Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992

Policymakers often trumpet the potential for third parties to stop the killing associated with civil wars, yet third parties as strategic actors also have incentives to encourage longer civil wars. We argue that in order to assess the influence of third parties on civil war duration, it is necessary to consider the interdependent nature of third party interventions as they are distributed across the set of civil war combatants. We also argue that it is important to consider the geopolitical context in which civil wars occur, rather than focusing solely on characteristics internal to these conflicts. To test our hypotheses about the impact of third parties and geopolitical factors on civil war duration, we rely on event history analysis and a sample of 152 civil wars for the period 1820–1992. We find empirical support for the idea that extremely long civil wars correspond to the equitable distribution of third party interventions—stalemates prolong wars. The analysis also indicates that separatist civil wars and ongoing civil wars in states proximate to the civil war state result in civil wars of longer duration. Finally, we find that when third parties raise the stakes of the conflict by engaging in the use of militarized force against the civil war state, the duration of these conflicts is reduced. In general, our analysis underscores the importance of modeling the interdependent and dynamic aspects of third party intervention as well as the world politics of civil wars when forecasting their duration and formulating policy.     

The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse

ABSTRACT

The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) fought one of the longest and bloodiest civil wars in recent Latin American history. In 1996, the URNG and the Government of Guatemala signed a Firm and Lasting Agreement ending the country’s civil war and initiating the URNG’s post-war life as a political party. After finishing third in its initial electoral competition, the URNG has since been unable to capture more than 4% of the vote, on its own or in coalition, leaving it a minor political party. What explains the poor electoral performance of the URNG as a political party? Based upon fieldwork, elite interviews, and analysis of electoral data, I argue that the URNG’s minor party performance was caused by both organizational and institutional factors.     

Power, sovereignty, and the great republic: Anglo-American diplomatic relations in the era of the Civil War

Historians have tended to view the American Civil War (1861-65) as a milestone in Anglo-American relations. It marked the transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States in the Western Hemisphere. As Great Britain backed the losing side overwhelming American power brought about a British withdrawal. This article argues that this is a very oversimplified interpretation of their relations in this period. Britain did not intervene in the Civil War because it was not good policy; throughout the British relied on deterrence because, save for the war years, American power could not be translated into military power. The British secured most of their policy objectives thanks to a combination of prudent and conciliatory conduct, and a desire to avoid war, but also due to calm resolution that belied belligerent and sometimes outlandish public statements. British leaders have often been criticized for hypocrisy and double standards, but such criticisms seem unfair. Their belief that the Civil War was futile resulted from a humanitarian desire to halt the killing. It should be remembered that although the nineteenth century witnessed many local conflicts, great wars seem to have disappeared. It therefore appeared to be a laudable objective to attempt to arbitrate in what turned out to be the greatest war after 1815. It is also important to recall that Europeans were less interested in this conflict than the Americans themselves, and that preoccupation with affairs closer to home led to hasty and erroneous judgements.     

Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality,the Freedom of the Seas,and the Myth of the “Civil War Precedents”

This analysis shows the importance of a problem of maritime law in an on-going debate between two interpretations of Wilsonian neutrality that have competed in various guises since the end of the First World War: can British blockade actions in that war be justified by American Civil War precedents? It proves that reliance on the “Civil War precedents” to justify Britain’s blockade measures was disingenuous from the beginning. British diplomats first used it in October 1914, and Woodrow Wilson embraced it to defend his mild response to British violations of neutral rights to incensed American citizens despite continuous protests from the State Department. Whilst all politicians involved knew the comparison was wrong, historians have embraced it as a justification of Britain’s illegal blockade ever since Arthur S. Link claimed it as the key to understanding Wilson’s neutrality policy.     

The power of arms: rethinking armed parties and democratization through the Palestinian elections

This article examines the role of armed parties in democratization. Usually considered volatile and thus excluded from the democratic process, we argue instead that in certain circumstances, armed parties can have a productive role in elections aimed at democratization – most notably by contributing to the balance of power between incumbents and opposition, both before, during and after elections. An in-depth analysis of the 2006 Palestinian elections, placed in comparative context, shows how arms affect the calculus of voters, opposition elites, and incumbents to make elections more competitive and democracy more likely. The article then directly addresses the objection that postponing disarmament fosters civil war, arguing rather that postponing disarmament may actually help promote peaceful, democratic outcomes of states emerging from civil war. It concludes by discussing the implication of the analysis for the study of democratization and for policies aimed at democracy promotion.     

