Negotiating international civil society support: the case of Ethiopia’s 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation

ABSTRACT

Since 2005, international civil society support has faced increasing resistance around the world. Ethiopia is widely recognized as a key example of this so-called Closing Space phenomenon. With the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) Ethiopia has established strict regulations on civil society organizations that, in particular, restrict the ability of local associations to make use of foreign funding and the range of activities allowed for foreign (funded) organizations. This paper traces the process of international negotiations that has accompanied the drafting of the CSP and identifies the consequences of these negotiations for international civil society support in the country. Focusing on the interaction between foreign “donors” and the Ethiopian government, it analyzes (a) what precisely these negotiations have been about, (b) to what extent these negotiations have actually influenced the content of the CSP, and (c) how the CSP as finally adopted has actually affected international civil society support in Ethiopia.     

Anatomy of a government massacre: Abuses of hostage‐barricade protocols during the Waco standoff

A systematic evaluation of the FBI's crisis negotiations with the Branch Davidians during a 51‐day standoff in 1993 is conducted. The analysis uncovers extensive violations of basic hostage‐barricade standards and protocols. The violations appear shortly after negotiations began indicating a premature disregard for the publicly declared goal of a peaceful resolution. Failed negotiations subsequently were cited by FBI officials as a rationale for organizing a violent and dangerous CS gas assault on the barricaded group, resulting in the destruction of the religious community and the deaths of 74 people. The violations do not appear to be random, incidental, or the result of disorganization, as officials claim. The data indicate that the FBI's on‐scene commanders and tactical component of the Hostage‐Rescue Team (HRT) contributed largely to the failed negotiations through methods of increased tactical pressure and psychological warfare providing justification for the high‐risk assault. The thesis is advanced that the HRT command may have pursued furtively what some insiders call a ‘Western’ view of hostage‐barricade incidents ‐ i.e., that negotiations should be used as a means of manipulating people into positions where a tactical solution can be executed. In this context, the standoff is analyzed as a government massacre. Possible motives for this state violence are linked to the sect's defiant posture, aspects of police culture, effective demonization of the sect, and the disturbing trend of ‘militarization’ within law enforcement.     

Approaching peace in Patani,Southern Thailand—some anthropological considerations

This article analyzes ways of approaching peace building and peace negotiations in Patani. Choosing an anthropological approach, the article argues that participant observation helps identify indigenous, local peace instruments. Hence, the design of local sovereignty is the most important step to durable peace in internal conflicts. The Surayud government has identified the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission as guide-posts and has praised the peace agreement in Aceh as model to emulate. There is an opening for peace talks, in which the solution to historical and cultural grievances will be a key to peace.     

Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship

ABSTRACT

Why do some states terminate their sponsorship of rebel movements while others are persistent in their provision of support? In the past, most research on external support to insurgents has focused on why states choose to sponsor rebel groups and particularly how this affects conflict duration. However, we know little about the termination of such support. This is surprising given that support has been shown to make armed conflicts more intractable and tremendous efforts are made in condemning and sanctioning such behavior. This study constitutes the first large-N analysis of support termination, employing survival analysis on global data of state support to rebel movements between 1975–2009. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that only some of the factors that explain support provision can offer insights into its termination. In particular, support is more likely to be terminated when no ethnic kinship bonds exist between the rebel movement and the government of the supporting state. Many decisions to withdraw support also seem to coincide with the transition from the Cold War. Threats and sanctions from other states appear largely ineffective. The study contributes to our understanding of the international dimensions of civil war and the role and motives of third parties.     

Reduction of socio‐economic injustice: Four scenarios to the year 2001

This empirical study is a continuation of the Limits‐to‐Violence project started in 1975 by the Canadian Peace Research Institute. The LIV project sought to model three kinds of violence‐civil war, international war, and socio‐economic injustice‐in an effort to limit global violence in the future.

The research reported here is concerned with reducing socio‐economic injustice, or so‐called “structural” violence. Four scenarios are calculated for the years 1973–2001. No. 1 is a “Status quo” model based on a slow growth or stagnant world economy, where in addition no attempt is made to reduce the gap between the rich and poor nations of the world. Scenarios Nos. 2–4 are different variations of a swords‐into‐ploughshares program where steady global disarmament and massive foreign aid proceed together over the 1982–2001 period. Four Tables and six Figures help to illustrate what is possible.     

Timothy E. Cook: 1954–2006

Abstract

This article describes the organizational and operational aspects of diplomacy's interplay with the news media in Britain. It examines the media's role as a source of information for ministers, officials, and the wider public; the media's effect on official and unofficial thinking; the media's roles in interdepartmental coordination and during international negotiations; and the uses of the media by the government as channels to mold public attitudes at home and abroad. It concludes by considering the implications of advancements in media technology, and greater public interest in international affairs, for media diplomacy.     

