俄罗斯实用主义气候政策探析

气候变化议题在今天的全球治理中居于核心地位。俄罗斯的气候政策对于全球气候变化合作的开展有着非常重要的影响。"气候实用主义"是当前俄罗斯气候政策选择的核心。本文分析了近年来俄罗斯"气候实用主义"的内涵特征、政策特点、选择动因以及造成的影响。本文指出价值观、经济发展模式以及国际体系中的地位是决定俄罗斯实用主义气候政策选择的三个关键变量。这些变量通过观念、利益和身份的路径影响了俄罗斯气候政策的理念框架、国内偏好以及国际合作参与。对于气候变化起源的"怀疑论"、对碳氢能源企业的重点保护,通过气候政策对内增强治理合法性,吸引投资和技术以缓解美欧制裁是当前俄政府实用主义气候政策的突出特点。俄罗斯的这种气候政策为国际气候变化合作的加强提供了新动力,也为中俄区域合作开辟了新领域。但却难以弥合俄罗斯与美欧在气候变化问题上的根本分歧,也不会对俄罗斯依赖能源经济的发展模式造成实质影响。     

The Berlin Republic,Iraq, and the Use of Force

This article holds that German security policy and attitudes towards the use of force remain framed by the distinct strategic culture that emerged during West Germany’s rearmament and international rehabilitation in the 1950’s. This strategic culture, characterised by strong anti-military sentiment and a commitment to multilateral diplomacy and international law, determined Germany’s position over Iraq and its ongoing opposition to the US-led invasion of the country. However, the strength and highly vociferous nature of Germany’s opposition to US policy also indicated that German strategic culture is itself evolving, as both elites and society reconsider aspects of German national history and the role of collective memory. Much of this new discourse relates to the notion of the ‘Berlin Republic’, which in foreign and security policy terms is synonymous with the emergence of greater self confidence, the introduction of more ‘national’ vocabulary into foregin policy statements and a less reflexive attitude to transatlantic security.     

美国智库对华战略构想的新内涵——以《更长电报:走向新的美国对华战略》为例

拜登执政后美国对华战略如何调整备受瞩目,美国一些智库则积极"兜售"相关政策主张,其中大西洋理事会发布的《更长电报:走向新的美国对华战略》匿名报告受到广泛关注。该报告反映出美国智库对华战略构想中区别于传统冷战思维的新内涵,在战略认知上更新涉华判断,臆想当前中国战略"脆弱点",批判特朗普政府对华"政治惯性",主张从外部瓦解中国;在战略目标上力推拓展核心利益、重塑国际秩序,强调"共同威胁"以重振霸权体系,旨在护持冷战后美国霸权地位;在战略布局层面,提出振兴国家权势和加强对华威慑、明确与华竞争合作界限并煽动意识形态斗争,以全面遏制中国。该报告肆意抹黑中国,错误界定中国国家利益,对中国充满恶意偏见和误判,其战略布局根本无法撼动中国大战略根基。值得警惕的是,该报告的部分战略与政策构想在拜登政府近期政策实践中已有体现,暴露出美国政治精英与知识群体在涉华政策方面具有很大程度上的共同认知。在中美战略竞争常态化下,必须厘清两国关系的"常量"与"变量",做好应对各种风险和挑战的准备,尤其维护好国家意识形态安全。     

Present at the Destruction? The Liberal Order in the Trump Era

Abstract

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sent shock waves across political classes globally and prompted debates about whether his ‘America first’ agenda threatened the liberal international order. During his first year in office, Trump seemed determined to undermine the hallmarks of the liberal international order: democracy, liberal economics and international cooperation. So, are we witnessing the emergence of a “post-liberal” and “post-American” era? Four sources of evidence help frame – if not answer – the question: history, the crisis of liberal democracy, Trump’s world view, and the power of civil society (globally and nationally) to constrain any US President. They yield three main judgements. First, continuity often trumps change in US foreign policy. Second, the liberal international order may have been more fragile pre-Trump than was widely realised. Third, American power must be put at the service of its own democracy if the US is to become the example to the world it used to be.     

