The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Elitist democracy and China's democratization: A gradualist approach towards democratic transition by a group of Chinese intellectuals

This article examines how a group of Chinese intellectuals experimented with the western concept of elitist democracy in a Chinese context in the late 1980s. Drawing insights from western theories on political development and political culture, they argued that China's lack of a civic culture meant an elitist democracy would be an historically necessary and inevitable stage during the process of democratization. To implement elitist democracy in China, the existing political institutions should be made more open to experts, technocrats and intellectuals. This political proposal was advanced, involuntarily, during the Tiananmen Movement of Spring 1989, but eventually suffered a great setback. Nevertheless, the article maintains that elitist democracy remains relevant to China's democratization in the future.     

Universal Democracy,Diminished Expectation

This wide-ranging article identifies some general characteristics of democratization with the intention of stimulating further discussion. The contemporary debate appears largely unreflective, and often curiously pessimistic about outcomes. There is little questioning of a global 'democratic imperative', which now even insists upon making democratic advances beyond just the electoral sphere. Yet there appears little expectation that such initiatives will effect real transformation. Critically commenting upon the impulse behind these trends, the article claims that their origins lie in the manner of democracy's triumph in the 1980s. Democracy unexpectedly came to be without rivals; third world nationalism was demoralised and ultimately collapsed with communism. Rather than through its own efforts or self-belief, the new agenda found itself in demand simply by default. Reflecting the reorientation of United States foreign policy, conceptions of democracy then became universalized and were in effect relativized, a development that created short-term gains but poses longer-term difficulties. Concern at the inflated expectations generated by this global democratic mood has led some accounts of democratization to now counsel lowered expectations. The article ends by asking whether democracy too might ultimately be the victim of the 'end of ideology' and the collapse of alternatives which led to its revival in the 1990s.     

India as a democracy promoter? New Delhi's involvement in Nepal's return to democracy

According to the theory of ‘democratic peace’, India, as the largest democracy in the world and as South Asia's predominant regional power, should be expected to promote democracy in neighbouring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any kind of official democracy-promotion policy, and its past record on democracy promotion efforts in the region is mixed at best. Against this background, the article analyses the substantial role India has come to play in the peace and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005–2008, asking whether this constitutes a departure from New Delhi's traditional policy of non-interference in its neighbours' internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion. However, the analysis shows that India's involvement in Nepal was the product of short-term stability concerns rather than being an indicator of a long-term change in strategy with the intention of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.     

JFK's ambassadors and the cold war

The importance of sound representation abroad was plain to President J.F. Kennedy. This survey of Kennedy's diplomats is selective, confined to the three most telling cases in the Cold War drama: Moscow, New Delhi, London. The countries corresponding with these capitals shaped America's world, as chief rival, preeminent neutral and pluckiest ally. Ambassadors in distinctive posts do not constitute the whole of JFK's foreign policy, but this account do shed light on significant achievements, thereby challenging those critics who have attributed every manner of blunder to Kennedy. His diplomatic record may not have been as brilliant as court historians suggested. Yet, to JFK's credit, the practical effect of his ambassadors in three major countries was to advance US security and prestige.     

Boxing and Politics in Slovakia: 'Meciarism' Roots,Theory, Practice

This article argues that 'Meciarism' represented an inevitable phase on Slovakia's way towards democracy and a market economy - it was the 'Slovak must'. 'Meciarism' as a distinct phase of development was determined by the fact that state-building and democratic transition took place at the same time and were fostered by peculiar traditional features of Slovak political culture. The first substantive section of the article introduces the theory and practice of 'Meciarism'. The attempt to clarify core features and their ideological roots is illustrated by a selection of examples that depict the reality of 'Meciarist rule' and the coalition government's political style. The second section investigates the political environment on the civic level, which was favourable to the emergence of 'Meciarism', and argues that 'civic incompetence' was the main reason for Prime Minister Meciar's political success. Finally, the third section explores the historic origins of 'Meciarism'. It shows how distinctive historical conditions and constellations shaped Slovak society's political culture to such an extent that 'Meciarism' was an inevitable feature of the first years of national independence.     

Civil society and the European common security and defence policy

The involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) is widely regarded by students of the EU's domestic policy fields as enhancing transparency and accountability and, more generally, the democratic quality of political processes. This article explores the contribution of CSOs to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and assesses whether a democracy-enhancing effect of their involvement can also be demonstrated for this policy field. We analyse the contribution of CSOs based on two common models of democracy: the intergovernmental and the supranational model of democracy. We find that CSOs are indeed quite actively involved in the EU's security policy. With regard to their democracy-enhancing effects, however, our findings are rather mixed. While the engagement of CSOs does provide a remedy for the democratic deficits associated with intergovernmental decision-making, these organizations do not fully meet the demands posed by supranational governance.     