Not Whether,But When? Governments’ Use of Militias in War

Abstract

Although government use of militias during civil conflict can ultimately undermine state authority, governments still use militias for battlefield assistance. This paper examines the selectivity of government decisions to use militias by disaggregating civil conflict to the level of battle phases. Civil-conflict battles typically consist of four phases: preparation, clear, hold, and build. I argue that governments decide to use militias based on the strength of government security forces, operational advantages of militias, and the type of battle phase. Governments will limit the use of militias during key battle phases that are likely to receive increased media attention unless a victory secured by government security forces is unlikely or militias hold an operational advantage. A comparative analysis of the offensive operations in Tikrit and Ramadi during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lends initial support to this theory.     

Studying small states in international security affairs: a quantitative analysis

Todays’ international security architecture composed of international security treaties and international security norms has been established and formalized by negotiations. Owing to the great importance of international security negotiations for international security practices, this paper sheds light on negotiation activities. A study of 100 different international security negotiations shows that states vary considerably with respect to their negotiation activity. Some countries voice positions very often, while others remain completely silent. This is puzzling, as active negotiation participation is an expression of state sovereignty and a means to influence the shape of the international security architecture. The article distinguishes between capacity and incentives as driving forces of state activity in international security negotiations. The analysis reveals that, next to political and financial capacities, states that place high priority on military matters are more active, while smaller and poorer states are more likely to shelter under the security umbrella of larger counterparts.     

An economic model of guerrilla warfare∗

This paper draws on the guerrilla warfare literature so as to synthesize and to describe the dynamics of the initial stages of a guerrilla war against an established government. It combines two classical economic models, the Solow growth model and the Ricardian model of economic rents, with two classic studies of guerrilla warfare by T. E. Lawrence and by Mao Tse‐tung. The transitional stages of the guerrilla warfare are modeled as conflict over control of the real line. Four different Ricardian distribution functions describe the country: the resources the guerrillas can extract from territory under their control; the porosity of the country, indicating the guerrilla's ability to obtain weapons; the government's ability to tax; and the mobility the guerrillas. Depending on initial conditions, the course of the guerrilla war could take one of several paths. One is a direct movement to a stable equilibrium independent of the initial conditions. Another is a situation in which for the guerrillas to make a successful transition to the second stage via the dynamics of the process they have to reach a certain critical level of capability. Finally, the third path involves cyclical motion, with alternating positions of the guerrillas and the government in the evolution of the war. This model, while simple, appears to be consistent with the historical pattern of guerrilla wars, a key parameter in the model being porosity.     

Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the field of political science have sought to explain both the scarcity and high failure rates of negotiated agreements in civil conflicts. This historical pattern, however, has fundamentally changed in the last two decades as changes in international norms and laws, as well as the increased prevalence and competence of peacebuilding professionals, now require conflict actors to have a greater commitment toward negotiations and the enforcement of agreements. While actors in interstate wars seek to avoid accountability, civil war actors seem to embrace the opportunities that these new dynamics create to achieve broad‐based reforms across numerous areas of policy and government. The result, we suggest, is that stakeholders evaluate agreements based on their potential to accomplish an array of sociopolitical objectives. In addition, for strategic and practical reasons, they perceive that those agreements that include more reforms across multiple policy sectors will have the greatest potential. Our examination of nearly two hundred agreements found evidence that the peacemaking potential of a negotiated agreement between civil war adversaries is greatly enhanced when reforms are pursued across many different policy domains. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the greater the number of policy areas left untouched by a peace agreement, the more likely the stakeholders will be to follow that agreement with additional negotiations to enhance that agreement, or, alternatively, the more likely that violence will resume.     

Parliamentary assertion and deep integration: the European parliament in the CETA and TTIP negotiations1

Abstract

Scholars have long viewed parliamentarians as parochial actors having little interest, or incentive to engage, in international diplomacy. Yet, parliaments have recently taken on a very active role in various international negotiations. This article explores the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the European Union (EU)–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU–United States Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Drawing on classic institutionalist insights, it develops the concept of parliamentary assertion and explores its usefulness through a combination of comparative and process-tracing analyses. The conclusions are threefold: (1) the EP has asserted its power in international trade matters beyond the simple power of consent; (2) the EP’s search for legitimacy in the EU polity is driving this phenomenon; and (3) this phenomenon is significant beyond the current CETA and TTIP negotiations.     

Russian–Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese war in the context of world politics

Abstract

The Treaty of Portsmouth could not solve all the diplomatic problems between Russia and Japan, and dissenting voices were heard in both countries. Nevertheless, Russo-Japanese relations went in the direction of not only normalization, but also building an alliance. That radical change from hostility has not often happened in history and needs careful research, in particular the early stages of this process after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The construction of an alliance was not the primary goal at the beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations after the war between the two nations. This goal appeared during the process of solving different problems, and so the international situation is extremely important to understand changes in Russo-Japanese relations. This process had several facets. First, there was the deterioration in Anglo-German relations with a corresponding realignment of British policy towards Russia. Second was the resolution of problems in Central Asia between Russia and Great Britain. Third, there was the mutual interests Japan and Russia had in China, in particular rail interests, which were related to the organic unity of the northern part of the Russian railroad in China. Finally, Russia had the desire to keep relations with France as a corner-stone of foreign policy.     

