战后初年苏联农民的反集体农庄情绪及其产生原因

集体农庄是十月革命后苏维埃政权建立起来的新的土地占有和使用形式。但是随着苏联在反法西斯战争中的胜利和国内环境的变化,苏联农民表现出了强烈的反集体农庄情绪。战后初年在苏联农民中出现反集体农庄情绪主要有以下几个原因:首先是农民目睹了更好的农业组织形式,进一步认识到了集体农庄制的弊端;其次是战后初年农民负担的进一步加重;第三就是党内严重的腐败现象。     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

苏联对意大利和东欧政策研究（1943—1947年）

在意大利战后安排问题上,苏联同美英两国的争斗早在二战后期就已经开始。意大利问题主要是战前殖民地等问题。出于利用英美矛盾为自己谋利的目的,苏联并不打算削弱意大利。由于英美两国在处理意大利问题上具有优先权,只允许苏联名义上参与意大利事务,并没有实际发言权,导致苏联在意大利问题上的变化以及在东欧问题上的强硬,美苏矛盾趋于尖锐化。苏联战后安全带政策目的是将东欧纳入自己的势力范围。苏联对意大利政策与对东欧政策是紧密联系在一起的。苏联从起初的不打算削弱意大利转变为不过分削弱意大利的政策,正是用来控制东欧并使其成为自己势力范围的政治筹码。这也成为美苏冷战的起源之一。     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo-French Third World Power, 1945-1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907-20

As the United States was becoming a major power in the early years of the twentieth century, it was confronted by a dilemma in its desire to promote a democratic free-enterprise system among the republics of the Western hemisphere. Should the United States act unilaterally or collectively to pursue its goals? The rise of the Pan American Union as a collective political and economic organization provided the means to deal with such issues as revolution and economic instabiliry in Latin America. Nations such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic provided early opportunities to test US policy approaches. However, the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and subsequent civil war, provided a major testing ground for both the Taft and Wilson administrations. Ultimately Woodrow Wilson chose to pursue unilateral military intervention in Mexico despite the offer from the Pan American Union and its director, John Barrett, to provide collective negotiations to avoid war and establish political stabiliry in Mexico. As we enter the twenry-first century, the United States finds itself still confronted by these choices on a global scale.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

A Problem Postponed: Britain and the Future of Austria-Hungary, 1914-18

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907–20

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

论斯大林在东欧推行的联合政府政策(1944—1948)

第二次世界大战结束前后,为维护通过战争获取的胜利果实,斯大林奉行大国合作战略。在围绕被解放欧洲国家未来命运问题的一系列国际会议上,斯大林以许诺"自由选举"换取了英美对苏联提出的"联合政府"建议的赞同。反法西斯大国合作是联合政府体制存在外部条件,在当时的历史条件下,斯大林把人民民主制度看成是长期的当时还未用尽其积极潜力的模式。     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

Demographic manipulation in the Caucasus (with special reference to Georgia)

The author discusses political developments in the Caucasus region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The focus is on the events in Georgia that led to the war in South Ossetia (particularly in Abkhazia), and the author suggests that this development is the latest in a 200-year history of demographic manipulation of minority peoples by the region's two major powers, Russia and Georgia. Parallels are drawn between the Georgian war in Abkhazia and Russia's war in Chechenia. The author questions the value of the principle of territorial integrity, and suggests that alternative principles safeguarding the rights of ethnic minorities would be more appropriate in these circumstances.     

Time Present and Time Past: Rivalry and the Duration of Interstate Wars, 1846-1985

This article sits at the intersection of the rivalry, war duration, and bargaining literatures, suggesting that histories of armed conflict between states increase war duration through their effects on the selectorate and the wartime bargaining process. I argue that the historical relationship between two states plays an integral role in the duration of future conflict. Specifically, historical conflict between states intensifies the preference of national selectorates for military victory and narrows the range of negotiated settlements that leaders might pursue while still maintaining domestic political support. I employ Bennett and Stam's (1996) ex ante data set and Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) International Interaction Score to provide an empirical test of the ability to generalize appropriately coded historical interaction to the topic of war duration. Contradicting earlier studies, the results of this analysis show that a properly operationalized measure of rivalry has significant and positive effects on war duration.     

'Suez in reverse': The arab response to the iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

苏联模式探析

斯大林所创建的苏联社会主义模式对20世纪人类历史产生过巨大的影响。苏联模式具有显著特征历史继承性、封闭性、社会主义本质同社会实践的背离、社会利益结构的不断变化同僵化的体制无法相容。等等。“政治大清洗”是苏联难以愈合的创伤。“个人崇拜”曾受到列宁的严厉．批判,而斯大林则把“个人崇拜”变成了苏联社会的主轴。     

An exploration of multi‐country political conflict/cooperation interdependence

Previous investigations of dynamic conflict actions and reactions among major countries have generally assumed the unit of analysis to be either a dyad or a triad. Our objective of the papa‐is to explore this assumption. The empirical analysis employs quarterly political conflict/cooperation among the United States, the (former) Soviet Union, China, Japan, and (West) Germany from 1950 to 1991. The model consists of a system of dynamic multiple regression equations. Various groups formed among mese countries are tested to find out whether they can be considered an autonomous unit of analysis. The analysis reveals several groups of countries whose political relations can be considered to be autonomous. In particular, either the United States‐the Soviet Union dyad or the United States‐the Soviet Union‐China triad is not an appropriate, autonomous unit of analysis in dynamic conflict action‐reaction models, because these countries are significantly influenced by the presence of other countries. New directions for future research are also suggested.     

艾森豪威尔处理苏伊士运河战争危机的经验及其对奥巴马政府的启示

1956年10月,以色列在美国总统大选前8天,不顾艾森豪威尔政府预先劝诫,在英、法两国幕后策划下,对埃及发动先发制人的打击。艾森豪威尔总统为此采取一系列行动,如诉诸联合国、启动对以经济制裁、甚至威胁驱逐其出联合国,最终实现被他称之为"侵略者"的三方无条件停火撤退。艾森豪威尔成功的范例给2012年面临同样难题的奥巴马提供了一些历史经验:美国的外交不能被一个小盟国所捆绑,即便他们曾是美国的"铁杆"朋友。美国只有坚持公正、理性与原则,且在冲突中支持受害者,才能最大程度上维护美国的利益与形象,并最终使美国成为中东最具有决定性的外部力量。     

“Between Two and Four”: The French Initiative and the Multi-Power Diplomatic Initiatives to Resolve the Middle East Crisis

This analysis examines one of the unknown chapters in the diplomatic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict: the French initiative of 1969 calling for diplomatic co-operation amongst the four Great Powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France—to put an end to the conflict. The “Forum of Four” did not just attempt to mediate and achieve a compromise between Israel and the Arabs; it also presumed to define the general envelope for the agreement and dictate the path that the sides should follow toward a peace agreement. This analaysis examines the diplomatic positions of Israel, Egypt, and their superpower patrons—which conducted a “Forum of Two”—during the first months of the War of Attrition in 1969 and presents the details of the planned agreement worked out in the deliberations amongst the Powers, especially the United States and Soviet Union. It also surveys the reactions to them and the reasons why mediation failed.     

'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.