Women's political participation in Greece since the fall of the Colonels: From democratic struggle to incorporation by the party‐state?

This article examines the changing nature of women's political participation in Greece and argues that the period since 1974 has seen a shift from political participation through women's involvement in popular democratic struggles to the increasing incorporation of the women's movement by the Greek ‘party‐state’. From 1967–74 Greece lived under the repressive dictatorship of the Colonels. Yet Greece now enjoys some of the most progressive legislation in Europe in the area of equality between the sexes. Most of the demands of the Greek women's movement of the late 1970s were already translated into public policy provisions by the 1980s.

Women's issues came to be accepted on to the political agenda in Greece in part as a result of women's participation in national struggles for liberation and democracy through which they developed close links with the parties of the Left. In the short term, collaboration with the newly formed or newly liberated parties of the Left brought important rewards for the women's organizations and allowed women a voice in Greek politics for the first time. However, it is argued that collaboration has also had its costs ‐ not least of which has been the linkage of progress on women's issues with the spoils of political office.     

“A Slight but Salutary Case of the Jitters”: The Kennedy Administration and the Alliance for Progress in Paraguay

In its Cold War struggle against communism in Latin America, the John F. Kennedy Administration faced a dilemma. How could it maintain the support of anticommunist yet authoritarian regimes whilst concurrently promoting the political liberalisation of those regimes, as Kennedy's core policy toward Latin America—the Alliance for Progress—seemingly mandated? In Paraguay, the Stroessner regime provided Kennedy officials with a clear test of its ability to craft a policy that appropriately balanced both considerations. This case study explores how bureaucratic politics decisively shaped the implementation of that policy, ultimately leading to a continuation in the broader pattern of maintaining support for authoritarian regimes that embraced US leadership in the Cold War.     

“Good Deeds Aren’t Enough”: Point Four in Iran, 1949–1953

Iran enjoyed some of the earliest fruits and efforts of the Point Four programme, an initiative borne out of President Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address. Over the last decade, a robust literature on development theory and American foreign policy has emerged. That research reveals complex motivations and agendas. Point Four in Iran, specifically, offers a discrete, early picture of America’s broader effort to utilise technical assistance to elevate poor peoples’ standards of living and inoculate poor states from communist appeals. It is one of the landmark programmes during this genesis period. The Iranian government was amongst the first that the State Department approached to establish technical aid under this initiative, and, indeed, American aid to Iran continued into the 1970s. By mid-1953, however, larger and more direct aid absorbed this specific assistance and development effort to bolster the shah’s government, which gained secure power after an American Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence—MI6—backed coup that same year. Scholars have argued that Truman’s foreign aid innovations reshaped United States foreign policy. The Point Four programme in Iran, however, also reveals the limits of that revolution.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Christianity and violence: The case of liberation theology

In the late 1960s a form of Christian radicalism known as liberation theology emerged in Latin America that argued that Latin America's ills were caused by dependent capitalism, and that Latin America could be liberated only by a socialist revolution. The theory of liberation theology had a direct impact on Central America in the 1970s since it justified the alliance of Christians and Marxists in attempting to overthrow repressive regimes in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Under Pope John Paul II, the Vatican has been critical of liberation theology's borrowings from Marxism and its implied endorsement of violence, although a moderate version that stresses the organization of the poor into Christian Base Communities has been more favorably received. Partly as a result of Vatican pressure and partly as a result of a generalized disillusionment of the Latin American left with violence as a means for social change, liberation theologians today have moved away from their earlier infatuation with revolution, and they argue for a deepened democracy that is aware of ‘the preferential option for the poor’.     

Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria

International sanctions against Iran and Syria have been tightened to unprecedented levels since 2012, particularly in the case of the European Union's (EU's) restrictions on the countries' energy and finance sectors. Marking a departure from the EU's carefully targeted sanctions policies of recent decades, they represent de facto comprehensive measures widely associated with negative humanitarian impacts. This paper analyses semi-structured interviews, official discourse and case studies to explore early reports of negative impacts on the health of ordinary citizens in Iran and Syria and examines associated policy responses, particularly in the EU context. The author outlines why a shift towards broader-based sanctions could be problematic for the EU and outlines constraints currently preventing more efficient risk mitigation. This paper suggests ways that sanctions, representing an increasingly vital, albeit contested, tool of EU foreign and security policy, could be used in a more prudent manner if a worsening humanitarian situation is to be avoided.     

