Centers of Gravity: Regional Powers,Democracy, and Trade

Classic studies on hegemonic stability and power transition suggest that concentration of capabilities favoring a single state can promote economic cooperation and discourage militarized conflict. However, tests of these arguments have been primarily limited to examining temporal variation in global capability distributions and corresponding levels of system-wide cooperation; few have examined the impact of capability concentration at the region level. In this article, we contend that concentration of regional military capabilities corresponds to lower trade costs for states throughout a region and to an incentive for weaker states to de-prioritize expenditure on the military, freeing resources that can be used to promote trade. As a result, this condition promotes higher levels of trade, particularly within the region. We also argue that democratic regional powers are better able to foster confidence in the sustainability of cooperation; thus, the trade-enhancing impact of concentrated regional capabilities is stronger when the predominant state is more democratic. We find evidence in support of our expectations in statistical models examining state trade between 1960 and 2007.     

Breaching the levee,waiting for the flood. Testing beliefs about the internationalization of securities markets

Abstract

In the 1970s and 1980s, the three major securities markets in New York, London, and Tokyo underwent significant regulatory shifts that lowered national barriers to entry and liberalized the markets. Popular explanations point toward technologies, economic efficiencies, foreign policy pressures, the removal of controls on international capital flows, or international competition as unleashing forces promoting liberalization and breaching the regulatory levees. Such explanations generate expectations about behavior once the international pressures are unleashed. Significant changes in overseas participants' market behavior should be observable. International competitive pressures should produce convergence in regulatory and transaction costs across markets upon one of two equilibriums—one by competitive deregulations or another by harmonization through agreement. Empirical tests produce results inconsistent with such expectations. Foreign participation does increase following the breach in the regulatory levees, but the unleashed demand cannot be described as a flood. Observable measures of market dynamics and transaction costs remain distinctive. The inconsistencies between results and expectations raise questions about explanations that emphasize increasing interdependence and international pressures as driving domestic political and economic changes.     

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.     

Compensatory Constitutionalisation: A Comparative Perspective

Legal scholars argue that there is an emerging global compensatory constitution. This denotes a set of compatible supranational and national institutions that fulfil functions hitherto fulfilled by national constitutions. Thus, de-constitutionalisation at the national level, which, as this strand of literature argues, has been brought about by forces such as globalisation, is compensated for. There are strong hints that such constitutionalisation takes place in a formal sense: there is an increasing number of norms which could be seen as elements of a new global constitutional order. But it is far from clear whether these norms make a difference. In this paper we ask whether states comply with this presumably new constitutional order. We distinguish between three types of rights which are granted by a constitution—political, economic and social rights. In this paper we focus on the economic and social components of the emerging global constitution, which have been neglected in previous research. We study compliance with International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms. The ILO is the major source of a global social constitution; the WTO is the major source of a global economic constitution. We show that compliance is very uneven. Whilst formally a global constitution may be in the making, it makes little difference for citizens.     

The Durability of Imposed Democracy

Why do imposed democracies endure and how do policy choices by imposing states affect durability? To study these questions, we formulate expectations linking durability to structural domestic conditions, the level of domestic security in the state into which a polity is imposed, the policies of imposing states, and the regional environment within which an imposed democracy is nested. We use event history to test our expectations on a sample of democracies imposed during the twentieth century. We find that relatively immutable, structural conditions, such as ethnic cleavages, economic development, and prior democratic experience strongly influence the durability of imposed democracies. While some policy choices made by imposing states can impact the survival of imposed democracy, they do so only modestly relative to the environment in which a democracy is imposed.     

War, Economic Development, and Political Development in the Contemporary International System

The European state-building experience has led many scholars to argue that war forces states to increase their fiscal-administrative capacity, or what we might refer to as political development, in order to compete in the international system. War also requires states to generate wealth to support such competition, which should lead to progressively increased levels of economic development. Yet, in contemporary empirical studies, war is often studied as a dependent variable, with economic and political development modeled as affecting its origination. This reading of theory and empirical work suggests that war, economic development, and political development constitute an endogenous system. In this paper, we develop expectations about how these three processes interact and test them using a three-stage least squares regression model. The results show significant simultaneous relationships between the three processes. We conclude that war, economic development, and political development are mutually constitutive processes in the contemporary international system.     

Managing great powers in the post-Cold War world: old rules new game? The case of the global war on terror

This article investigates the impact of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) on the primary institution of great power management. To this end, it first identifies a misalignment between the new post-Cold War social reality and the capacity of some traditional norms of great power management to mediate this reality. Having established and described this environment of normative uncertainty, I then probe how the GWoT propels the consolidation of new identities and norms of great power management in interstate society. I argue that since the beginning of the GWoT the primary institution of great power management has institutionalized new norms to address transnational violence within its processes. At the same time, as hard balancing amongst great powers is becoming increasingly obsolete, two distinct social structures have been constructed with the GWoT: one that privileges an inequitable social structure of friends/rivals amongst states; and another that shapes a social structure of enemies with regard to terrorist–state relations. In this process, the capacity of managing transnational violence globally has increasingly become one of the central constitutive elements of being a great power. I conclude by demonstrating how the GWoT has acted as a subtle ‘bargaining bid’ in the process of organizing the current social meaning of polarity and great power management amongst states. State practices under the GWoT have delineated, in a clearer form, underlying expectations about the pattern of interactions between the superpower and great powers. Consequently, the GWoT has exerted a symbolic and psychological impact over international society by institutionalizing not only a specific meaning of unipolarity but also further raising the threshold of what is acceptable behaviour on the part of the superpower within an interstate social structure of friends/rivals.     

States,Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order

How would a hegemonic China shape international norms related to states, nations, and territoriality? Scholars have noted the conflict between the right of minority nations to self-determine and the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity. An unrestricted application of the former would risk considerable state fragmentation; an unconditional acceptance of the latter would condemn stateless nations to a subordinate status. Powerful actors like the United States have attempted to navigate these norms by specifying the conditions under which one norm should take precedence over the other, but such decisions are difficult to make in an international environment that lacks consensus, and the result is an ambiguous international order where conflict is common. I analyze the future of these norms in a Chinese-led international order, explaining why China would champion territorial integrity over self-determination, and why this would be better for territorial stability.     

Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks Through Attribution

In light of ongoing work to improve nuclear attribution capabilities, policymakers could be tempted to consider a nuclear terrorism deterrence doctrine relying strongly on the ability of those capabilities to support retaliation against states that supply materials used anonymously in an attack. Although the United States must develop the best possible nuclear attribution capabilities, at the very least to support response actions after an attack, prospects for deterrence are uncertain. To accommodate these uncertainties, as well as the wide range of possible nuclear terrorism scenarios, the United States should adopt a broadly scoped operationally ambiguous declaratory policy in the context of a comprehensive strategic doctrine to prevent nuclear terrorism.     

Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992

Previous studies provide strong evidence for the Kantian theory of peace, but a satisfactory evaluation requires establishing the causal influence of the variables. Here we focus on the reciprocal relations between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992. Using distributed-lags analyses, we find that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. The benefit of interdependence is particularly great in the case of conflict involving military fatalities. Militarized disputes also cause a reduction in trade, as liberal theory predicts. Democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, too, have im-portant pacific benefits; but we find only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace. We find no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied. Democracies and states that share membership in many international organizations have higher levels of trade, but allies do not when these influences are held constant.