The Spread of Military Innovations: Adoption Capacity Theory,Tactical Incentives,and the Case of Suicide Terrorism

What explains the adoption of military innovations? In this article, we assess the empirical validity of adoption capacity theory by reconsidering one methodologically important case analyzed by Michael Horowitz: the diffusion of suicide terrorism. We show that, when addressing problems in Horowitz's research design, the case of suicide terrorism fails to support adoption capacity theory. We argue that, in order to account for the diffusion of this innovation, one needs to take into consideration the tactical incentives to overcome technologically superior enemies. The results of our quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that terrorist groups fighting against very powerful states in terms of conventional capabilities are more likely to employ suicide attacks than those fighting against poorly equipped ones. Our findings are important because they provide systematic evidence in support of Kalyvas and Sànchez-Cuenca's argument that suicide terrorism is driven by tactical considerations and because they provide confidence in the external validity of Berman and Laitin's hardness of targets hypothesis. Our results also question Lyall and Wilson's finding that highly mechanized armies are inherently inadequate to win counterinsurgency operations. The superior conventional capabilities of a counterinsurgency army might in fact make traditional insurgent tactics ineffective and thus give insurgents an incentive to adopt suicide attacks.     

Beheading the Hydra: Counterinsurgent Violence and Insurgent Attacks in Iraq

We evaluate the effectiveness of anti-insurgent violence as a means to suppress insurgency with micro-level data from the Iraq War. Our findings suggest that while violence against insurgents increases the incidence of future insurgent attacks, the intensity of this violence can significantly influence the outcome. Rather than shifting monotonically, the effect is actually curvilinear, first rising, and then contracting. We argue that at low to moderate levels, violence against insurgents creates opportunities for these groups to signal strength and resolve, which enables them to build momentum, heighten civilian cooperation, and diminish political support for counterinsurgency efforts in these forces’ home countries. The result is an escalation in insurgent attacks. However, at higher levels, this effect should plateau and taper off as insurgent attrition rises, and as civilian fears over personal safety displace grievances that might otherwise provoke counter-mobilization. Our empirical tests on data from the Iraq War, 2004–2009, demonstrate robust support for this argument.     

Bringing the Insurgents Back In: Early Wars in British India

What role do weaker actors play in determining the outcomes of irregular wars? The literature on counterinsurgency outcomes has tended to explain weak-side victory either as a result of informational asymmetries caused by constraints on counterinsurgent forces, or as a result of suboptimal strategic choices by the state. We suggest that this underplays the role of insurgents themselves; we attempt to “bring the insurgents back in,” giving variation in insurgent polity a role in explaining their own victories and defeats. In order to do so, we focus inductively on a relatively novel pool of cases: Great Britain's wars in India from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. Doing so allows us to hold the counterinsurgent side constant while evaluating variance among the insurgents themselves. We find that variance on the insurgent side is indeed significant in determining outcomes, and suggest possible reasons why this occurs.     

Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence

How does the way in which a group organizes change the lethality of the group's attacks? In this article, we argue that groups organized vertically as hierarchies are likely to conduct more lethal attacks. We build our argument around three advantages inherent to centralized structures: functional differentiation, clear command and control structures, and accountability. We argue that each of these characteristics positively impacts an organization's ability to deliver an effective lethal blow. To test our argument, we use a mixed method approach, drawing on empirical evidence and support from a time-series case study. Our large-N analysis examines the trends in more than 19,000 attacks. In this test we develop a novel proxy measure for hierarchy based on a group's bases of operation and non-violent activities. To complement the empirical work, we examine the history of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist group. Over several decades of violent operations, this group's structure has changed dramatically. We analyze how these shifts impacted ETA's ability to maximize the effectiveness and damage of their attacks. In both the case study and large-N analysis, the more hierarchically organized the group, the more easily the group can orchestrate lethal attacks.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.     

Flipping the Switch: Combat,State Building,and Junior Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Contemporary us counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan requires junior leaders to engage in both combat and state-building activities. This study aims to explain the fundamental challenge in merging these. I argue that difficulty lies in separating insurgents from civilians, and translating doctrine from senior to junior officers. Junior officers consistently develop a similar ad hoc decision-making tool— role-switching—to simplify complex situations to a binary of “hostile or not.” They understand themselves to fill only two roles, the violent “on” role and the non-violent “off” role and develop several tools to minimize the difficulty of role-switching, help their subordinates switch, and signal switching to local populations. Ultimately, however, problems with role-switching—role stickiness, inappropriate switching, and role bias—can in some cases encourage indiscriminate and excessive violence, pointing to the fundamental failures of using military forces as a one-size-fits-all solution to state-building projects abroad.     

Vietnam's Better War

When General Creighton Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam a better war resulted from his superior understanding of the war and more effective conduct of it, including improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces and emphasis on pacification. As American forces were progressively withdrawn, the South Vietnamese took on more and more of the load, winning the counterinsurgency war and fighting valiantly and effectively against the enemy's conventional invasion until the United States Congress drastically reduced materiel and financial assistance at the same time communist forces received massively increased support from their patrons. Thus, inevitably, South Vietnam succumbed.     

Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy

An intense debate now rages concerning whether the Army should be preparing and organizing to conduct more ambiguous, irregular operations or focus on maintaining its well honed edge in high-intensity warfare. The terms of the debate are clearly affected by the fact that United States is currently embroiled in perilous counterinsurgency and other irregular operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the Army recalibrate itself to wage counterinsurgency and other irregular operations more effectively, or does it need to keep doing what it does best with an eye to future conventional warfare? Given the impossibility of accurately predicting the character of future conflict, it is necessary for the Army to strike a balance between the extremes. But for the Army to effectively implement a policy of “balance,” it must be prepared to dramatically change the way it organizes itself and drop its opposition to specializing its forces for irregular and conventional warfare, respectively. The approach that the Army should take should be based upon a Total Force construct. By utilizing the entire Total Force portfolio, it should be possible to better optimize the mix of ground units prepared for conventional war, irregular war or peace operations to avoid a mis-match between national security strategy and military force. In this manner, it may be possible to stake our claim on the hard won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet hedge against the unknowable future.     

Insurgents,accidental guerrillas and valley-ism: an oral history of oppositional US soldiers' attitudes toward the enemy in Afghanistan

In recent years Western policy towards Afghanistan has been marked by inconsistencies and errors. This article explores United States (US) soldiers' perceptions of the enemy in Afghanistan based on oral history interviews with dissenting combat soldiers who served in the Afghan theatre. By foregrounding soldiers' attitudes towards the enemy, this study includes marginalized voices, often overlooked, that challenge prevailing misconceptions. General David Petraeus, the former commander of US forces in Afghanistan, has argued that significant battlefield decisions are not reserved for generals alone. Petraeus' counterinsurgency programme promotes ‘strategic corporals’ whose decisions hold important consequences. If strategic corporals are involved in military decision-making, it follows that their interpretation of the conflict may also hold strategic implications for the researcher. Soldiers' views of war are not the final, authoritative verdict. However, this article suggests that these strategic corporals should be included in a complex matrix of interpretation to broaden US understanding of the enemy.     

The Soldier, The State, and The Clash of Civilizations: The Legacy of Samuel Huntington

The major military challenge that the United States faces today is the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is engaged in a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist movement known as the Taliban, which is based among Pashtun tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan, who have never been permanently subdued by a foreign military force. This challenge comes in the wake of that other grueling counterinsurgency war that the U.S. military has had to conduct in Iraq, where its chief adversary was the Islamist movement known as al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the challenge in Afghanistan comes on what could be the eve of an impending military challenge, perhaps even a war, with Iran, as that Islamist state relentlessly moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. In its entire history of two- and-a-quarter centuries, the United States has never been engaged in an unbroken succession of three wars, in three different countries. Together, the U.S. wars with or within Islamist countries add up to what is a “long war,” indeed.     

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of individuals who have already “betrayed” once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensities to avert “double defections” at the peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These mechanisms are: a) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, b) initiation violence targeting insurgents’ relatives, and c) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents.     

Campaign Analysis: The “Surge” in Iraq, 2007-2008

In analyzing the “Surge” in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, the article contends that the campaign contributed greatly to Iraq's stabilizing, and did so because the “surge of ideas” facilitated crucial variables: population separation, both by U.S. forces and from ethnic cleansing; local Sunni insurgents’ reconciliation; a new, “networked” Special Operations Forces campaign, and a politically self-reinforcing impression that the United States had recommitted to Iraq. Ultimately, however, the essay concludes, the Surge needed to be more ambitious to be endurable.In January 2007 President George W. Bush announced the “new way forward in Iraq.”¹ He deployed 30,000 additional troops, replaced the commander, and endorsed a new counterinsurgency strategy. The campaign that followed became known as the Surge: these five additional brigades fanned out to Baghdad and neighboring provinces; and a “surge of ideas” shifted the goal to protecting the Iraqi population, instead of transitioning responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. The strategy, President Bush announced, was to reduce the violence enough so that “daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas.”²

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Why Germany Won’t Be Dropping Bombs on Syria,Iraq or Mali

Following the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, Germany's Angela Merkel promised “to give France every support” in its war against jihadi terrorist groups, affirming that the “the Islamic State must be fought militarily.” After considerable debate, the Bundestag approved the deployment of German forces to the Middle East, Mali, and elsewhere, leading some to claim that Germany has set aside its reservations regarding the utility of force. A closer look at German contributions to UN and NATO missions from the 1990s through 2016 reveals, however, that Germany continues to draw a red line in terms of coercive airpower and direct combat operations. This reluctance stems from its interpretation of the past, demonstrating that constructivist approaches to strategic culture remain valid.     

