Lifting the 'No Haste,Be Patient' Policy: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

Cross-Strait relations remain deadlocked following Chen Shui-bian's inauguration as Taiwan's president. Amid this political stalemate, Chen's administration decided to change the 'no haste, be patient' ( jie-ji yueng-ren ) policy while refusing to endorse the 'one China' principle. While this policy change is in response to domestic demands, Chen and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are unlikely to reap any benefit from these actions without active cooperation from China's leaders. Beijing will continue to use its economic clout in an attempt to pull Taiwan into political union, as Taipei needs to nurture an environment favourable for domestic and foreign investment in Taiwan in order to maintain its competitive edge over China and thus preserve its de facto independence. Beijing's leaders will need to rethink their rigid stand on the 'one China' principle, since increased cross-Strait economic integration may not lead to the expected political union they desire.     

New trends in the cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan

Although the political relation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan has been stagnating in recent years, the bilateral trade and exchange between the two sides are booming rather swiftly. Beijing has changed its policy from using force against Taiwan even without independence in the year 2000 to only using force against independence in 2005. It indicates the maintenance of the status quo, the tolerance of the ROC legal structure, and peaceful coexistence only if Taiwan did not cross the Rubicon. While the opposition tries to reconcile with Beijing, the government keeps on its policy of confrontation. But still, Beijing has been trying hard to collaborate with the USA on the Taiwan issue, while offering increasing amount of friendly measures toward the Taiwanese people. Due to tremendous domestic and international pressure to the government in Taipei, its rapprochement to the Mainland is more and more likely to take place in the near future.We can set the Cornell visit of the former President Lee Teng-hui in summer 1995 as the start of the current stagnation of the cross-Strait relations because it triggered the PLA’s military manoeuvre in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, except for a short period of rapprochement in autumn 1998, the bilateral relations have never been improved. See: Tang 2002; ; ; .

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Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy

Soft power, like so much else in relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, is asymmetrical and freighted with implications for U.S. policy and U.S.-China relations. For China, soft power largely serves—or strives—to reduce alarm (or at least reaction) among other states concerned about China's new-found hard power or, perhaps more realistically, the hard power that China's economic rise can underwrite. Much of the value for Beijing of soft power is—and is likely to remain for quite some time—its potential contribution to reducing the likelihood that other states will react to China's rising hard power in ways that could threaten China's interests.     

Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?

The increasingly prosperous, mighty, and assertive China is arguably the most powerful country blocking democracy today. In addition to withholding democratic rights of one-fifth of the world's population, authoritarian China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant traction. China thus constitutes a challenge to democracy promoters. But does Beijing also countervail democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States? After a summary of the party-state's response to democracy promotion at home, we test the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders. We do so by focusing on the most likely cases in China's near-abroad: Myanmar and Hong Kong. Our analysis of Myanmar suggests that Beijing remains focused on securing economic and security interests irrespective of regime type when regime survival at home is not at risk. The case of Hong Kong, on the other hand, allows us to identify the tactics used by Beijing when there is a significant risk of democratic spillover. This case also demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is able to stifle United States and European Union democracy support when it wishes to do so.     

From the 'Olympic Formula' to the Beijing Games: Towards Greater Integration across the Taiwan Strait?

The award of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing has animated the people of China, but has raised hopes as well as fears among people in Taiwan. The Olympic movement has enabled both countries to participate in international sports under the so-called 'Olympic formula'. It has also stimulated cooperation between them in such areas as science and trade. Can the Beijing Games bring the two sides closer together through the co-hosting of some events? Three issues may stand in the way: operational feasibility, juridical consent and political agreement. The most intractable problem is the 'one China' principle, a condition set by Beijing for further cooperation. The co-hosting project is not impossible, provided both sides have the political will to make it work. At the moment, however, this political will seems to be wanting.     

