国际金融危机对日本经济的主要影响因素分析——基于MIMIC模型的硏究

2008年由美国次贷危机引发的"金融海啸"席卷全球,日本经济也受到了强烈的冲击。日本MIMIC模型的建立发现了影响日本"危机强度"的国内信贷/GDP和政府债务/GDP两个国内主要影响因素,对各种传染渠道进行检验后发现了这次引起日本金融危机的主要是贸易传染渠道,对上述国内外主要影响因素进行分析,日本政府为刺激经济的一系列扩张性政策,在金融市场中并没有转化为有效的投资和需求反而大大增加了政府债务。     

Region-building and critical juncture: Europe and Northeast Asia in comparative perspective

China, Japan, and Korea have begun to engage one another vigorously since the 1997 crisis. As intraregional economic ties have further deepened and broadened, interconnectedness in cultural and political aspects has risen rapidly in a variety of forms. Decision-makers and intellectuals in China, Japan, and Korea have been floating ideas and interests for establishing various types of Northeast Asian community formation. New security dialogues and co-operation frameworks also emerge. Accordingly, the rapidly growing Northeast Asia is likely to emerge as an identifiable regional community. With the incipient emergence of regional community in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asian region-building becomes a salient issue of major academic and policy debates. Yet, in spite of the recent mushrooming of research in and attention to the region-building, the questions regarding within what surrounding and under what situation regional community can be built, as well as what motivates people to choose region-building, and when and how state system can be transformed into a regional community remains only partly resolved. In order to solve this puzzle, this paper will compare the current Northeast Asian region-building with the early stage of European region-building, arguing that while there are important differences in evolution, format, and kind of region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia, critical juncture is influential in region-building.     

中、日、韩金融合作与东北亚区域经济发展

东北亚金融合作的滞后已经成为导致区域经济不稳定和制约区域经济合作进一步发展的重要因素。因此 ,加强中、日、韩金融合作 ,为东北亚区域经济合作提供更多的开发资金 ,有效地防范区域金融危机 ,十分必要。从现实的角度来分析 ,中、日、韩金融合作既有坚实的物质基础 ,又有适合的制度基础 ,关键是要解决合作途径的选择和操作问题。从当前中、日、韩之间的合作条件来看 ,比较现实的选择是应积极开展中、日、韩之间的功能性金融合作。从成立东北亚国际开发银行、建立中、日、韩之间的清算支付体系和中、日、韩 3边货币互换机制等方面实施合作。     

Competing Visions of Japan’s International Engagement: Japan First vs Global Japan

ABSTRACT

The state and direction of Japan’s international engagement can best be understood as a competition between the ‘Japan first’ and ‘global Japan’ schools of thought. In light of the ever worsening security environment surrounding Japan, the gap between the Japan first school advocating a focus on the immediate needs of Japan’s territorial defence and the global Japan school arguing for more global engagement is widening. The competition between the two will continue to shape the direction of Japan’s foreign and security posture – and importantly, the global Japan school is far from winning, contrary to what Abe’s hyperactive diplomacy might suggest.     

六方会谈与东北亚安全合作机制

朝核危机的爆发使得构建东北亚安全机制再次成为各国关注的课题。为了解决朝核危机,相关各国先后举行了六轮六方会谈。六方会谈取得了一些进展,也推动了东北亚安全机制的建设,但是作为一个问题机制而存在的六方会谈,不仅受限于朝鲜半岛局势的发展,还深深受限于中美关系的发展和中日之间的结构性矛盾。因此,即使最终能够成功地解决朝核问题,东北亚安全合作机制的建立还将有待于进一步努力。     

灾后日元升值初探

短期来看,日元汇率没有因经济受到巨大损失而贬值却转向迅速升值在于投资者形成"保险机构或企业资金的资金回流"的预期,投机力量就借助这个题材不断的推升日元。长期来看,这一轮日元升值并不是因贸易摩擦、美国压迫日本的结果,而是与金融危机过程中动荡的国际货币体系有关。日元在国际货币体系内主要执行价值贮藏的功能,而其贸易结算功能相对较弱。日元快速升值的根本原因是日元在估值上存在升值压力,以及日元发挥避险货币和套利交易的作用。中日两国都面临着美元贬值的巨大风险,可采取相互增持对方货币资产的方法,逐渐减少降低外汇储备中美元的比例,建立区域汇率稳定性机制。     

