演"桥梁国家"角色的愿望。今后韩国如何进一步回应美国的要求,主要取决于未来韩国政权的性质、拜登政府推动"印太战略"的连续性,以及中美关系的变化等。但无论未来内外形势如何变化,韩国都会认识到中国和中韩关系的重要性,而不会一边倒地完全参与到旨在围堵中国的"印太战略"中去,而是有选择地支持与合作。     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy. ¹ 1. If no particular sources are mentioned, the facts of the case are based on reports of the printed editions of the International Herald Tribune, The New York Times and The Wall-Street Journal and the on-line editions of the Los Angeles Times The Washington Post The Korea Herald The Korea Times, The People’s Korea and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)