Taiwan and Japan in the Tsai Era

Under the administration of Taiwan's first woman president, Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan-Japan relations are likely to deepen while relying, as far as possible, on non-governmental and quasi-governmental working relationships. This reflects the Japanese government's desire to avoid friction with China while endeavoring to protect its strategic and economic interests by partnering with Taiwan. Concern about these developments is already evident in the People's Republic of China.

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Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan

Over the last 20 years, Taiwan has witnessed an impressive transition from authoritarian one-party rule to liberal democracy. This included considerable changes in the relations between the civilian political elites and the armed forces. While under the emergency laws of the authoritarian regime the military had been a powerful political force, during democratization the elected civilians have managed to curb military political power and have successively widened their influence over former exclusively military prerogatives. This article argues that the development of Taiwan's civil–military relations can be explained as the result of civilians using increasingly robust strategies to enhance their influence over the military. This was made possible by a highly beneficial combination of historical conditions and factors inside and outside the military that strengthened the political power of the civilian elites and weakened the military's bargaining power. The article finds that even though partisan exploitation of civilian control instruments could potentially arouse civil–military conflict in the future, civil–military relations in general will most likely remain supportive of the further consolidation of Taiwan's democracy.     

Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military Modernization

According to a recent RAND report, the United States will not be able to defend Taiwan from Chinese military aggression by 2020. However, this study, like many others, raises more questions than it answers about the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) current defense posture.¹ Is there a Chinese plan to claim Taiwan by force after 2020? In contrast to the conclusions of the RAND report, this article argues that China's strategic approach is not designed primarily for fighting a war over Taiwan, or over any other matter of critical interest to China, but to create a disposition of forces so favorable to Beijing that China will not need to fight a war. Rather than thinking of China's strategy as a blueprint for using military power to secure territory or vital resources, such as oil, it may be more appropriate to consider the possibility that Beijing's actions are directed at obviating the need to fight. Beijing may calculate that it can render its interests unassailable by constructing a network of friendly or dependent states by means of arms transfers and the like. The basis of such a strategy is the assumption that China's prospective enemies, finding themselves encircled or obstructed by powers aligned with Beijing, will be unable to envision a military campaign to deny China oil at an acceptable level of costs. They will, therefore, be deterred from threatening China, e.g. by interrupting its oil supplies. It is a mark of the efficacy of this broader deterrence strategy that American security analysts are already ruling out a successful defense of Taiwan in 2020. Similarly, the early stages of an effort to insulate China from an energy-related challenge are already visible.     

The EU's policy towards China and the arms embargo

Since the rise of the “Middle Kingdom” in recent years most European leaders consider this major Asian power as the most important opportunity and challenge in the years to come, not only economically and commercially but also politically and strategically. The EU's China policy is promising, and EU–China ties have been smooth and comprehensive despite bilateral trade and human rights disputes. Concerning Cross Strait relations the domestic political development in Taiwan has a strong impact on the peace and stability in the region because Beijing has never renounced the use of force against the island in case of its formal independence. Given its large bilateral trade deficit, the EU's potential arms exports to China remain significant to the European countries. But this prospect aroused great concern from the US, Russia and Japan. Nonetheless, the Anti-Secession Law from Beijing against Taiwan in mid March 2005 and the likely change of government in the German elections in autumn 2005 on top of the failures of the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands in June 2005 will affect the EU decision on the embargo.     

Public Opinion,Foreign Policy,and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait

The delicate security balance in the Taiwan Strait is threatened on several fronts. In Taiwan, democratization has placed Taiwan independence as one of the most salient issues in its domestic politics, and the rise of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to power has created uncertainty regarding Taiwan's future policy on the Taiwan independence-unification issue. In this paper, we investigate whether external factors such as China's military threat and the United States' security commitment to Taiwan can affect the development of the Taiwan independence movement. An interesting finding from our analysis is approximately one-third of the people in Taiwan can agree simultaneously on two seemingly contradictory issues: to unite with China if China becomes democratic and to declare independence if China will not use force and peace can be maintained. Voters in Taiwan with conditional preferences create opportunities for China and the United States to formulate foreign policy that will restrain Taiwan's drive toward independence.     

