The Bundeswehr and the Kunduz air strike 4 September 2009: Germany's post-heroic moment?

The article sets out to investigate Germany's involvement in the controversial 2009 Kunduz air strike in Afghanistan. Utilizing a theoretical framework derived from existing literature on postheroic warfare, it employs a detailed case study of this particular military engagement to highlight the operational, strategic, and cultural dimensions of Germany's operations in Afghanistan. Through an analysis of primary documents and field interviews, this paper concludes that German public opinion, politicians, soldiers and media reacted in ways that mirror closely theories of postheroic warfare. These included widespread condemnation of the air strike, increasing doubts about the Afghan mission, and emphasis on low-risk stand-off precision weapons, which paradoxically resulted in higher civilian casualties. Germans still have a long way to go to accept the brutal realities of military engagements that the Bundeswehr increasingly confronts during its expanded scope of post-cold war military operations.     

Whither Lafayette? French military policy and the American campaign in Afghanistan

During the American‐led military campaign against international terrorism, France has sought to preserve its special status and role as a global power. This effort continues longstanding French policies designed to maintain autonomy in security and foreign policy areas. Such policies create differences and discord with the United States over coalition warfare. This article examines the underpinnings of American and French preferences for coalition military missions in the context of national policy and past military operations. A case study of French participation in the operations in Afghanistan provides the framework for analysis.     

Has the Forgotten “Stability-Instability Paradox” Belatedly Reared Its Ugly Head in Ukraine?

When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine last February, he seemed surprisingly confident that threatening nuclear escalation would inhibit any North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response. Despite Russia’s poor military performance, this coercive nuclear gambit seems to have paid off. Western countries preemptively ruled out direct intervention and have declined Ukraine combat aircraft and longer-range missiles as they openly agonize about how Putin could react if facing an outright military defeat. This seemingly successful use of nuclear brinkmanship raises the specter of the stability-instability paradox, a largely forgotten Cold War theory worrying that stable mutual nuclear deterrence could embolden military adventurism at lower levels of warfare     

Responding to terrorism across the technological spectrum

The ‘revolution in military affairs’ arguably heralds a new era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the conventional battlefield. This ‘revolution’, however, will have little if any impact on American military capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare are concerned. With regard to terrorism specifically, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative and the implications that it has to trigger acts future of mass, indiscriminate violence; the proliferation of ‘amateur’ terrorist groups which may contribute to the loosening of previous self‐imposed constraints on operations and lethality, and the growing sophistication of established, more ‘professional’ groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction than in the past.     

21世纪初俄罗斯军事战略的调整方向

在新世纪到来之际,为实现国家振兴与长远发展,俄正在做出新的规划.21世纪初的俄罗斯军事战略将以对付面临的军事威胁为基本目标,贯彻以核武器为基本手段的战略遏制方针,建设一支均衡发展的现代化军队,加强对各种战略行动样式的研究和准备,推进以军事合作为基础的联盟防御,做好应付中小战争和武装冲突的准备.     

Major Combat Operations and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959–1960

In 1959–60, the French Army in Algeria achieved a major tactical and operational military success under the command of General Maurice Challe, in which the French destroyed half of the combat capability of the Algerian insurgency. Rather than adopting a population-centric, or “hearts and minds,” approach to coin, the French Army created an innovative method for military success based on the use of major combat operations against the military power of the insurgency. The success of major combat operations in Plan Challe is omitted or dismissed in most of the Algerian War historiography, which focuses instead on French pacification. An analysis of Plan Challe, however, provides lessons and examples for the conduct of a successful sustained counterguerrilla campaign, a coercive method seldom discussed in current debates over coin warfare.     

Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy

An intense debate now rages concerning whether the Army should be preparing and organizing to conduct more ambiguous, irregular operations or focus on maintaining its well honed edge in high-intensity warfare. The terms of the debate are clearly affected by the fact that United States is currently embroiled in perilous counterinsurgency and other irregular operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the Army recalibrate itself to wage counterinsurgency and other irregular operations more effectively, or does it need to keep doing what it does best with an eye to future conventional warfare? Given the impossibility of accurately predicting the character of future conflict, it is necessary for the Army to strike a balance between the extremes. But for the Army to effectively implement a policy of “balance,” it must be prepared to dramatically change the way it organizes itself and drop its opposition to specializing its forces for irregular and conventional warfare, respectively. The approach that the Army should take should be based upon a Total Force construct. By utilizing the entire Total Force portfolio, it should be possible to better optimize the mix of ground units prepared for conventional war, irregular war or peace operations to avoid a mis-match between national security strategy and military force. In this manner, it may be possible to stake our claim on the hard won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet hedge against the unknowable future.     

Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Washington was embarking on a defense transformation emphasizing missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology. This transformation proved irrelevant to the national security threats we now face, with the emergence of nontraditional adversaries pursuing “complex irregular warfare.” U.S. forces will have to assume a much more expeditionary character to successfully deal with Islamists’ complex irregular warfare. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy provides a balance to the longstanding American military emphasis on major-theater war, but it remains to be seen whether the military's new interest in operations other than conventional, major-combat operations will last or if it will diminish as soon as a new peer competitor rises, allowing the Pentagon to return to its more familiar paradigm.     

The Future of War and American Military Strategy

The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.     

俄罗斯新版国家安全战略评析

2021年7月2日,俄出台新版《俄罗斯联邦国家安全战略》,其中有许多新变化值得关注.俄认为,当前国际形势动荡不安,地缘政治紧张局势日益加剧,武力仍是解决国家间冲突矛盾的重要手段.俄当前国家安全面临的主要威胁是美西方针对其进行的"混合战争",具体包括军事威胁、经济制裁和政治施压.为此,新战略提出的基本战略目标是维护国内、...     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.     

Russia's information warfare structure: Understanding the roles of the security council,Fapsi, the state technical commission and the military

During the past two years, Russia has made significant progress in improving its infrastructure responsible for information security. Security specialists also have produced a draft information security doctrine (which the US does not possess) that discusses critical information issues and areas, and the internal and external information threats to the state. The primary organizations responsible for information security in Russia are the Security Council, responsible for national interests affected by the information age; the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), responsible for ensuring the security of state communications and conducting intercept operations; the State Technical commission, devoted to the development of international laws, licensing and certification of IW related policies; and the Russian armed forces, responsible for studying the impact of information operations on military art.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.     

俄罗斯与中亚国家安全合作机制分析

安全合作是俄罗斯与中亚国家关系的关键性领域,对中亚地区安全态势及发展趋势具有关键意义。俄罗斯与中亚国家借助双边及多边安全制度,构建了军事同盟体系,并形成了完备的组织机构和决策模式。俄罗斯与中亚在共同使用军事设施、军事技术合作、联合军事演习和军事人才培养等方面展开具体的安全合作。俄罗斯与中亚国家安全合作机制的有效性受到权力结构、合法性与国内政治等因素的制约,其未来有可能向更为紧密的方向发展,对中亚地区安全发挥着长期的主导性作用。     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

Russian Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: What to Know and What to Fear

Recent news of hypersonic tests in both Russia and China stoke fears of a technological gap for the United States. However, a sober analysis of the state of hypersonic technology raises doubts of its capabilities, or usefulness in military operations. Instead, overassessment of hypersonics gives them their strategic value: political leverage. A nuclear-tipped hypersonic might not actually tilt the balance of deterrence at all but would nonetheless require a complex arms control negotiation between the United States, Russia, and China. A conventional hypersonic would have to overcome serious technical barriers to even match current precision weapon systems, but not fulling knowing the system’s capabilities means the United States must treat it as a credible threat. Without a careful measure of the technology, policymakers risk diplomatic missteps, budgetary waste, and an escalatory miscalculation.     

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER 9–11

Can military reform in Russia become a reality, or is it doomed forever to the status of oxymoron? The answer to this question will have as much to do with US-Russian relations as with internal Russian politics and finance. Despite a warm personal friendship between Presidents Putin and Bush, polls show the Russian people remain highly ambivalent about US policies and intentions toward Russia and the CIS. Many inside and outside the military believe the United States will use the war in Afghanistan and its foothold in Central Asia to encircle and weaken Russia. This thinking has spilled over into attacks on Putin for his attempts at military reform, particularly his decision to de-emphasize the strategic nuclear forces. While Putin has made some courageous moves to stem corruption and bring the military to heel, in other cases he has been forced to back off in order to avoid a political backlash. As a result, military reform continues to proceed in fits and starts, still more oxymoron than reality.     

Information warfare and nuclear conflict termination

This study considers the possible implications of information warfare for efforts to terminate a nuclear war, or a war between nuclear armed states that is about to go nuclear. Information warfare could interfere with some of the requirements for nuclear conflict termination in at least five ways: by increasing the difficulty of accurate communication between heads of state; by decreasing the likelihood of military compliance with terms of ceasefire or settlement; by reinforcing mass images of the enemy that make it more difficult for leaders to negotiate; and by making battle damage assessment more complicated; and by increasing the amount of uncertainty within an already chaotic government decision‐making process and within a possibly acephalous military instrument.