The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana

In this article I show that the unipolar era already is drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States' relative economic power is declining, and mounting US fiscal problems and the dollar's increasingly problematic role as the international financial system's reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. After examining how these trends undermine the argument for ‘unipolar stability’, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana's end presages dramatic changes in international politics.     

National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 1930–1939

British grand strategy in the 1930s had two cardinal elements: security of the home islands and Imperial Defence. This article questions the view that Britain did not have a strategic commitment to the continent of Europe till late in the 1930s. It also provides an over-arching analysis of the two distinct but intertwined periods in the evolution of national strategy and Imperial defence in that decade: before 1930 till late 1937 built around the strategy of the balance of power; and from late-1937 till early 1939 built around the strategy of appeasement. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the high level debate within the British government over strategic issues without putting the domestic political situation into the context of the impact of the First World War on Britain's society and economy. Similarly, the development of the new international order created at the Paris Peace Conference – and its demise in the ‘hinge years’ of the early 1930s – also needs to be better understood in terms of how British grand strategy emerged in this period. A rational and realistic policy, appeasement was a tactical diplomatic manoeuvre; it had no place serving as the strategic basis of British external policy.     

Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government

This chapter will consider how the elements of continuity and change in British foreign policy that emerged under the current Labor government will be managed in the short to medium term and ask what their fuller implications for the UK and European security may be in the longer run. The article will examine how the change that transpired after 1997 which saw a new pro-European stance on security can be reconciled with the prevailing continuities in British strategic culture, namely Britain’s special relationship with the US, its global role, and, as demonstrated in the case of Iraq, the UK’s negation of Franco-German security initiatives. The article will also emphasise the central importance of the UK’s commitment to the EU’s security policy ambitions, given that the UK armed forces are the most capable in Europe and as confirmed in Iraq, an ESDP without a UK contribution would have no credibility. Despite Blair’s policy overtures towards developing greater European military capabilities, the continued reliance on the US has meant that British strategic culture has displayed remarkable continuity rather than fundamental transformation.     

The Loneliness of Israel. The Jewish State’s Status in International Relations

Israel’s international position has declined in recent years. Even if its relationship with the EU – and even more with the US – is solid, there have been frictions that are not likely to disappear in the years to come. Its relations with other states, from Middle Eastern countries to India and China, are either highly problematic or have not improved despite the Israeli government’s efforts. It is Israel’s policy in the Occupied Territories that is being increasingly criticised and this is creating a sort of ‘vicious circle’ in Israel: the critiques reinforce Israeli’s ‘bunker mentality’, strengthening the ethno-nationalist character of Israeli politics and society and causing de-democratisation, and this, in turn, brings on more international isolation.     

Buck-passing,Chain-ganging and Alliances in the Multipolar Indo-Asia-Pacific

ABSTRACT

Christensen’s and Snyder’s neorealist-based theory of buck-passing and chain-ganging uses offence-defence balance to predict state security policy choices under multipolarity. This approach is applicable to the US-led alliance system in the multipolar Indo-Asia-Pacific. Given regional Sino-US rivalry, hedging opportunities for US ‘hub-and-spoke’ allies will dissipate, increasing the likelihood of allies choosing to buck-pass or chain-gang in the face of conflict. With defence superior in the region, it is more likely that US allies will buck-pass rather than chain-gang. Beyond Indo-Asia-Pacific states, this has implications for global actors – such as the EU – seeking to raise their security profile in the region, as buck-passing behaviour gives greater time to adjust to potential conflict scenarios than chain-ganging.     

