The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

The Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered: Realism,the Balance of Power in Europe,and America's Decision for War in 1917

According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.     

A 'visionary hope' frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo-American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.     

A ‘visionary hope’ frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo‐American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.     

The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors

Strategic culture, beliefs, and perceived status in an anarchic international system played a crucial role in the development of British nuclear weapons policy from its inception in the Second World War through to the Nassau Agreement in 1962 that provided Britain with a sophisticated submarine nuclear deterrent—Part Two, in the next issue of Diplomacy and Statecraft, will look at the period from 1962 to the present day. Adopting what has been described as a “Conventional Constructivist” approach, the argument is that these ideational factors have helped to shape the character of Britain's nuclear capability and the operational plans for the potential employment of those capabilities. It also provides an insight into how these factors have shaped elite views of the UK nuclear deterrent in the crucial early years of its development.     

The Polonium trail to Islam: Litvinenko,liminality, and television's (cold) war on terror

This article examines how Aleksandr Litvinenko's death links the ‘war on terror’ with an emergent New Cold War. Based on an analysis of BBC and Russian Channel 1 news bulletins, it highlights the centrality of the post-imperial legacy of the two sides in the dispute to the manner of its unfolding, and to how war on terror discourse reconstructs national identities and international antagonisms. It draws on narratology to account for Litvinenko's liminal position inside and outside Islam (his deathbed conversion), the Russian security apparatus (his prior conversion from Cold War spy to noble dissident), and the UK (his ‘good asylum seeker’ status).     

“To Have a Friendly Co-Operation between Canadians and Americans": The Canada–United States Relationship Regarding German Prisoners of War, 1940–1945

This analysis focuses on the Canadian–American relationship during the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1946, both Allies held over 400,000 German prisoners of war [POWs] in hundreds of camps spread across their territory. The presence of these “Hitler’s soldiers” on the North American continent quickly became an issue of close collaboration between the two Powers. Exploring the complex intra-Allied negotiations and collaboration via the Canada–United States exchanges on German POWs, this exegesis challenges the general argument that as a middle Power, Canada found exclusion from Allied policy-making on POWs. Although differences existed between the two detention systems, Canadian and American policy-makers consistently viewed the war captivity as an intra-Allied object of concern. They exchanged security information, shared their experience, and organised visits in camps. This collaboration indicates that Ottawa played a pivotal role in German POW captivity.     

Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth

This article argues that, contrary to the assumptions of international relations scholars, policymakers, and the general public, states do not engage in oil wars. A twofold strategy is employed to support this assertion. First, the article scrutinizes the logical underpinnings of oil war claims, arguing that proponents have underestimated the obstacles to seizing and exploiting foreign resources and, consequently, exaggerated the likelihood of oil wars. Second, the article examines four conflicts that are commonly identified as international oil wars: Japan's attack on the Dutch East Indies in World War II, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Iran--Iraq War, and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. It finds that the desire to control additional oil resources was not the fundamental cause of aggression in any of these conflicts. In the latter two cases, aggression was unconnected to oil interests. In the former, states fought for their survival, not for an oil prize.     

Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality,the Freedom of the Seas,and the Myth of the “Civil War Precedents”

This analysis shows the importance of a problem of maritime law in an on-going debate between two interpretations of Wilsonian neutrality that have competed in various guises since the end of the First World War: can British blockade actions in that war be justified by American Civil War precedents? It proves that reliance on the “Civil War precedents” to justify Britain’s blockade measures was disingenuous from the beginning. British diplomats first used it in October 1914, and Woodrow Wilson embraced it to defend his mild response to British violations of neutral rights to incensed American citizens despite continuous protests from the State Department. Whilst all politicians involved knew the comparison was wrong, historians have embraced it as a justification of Britain’s illegal blockade ever since Arthur S. Link claimed it as the key to understanding Wilson’s neutrality policy.     

论斯大林在东欧推行的联合政府政策(1944—1948)

第二次世界大战结束前后,为维护通过战争获取的胜利果实,斯大林奉行大国合作战略。在围绕被解放欧洲国家未来命运问题的一系列国际会议上,斯大林以许诺"自由选举"换取了英美对苏联提出的"联合政府"建议的赞同。反法西斯大国合作是联合政府体制存在外部条件,在当时的历史条件下,斯大林把人民民主制度看成是长期的当时还未用尽其积极潜力的模式。     

国际冷战初期的一个地方热点--1945年至1950年间的中越边境跨国革命区

自1920年代起,东亚各国,特别是中国、朝鲜和越南的共产主义运动即互相交织并连成一片。东亚三国共产党之间的合作,促成了南北两个跨国革命区的形成,本文探讨的即是1945年至1950年间南方中越边境跨国革命区形成的条件、中越双方合作的方式,以及1950年前与1950年后中越同盟关系的区别。学术界对于1950年后的中越同盟关系已多有论述,但1950年前中共与印支共之间的合作则未引起同等重视。1950年前的中越跨国革命区值得探讨,一是因为这一时期的中越革命同盟关系实际上是第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争的延伸,也是这两场战争的连接点。这种联系突显了这两场战争的国际性,进一步证明第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争都是与冷战密切关联的热战,中越跨国革命区因此成为冷战初期的一个地方热点,并代表了国际冷战的一种地方形态;二是因为这一阶段两党之间的合作为1950年代至1970年代末期的中越关系奠定了基础。在国共内战期间,中共不仅得到了苏联共产党和朝鲜共产党的支持,也得到了印支共产党的援助,中共对于胡志明和越南革命运动的支持也是从印支战争爆发之日起即已开始,1950年后只是扩大了援助的范围,并提高了援助的规模和合作的级别。1950年前两党关系中发生的一些问题也将在1950年后重复出现并带来严重后果。     