暴力方式与民心向背：寻找治理族群叛乱的条件组合

治理族群叛乱的目标既包括土地的控制，也包括人的控制，这是治理族群叛乱区别于其他形式叛乱的特点之一。人的控制实际包含两个内容，既包括人心向背，也包括人员数量的控制。人心向背关乎民众支持，而争取民众支持的必要性在于，虽然拥有民众支持并不必然导致叛乱的平息，但是没有民众支持是不能平息叛乱的。在族群叛乱已经发生的情况下，国家政府只有赢得更多当地民众的支持，才能成功治理叛乱。根据冲突各方的暴力行为方式及其对当地民众支持的影响，成功平息叛乱应具备国家政府有区别使用暴力、叛乱组织无区别使用暴力、当地温和派主导平叛行动等三个必要条件，以争取更多民众支持。这三个条件构成的条件组合，可以有效控制和减少叛乱组织能够招募到的人员数量，只要国家政府的平叛战略能够有效控制叛乱组织所招募的叛乱人员数量，叛乱组织就将走向衰败并最终消亡，也就是说这一条件组合能够成为国家政府成功平叛的一个充分条件。通过对结合俄罗斯、印度和西班牙等国家治理族群叛乱的经验和教训的分析，进一步证实了以上观点。     

How Many Lives Do the Taliban Have?

After having participated in the civil war and later ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, the current Taliban have a third life as insurgents against the Afghan government and its foreign supporters. Their aim is to return to power and establish an Islamic system. Pakistani shelter and support, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist tactics allowed the Neo-Taliban to extend their influence, particularly to the south and east of Afghanistan. They used the weakness of the Hamid Karzai regime to set up shadow governments. Since even the coalition forces have abandoned the aim of defeating them, the Taliban are guaranteed survival after foreign combat troops leave Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Due to the different interests of the main stakeholders—the Afghan government, the Taliban, the United States, and Pakistan—it is unlikely that the conflict will end by negotiations any time soon. Thus, the civil war will continue. When the Taliban try to extend their reach beyond rural areas and into non-Pashtun districts, they will meet tough resistance. Therefore, it is likely that the fragmentation of Afghanistan will persist and that the Taliban will not return as rulers of a united Afghanistan.     

The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco

Over the last few years, Moroccans have been disproportionately involved in jihadist terrorism. Morocco has been increasingly identified as one of the largest producers of terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout Europe. This article examines the factors behind the emergence of jihadist terrorism in Morocco, and how this terrorist threat has gone beyond this country's borders. Three factors have contributed to this development: the influence of global jihad on potential Moroccan jihadists; the growing Islamization of the country; and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. In analyzing these variables, special attention will be paid to the Casablanca terrorist attacks on May 16, 2003, marking the debut of suicide terrorism in Morocco. The article will also examine the principal counterterrorist initiatives Morocco has implemented in response to this threat.     

High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan

Four years have passed since the United States and allied governments toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and began security and nation-building operations. Despite the continuing deployment of thousands of Western troops and the expenditure of billions of dollars in foreign aid, current conditions in Afghanistan are perilous. Poverty is rampant, the drug trade has shown no sign of decline, warlords remain in power, and the Taliban continues to confront US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces. With the US preparing to reduce its troop presence in 2006 and NATO poised to deploy forces into Afghanistan's dangerous southern provinces, Western security and nation-building efforts are at risk of failure.     

The Big Problem of Small Allies: New Data and Theory on Defiant Local Counterinsurgency Partners in Afghanistan and Iraq

Alliance politics are critical yet understudied in counterinsurgency interventions. Despite the importance of local allies, traditional research on alliances fails to account for the challenges of managing in-country counterinsurgency security partners or explain variation among which types of policy requests from large intervening allies are likely to result in compliance or defiance by local partners. When did US intervening forces have leverage in Iraq and Afghanistan, and when was American influence limited? Utilizing thousands of US government documents to analyze over 250 US demands of allies in Kabul and Baghdad, this paper reexamines established variables in the literature on inter-alliance bargaining—namely allied interests and dependencies—to offer a new model describing the interaction of these variables in asymmetric counterinsurgency partnerships. The theory predicts when large allies are likely to influence local partners and when these intervening forces will likely fail to coerce them.     

We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.     

Indian counterterrorism policy and the influence of the Global War on Terror

India has been a major victim of Islamist terrorism and has long fought against an array of Islamist terrorist groups. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, India's previously lonely struggle against terrorism has taken place against the background of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). After outlining India's Islamist terrorist challenge, this article examines India's evolving approach to counterterrorism and how the GWOT has influenced it. It concludes that India has adopted a localized, defensive, law-and-order approach to counterterrorism which has evolved in response to various attacks over the years but still remains seriously underdeveloped. The GWOT has influenced Indian counterterrorism in important ways, although its influence has been subtle and indirect rather than transformative. The GWOT has enhanced Indo-American counterterror cooperation, shaped India's terror environment by launching the war in Afghanistan and enriched Indian counterterrorism with American experience. Just as important, it has also had an impact on India's debate on counterterrorism, civil liberties and human rights.