How democracy ends,by David Runciman

In 2006, Poland and Romania embarked on renewed lustration programmes. These late lustration policies expanded the scope and transparency measures associated with lustration as a form of transitional justice. While early lustration measures targeted political elites, late lustration policies include public and private sector positions, such as journalists, academics, business leaders, and others in ‘positions of public trust’. Given the legal controversy and moral complexity surrounding lustration, why lustrate so late in the post-communist transition and why expand the policies? The dominant explanation is that lustration is a tool of party politics and is a threat to democratic consolidation. However, the late lustration programmes do not fit this hypothesis neatly. The new laws have been restructured and packaged with other reform programmes, specifically anticorruption programmes. Late lustration has evolved to include economic and social, as well as political concerns. As such, some post-communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe appear to be trying to use lustration as a way to further the democratic transitions by addressing remaining public concerns about corruption, distrust, and inequality.     

Democratization in Mozambique: Trends and practices

This article explores the nature of party political competition four years after Mozambique's first democratic national elections, with particular attention being accorded to the democratization of local government. It commences with an overview of the nature of contemporary party politics in Mozambique. Secondly, the democratization of local government is reviewed. Thirdly, recent political developments are located within the context of major economic reconstruction and escalating corruption. It is concluded that whilst Mozambique does have a stable multi‐party system in the formal sense at least, the substance of genuine multi‐partyism remains elusive, given the near‐total lack of policy alternatives and the proliferation of corruption at the highest levels of political life.     

Textbook citizens: Education for democracy and political culture in el Salvador

Political education can play a crucial role in the process of democratization precisely because it is moulding the norms and expectations of the ‘ordinary’ citizen. After identifying three politico‐cultural obstacles to democratization, ‐ exclusion, violence and institutional manipulation ‐ the article explains how education for democracy programmes might undermine these obstacles. An assessment of several projects follows, including a new school curriculum and non‐governmental organization programmes among young people and poor communities. Given the enthusiasm shown towards such initiatives, it is paradoxical that levels of formal political participation via the parties are very low. The article explores the credibility gap of the parties, especially notable during elections, and which is leading the parties to respond by adopting more participatory practices at the base. El Salvador is in an advantageous position precisely because of its greatest problem: the lack of a liberal democratic history which is now allowing ordinary citizens to ‘create’ their democracy from scratch and to imagine for themselves a new identity as citizens.     

The Perils and Promises of Democratization through United Nations Transitional Authority – Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor

This article compares democratization under the aegis of the United Nations in Cambodia and East Timor. The analysis points to the inherent contradictions and problems of democratization in post-conflict situations and discusses the difficult issue of timing. It draws four generalized conclusions about democratization through international interim governments in post-conflict societies. First, UN-led interim governments can provide a solution to the problems of civil strife, insecurity, and political instability in disrupted states. Second, democratization through international interim governments in civil-war countries can be successful if the transitional authority is able to maintain a stable ‘hurting balance of power’ and to guarantee the parties' compliance with democratic procedures. Third, international interim regimes like UNTAC are designed on the premise that reconciliation among the domestic parties is possible. If the premise turns out to be inaccurate, the very foundation of the peace process is challenged and it will be almost impossible successfully to adjust the interim government's institutional structure. Fourth, the cases of Cambodia and East Timor demonstrate that democratization must be embedded in a comprehensive agenda of political, social, and economic methods of peace-building. If interim governments end before the roots of democracy are deep enough and before democratic institutions are strong enough to stand alone, then the entire endeavour may fail.     

The Arab middle east and the question of democratization: Some critical remarks

While many of the contemporary writings on Middle Eastern political change contend that democratization is under way in the Arab world, this article maintains that much of the recent optimism is due to a lack of terminological clarity. Neither are there any Arab democracies today, nor is there any tangible democratization in this region. Adherents of the democratization hypothesis in the Arab world invoke mainly two arguments: that of a strengthened civil society and that of economic transformation, which are supposed to trigger democratization. Both arguments are discussed with the finding that they do not provide convincing evidence to support such hypotheses. Rather, systemic transitions from non‐democracies to other non‐democratic systems are likely developments in the Arab Middle East. Comparative research should therefore focus not only on the ‘breakdown of democratic regimes’ or ‘democratic transitions’, but develop models better to grasp non‐democratic transitions.     