世界政治“平靖进程”的技术变迁支撑

二战后,世界政治经历了"平靖进程",具体体现为:"大国罕有战事""国家罕有消亡"。本文融合国际政治经济学与国际安全研究,展示二战后的技术变迁改变了大国的"意愿"与"能力",支撑了世界政治新变化。在马尔萨斯时代,由于技术水平低下,生存物资稀缺,生存保障匮乏,人类面临持续的安全难题。二战后,技术发展影响了当代大国的"意愿"与"能力",让世界政治呈现新变化。技术变迁给大国提供了更为丰富的选择,让大国使用武力征服的意愿降低;同时,随着技术变迁,尤其是在"核革命"后,大国确保自身安全的能力更强,使得"大国罕有战事"。得益于技术变迁,大国利益半径扩大,即便距离遥远地域的变化也与自身息息相关,大国保障遥远海外利益的意愿提升;同时,技术变迁扩大了大国的权力投射,让世界各国,尤其是大国保障体系稳定的能力更强,致使"国家罕见消亡"。随着技术变迁,世界政治已呈现出很多与传统智慧不同的方面,孕育国际交往的新理念。     

Theoretical foundations for the collection of major power‐minor power war data

Two basic theoretical considerations underlie the collection of data on major power‐minor power conflicts. Both perspectives have major power‐minor power relations at their core, and are developed more fully in The Onset of World War (Midlarsky, 1988). First, an hierarchical equilibrium structure consists of two components: (1) two or more alliances (or other loose hierarchies such as loosely‐knit empires) of varying size and composition but clearly including a great power and a number of small powers within each, and (2) a relatively large number of small powers not formally associated with any of the great powers. Time periods during which the hierarchical equilibrium was obeyed did not experience systemic war, while those in which it was violated experienced this type of warfare. The second major theoretical basis is the overlap between great power conflicts exclusively, on the one hand, and great power‐small power conflicts on the other. This combination was a major contributor to the onset of World War I as well as other systemic wars such at the Thirty Years’ War and the Peloponnesian War.     

Not 'by those old books of international law, but only by war': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War

Prevailing understanding of the Ottoman entry into Word War I has focused on the role of Enver Pasha and the so-called pro-German faction in the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This article examines Ottoman views on international relations and the future of the Ottoman Empire in contemporary Ottoman publications. The article concludes that substantial parts of Ottoman society viewed war in 1914 not only as an acceptable course of action, but as a morally justified, potentially liberating, and unifying experience for many Ottomans. Ottoman views, therefore, form part of a much wider non-Western response to Western expansion, and Ottoman entry into World War I is best understood as a reaction against the international system which the Ottoman leaders thought had betrayed them.     

Not ‘by those old books of international law,but only by war’: Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War

Prevailing understanding of the Ottoman entry into Word War I has focused on the role of Enver Pasha and the so-called pro-German faction in the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This article examines Ottoman views on international relations and the future of the Ottoman Empire in contemporary Ottoman publications. The article concludes that substantial parts of Ottoman society viewed war in 1914 not only as an acceptable course of action, but as a morally justified, potentially liberating, and unifying experience for many Ottomans. Ottoman views, therefore, form part of a much wider non-Western response to Western expansion, and Ottoman entry into World War I is best understood as a reaction against the international system which the Ottoman leaders thought had betrayed them.     

韩国出兵越南对其国家发展的影响

参加越南战争对于韩国来说是一次经济发展的有利时机.在与美国关于越南战争问题的讨价还价之中,韩国不仅获得了大量的美国战争补贴,还获得了企业开拓市场的机会,同时在政治上增强了自身的国际地位和与美国讨价还价的砝码.因此,韩国出兵越南参加越南战争成为推动国家发展的一把利剑.     

Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation of the Ethiopia--Eritrea Conflict

The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to defy rationalist explanations. This paper contends that the escalation of the war, from an isolated border clash to the largest conventional war of the past decade, has its roots in the domestic politics of each of the two states. Quasi-democratisation in both countries created environments in which political elites were able to bolster their popular legitimacy by utilising nationalist and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric. The Eritrean leadership believed that a rapid escalation of the border clash to full-scale war would undermine domestic popular support and topple the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime. War escalation had the opposite effect, strengthening the EPRDF domestically and provoking a massive Ethiopian retaliation. War thus served nation- and state-building goals in both countries. This paper provides a theory of the domestic political roots of international conflict in transitional regimes and applies this theory to explain the escalation of a localised border conflict into a highly destructive, full-scale war.     

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the ottoman empire

For more than three decades Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played a crucial role in the development of military relations between the German and Ottoman Empires. He trained and advised the Ottoman army, and commanded Ottoman troops in the First World War. He was a firm believer in the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's political and military revival, this belief reflecting his own conservative, militarist ideology. From 1898 onwards he was also a firm advocate of a German-Ottoman alliance in a future war against Britain, arguing that Ottoman expeditionary forces sent against Egypt and India could deal mortal blows to Britain's world power.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

国际资本对日俄战争的影响

日俄战争充分反映了国际资本势力向外扩张过程中的激烈争夺程度,战争双方均得到不同国家资本势力的支持和同情,从而使其具有强烈的国际色彩。日俄战前,两国仍处于资本阵营中的"二流地位"。因此,两国发生大型军事冲突时,仅仅依靠其本国的经济力量很难支撑长期的战争,这就为其他外国资本势力影响日俄战争提供了机会。在战争过程中及其和平谈判问题上,国际资本势力的运作都对日俄战争产生了重要影响。