Determinants of civil war in post-colonial Asia, 1950-1992: the role of trade openness and economic development

Although Asia has experienced civil war about as often as Sub-SaharanAfrica during the post-World War II era, there have been fewsystematic investigations into the determinants of civil warin Asia. This article examines the effects of trade opennessand economic development on the onset of civil war in post-colonialAsia, controlling for political, demographic, and geographicfactors. Analyzing data on post-colonial Asian states between1950 and 1992, we find that the onset of civil war is less likelywith increased trade openness. However, when taking into accountinteraction between trade openness and economic development,we discover that increased trade openness reduces the likelihoodof civil war onset significantly only in the context of higheconomic development. This result is robust with different modelspecifications.     

Civil wars,party politics and the consolidation of regimes in twentieth century Europe

The present article explores how winners' and losers' strategies for competition influence the possibility of democratization after civil war. Civil wars have been pivotal events in many states, but there has been little analysis of how they affect democratization. Since most have been won by the political right in twentieth century Europe one expects a correlation between civil war and the imposition of authoritarian solution to political conflicts. However, an analysis of five civil wars shows a wide variety in the patterns of political dominance achieved by the winners, ranging from total clampdown in Spain to the winners relinquishing power, as in Ireland. In between, Finland, Greece and Hungary combined various degrees of open competition with restrictions on the losers. In effect democratization can be as likely an outcome of civil war as regression to authoritarianism. Explaining the variation in outcomes of the five cases is the objective of this article.     

国际冷战初期的一个地方热点--1945年至1950年间的中越边境跨国革命区

自1920年代起,东亚各国,特别是中国、朝鲜和越南的共产主义运动即互相交织并连成一片。东亚三国共产党之间的合作,促成了南北两个跨国革命区的形成,本文探讨的即是1945年至1950年间南方中越边境跨国革命区形成的条件、中越双方合作的方式,以及1950年前与1950年后中越同盟关系的区别。学术界对于1950年后的中越同盟关系已多有论述,但1950年前中共与印支共之间的合作则未引起同等重视。1950年前的中越跨国革命区值得探讨,一是因为这一时期的中越革命同盟关系实际上是第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争的延伸,也是这两场战争的连接点。这种联系突显了这两场战争的国际性,进一步证明第二次国共内战和第一次印支战争都是与冷战密切关联的热战,中越跨国革命区因此成为冷战初期的一个地方热点,并代表了国际冷战的一种地方形态;二是因为这一阶段两党之间的合作为1950年代至1970年代末期的中越关系奠定了基础。在国共内战期间,中共不仅得到了苏联共产党和朝鲜共产党的支持,也得到了印支共产党的援助,中共对于胡志明和越南革命运动的支持也是从印支战争爆发之日起即已开始,1950年后只是扩大了援助的范围,并提高了援助的规模和合作的级别。1950年前两党关系中发生的一些问题也将在1950年后重复出现并带来严重后果。     

The Short‐Term Effects of Mediation on Low‐Intensity Civil Wars

International diplomacy, to the extent it is effective, should not only prevent escalation of low‐intensity conflict, but should also facilitate de‐escalation. This article focuses on the short‐term effects of managing low‐intensity civil wars through third‐party mediation. Specifically, we compare the efficacy of third party‐mediated direct (face‐to‐face) and indirect talks in low‐intensity civil wars from 1993 to 2004 using the Managing Intrastate Low‐Intensity Conflict data set. We argue that a focus on short‐term success is valid because of the relationship among mediation, short‐term success, humanitarian aid access, and peacebuilding. We also assess the roles of mediator identity, mediation strategy (behavior focus versus incompatibility focus), peace agreements, war type, per capita gross domestic product, level of democracy, and conflict duration. Our overarching finding is that direct forms of mediation in which all parties meet face to face were the most likely to yield short‐term success in the sample of civil wars that we analyzed.     

International Dimensions: What Is the Role of Third Parties?

In the Arab–Israeli arena, third parties have traditionally played a prominent role. External intervention has tended to peak when violence threatens international interests (e.g., the 1973 Arab–Israeli War), or when the parties are unable to sustain a negotiating process. Whether providing political and security assurances aimed at mitigating insecurity or offering economic inducements to underwrite peace accords, third parties have made a number of positive contributions toward managing the conflict.     

International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties

This study extends the previous literature on actors' incentives in conflict management by examining how direct and indirect links between fighting parties influence the prospects for mediation onset from a social network perspective. The paper argues, contrary to existing research, that direct links, i.e., bilateral ties between warring parties, do not notably increase the likelihood of mediation. Rather, indirect links, i.e., ties that connect two states via one or more than one third party to each other, are more likely to determine whether a conflict sees mediation. Although direct links can indicate mutual interests, shared preferences, and decreased uncertainty between the warring parties, these ties either lose importance or become cut off when states enter a conflict. By contrast, indirect ties create a social network that involves outside parties in the dispute process, and indirect ties increase the exchange of information between belligerents and potential mediators and the chances that third parties will have a vital interest in intervention. My empirical analysis using conflict and social network data in 1946–1995 provides strong support for the theory.     