Stuck in the Middle: Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry,the U.S.-China Tech Fight,and Cross-Strait Stability

The Trump administration has worked to restrict the People's Republic of China's ability to manufacture and acquire semiconductor chips since 2018. Caught in the crossfire of this burgeoning tech war is Taiwan, which is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor chip manufacturer. With the United States banning companies that use U.S. technology in their chip manufacturing process from doing business with Huawei, TSMC can no longer do business with the Chinese tech company, one of its most important clients. Until the Trump administration announced the license restriction on Huawei, TSMC had managed to walk the fine line of doing business with both China and the United States, without riling either. This article argues that the TSMC example is indicative of how great power competition between the two countries will play out for the foreseeable future. TSMC has announced that it will build a new factory in Arizona as it faces Chinese firms poaching its employees and Chinese actors hacking its systems and code for trade secrets—all actions demonstrating how great power competition will play out for tech dominance. Avoiding direct live-fire conflict, China and the United States will work to restrict the other's actions and development by forcing important tech companies, such as TSMC, into picking a side.     

The 2016 Election and Prospects for Taiwan's Democracy

This article reviews the results of the 2016 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, in which the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a sweeping victory. It identifies the likely reasons for the DPP's success and then explores the implications of the outcome for Taiwan's political future, relations with Mainland China, and relations with the United States.     

When Rivalry Goes Viral: COVID-19, U.S.-China Relations,and East Asia

Regional security and regional order in East Asia are shaped profoundly by the United States, the People's Republic of China, and U.S.-China relations. The COVID-19 crisis accelerated a negative trajectory in the relationship between Washington and Beijing. As with so many issues, here, too, the situation in the time of COVID is much like the status quo ante, only more so. The pandemic-related and pandemic-exacerbated problems in U.S.-China relations pose challenges for security and stability in East Asia. They do so in ways that several theories of international relations would predict. This is the first of a two-part series, the latter of which will appear in an upcoming issue of Orbis.     

J. R. Winkler,Nexus. Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I

Microstates are unique participants in the international arena. Many of the world's microstates are located in the Pacific basin and are characterized by limited natural and human resources. Because they are so small and isolated, the Pacific microstates are frequently overlooked diplomatically in the larger, international system. Conversely, diplomacy is often their only effective instrument of statecraft for making an impact within the international system on issues critical to their national interests.

In contrast to the belief that the microstates are mere pawns in international relations, this text will view the Pacific microstates as active participants in diplomacy by exploring their involvement in two broad strands of Pacific Rim diplomacy: ? The political struggle between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan for influence in the Pacific region, diplomatic recognition, and support in the United Nations and other international agencies.

? Fishing issues between Japan, the microstates, and other regional powers as illustrated within the International Whaling Commission.

The article will show that reciprocity is the key concept and mechanism governing their diplomatic arrangements with Taiwan and Japan. The conclusion suggests two ideas for these microstates in dealing with their larger neighbors on the above issues, and summarizes their active, rather than passive, diplomatic role in Pacific Rim international relations.     

Marketization,Class Structure,and Democracy in China: Contrasting Regional Experiences

After two and half decades of market reforms in China, the question of whether reforms have created favourable social conditions for democracy and whether the country's emerging entrepreneurial class will serve as the democratic social base have become hotly debated issues in both academic and policy circles. Based upon an analysis of two regions – Sunan and Wenzhou, the two prototypical local development patterns in China – the article argues that different patterns of economic development have produced distinct local level social and political configurations, only one of which is likely to foster the growth of democratic practices. It suggests that China's political future is largely dependent upon the emerging class structure and class relations that reform and development have produced. If the market reforms and economic development only enrich a few (like the Sunan case), then the possibility of democratic transition will likely be very bleak. Nonetheless, the possibility of a brighter alternative exists, as demonstrated by the Wenzhou case. These arguments thus link China's political transition to critical social conditions, echoing Barrington Moore's influential work on the social origins of democracy and dictatorship.     

