Re‐evaluating US strategic priorities in the Caspian Region: balancing energy resource initiatives with terrorism containment

In the aftermath of September 11, US strategy has shifted in the Central Asian region from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post‐Soviet states to ensuring their stability in light of the dual impacts of energy development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although US–Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward US and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region's energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximising Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, US policy is increasingly prioritising Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region's ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region's energy resources has therefore become a critical US security concern. Yet, by failing to engage with Russia in a meaningful cooperation that could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of either in offering the Central Asian states the kind of support they need to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.     

The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.     

俄罗斯与中亚国家安全合作机制分析

安全合作是俄罗斯与中亚国家关系的关键性领域,对中亚地区安全态势及发展趋势具有关键意义。俄罗斯与中亚国家借助双边及多边安全制度,构建了军事同盟体系,并形成了完备的组织机构和决策模式。俄罗斯与中亚在共同使用军事设施、军事技术合作、联合军事演习和军事人才培养等方面展开具体的安全合作。俄罗斯与中亚国家安全合作机制的有效性受到权力结构、合法性与国内政治等因素的制约,其未来有可能向更为紧密的方向发展,对中亚地区安全发挥着长期的主导性作用。     

EUGENE SCHUYLER,THE ONLY DIPLOMATIST

Eugene Schuyler (1840–1890), little known today, was America’s best-qualified diplomat, one of its first PhDs, and a friend of Tolstoy, translator of Turgenev, and biographer of Peter the Great. Schuyler spent a decade in Russia; his first book describes a nine-month trip through Central Asia which Russia was then subjugating. Schuyler’s subsequent reports from Bulgaria on Turkish atrocities helped to make Bulgaria the modern world’s first “fashionable cause.” Schuyler was American minister to Greece, Romania, and Serbia, but was refused confirmation as the State Department’s number two because of his frank criticism of a former secretary of state. He died after some months as diplomatic agent in Egypt.     

Russia's Attempts to Undermine Democracy in the West: Effects and Causes

By exploiting pre-existing divisions in Western societies and attempting to sway elections toward candidates palatable to the Kremlin, the Russian Federation has had some success in eroding social cohesion and confidence in the institutions of democracy. But pulling the West down has not improved Russia's position in the world. Russia today is less well-regarded, less prosperous, and less secure than it was before it began its campaign of sowing disorder. Since the Kremlin sees its actions as justified responses to the West's alleged attempts to undermine Russia, this is a price it is willing to pay. Rather than trying to convince Russia to cease its malign activities, Western societies need to look inward. We need to eliminate the societal divisions that Russia exploits rather than try to convince Russia not to exploit them, denying it fertile ground on which to scatter its seeds of disinformation and propaganda. Only then will we solve the “Russia problem.”     

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变及其政策效应

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变过程分为友好合作、竞争凸显和激烈对抗三个阶段。俄罗斯的强势外交和安全政策,表现为俄罗斯对美国和北约的强硬战略姿态以及追求超出自身相对实力的外交和安全目标。俄罗斯战略认知的演变与俄美两国的利益冲突之间有着相互塑造的关系,但是俄罗斯战略认知的变化并不仅仅取决于利益考量。俄罗斯之所以把北约东扩、乌克兰走向、叙利亚局势等看得如此重要,不惜投入大量资源,这是与塑造俄罗斯战略认知的历史和心理因素是分不开的。美国采取的许多对俄政策和行为,正是因为忽略了这些因素,才被俄罗斯看作是“侮辱性”和“威胁性”的,从而导致了双方敌意的螺旋式上升。由于俄罗斯独特的历史记忆和大国情结,俄罗斯对俄美两国的利益冲突作出了激烈的回应,这些回应虽然不利于俄罗斯的国家实力和整体利益,但却是可以理解的。随着俄罗斯对美战略认知的逐步定型,俄美关系在短期内很难实现所谓的“重启”。从俄罗斯对美战略认知的案例分析可以看出,战略认知自身有其相对的独立性,在受到利益冲突影响的同时,也受到社会文化因素的深刻影响,从而使得国家的外交与安全政策未必完全遵循理性主义的路径。     