Expert intervention: knowledge,violence and identity during the Algerian crisis, 1997–1998

Civil wars and humanitarian intervention became two of the most dominant security concerns of the 1990s and Algeria was one of the many sites where these discourses were played out, especially during the wave of massacres that claimed the lives of hundreds (if not thousands) of Algerian civilians between mid-1997 and early 1998. The internationalization of the Algerian Civil War was driven as much by the horrific violence as by a lack of certainty as to the identity of those perpetrating the massacres. The indeterminacy of violence in Algeria provided the warrant for experts to fill the void. Yet interpretations of the violence in Algeria, coupled with the generic logics of intra-national armed conflicts and the use of international coercive force for the protection of human rights, produced divergent problematizations of the crisis. This paper thus examines the ways in which Algeria was, and often was not, produced as a civil war and a humanitarian crisis by expert and scholarly knowledge and practice. Through an analysis of the exclusionary effects of the dominant understandings of political violence in Algeria, we are able to understand the conceptual impasse that faced international action against the massacres.     

Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group’s pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country’s political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders’ expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.     

Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship

ABSTRACT

Why do some states terminate their sponsorship of rebel movements while others are persistent in their provision of support? In the past, most research on external support to insurgents has focused on why states choose to sponsor rebel groups and particularly how this affects conflict duration. However, we know little about the termination of such support. This is surprising given that support has been shown to make armed conflicts more intractable and tremendous efforts are made in condemning and sanctioning such behavior. This study constitutes the first large-N analysis of support termination, employing survival analysis on global data of state support to rebel movements between 1975–2009. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that only some of the factors that explain support provision can offer insights into its termination. In particular, support is more likely to be terminated when no ethnic kinship bonds exist between the rebel movement and the government of the supporting state. Many decisions to withdraw support also seem to coincide with the transition from the Cold War. Threats and sanctions from other states appear largely ineffective. The study contributes to our understanding of the international dimensions of civil war and the role and motives of third parties.     

Intervenors with Interests and Power

This article presents a framework for understanding the roles that interested and powerful intervenors play in resolving disputes. Called an intervention role grid, this framework can be used to analyze the dispute resolution functions that third parties can perform. It may also be used to shed light on the difficult choices that confront intervenors with interests and power. The article uses case material from five recent international conflicts to illustrate how the intervention role grid works.     

British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back

The American Civil War is an important test case for offensive realism because it was the last occasion when offshore balancing by Britain could have prevented the United States from becoming a regional hegemon. Instead, Britain drew on the norm of nonintervention to justify a policy of neutrality. Offensive realists reject the idea that Britain was constrained by normative considerations but disagree about why Britain failed to operate as an offshore balancer. I acknowledge the importance of the offensive realists' regionalized approach to the international system, but use English School thinking to argue that the normative framework that Britain and the United States subscribed to must be taken into account to provide a coherent explanation of Britain's response to the Civil War. Detailed archival research demonstrates that despite concern about u.s. regional hegemony, Britain was unequivocally constrained by normative considerations. The case study suggests, therefore, that societal constraints were stronger than systemic ones.     

Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

1958年印尼内战与艾森豪威尔政府的政策

美国对1958年印尼内战的干涉是美国与第三世界关系史上一个有代表性的事件。艾森豪威尔政府从美苏两极对抗的角度认知和处理美国与新兴的民族主义国家的关系，将美国对亚非民族主义国家的政策附属于美国对苏冷战战略。正是基于这样一种政策思维，美国对印尼内战采取了干涉政策。干涉行动的失败，迫使美国决策当局重新检视对印尼政策的基本构架，并着手制定一项更为可行、更能反映印尼政治经济和社会现实的政策。     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

Why Foreign Fighters?: Historical Perspectives and Solutions

Insurgencies that recruit foreign nationals to join rebel groups in various civil wars around the globe are a source of growing concern to policymakers. Despite attention focused on recent Islamist groups, foreign fighters are a phenomenon that is neither new nor uniquely Islamic. In conflicts from the Spanish Civil War to the Afghanistan War, insurgencies consistently recruited foreigners by framing the local war as one that threatened a shared transnational identity group and necessitated a defensive mobilization. It is therefore possible to draw lessons about combating their flow through counter-recruitment from a wide array of historical cases.