Interpretive Filters: Social Cognition and the Impact of Turning Points in Negotiation

A number of studies have shown that certain events that occur during a negotiation can alter its course. Referred to as "turning points," these events are precipitated by actions taken either outside or inside the talks that have consequences for outcomes. In this article, we report the results of two experiments designed to examine the impacts of two types of precipitating actions, external and internal. In the first experiment, which focused on external actions, we found that crises — as opposed to breakthroughs — produced more movement in negotiations in which parties viewed the social climate positively (high trust, low power). We found that parties achieved less movement in negative social climates (low trust, high power).
In the second experiment, which focused on internal actions, we found that cooperative precipitants (factors inducing change) were more likely to occur when parties negotiated in the context of positive social climates. Negotiation outcomes were also influenced by the climate: we found better individual outcomes for negotiations that occurred in positive climates (high trust, cooperative orientations). Inboth experiments, the social climate of the negotiation moderated the effects of precipitating factors on negotiation outcomes. Perceptions of trust and power filter the way negotiators interpret actions that occur outside or are taken inside a negotiation, which can lead to agreements or impasses.     

A Conceptual Framework for Modeling Automated Negotiations in Multiagent Systems

In fully automated e‐negotiation all involved parties are software agents, so negotiation takes place in a multiagent system between software agents that have been developed as a computer system for automating tasks in a specific application domain. A multiagent system is a group of agents that interact and cooperate with each other to fulfill their objectives or to improve their performance. How do these agents negotiate with each other to manage their task interdependencies? What negotiation mechanisms are needed? These are important questions. In this article, we present a conceptual framework for modeling and developing automated negotiation systems. This framework represents and specifies all the necessary concepts and entities for developing a negotiation system as well as the relationships among these concepts. This framework can also be used to model human negotiations scenarios for analyzing these types of negotiations and simulating them with multiagent systems. The work reported in this article is the first unified framework that represents all the needed elements for modeling and developing automated negotiation systems and existing relationships between them.     

Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows

Back‐channel negotiations (BCNs) are officially sanctioned negotiations conducted in secret between the parties to a dispute. These extraordinary negotiations operate in parallel with, or replace, acknowledged front channels of negotiation. Back channels are like the black markets of negotiation; they are separate tables where bargaining takes place in the shadows. When front‐channel negotiations fail, they are sometimes eclipsed by successful BCNs even though the same principals, conflicts, and sociopolitical contexts are involved. This article asks: Why do decision makers deploy back channels? What is the impact of BCN on international peace processes? The Palestinian–Israeli peace process, in which both back and front channels have been used consistently, provides the basis for comparing channels and offering initial answers to these questions. The author concludes that while BCN can facilitate breakthrough agreements, it can also damage a peace process by helping to reinforce some of the uncertainties that gave rise to the use of back channels in the first place.     

Negotiating in a Complex World

Drawing on the literatures on negotiation and conflict resolution as well as research on international diplomacy, the author proposes a framework for understanding complexity in real-world negotiations. Rejecting models of the process that are simplistic, sterile, or static, he argues that complexity is inherent in negotiation. In ten propositions, he lays out key dimensions of complexity and ways that skilled negotiators can manage it. The propositions focus attention on the ways negotiators create and claim value, shape perceptions and learn, work within structure and shape the structure, negotiate and mediate, link and de-link negotiations, create momentum and engineer impasses, and work outside and inside. The author also highlights the importance of organizational learning in negotiation, noting that most negotiators manage multiple negotiations in parallel, and most organizations have many negotiators doing similar things.     

Departures in Negotiation: Extensions and New Directions

The conception of turning points advanced in this essay emphasizes events that occur in a chronological sequence which the author, in his previous work, has incorporated into a framework for case analysis. The framework covers three stages: precipitants that trigger change; departures which are the reaction to the precipitant; and consequences, which refer to the direction the negotiation takes as a result of the departure. Building on his earlier work, the author uses examples of a less-bounded international negotiation and cases culled from the headlines to demonstrate the framework's generality. He then considers the concept at the individual, relational, and collective levels in an attempt to probe the psychological and social processes that occur before, during, and after departures (turning points); and may be in fact, the underlying impetus for departures.     