Contradictions between economic liberalization and democratization: The case of South Korea

This article examines the relationships between economic liberalization and democratization in South Korea. The two processes are often correlated, but in Korea liberalization has been problematic for democratization. Domestic liberalization initially expanded space for labour organizations, but after they appeared to become too active, the process was so managed as to block political activity. This also resulted from pressures brought on by international liberalization, which made competitive wage costs increasingly important and raised the prospect of disinvestment by Korean and foreign firms. Liberalization has not reduced the power of business (the chaebol). Deregulation and privatization have encouraged a transfer of public economic power to the private sector. The increased political role of business is not necessarily beneficial, and the chaebol's economic power represents a threat to democratization in a variety of ways. In previous decades state power rested on economic controls; and the main impetus for democratization has come from the expansion of civil society through economic development, rather than from economic liberalization. State intervention in the economy may continue to be required to protect the position of certain civil society groups and to control business power, but domestic and international liberalization have challenged both of these functions and may increasingly curtail them in the future. Thus, close examination of the specifics of liberalization in South Korea show no automatic positive correlation can be made between economic and political reform without risking either reductionism or reification.     

Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-building in Kosovo

This article examines the relationship between democratization and the state with reference to recent political developments in the non-state entity of Kosovo. Existing analyses of the role of the state in democratic transitions provide critical insights into the politics of democratization, but have suffered from a lack of consensus regarding the concept of the state itself. This study distinguishes three separate dimensions of statehood – recognition, capacity and cohesion – and argues that each has separate implications for transition politics. Analysis of democratic political development in Kosovo suggests two conclusions: first, that international recognition of statehood should not be viewed as a prerequisite for democratization, and second, that problems of state capacity or state cohesion present far more fundamental challenges to successful democratic regime change.     

War and Democratization: Legality,Legitimacy and Effectiveness

Promotion of democracy in post-war and post-conflict societies became a hot topic during the 1990s. External actors linked their peace-building efforts to the promotion of democracy. Four modes of promotion of democracy by external actors can be distinguished: first, enforcing democratization by enduring post-war occupation (mode 1); second, restoring an elected government by military intervention (mode 2); third, intervening in on-going massacres and civil war with military forces (‘humanitarian intervention’) and thereby curbing the national sovereignty of those countries (mode 3); and fourth, forcing democracy on rogue states by ‘democratic intervention’, in other words, democracy through war (mode 4). In this special issue we consider the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the four modes where the international community of states not only felt impelled to engage in military humanitarian or peace-building missions but also in long-term state- and democracy-building. All cases analysed here suggest that embedding democratization in post-war and post-conflict societies entails a comprehensive agenda of political, social, and economic methods of peace-building. If external actors withdraw before the roots of democracy are deep enough and before democratic institutions are strong enough to stand alone, then the entire endeavour may fail.     

The transnational protection regime and democratic breakthrough in Taiwan and South Korea

External state pressure is understood to have played a causally significant role in democratic breakthrough in Taiwan and South Korea during the 1980s. This article problematizes the international dimensions of democratization in Taiwan and South Korea by first providing a revisionist account of external agency which involved complex networks of transnational nonstate and substate actors. These included human rights activists, Christian churches and related ecumenical organizations, members of the Taiwanese and Korean diaspora communities in the US, academics and students, foreign journalists, and members of the US Congress. In forming a transnational “protection regime” during the 1970s and 1980s to protect the political opposition from repressive governments, they contributed to the development of effective democratic movements. The case studies provide us with a more comprehensive view of the international dimensions of democratization, speaking to both the country specific and general theoretical literatures on democratization at the same time.     

A process tracing plausibility probe of uneven democratization's effects on cooperative dyads: The case of Zambia and Zimbabwe 1980–1993

