The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The United States and the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979

This analysis re-examines the Carter Administration’s formulation of policy on the theatre nuclear force issue following the neutron bomb affair. It demonstrates that European leaders did not foist the arms control component of the NATO dual-track decision on Jimmy Carter. Rather, the Carter Administration understood the merits of an arms control component following the August 1978 PRM-38 review and thought that Soviet–American arms control negotiations would play a crucial role in resolving the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over theatre nuclear forces. This analysis also considers the previously unexamined interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the months leading to the dual-track decision. It reveals that American officials underestimated the degree of Soviet anger over the dual-track decision, believing that arms control negotiations with the Soviets on theatre nuclear forces would be possible and productive. The Carter Administration did not foresee the Euromissiles crisis.     

Interagency bargaining and international negotiation: Lessons from the open skies treaty talks

Internal bargaining among government agencies has a direct effect on the formal external negotiation, particularly with regard to the flexibility of the negotiators and their ability to reach agreements. This article illustrates how interagency bargaining within the U.S. and Soviet governments affected the negotiation of the 1992 Open Skies Treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact.He is currently directing a research project at the center on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.     

Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: U.S. Estimates of the Soviet and "Rogue-State" Nuclear Threats

United States estimates of Soviet nuclear goals and capabilities and the current "rogue-state" nuclear threat reflected prevailing beliefs about threat within the U.S. government and the relative influence of agencies charged with threat assessment. This article establishes that the patterns in formal Soviet threat assessment: (i) did not reflect a uniform response to "external threat," (ii) were inevitably tied to underlying assumptions about adversary intent, and (iii) were susceptible then to perceptual, organizational, and/or political influences within government. Thus, threat assessments reflected the optimism and pessimism—and political interests and ideologies—of those who participated in the estimating process. The article concludes by examining these lessons in light of the experiences and challenges of assessing threat from small states harboring nuclear ambitions.     

A Soviet Eye on France from the rue de Grenelle in Paris, 1924–1940

The present article is about Soviet perceptions of French politics and society as reported by the five Soviet ambassadors in Paris between 1924 and 1940, and about how their reports influenced Soviet policy making in Moscow. This article is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy archives in Moscow (AVPRF), specifically opened to researchers in the 1990s. It contends that these Soviet ambassadors established effective relationships with French counterparts and that they were pragmatic, non-ideological realists trying unsuccessfully to improve Soviet relations with France. The narrative is about the failure of these efforts over a period of sixteen years and ultimately about the failure of the Soviet Union and France to form anti-Nazi alliance during the 1930s.     

A Soviet Eye on France from the rue de Grenelle in Paris, 1924-1940

The present article is about Soviet perceptions of French politics and society as reported by the five Soviet ambassadors in Paris between 1924 and 1940, and about how their reports influenced Soviet policy making in Moscow. This article is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy archives in Moscow (AVPRF), specifically opened to researchers in the 1990s. It contends that these Soviet ambassadors established effective relationships with French counterparts and that they were pragmatic, non-ideological realists trying unsuccessfully to improve Soviet relations with France. The narrative is about the failure of these efforts over a period of sixteen years and ultimately about the failure of the Soviet Union and France to form anti-Nazi alliance during the 1930s.     

Neill S. Brown's mission to Russia, 1850-53

Neill S. Brown, who served as US minister to Russia from 1850 to 1853, had little formal education, no prior experience in diplomacy, and spoke only the English language. His support for a winning candidate for the presidency constituted his sole qualification for a diplomatic post. The question addressed in this article is how such an individual could author reports on Russian governance and society that qualify as minor classics in the literature of Russian-American relations. Although the focus is on the 1850s, the analysis reaches across space and time to draw comparisons and contrasts between Brown and George Kennan, America's premier twentieth century interpreter of Russia. Despite significant differences between the two diplomats and between the Russia of Nicholas I and the Soviet Union of Josef Stalin, the suggestive parallels are helpful in understanding the statecraft of Neill Brown.     