For the Sake of the Team: Unity and Disunity in a Multiparty Major League Baseball Negotiation

"Divide and conquer" is a well-known expression although the literature on distributive negotiation offers little theory in support of this technique. This article develops theory to explain increases or decreases in unity and disunity among negotiation groups comprising multiple parties in organizational settings. Specifically, this study analyzes the negotiations surrounding the purchase of the Seattle Mariners baseball team in 1992 by a group that included Japanese investors. The study identifies reframing as a technique that can be used strategically to create disunity between cooperating parties on the same side in a negotiation. This article also develops a theory about techniques that can enhance unity between cooperating parties and can protect against disunity that may be generated by the opposition. Dividing and unifying techniques are both components of a larger negotiation theory that seeks to evaluate actions designed to affect the degree of unity between parties working together in distributive settings.     

Civic Fusion: Moving from Certainty through Not Knowing to Curiosity

Civic fusion occurs when people bond across passionate difference to solve a shared public problem. It requires bringing people close together under conditions that enable them to bond, even as their polarizing beliefs remain intact. In managing multiparty multi‐issue negotiations, public policy mediators help disparate, passionate parties negotiate actionable agreements. To achieve and sustain civic fusion, interested parties recognize and acknowledge confining assumptions and move through a continuum in which their certainty about each other and their presumed solutions is challenged and transforms to uncertainty and then to curiosity. They connect across common public goals and find mutual understanding and respect for the interests of others as they come to understand and accept the opportunities and limitations that are inherent to their complex situations. A steady stream of new understandings moves people beyond their long‐held perspectives to foster productive negotiations and build innovative solutions. Ultimately, the parties generate sustainable consensus agreements even as they retain their deeply held and often opposing values and beliefs.     

Navigating differences: transatlantic negotiations over Galileo

The European global navigation satellite system, Galileo, entered its development phase in 2002 and is scheduled to become operational in 2012. Since its inception, Galileo has been yet another contentious issue in transatlantic negotiations. American concerns spanned economic and security-related issues, but, despite considerable tensions, a comprehensive agreement was entered into in 2004. This paper analyses the roots of the transatlantic dispute, as well as the negotiations that led to its resolution. It points out the vital and wide-ranging lessons that may be gleaned from this case. The European Commission has become a notable actor in the security realm via dual-use items such as Galileo. Technological progress has, in itself, become a bargaining instrument whereas time-honoured negotiation tactics have failed. Galileo sheds light on the ongoing recalibration of the transatlantic partnership in which autonomy has become a powerful motivation for European policy-makers. Constructive engagement, triggered by shared interests, only occurred when parties accepted each other as equals.     

Domestic and International Politics during an EU Intergovernmental Conference: Bridging the Gap between Negotiation Theory and Practice

This article describes selective results of a large-scale study of within-governmental coordination processes and international negotiations. We examined a European Union intergovernmental conference (IGC), the so-called IGC 1996, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, from a quantitative negotiation analysis perspective. Our focus of attention has been the embeddedness of international negotiations within formal governmental organizations and within informal communication networks. We have identified the relative impact on negotiation dynamics and on negotiation performance of each of the parties by using various statistical techniques. We argue that such insights can be used for a research-based consulting in which social scientists respond to practitioners'"what-if" questions with evidence-based simulations and scenarios.     

Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

Teaching Students to Shape the Game: Negotiation Architecture and the Design of Manageably Dynamic Simulations

Although important work is being done in the emerging field of negotiation architecture and "shaping the game," little of it has found its way into the classroom. Simulation exercises are among the most powerful pedagogical tools available to negotiation educators, but most existing exercises have static architectures in the form of fixed parties, issues, and interests. This article summarizes existing research on negotiation design and proposes a framework for designing "manageably dynamic" exercises that can be used to teach key game-shaping concepts. The framework is illustrated through an in-depth discussion of an exercise based on the negotiations to end the civil war in El Salvador.     