Political Aspects of Taiwan's Security in a New Asian Environment

With the announcement in 2010 that sovereignty over the South China Sea was a national interest comparable to Taiwan or Tibet, China has created a new geopolitical situation in East Asia. Although Peking would seem to expect that her neighbors, all relatively smaller than China, will accept these new claims, both initial reactions and political science theory suggest instead that a countervailing coalition will be formed to offset them. Just what Taiwan will do, however, is an important question given the island's key strategic position, its democratic government, and its increasing connectedness with China. This essay reviews the history of American approaches to East Asian alliances, arguing that at one time Washington considered dropping ties with Tokyo in favor of Peking. Then it examines the new situation, finding the United States uneasily seeking to balance China and Taiwan likely to join in.     

The Construction of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Study of China's Active Involvement

The central argument of this paper is that China's economic diplomacy not only improves its political relations with ASEAN countries but also promotes regional economic co-operation and integration. This paper is organised into two parts. The first part starts with a review of Chinese foreign policy changes in order to show how Beijing adjusted its foreign policy to pursue its economic and political interests. It also examines China's political and institutional efforts to forge the coming Free Trade Area (FTA) with ASEAN. The second part studies China–ASEAN trade relations from three aspects: the adjustment of Chinese industrial structure, foreign direct investment to both sides and the formation of a production network with China at the centre. While difficulties and problems are unavoidable in the construction of CAFTA, with China's active efforts and the enhanced co-operation between China and ASEAN, the building of CAFTA is moving towards fulfilment.     

“Trade with the Devil”: Rubber,Cold War Embargo,and US–Indonesian Relations, 1951–1956

This article examines the issue of rubber in US–Indonesian relations in the 1950s. Indonesia, attempting to promote its economic development, sought to sell natural rubber to the Communist People's Republic of China. In so doing, it risked alienating the United States, which for its part led anti-PRC trade embargo efforts while at that same time attempting to woo Third World neutrals such as Indonesia. The article explores the course and complexities of this issue on both sides, and concludes that, in the end, Washington decided that enforcing an increasingly questionable rubber embargo was not worth a rupture in relations with Jakarta. It also finds that President Eisenhower, although keenly aware of the issues at stake, did not provide the decisive leadership that would allow Washington to take the initiative, rather than react to circumstances, regarding the sale of rubber to the People's Republic of China.     

From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: nuclear impasse or diplomatic opportunity?

The recent death of Kim Jong Il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un, as Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leaves the Northeast Asian region at a crossroads. Given the younger Kim’s lack of political experience, it is reasonable to believe that his priority will be on consolidation of his political and military power base in Pyongyang. More recently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has sent mixed signals with regard to its intentions. On the one hand, North Korea has agreed to a moratorium of its nuclear activities and has even invited the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities; at the same time, however, the DPRK has also announced its plan to launch a satellite in mid-April, using technology derived from the Taepodong missile. Set against this backdrop, we underline and comparatively assess the importance of the USA, the Republic of Korea, and China, all of which will be going through a political transition in 2012. We conclude that Seoul and Beijing are in the best position to reopen the process of dialogue with the DPRK.     

National Unification and Mistrust: Bargaining Power and the Prospects for a PRC/Taiwan Agreement

Can states that mistrust each other as much as the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan reach unification agreements? Unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds: the unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to use its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. Our argument accounts for two historical cases—the nineteenth century Argentine and German unifications—and helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan. We describe several possible future scenarios for cross-Strait relations and show that democratization in the PRC is not a necessary prerequisite for a unification agreement between the mainland and Taiwan.