日本对能源危机的应急管理——以第一次石油危机为例

日本面对战后第一次国家危机,先是组建应急管理机构,以此为基础,从行政号召、政府指导和法律管制等层面制定了诸多措施,并很快形成了具有"防火墙"作用的应急管理体系。该体系为调整危机状态下的国家权力、公民权利以及国家权力与公民权利之间的各种能源经济关系,充分发挥行政、法律对社会无序状态、紧急状态的防范和矫正功能起到了关键性的作用。在应急危机管理中,日本政府所发挥的6大能效,也为日本从无预防性的应急管理向未雨绸缪的预防管理转型提供了极为宝贵的心理储备、经验借鉴和制度遗产。     

新一轮朝鲜核危机与日、韩、美3国协调体制

新一轮朝鲜半岛核危机正在挑战美国的反恐新战略。同时 ,朝鲜南北和谈、日朝平壤宣言 ,东北亚两大历史事件也冲击了美日、美韩同盟。在这历史性的转换中 ,日、韩、美 3国协调体制将从同盟向外交转换。构筑TCOG和KEDO的新协调体制 ,是这一转换的重要形式。     

日本经济安全保障理论辨析

日本是对经济安全问题研究比较早的国家之一,形成了独具特色的经济安全保障理论。在日本的经济安全保障理论中,关于什么是经济安全保障以及经济安全保障与军事安全保障、综合安全保障、人类安全保障的关系等问题,在不同的时代产生了各种各样的观点,对此要进行综合地辨析,才能真正理解日本的经济安全保障理论,从而能够更好地理解日本安全保障政策。     

朝鲜核危机的现状及展望

朝核危机问题作为重大的国际危机事件,其影响与破坏力已经危及到地区甚至全球的和平发展环境。目前来看,美朝双方都寻求能在朝核危机上取得一些突破,但美朝之间在一些问题的认识上还存在差距,美国会力争以利比亚的模式来解决朝核问题,而朝鲜方面即使不寻求印巴模式结束这场核之争,也将会通过这一边缘政策寻求利益最大化。因此,尽管朝核去功能化已经出现曙光,但朝核问题的解决还会有很长的路要走,而且不会一路平坦。     

金融动荡背景下的中日韩合作及东亚一体化

2007年爆发于美国的次贷危机已扩散和转化为全球性的金融动荡.金融动荡对世界各国、包括中日韩等东亚国家的影响,尤其是短期影响,已有大量研究论及,本文不再重点讨论,而是拟从中日韩合作及东亚一体化的意义上,分析此次金融动荡的效应①.金融动荡、中日韩合作、东亚一体化三者之间的逻辑关系如下:首先,在当前国际环境下,国家维护经济安全必须通过国际合作实现,维护经济安全的紧迫性加快了国际合作的步伐,包括中日韩3国在内的东亚国家亦然;其次,不论是从欧盟的经验还是从当前东亚合作的现状来看,东亚一体化必然从经济领域起步,而维护经济安全的国际合作(主要是金融货币合作)能够提升经济合作层次,为一体化提供政治动力,推动合作的机制化;最后,中日韩3国的合作对东亚地区金融安全起着决定性作用,在现有的东亚合作框架下,中日韩合作也必然扩展为整个地区的合作.     

日本大地震与中日战略合作的契机和挑战

2011年初的这场千年一遇的日本大地震使日本面临战后最大危机,在强震、特大海啸和严重核泄漏组合而成的天灾人祸中,日本国民表现出高素质、克制和隐忍精神,但日本政府和企业的应对举措也让日本的国际和国家形象大打折扣,日本面临产业、能源和外交等诸多政策的转折。灾难使中日两国去年撞船事件以来一直紧张的关系得到舒缓,中日战略合作迎来关系改善的重大契机。日本大地震对于中日战略合作而言,究竟是契机还是挑战,需要及时研判,审慎思考。     

第二次世界大战结束前日俄、日苏关系的特点

第二次世界大战前的日俄、日苏关系是影响东亚地区国际关系格局的重要双边关系。在日本明治维新以前日俄关系具有西方殖民列强与亚洲闭关锁国的封建国家之间关系的特点，总体态势是“俄攻日守”。明治维新到十月革命前的日俄关系具有老牌的殖民主义列强与新兴殖民主义列强之间关系的特点，日俄在东亚既有争夺，又有合作，日本逐渐占了上风。十月革命后日苏关系既有社会主义国家和帝国主义国家之间的关系、邻国关系的特点，又有较为浓厚的欧洲国家和亚洲国家之间关系的特点。这时期，两国之间始终未能建立真正的信赖关系，经历了“日攻苏守”到“苏攻日守”的转变过程。     

Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm?