The Shadow Negotiation and the Interest-Based Approach at Kaiser Permanente

As interesting and significant as the Kaiser Permanente case is in and of itself, there were many parallel negotiations that took place just below the surface of the overt negotiations. The author focuses on this "shadow negotiation," exploring a series of strategic moves that took place in the case, enabling the parties to craft their negotiation process. These shadow negotiations involved positioning moves, process moves, power moves, and appreciative moves. The parallel shadow negotiation was a significant factor in the success of the Kaiser Permanente negotiations.     

Broadening the Evaluation of Dispute Resolution: Context and Relationships Over Time

Evaluation of negotiation outcomes tends to focus on measurable, dyadic,short-term resolutions of conflict. We review current challenges to this traditionalmodel of the evaluation of dispute resolution outcomes, and we offerfour perspectives that can help address them. First, we advocate the needfor longitudinal studies of negotiations that incorporate disputant relationshipsbefore and after a particular negotiation. Second, we highlight theincreasing importance of third parties in resolving conflict. Third, we suggesta more comprehensive conception of parties, relationships andoutcomes in negotiations research. Finally, we advance an explicit incorporationof context and culture into dispute resolution research models.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

Why Do We Respond to a Concession with Another Concession? Reciprocity and Compromise

All negotiation processes involve an exchange of concessions, and compromise is an agreement based on mutual concessions. Hence the questions investigated in this article: Why are concessions in negotiations always reciprocal? Why do negotiators follow this rule? And why do negotiators achieve these concessions through a process that we call compromise? Is there a connection between conceding and promising? In this article, I examine the structure of concession making and compromise through sociological, anthropological, and etymological lenses to better illuminate this critical negotiation component.     

The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation

This article addresses the influence wielded by the formal leaders of international cooperation—those state or supranational representatives that chair and direct negotiations in the major decision bodies of multilateral organizations and conferences. This is a topic that so far has received limited systematic attention by IR theorists, who have tended to treat bargaining parties as functionally and formally equivalent, leaving little theoretical space for formal leadership. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, I introduce a theory that develops a coherent argument for the delegation of authority to the chairmanship, the power resources of negotiation chairs, and the influence of formal leaders over outcomes. I assess the explanatory power of this theory through evidence on formal leadership in three alternative organizational settings: the European Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations environmental conferences. I find in favor of the chairmanship as a source of independent influence in international cooperation. Formal leaders perform functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed, and possess privileged resources that may enable them to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer.     

Beyond contestation: conceptualizing negotiation in democracy promotion

ABSTRACT

This article presents an analytical framework that guides the contributions to this special issue and, in general terms, aims at enabling a systematic investigation of processes of negotiation in the international promotion of democracy. It first briefly introduces the rationale for studying democracy promotion negotiation, offers a definition, and locates the general approach within the academic literature, bringing together different strands of research, namely studies of negotiation in international relations as well as research on democratization and democracy promotion. The larger part of the article then discusses key concepts, analytical distinctions and theoretical propositions along the lines of the three research questions that are identified in the introduction to this special issue. More specifically, the article (1) offers a typology that facilitates a systematic empirical analysis of the issues that are discussed in democracy promotion negotiations; (2) takes initial steps towards a causal theory of democracy promotion negotiation by identifying and discussing a set of parameters that can be expected to shape such negotiations; and (3) introduces key distinctions and dimensions that help guide empirical research on the output and outcome of negotiations in democracy promotion.     

When Negotiations Become Routine: Not Reinventing the Wheel While Thinking Outside the Box

In this article, we seek to apply the insights of recent research on routine to the context of repeated negotiations. To demonstrate the link between both concepts, we introduce an analytical framework in which we identify different negotiation situations in which routine can develop. We distinguish two dimensions of the negotiation process: a problem-solving dimension and a communication dimension. Our framework for analyzing the role of routine in negotiation is built around these two dimensions. We define those skills that we argue in repeated negotiations can help negotiators manage particular kinds of negotiations depending on the level and type of routinization that type of negotiation involves. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework is inherently dynamic, which we illustrate with simplified business examples.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.