特朗普执政以来美国南亚战略的实施、未来走向及对策建议

特朗普执政以来,美国南亚战略的实施凸显出鲜明的特点:其一,整合南亚战略与印太战略,强调跨区域战略协调;其二,美国与阿富汗塔利班会谈并签署和平协议,贯彻基于条件而非时间表的撤军精神;其三,重视印度在美国南亚战略与印太战略中的"关键国家"作用;其四,希望巴基斯坦继续发挥"前线国家"和关键"第三方"的双重作用。未来,美国解决"阿富汗困境"之路既阻且艰,美印关系将更趋紧密而美巴关系则趋于平淡,美国整合南亚战略与印太战略的雄心不减,但将面临诸多挑战。基于此,建议中国与南亚共建"一带一路"以打造中国-南亚区域经济圈,发挥中巴经济走廊建设的辐射与示范作用,促动良性竞合的中印关系的发展,支持阿富汗政府与塔利班的政治和解努力的同时做好美撤军后阿富汗内战再起的预案。     

哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的举措、动力及前景

自1991年独立以来,哈萨克斯坦不但成功巩固了国家主权,在政治、经济、社会发展等领域取得了举世瞩目的成就,而且在外交领域赢得了国际社会的高度赞誉,使哈萨克斯坦成为全球治理舞台中最为活跃的中亚国家。在参与全球治理进程中,哈萨克斯坦将自己定位为“有实力的重要地区大国”,奉行以巩固主权独立和维护国家利益为中心的“全方位务实平衡”外交战略,通过建立睦邻友好信任带的“近邻外交”和以伙伴关系为基础的“远邻外交”,拉近与世界各大国及周边国家的外交关系,在国际和地区热点问题上扮演着“沟通者”和“调停者”角色,积极推动中亚地区内部的一体化进程,广泛参与全球与地区性国际组织,在核不扩散和文明对话等领域提出了各种有影响力的倡议,力图将本国的利益和世界的利益融为一体,为哈萨克斯坦的发展赢得了很大的机遇和空间,使哈萨克斯坦在国际社会中的能见度不断提升。作为中亚国家经济发展最为成功、外交最为活跃、国际影响力最为显著的国家,哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的实践经验值得发展中国家学习借鉴。     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

Italian Aid Policy in the 60's

The search for common language has become a demanding issues in the Russia-EU relationship. One of the strongest messages contained in Russia's “sovereign democracy” concept is its desire to be regarded as a “normal” country, a full-fledged member of the international community. The concept embodies a search for its own subjectivity, which is ultimately felt to be a pre-condition for its self-assertion vis-à-vis Europe. Russia does not question any of the basic European norms; instead it seeks to offer an alternative version of each of them. For the Western audience, analysis of these concepts is essential for a better comprehension of Russia's foreign policy arguments.     

Change Nobody Believes In: Obama and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Despite the promise of ‘change’ in President Barack Obama's early dealings with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the policy that has since emanated from the White House was in fact commensurate with those of preceding administrations. Rather than heralding a new direction for American engagement with the conflict, the Obama Administration had displayed more patterns of continuity than change in its dealings with both parties. Specifically, by continuing to act as “Israel's attorney” during negotiations, the Obama team had in effect negated the president's early pledges to act as an honest broker in the conflict. In assessing the (in)effectiveness of the Administration's management of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, it seems that on-going mediation efforts to revive the moribund peace process have exhausted their potential. Arbitration may be explored as a more effective method to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian territorial dispute.     

Russia's changing security role in Central Asia

The paper explores Russia's role in security in Central Asia, which analysts interpreted as projection of hegemony. It argues that this role is changing and is shaped by a variety of factors, sometimes acting in contradiction to one another. Domestic agenda is influenced by the danger discourse on drugs and anti-migrant sentiment and urges to detach from Central Asia. Moscow maintains a military presence in the region but is uncertain if it has serious enough stakes to justify a robust approach to security. Refusal to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 serves as a potent case. Regional organisations echo the non-intervention stance. As a ‘cost-benefit’ approach to security gains momentum, the paper asks if a policy of selective engagement is emerging when only the issues threatening Russia directly will be addressed. The implication can be a security vacuum in the region, affected by ethnic conflict, inter-state disputes and the consequences of withdrawal from Afghanistan.     

美国新中亚战略评析

美国公布新的中亚战略包含四方面调整,即将中亚地区视为独立的地缘政治板块、将阿富汗视为中亚一部分、明确将在中亚加强对俄罗斯和中国的遏制、重新界定美国在该地区的比较优势。新中亚战略的实施将会对中亚地区稳定和主要大国在该地区互动产生一定影响。但由于美国在实施该战略中投入力度有限、比较优势不明显,中亚国家不会轻易改变自身多元平衡外交政策、对阿富汗及其局势的认知与美有明显差异,以及美国在中亚地区的战略冒进可能引发大国反制,新战略的实施不会一帆风顺。     

A FAREWELL TO THE GREAT GAME? PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Long before 9–11, Russia and the United States found common ground in their efforts to undermine the Taliban government in Afghanistan, despite serious disagreements over policy in other parts of the world. The events of 9–11, however, changed Russian foreign and security policy drastically. One of the most fundamental and controversial shifts came when President Putin chose not to interfere in US negotiations with the Central Asian states to use their airbases for the US war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Putin also offered to use Russia’s oil reserves as a means to stabilize jittery world markets. In return, Russia gained US support for its bid to pipe Caspian Sea oil over Russian territory. More importantly, the US government gave Russia essentially a free hand in its war against separatist Chechnya. While there are many potential scenarios in highly unstable Central Asia that could serve to sour relations once again, Russia and the United States have an unprecedented opportunity to build trust and cooperation through peacekeeping and problem solving in the region.     