The Structure of Negotiation: Lessons from El Salvador for Contemporary Conflict Resolution

During more than a decade of violent conflict (1980–1992) involving the military, rebel forces, and paramilitary "death squads," El Salvador suffered some 75,000 casualties, mostly civilians. After three years of negotiations, the government and the largest rebel group signed a historic comprehensive peace accord that brought an end to the war and instituted wide-reaching political and social reforms. This agreement, and the peace process that produced it, has been widely hailed as a successful example of a negotiated end to civil war. In order to understand the conditions that led to the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ending the war, this article tests ripeness theory in the context of the Salvadoran peace process.
This article affirms the validity of theories of ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate as structural explanations for the initiation of dialogue and notes the role of "indicators of ripeness" in forcing the parties to recognize a hurting stalemate that may already exist. It also proposes several hypothesized explanations for the effectiveness of the Salvadoran negotiations themselves. These explanations include the presence of strong, empowered policy entrepreneurs on both sides with the political will and capability to make credible commitments; the combination of internal and external pressure for a negotiated solution that raised the cost of defection; and the active involvement, based on consent of both parties, of a neutral, empowered, and credible mediator who provided both technical assistance and vigilance to move the process forward. After analyzing the Salvadoran case through this theoretical lens, the article applies the same concepts to contemporary conflict cases such as Iraq and Colombia, discussing how the lessons learned in El Salvador do and do not provide instructive guidance for managing civil conflicts today.     

The FARC and democracy in Colombia in the 1990s

Three issues dominate the debate about the leading guerrilla group in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The issues are the survival and strengthening of the movement after the end of the cold war, its incapacity to defeat the state and the chronic nature of the conflict. The article addresses these issues through the concept of the partial breakdown of the state, first used in reference to the political violence of the 1950s. The account finds little room for hope about the success of the peace talks currently taking place between the government and the FARC. The outlook is for chronic conflict that will continue to sap Colombia's democracy.     

A Military Anthropologist Looks at Islamic Insurgency in Aceh

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1858-1936), a Dutch scholar of Islam, served as a “military anthropologist” in during the Aceh war in the Dutch East Indies. The Acehnese fighters viewed their anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch as a jihad, construing themselves religious martyrs fighting “infidel invaders,” and carrying out suicide attacks with a machete or dagger. To combat this insurgency Snouck Hurgronje, one of the first Westerners to visit Mecca and author of many books on Islam, developed the so-called “Aceh method,” which became the basis of modern Dutch counterinsurgency strategy. This article addresses the question: what can we learn from the life and times of Snouck Hurgronje?     

Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996–2006: A New Data Set

This article introduces individual-level microdata on victims of violence in Nepal’s civil war (1996–2006). The data being presented in this study are unique in that they are a census—not a sample—of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of analysis is the individual victim, and the data provide information on: whether the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where they were targeted; their permanent home addresses; the circumstances of the attack (combat, extrajudicial, etc.); socioeconomic information; whether they had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist informant. After describing the data, an application of the data is performed and some preliminary findings are discussed on the differences in targeting behavior between the government and the Maoist rebels.     

Useful Knowledge: Snouck Hurgronje and Islamic Insurgency in Aceh

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1858-1936), a Dutch scholar of Islam, served as a “military anthropologist” during the Aceh war in the Dutch East Indies. The Acehnese fighters viewed their anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch as a jihad, construing themselves religious martyrs fighting “infidel invaders,” and carrying out suicide attacks with a machete or dagger. To combat this insurgency Snouck Hurgronje, one of the first Westerners to visit Mecca and author of many books on Islam, developed the so-called “Aceh method,” which became the basis of modern Dutch counterinsurgency strategy. This article addresses the question: what can we learn from the life and times of Snouck Hurgronje?     

Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?

ABSTRACT

Does the inclusion of rebel parties into the post-conflict political process help contribute to peace after the end of conflict? In this article we examine whether the transformation of rebel groups into political parties actually leads to the development of a durable peace after a civil war. Examining the likelihood of recurrence of civil wars in a country and recurrence of conflict in government–rebel group dyads after a settlement, we find that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national government has an important impact on the likelihood of a durable post-settlement peace. Most importantly, not excluding major rebel parties from access to governing institutions is the most important factor in promoting post-conflict peace.     

The Sturdy Child vs. the Sword of Damocles: Nuclear Weapons and the Expected Cost of War

Abstract

Is the world better off with nuclear weapons or without? Nuclear pessimists point to the potentially devastating costs of a nuclear war. Nuclear optimists argue that nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war and are thus beneficial. This debate is inconclusive in part because it misses an important conceptual point. We should care both about the cost of war and the likelihood of war, as they combine to form the expected cost of war, which is the product of the two. I discuss five implications of focusing on expected costs. Three support the pessimists: (1) nuclear weapons raise the upper limit on how destructive wars can be; (2) there may be a floor on how low the likelihood of war can go; and (3) risk aversion over damage will raise the expected cost of nuclear war. The remaining two support the optimists: (4) strategic models exhibit a declining expected cost of war; and (5) casualty data show that the expected cost of war is declining over its observed range in the past two hundred years.