In this article we conduct a plausibility probe of the hypothesis that uneven democratization decreases cooperation within primarily cooperative dyads. This hypothesis is derived from a combination of Remmer's theory of democratization and international cooperation with democratic peace theory. The case of cooperation and conflict between two small powers, Zambia and Zimbabwe, from the latter's independence in 1980 to 1993 fits Eckstein's criteria for a useful plausibility probe. In addition to overall, bilateral and regional interactions between the two countries, we examine relations in the political, economic, strategic, and physical environment issue areas. Methodologically, we combine time series analysis of events coded in the COPDAB format and interviews with policy makers. We find that, although net cooperation between the two countries remained positive during the entire 1980–1993 period, it decreased significantly overall and in economic issues after the beginning of the Zambian democratic transition in June 1990. Our data allow us to trace the process involved in this decline in net cooperation, ruling out some alternative explanations but not concurrent Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and showing how even slightly uneven democratization was an important cause because it decreased similarity and trust, while not decreasing transparency, and increased uncertainty and thus nationalist responses. We conclude that this plausibility probe justifies further systematic research on the effects of uneven democratization on cooperative dyads to test our hypothesis on cases with and without SAPs, and suggests the utility of further probes of the effects of different types of uneven change on various types of dyads.     

Democratization by association? Brazil’s social policy cooperation in Africa

The field of international development has undergone major shifts as South–South cooperation expands. New questions are being raised about the political implications of this cooperation, including with respect to democracy and human rights. In this paper, we analyse the role of Brazil, a democratic provider of South–South cooperation, in fomenting these principles in Africa. We find that explicit democracy promotion makes up a minority of Brazil’s cooperation with Africa. However, Brazil also engages in social policy initiatives which, despite not being labelled as democracy and human rights promotion, are inspired by Brazil’s own experiences with re-democratization—what we refer to as “democratization by association”. We argue that these initiatives—mostly geared towards institution-building in areas where Brazil seeks to promote itself as a hotbed of policy innovation—are disembedded from the political context in which they arose in Brazil. While this disembeddedness allows the Brazilian state to maintain its official discourse of non-interference, it also makes the political impact of Brazilian cooperation in Africa highly uncertain.     

Cross‐cutting issues and the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan

This article examines the cause of Taiwan's recent successful democratic consolidation. It argues that cross‐cutting issues in the electoral process allow democratic systems to periodically generate new winners. The prospect of reasonable certainty to win gives different political groups, including previously anti‐system or semi‐loyal groups, incentives to adhere to the democratic rules of the game. This process contributed to the democratic consolidation in Taiwan. More specifically, the non‐mainstream faction of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, which initially opposed democratization, and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which wanted more radical constitutional and political reforms, came to accept the post‐transition democratic regime due to the emergence of new electoral issues. New issues surrounding corruption and socio‐economic reforms allowed both the non‐mainstream faction of the KMT and the DPP to advance their interests through the democratic electoral process.     

Demand for democracy in resilient authoritarianism: evidence from rural China

This article investigates the sources of public demand for democratic institutions under authoritarian rule. While a growing body of literature recognizes that in authoritarian polities such as China, economic development does not lead to democratization in a linear fashion, our understanding of the sources of democratization in resilient authoritarianism remains limited. This article provides an empirical test of the three most compelling theories to subsequently emerge: modernization theory, social capital theory, and institutional theory. The results of a survey conducted in the countryside of Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces provide support for the institutional approach in understanding public demand for democracy in rural China, while the modernization theory and social capital theory are shown to be less useful. Specifically, results show that people working in the government system are core supporters of the regime, whereas income, education attainment, social trust, and one’s satisfaction with regime institutions turn out to be irrelevant and do not serve as direct sources of public demand for democracy. These results extend our understanding of the complex interaction between an authoritarian regime and its people, shedding new light on the democratic prospects for resilient authoritarianism.     

Globalization,democratization, and the Arab uprising: the international factor in MENA's failed democratization

What explains the almost wholly negative impact of international factors on post-uprising democratization prospects? This article compares the utility of rival “diffusionist” and neo-Gramscian political economy frames to explain this. Multiple international factors deter democratization. The failure of Western democracy promotion is rooted in the contradiction between the dominance of global finance capital and the norm of democratic equality; in the periphery, neo-liberalism is most compatible with hybrid regimes and, at best, “low intensity democracy”. In MENA, neo-liberalism generated crony capitalism incompatible with democratization; while this also sparked the uprisings, these have failed to address class inequalities. Moreover at the normative level, MENA hosts the most credible counter-hegemonic ideologies; the brief peaking of democratic ideology in the region during the early uprisings soon declined amidst regional discourse wars. Non-democrats – coercive regime remnants and radical charismatic movements – were empowered by the competitive interference of rival powers in uprising states. The collapse of many uprising states amidst a struggle for power over the region left an environment uncongenial to democratization.     