Parties,Party Systems and Democracy in the European Union

Since the late 1980s, research on political Islam has been much in vogue in Europe and the US. This phenomenon is typically viewed as an expression of religion rather than of politics. Precisely because of the assumed “religious” underpinnings of political Islam, most Western attempts to engage with Islamists often remain trapped in an attempt to test their “democratic credentials”. By focussing on what Islamists think about democracy, many studies have ignored the political, social and economic contexts in which Islamists operate. Accounting for the political underpinning of Islamist movements can both help understand their political evolution and open up fruitful avenues for comparative analysis. For this reason, attention is turned to Europe to seek best practices of external engagement with domestic opposition movements in authoritarian contexts, such as Western engagement with opposition actors in Franco's Spain, Kuchma's Ukraine and Shevardnadze's Georgia.     

The Russia–EU Energy Relationship: Getting it Right

The problems of Russia's energy sector, the part of the economy most broadly linked with Russia's prosperity and revived international influence, have been emphasized by the global financial crisis. Yet it remains an open question whether this, as well as various other factors, including the beginning of a genuine gas market and China's methodical advances in Central Asia, could encourage Russia to take the difficult decisions needed to make the energy sector more responsive and competitive. For its part, the EU has the potential to influence Russia, but if it continues to define itself by its divisions, it will not be able to use the influence it has gained. Without a strategic and coordinated approach, the EU is unlikely to be able to overcome its security dilemma and could find that the future is determined by other actors.     

The role of Russian gas in China’s energy supply strategy

China’s gas industry has witnessed a massive expansion and Chinese energy planners envisage a huge development of natural gas in China until 2030. This growth requires large-scale imports of gas in the coming two decades. This article discusses the role of Russian gas exports in China’s gas expansion. It analyses China’s natural gas growth in the coming decades, based on the projections of China’s domestic production capacity and the consequent necessity of large-scale pipeline gas imports from Russia, the Central Asian Republics, and Myanmar. Included in the projections are LNG imports from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Australia, North America, and East Africa. The article explains how Russia is trying to avoid depending exclusively on the China market by using the options of gas exports to Korea and Japan. However, it concludes that Russia’s pipeline gas exports to China will play an important role in China’s energy supply plan in the coming decades.     

What was Britain's “East of Suez Role”? Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964–1968

Although often considered an objective fact, Britain's “East of Suez role” was actually a rhetorical construction. As such, it was dependent on the continued ability of Britain to “make” that role and other important players to “cast” Britain into it. But the Wilson government's initial support for East of Suez had the paradoxical effect of bringing its coherence into question. Without a British future in Aden, East of Suez was increasingly linked solely to the Far East, where, with the end of Confrontation in 1966, the argument for staying lost much of its force. Other interested Powers were also increasingly unable to cast Britain into the role: the nationalist tide and the United States' tribulations in Vietnam being primary factors. The article thus shows that thinking through the implications of this realisation provides a better understanding of the withdrawal than by resting on economic or domestic political factors alone.     

The East African community and Europe

The European Union and Russia are preparing to negotiate a new comprehensive agreement at a time when their bilateral relations have become increasingly prickly. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin's Russia is perceived as having gone undesirably far in reverting to a semi-authoritarian state and in exerting economic and political pressures on some pro-Western, former Soviet states. On the other hand, the EU's Russia policy remains ambivalent because of the continuing deference towards Moscow of a number of large European countries and the confrontational posture of some new EU member states. Other factors add to this deteriorating state of affairs. For one, there are a number of legal complications coming from the shape and scope of the new agreement. Perhaps more importantly, there are several political uncertainties, first and foremost the definition of those “common values” upon which the new treaty should be based. To get out of this quandary, the two sides will have to scale down their ambitions on the new agreement. A mutually acceptable formula might imply the negotiation of a concise “framework” treaty, accompanied in due time by sector-specific agreements.     

Liberalism and geopolitics in EU–Russia relations: rereading the “Baltic factor”

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.