International Studies is on the cusp of a debate between para-keepers , observers who are steadfast about maintaining the prevailing paradigms and deny that globalization offers a fresh way of thinking about the world, and para-makers , who bring into question what they regard as outmoded categories and claim to have shifted to an innovatory paradigm. This distinction is a heuristic that allows for various gradations and dynamic interactions between the keepers and the makers. It helps to identify anomalies in and discomfort with International Studies. Partly as a response to these problems, globalization studies has evolved and may be tentatively delimited by a distinct set of characteristics. But, in the near term, there is no looming Kuhnian crisis in the sense of an impending overthrow that would quickly sweep away reigning paradigms. Given that systematic research on globalization is only slightly more than a decade in the making, it is most likely that International Studies has entered an interregnum between the old and the new. At this time, as a paradigm, globalization is more of a potential than a worked-out framework. It may be best understood as a proto-paradigm.     

NATO's Southern flank in the east‐west balance

American primacy continues to characterise the international system, despite trends toward a diffusion of power. The discussion is too often biased in favour of multipolarity due to imprecise or misleading definitions of US primacy. On the basis of a simple definition of what a “pole” is, combining GDP and defence expenditure, only the US can be considered a global pole. The current economic crisis is not changing this reality. Even considering perceptions, soft power, and the ability to translate power into influence, rising powers like China or an aggregate power like the EU have a long way to go before they can get on an equal footing with the United States.     

Political Risk: The Institutional Dimension

The argument developed in this paper is that the political arrangements and institutions that help leaders stay in office are not necessarily the ones that promote economic growth and prosperity. Indeed political leaders can remain in office more securely by rewarding the groups that keep them in power with privileged access to public resources. The net result is that the leadership remains in office but at the price of poor economic performance. It is not that the consequences of mismanaging the economy are unforeseen; rather the increased chances of an economic crisis are an acceptable price to pay if it means avoiding a political crisis which challenges the leaders' hold on power. Political survival, not peace and prosperity, is what determines the choice of policies. In this way bad economics can be good politics. The principal hypothesis addressed is that the smaller the size of the winning coalition the more the leadership depends on distributing private goods to the coalition members in order to purchase their loyalty, and, therefore the greater is the level of political risk. The ultimate effects of coalition size and the corruption attending the competition for private goods are the reduction of foreign direct investment per capita. These hypotheses were tested in a three stage least squares (3SLS) simultaneous estimation. The results generally supported the theoretical expectations.     

Making Government Work: Pragmatic Priorities for Interagency Coordination

Numerous studies outlining what needs to be done to improve the U.S. interagency system have been conducted in the past few decades. Together, these studies reflect a growing consensus on the range of changes needed across the government, from personnel reform, to changes in processes and structures. This article does not quibble with this consensus. Rather, in light of the current economic crisis and the challenges we face in Iraq and Afghanistan, this piece argues that dramatic reform may be a luxury we cannot afford right now. Instead of offering another proposal for large-scale reorganization, the author suggests a way to get started now; one that focuses on winning the fights we are currently in while setting the trajectory for long-term change.     

The sovereign debt crisis: why Greece,but not Japan?

This paper asks why Japan has not yet suffered from a sovereign debt crisis, although its gross public debt as a percentage of GDP is much higher than in Greece. We use a simple stylized model to explain the occurrence of both a fundamental and a speculative debt crisis. We apply this model to both countries and derive some hypotheses about why investors are still ready to hold Japanese Government Bonds. In particular, we point to the significance of domestic debt holdings, to the central bank’s government debt purchases, to investors’ access to “safe havens,” and to the role of an autonomous monetary policy. We also analyze potential challenges to Japan’s long-term fiscal situation, resulting from its aging population.     

Foreign Policy Orientation, Strategic Interaction, and the Initiation of International Crises

In recent years, scholars studying U.S. foreign policy and the diversionary use of force have begun to focus more attention on when foreign regimes time crises with the U.S. Many argue that U.S. domestic conditions play a role in this. I argue that these models should take into consideration the foreign policy relationship between foreign governments and the U.S. I develop a theory of crisis initiation that considers the foreign policy orientation of states that may initiate a crisis with the U.S., and second, when the crisis may occur. I argue that by virtue of their foreign policy orientation, some regime leaders will be more likely than others to initiate a crisis with the U.S. Those regimes that are either closely aligned with the U.S. or closely identified with anti-U.S. interests will be much more likely to initiate crises with the U.S. than those whose foreign policy interests do not lead to such intimate ties of friendship or enmity. I develop and test hypotheses predicting what regime characteristics will be predictive of crisis initiation and when such crises are likely to occur. The results demonstrate that regime type matters more than U.S. domestic conditions in predicting where and when crises involving the U.S. will take place.