Corruption

This article engages with the ways in which corruption has taken centre stage in much development policy making and rhetoric. It argues that there is a need to destabilise ‘taken for granted’ assumptions about what corruption is and how it operates. This means generating an understanding of how meanings of corruption vary, and how this variation is determined by the social characteristics of those engaged in corruption talk. It also means examination of how discourses of corruption and anti-corruption are translated from international to national and local stages – from the anti-corruption ‘establishment’ to the realities of bureaucratic encounters in diverse contexts.     

欧盟的中东民主治理：以阿富汗为例

欧盟作为新的国际行为体，在新的历史时期积极参与全球治理，尤其是在中东地区的民主治理。欧盟的中东民主治理体现出了相互区别又相互联系的两种角色：规范的角色和民事的角色，而其民主治理的动力、动机和方式无不根植于此并充满逻辑联系。阿富汗作为新的国际秩序下的破碎国家，其政治重建和民主化发展意义尤为重大，欧盟以异于美国的战略将其纳入中东民主治理之下来促进。欧盟与阿富汗的互动促进了欧盟规范在阿富汗的内化及该国民主化的发展，这在一定程度上实现了欧盟的初衰。     

Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes

Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.     

Transformative pathways to world government: a historical institutionalist critiquea

Proposals for world government (WG) have come from a variety of sources including international relations (IR) scholars, economists, normative political theorists and global justice academics. In general, these visions are couched as ideal models to be approximated as closely as possible. The key argument of the article is that, in evaluating the democratic potential of these proposals, we should focus upon the process of designing and building a WG. This is because there is an ineluctable gap between ideal conceptualization and non-ideal realization that emerges through institutionalization. I employ a historical institutionalist lens to describe and problematize potential institutional shifts along a WG pathway. I argue that institutionalizing these ideal visions in our current, non-ideal context would actually exacerbate the democratic deficit. Specifically, building a WG would likely entrench existing inequalities, expand the authority of unaccountable bureaucrats and limit institutional improvements over time. These three points respectively undercut three core values of democratization: equal participation, accountability and institutional revisability. Given this argument, I conclude that an incremental approach—which focuses on advancing values rather than moving towards an ideal model—represents a more productive pathway for global democratization.     

The Determinants of Palestinians' Attitudes Toward Peace with Israel

This study explains the variations in the Palestinians' support of the peace process with Israel. It uses multivariate Logit analysis, employing a large public opinion poll conducted in January 2000. It tests seven hypotheses, drawn from various perspectives, on the conditions of Palestinian support of or opposition to the peace process.
The study supports several of our hypotheses including the positive association between the Palestinians' perceptions of democracy and the support of peace and Palestinian women's support of the peace process. These results are important because they reconfirm the findings of the vast international relations literature, which established a strong linkage between democracy and peace and that women are more peace-oriented than men.
The study further suggests that the Palestinians associate their support of the peace process positively with their trust of domestic political institutions, a sound nation-building process, and governmental public accountability, and negatively with the perception of governmental corruption. It also reveals that the Palestinians' positive evaluation of their domestic institutions and Israel's commitment to a just and fair settlement to the conflict are more important determinants of the support of the peace process than efforts to improve their economic conditions and that the economic conditions have, at best, a small impact upon the support of or the opposition to peace. Lastly, the study points to the presence of a positive relationship between support of the peace process and each of political institutionalization, party identification, and the second level of leaders. This finding points to an emerging trend among Palestinians toward political maturation and stabilization of their domestic politics.     

Frozen political liberalization in Jordan: The consequences for democracy

Prompted by serious economic difficulties, in 1989 the Jordanian government launched a series of political liberalization measures aimed at rejuvenating the country's parliament and party politics, and restoring freedom to the media. Despite much initial enthusiasm, the liberalization process has become frozen and there have been few substantive moves toward a meaningful transition to democracy. Two developments have combined to result in this democratization freeze. One is the reluctance of the state to give up many of its powers in relation to the forces of civil society. A second is the inability of professional associations and the emerging parliamentary opposition bloc to formulate and institute viable links within themselves and with other social actors in an attempt to pressure the monarchy for more political concessions. The hybrid, semi‐democratic, absolutist monarchy that has emerged in the process has enhanced its popular legitimacy by adopting certain democratic trappings, which, in the short run at least, appear detrimental to a more meaningful transition to democratic rule.