The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope

ABSTRACT

The changes in the US-Japan alliance are taking place in times of a global power shift – a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity – and China’s challenge to the US’ security dominance in the Asia-Pacific. The alliance security dilemma now manifests itself in the rise of ‘entrapment’ concerns for Washington and ‘abandonment’ anxieties for Tokyo. The US increasingly insists on more mutuality in alliance arrangements, while seeking to maintain ambiguity in its defence commitments to Japan. The relative decline of US power and the fluid regional security architecture, however, incentivise Japan to step up preparations for abandonment. Although Tokyo’s hedging strategy contributes to enhancement of the bilateral alliance in the short term, it also paves the way for Japan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the medium to long term.     

CMEA trade with the west ‐ present problems and future prospects

The severe and fast-evolving Ukraine crisis has required a great concentration of Russia’s political efforts and is having a massive impact on Russian policymaking, including in the Middle East. This region provides the best opportunity for Moscow to reassert its status as a key player in the global arena, and the deep fall of oil prices makes Russia particularly attentive to regional conflict developments. One of the main motivations for Russia is the pronounced desire to demonstrate its capacity to thwart US policy, but another is to prove its value to China as a strategic partner. Russia’s reach remains limited but it will continue to look for opportunities to make a difference.     

Overcoming US-North Korean Enmity: Lessons from an Eclectic IR Approach

ABSTRACT

Periods of mutual enmity in US-North Korean relations are typically interrupted by more conciliatory gestures. How can the many twists and turns in this relationship be explained and hopefully overcome so that more long-lasting détente is accomplished? Drawing eclectically on realism and constructivism, we conclude that a nuclear deal should address not only North Korea’s interests in security and regime survival, but also its status concerns. Applying the same theories to the other part of the dyad – the US – we conclude that it may now have material interests in ameliorating the relationship, but that such a development requires US foreign policy discourse to cease depicting North Korea as “irrational” and “evil”.     

太空安全秩序构建中的体系压力与战略指向

在当前“一超多强”的国际体系中,美国加大太空威慑不仅直接给对手带来清晰的威胁,还导致国际太空安全日益滑向军备竞赛和安全困境。这种由美国追求太空霸权所导致的国际体系层面的变化又反过来塑造着当前太空安全关系,促使其他各国在体系压力下作出包含反威慑在内的复杂应对。除了来自国际体系层面的安全压力,各国的太空安全战略选择还受到太空力量功效、太空法规意识、战略协调、国家互动情势、政治过程等中介变量的影响。这些中介变量不但影响国家对太空安全的认知,而且一段时间内会导致国家间太空安全决策的效率竞争型社会化。不过,随着国际社会过程不断延伸发展,太空力量功效和太空法规意识增强使相关国家安全决策更为谨慎和规范。全球化曲折推进中的战略沟通和政策协调使国家间太空安全互动情势由进化冲突向进化合作转变。在各国保持战略审慎的前提下,太空力量的多元化有助于构建包容、普惠、和谐的新太空安全秩序。太空全球性实质引领的共同利益观念又将助推人类命运共同体的构建。     

Who matters for memory: Sources of institutional memory in international organization crisis management

Scholarship on organizational learning has explored how international organizations (IOs) reform but has paid little attention to the origins of institutional memory. For IOs engaged in crisis management operations, acquiring knowledge about strategic errors is necessary for adopting reforms that could save lives. This study seeks to identify the sources that affect whether or not IO elites will contribute knowledge to an IO’s institutional memory in crisis management. The study employs a survey experiment in the field on 120 NATO elites who decide on and plan operations. Findings indicate that when the United States introduces knowledge of a strategic error, NATO elites are significantly less likely to share it. This deterrent effect on knowledge-sharing illustrates an unexpected way in which the US influences international crisis management. The study also finds that an IO’s secretariat can somewhat increase elites’ likelihood of contributing to the IO’s institutional memory.     