Russo–Cuban Relations in the 1990s

This analysis re-examines Russo–Cuban relations in the period in which Boris Yeltsin was Russian President using previously unseen documents housed in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba [MINREX] archive in Havana. A number of conclusions offer themselves including that the relationship remained key for Havana throughout the 1990s, despite a Cuban ideological aversion to the Russian reforms of the early to mid-decade and the subsequent “new realities” of Russo–Cuban relations. Cuba desired a relationship that preserved a number of features of Soviet–Cuban relations, which MINREX officials strove to achieve by purposefully creating a political legacy from the Soviet era, whilst also specifically lobbying members of the Russian political elite who had sympathies with the Soviet period. This development has resonance for contemporary Russo–Cuban relations that are at their most robust politically since 1991. Consequently, the Soviet legacy remains both much greater than previously thought and deliberately created by Cuba.     

试析20世纪70年代中越关系剧变原因之苏联因素

20世纪70年代中越关系的变化出人意料,两国在短短的十年时间就从肝胆相照的兄弟变为不共戴天的敌人,促成这一剧变的诸多因素中,苏联因素不容忽视。苏联对第三世界政策的调整,导致其对越南政策的变化,在越南问题上由超然的脱身态度变为积极援助,中苏两国关于援越问题产生矛盾,越南出于自身国家利益考虑,推行有利于自身的倾向性政策,越南在中苏两国关系的天平上倒向了苏联一边。与此同时,苏联调整对社会主义阵营的政策,中苏关系破裂,从而影响中美关系走向,中美和解对中越关系产生诸多负面影响,两国关系交恶,矛盾冲突愈演愈烈,不断升级,最终导致中越处于全面紧张和严重对立状态,两国关系产生戏剧性变化。总之,苏联的全球性进攻战略政策对此期中越关系影响深远。     

意识形态、国家认同与苏联解体

相当多的学者认为意识形态的瓦解导致了苏联的崩溃，但事实上这两者之间并不存在直接的因果关系。由于苏联的国家认同主要建立在马克思主义意识形态基础之上，早期马克思主义的教条化和后期对马克思主义的背离，使官方意识形态不断削弱乃至最终变异，导致人民的国家认同感丧失，苏联作为一个国家才难以为继。     

An exploration of multi‐country political conflict/cooperation interdependence

Previous investigations of dynamic conflict actions and reactions among major countries have generally assumed the unit of analysis to be either a dyad or a triad. Our objective of the papa‐is to explore this assumption. The empirical analysis employs quarterly political conflict/cooperation among the United States, the (former) Soviet Union, China, Japan, and (West) Germany from 1950 to 1991. The model consists of a system of dynamic multiple regression equations. Various groups formed among mese countries are tested to find out whether they can be considered an autonomous unit of analysis. The analysis reveals several groups of countries whose political relations can be considered to be autonomous. In particular, either the United States‐the Soviet Union dyad or the United States‐the Soviet Union‐China triad is not an appropriate, autonomous unit of analysis in dynamic conflict action‐reaction models, because these countries are significantly influenced by the presence of other countries. New directions for future research are also suggested.     

Participatory small-group communication as a medium for information campaigns in KwaZulu-Natal

ABSTRACT

The paradigm shift from top-down to participatory development has serious communication implications. Instead of using the mass media (especially radio) to carry development messages, the use of face-to-face communication is implied. This approach gives communities the opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the development facilitator, resulting in a co-ownership of development, which is believed to lead to sustainable development. This case study shows that small group communication is preferable to radio in carrying development messages – a preference stemming from the dialogical nature of small-group communication. Small-group discussions or workshops should be facilitated by knowledgeable people on the development topic under discussion. It was also found that the more rural and lower the formal school education level of the respondents in this region, the higher they valued face-to-face communication. This case study also indicates that the composition of small groups for discussion sessions should be according to the gender divide and to a lesser extent according to age groups. Younger and older males prefer to be grouped separately, whilst the age divide plays a lesser role in the female groups in this region.     