War Games redux? Cyberthreats,US–Russian strategic stability,and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control

Some 30 years since the release of the Hollywood blockbuster War Games, the possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities, compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of a nuclear weapon has become disturbingly real. While this challenge will impact all nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the USA and Russia given their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces. The fact that east–west relations have deteriorated to a nadir perhaps not seen since the 1980s, strategic instability has increased – particularly in the wake of the Ukraine and now Syria crises – and that the nuclear arms reductions agenda appears to have reached a standstill makes this challenge particularly pressing. In this discouraging milieu, new cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already strained US–Russia strategic balance – particularly the perceived safety and security of nuclear forces – and at the same time creating new vulnerabilities and problems that might be exploited by a third party. Taken together, these dynamics add another major complication for current arms control agreements and possible future nuclear cuts, and also seem likely to increase the possibility of accidents, miscalculation, and potential unauthorised nuclear use, especially given the large number of nuclear weapons that remain on “hair-trigger” alert.     

The Biden Administration's Policy Toward Southeast Asia: Momentum,Motivation and Challenges

After Biden took office,the United States,on the basis of inheriting the main framework of the Trump administration's Southeast Asia policy,has gradually increased its strategic input in Southeast Asia to expand the depth and breadth of cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.First,consolidate its diplomatic influence.     

“印太战略”:以美印日澳的战略逻辑、利益与策略选择为分析视角

"印太战略"是美国均势+有限遏制+规制+话语诋毁的混合型战略。它意在前沿、中间地带与后方的三层构建不对称的对华遏制性力量,突破中美双边、单区域战略竞争的狭窄战略空间;在多地域与多维度孤立中国,拉拢更多国家在产业价值链、数字经济等层面与中国切割;制订基础建设投资透明化的新标准,嵌入有利于美国利益的规制;通过国际法、舆论等软性手段抹黑中国的"一带一路"与海权发展。虽然共同逻辑都是制衡中国崛起,但日澳印在策略上强调非对抗性。其中避免成为中国优先反制是日本重要的策略目标;印度在拉达克边界冲突后尚没有形成一个完全倒向美国的战略,因为这必定使其背上沉重的战略包袱,成为美国的附庸;澳大利亚作为地缘政治影响有限的中等国家,在美国反华行动中冲在最前列已使其利益严重受损。而"印太战略"与东盟所推动的包容性、合作安全理念也有着本质的区别,东盟要在"印太地区"发挥中心领导作用,定位"印太"为对话与合作区域。所以由于东盟的抵制、印日澳的消极政策,这个战略形成的攻势将很难保持可持续性,其长期前景并不看好。     

Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan's security,the US–Japan alliance and the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia

Japan, in responding to US expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’, has displayed a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub it the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this role. For Japan, the ‘war on terror’ serves more as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US's anti-terrorism agenda. Instead, Japan has focused much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to push forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ or as involving elements of counterterrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's potential divergence from the US global security agenda.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

Russia’s Neorevisionist Challenge to the Liberal International Order

Abstract

A conventional opinion is that Russia is trying to destroy the liberal international order. Russia indeed defies it, but also justifies its foreign policy with the liberal order’s normative frameworks and reproaches the West for not standing up to these norms. Moreover, Moscow does not present any alternative vision. Russia complains about the internal contradictions of the liberal order: sovereignty vs. intervention, pluralism vs. universality, US hegemony vs. equality and democracy, although it also exploits these contradictions. In fact Russia demands an adjustment of the liberal order rather than its eradication and should, therefore, be classified as a neorevisionist power. Two elements underlie Russia’s at times aggressive foreign policy conduct. The first one, its feeling of being ill-accommodated in the present order, predefines the direction of the policy. The second, the prioritisation of foreign policy over domestic reforms, explains the intensity of Russian discontent and its occasional aggressive manifestations. Russia’s domestic consensus regarding its foreign policy, including views on the liberal international order, facilitates this aggressiveness. Three policy conclusions can be drawn: acknowledging that Russia uses the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order opens up possibilities for dialogue and an eventual overcoming of the crisis; the survival and strengthening of the liberal order depends on its embrace of all major players, including Russia, and hence, the need for some adjustments to the order itself; and finally such adjustments presuppose Russia’s readiness to shoulder responsibility for the (reformed) liberal international order.