The economic transition in Central Asia: Implications for democracy

Ten years have now passed since the August coup of 1991 heralded the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whilst many of these states have successfully navigated themselves through the processes of democratic transition and consolidation, others have not. Although each of the states within the Central Asia region have held elections so that we can speak of some sort of formal democracy having been established, substantive democracy within these states is either absent or falls short of the mark. This article identifies the obstacles to democratic transition and consolidation arising from current economic circumstances and the leaders' appraisal of the political costs of further democratization.     

Red Star Ascending,Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

Red Star Ascending, Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

“Never a Dull Moment”: The Moscow Ambassadorship of Sir Frank Roberts in the Years of the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, 1960–1962

This analysis explores the largely unsung Moscow ambassadorship of Britain’s Frank Roberts (1960–1962). After examining his Embassy’s role in developing cultural and commercial relations, the article addresses Roberts’ involvement in the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In the former case, he made a low-key but important contribution by influencing American policy; in the second, he provided insightful assessments of Soviet attitudes and thinking. Roberts’ ambassadorship demonstrated the continued importance of resident embassies and ambassadors, because of the lack of ministerial-level Anglo–Soviet relations and the need to interpret Soviet policy in crisis situations. The research contributes to the literature of diplomatic representation as well as of Anglo–Soviet relations during the Cold War.     

Carving a Diplomatic Niche?: The April 1956 Soviet Visit to Britain

Abstract

Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin's visit to Britain in April 1956 was the first by the new Soviet leadership to a Western bloc country after Josef Stalin's death. It presented British policy-makers with a unique opportunity for insight and discussion. However, British self-deception regarding their scope for independent action as well as excessive focus on events in the Middle East hampered efforts to build a rapport with Khrushchev and Bulganin. This analysis explores the planning and conduct of what turned out to be a fruitless diplomatic initiative. The visit illustrates British and Soviet policy at the time, as well as Britain's already clear position as the junior partner in the Anglo-American “special relationship” on the eve of Suez.     

从文化视角解读乔治·凯南的长电和 X 文章

乔治.凯南是美国著名的"苏联通",也是美国"遏制政策"的提出者。1946 年他向美国发回长电,1947 年又发表 X 论文,分析苏联的思维方式和行为根源,在美国政坛和民众中引起震动。时隔半个多世纪,我们再分析凯南的这两篇文章,仍被他惊人的洞察力和预言所折服。他对苏联的民族性格、苏联外交的行为方式有着深刻理解,他的这一认识正是建立在对俄罗斯( 苏联) 历史文化的深刻认识的基础之上。     

偏激的行为 沉痛的教训

苏联的文化政策曾经历了一个由极左滑向极右的过程,先是对"持不同政见"的作家采取高压政策,制造了不少冤假错案。戈尔巴乔夫上台后,又打着"民主化"、"公开性"的旗号鼓动"自由派"作家肆无忌惮地攻击苏共和社会主义,成为导致苏联解体的原因之一。事实提醒人们,作家不能以偏激的态度去对待现实,不能将个人恩怨置于民族大义之上,应该公正、客观、全面地评价社会制度和社会生活,不能被西方敌对势力"民主"、"自由"、"人权"的漂亮口号所迷惑,以至于做出亲者痛仇者快的事情来。同时,沉痛的教训告诉我们,思想舆论阵地任何时候不能落入外国敌对势力的代理人手中,否则,悲剧将难以避免。     

俄罗斯私有化改革的经济绩效分析

随着苏联的解体 ,独立后的俄罗斯走上了私有化的道路。在将近十年的私有化改革过程中 ,俄罗斯取得了一定的成绩 ,也存在着严重的问题 ,就改革者最初设想的结果而言 ,俄罗斯的私有化是失败的     

Interpersonal communication and the dialogue of drama

SUMMARY

Because of the problems that people encounter in their everyday relationships there is a need for a greater understanding of interpersonal communication in the modern world. This article is a study of interpersonal communication based on the dialogical approach to communication which departs from the premise that communication is man's mode of existence. Communication is the way in which people reach an understanding of each other and at the same time, realise their potential as human beings through self-expression. Because of the difficulties involved in studying people in interpersonal communication, the dialogue of drama is used as a paradigm for dialogue in the real world. The insights gained should be of value in reaching an understanding of the communication problems that people experience in the course of their everyday lives.