L. Louër,Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf

If one analyzes Austrian integration policy, a range of repeating elements becomes visible. Starting with the 1950s, continued efforts to intensify economic and trade relations with the Common Market can be witnessed. This occurred in the form of step by step cooperation with European institutions. Since 1955 Austria's integration policy had been accompanied by the maintenance of and focus on 'permanent neutrality'. Among the EFTA states, Austria was the country the EEC sympathized with most, for it was important with regard to foreign and trade policy in the context of the East-West conflict. Austria was of central geostrategic significance. With regard to Russia's attitude, Austria succeeded in underlining its 'special case'. Austria's policy of going it alone failed in 1967 for several reasons, not only because of Italy's veto. There were also French reservations and Russian objections. Bridging the gap to Brussels revealed wishful thinking that was only to become true in 1972. An arrangement of bilateral tariff and trade treaties with different EFTA states and the EEC and ECSC came into force.     

Remarks

This study analyzes the ways in which the issue (or issues) of religion and politics were shaped during the 1984 campaign partially by the exigencies of political rhetoric and partially by the logic of the problem itself. The form in which the issue(s) of religion and politics came into view is traced in four addresses: one each by President Reagan, Walter Mondale, Senator Edward Kennedy, and Governor Mario Cuomo. One premise of this study is that such political speeches are in some sense and to some extent rational discourse aimed at persuading the unpersuaded that the speakers’ moral, political, and constitutional perceptions are cognitively superior to opposing perceptions. The author finds two substantive issues in the argument: the “toleration/church and state” issue and the “relation of Catholic moral principles and public policy” issue. The manner in which the speakers defend their position on these issues is explicated so as to reveal the strengths and weaknesses in each speaker's formulation. The limits of the accuracy of each side's rhetoric are identified in such a way that it becomes evident they are debating importantly different interpretations of principles on which they nominally agree. It is argued that the core of the debate concerned whether religious citizens have a right to try to change the drift towards an exclusion of religious traditions and practices and of religiously based moral values from a place in our public policy or whether such exclusion is required constitutionally and hence attempts to change its attack or undermine the Constitution.     

Just How Special is “Special”: Britain,Cuba, and US Relations 1958–2008 an Overview

In June 2008, despite intense lobbying from the Bush administration, the Council of Ministers of the European Union lifted the diplomatic sanctions on Havana that it had imposed in 2003 and agreed to resume a “comprehensive political dialogue” with the revolutionary regime. Instrumental in this decision was a change in policy by the UK that had hitherto stood against such a normalisation of relations. The move came as a surprise to many who had anticipated that the British would oppose the lifting of sanctions in deference to their “special relationship” with their transatlantic ally. However, as this overview suggests, the UK decision was not unusual. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, the UK has differed with the US over Cuba. By surveying the five decades of the UK–Cuba relationship since 1959 the article explains how the UK has maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Washington's embargo. While recognising US primacy of interest in Cuba, London has consistently attempted to follow an independent policy that at times has come between the close allies. It concludes that although the UK (along with other European partners and Canada) shares the US goal of seeing the end of Communism on the island, it has ironically helped to thwart this ambition. The history of the relationship provides an example of the limitations of unilateral economic sanctions as policy instruments. The failure of the US embargo to affect the behaviour of the Castro regime should be no surprise when Washington's closest ally has never fully agreed to it.     

The Gordian Knot of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Promoting democracy while respecting sovereignty

President Cardoso has provided decisive impetus for strengthening Brazil's commitment to democracy abroad, both through multilateral diplomacy and foreign policy. However, there exist inherent tensions between the dual principles guiding Brazilian foreign policy, the promotion and protection of democracy abroad and the attachment to national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. This study assesses Brazil's response to threats to democracy during the last decade in 10 case studies. It argues that presidential diplomacy has played a key role in furthering the democratic commitment of Brazilian foreign policy. The author thanks Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Juan Fernando London ?o, Anja Linder, and Riordan Roett and gratefully acknowledges the support of the Democracy Coalition Project (DCP) of the Open Society Institute (OSI) in Washington DC.     

International,national or local? Explaining the substance of democracy promotion: the case of Eastern European democracy promotion

The EU is one of the most prominent democracy promoters in the world today. It has played an especially important role in the democratization of its Eastern European member states. Given the acknowledged success and legitimacy of EU democracy promotion in these countries, it could be expected that when they themselves began promoting democracy, they would borrow from the EU's democracy promotion model. Yet this paper finds that the EU's model has not played a defining role for the substantive priorities of the Eastern European democracy promoters. They have instead borrowed from their own democratization models practices that they understand to fit the needs of recipients. This article not only adds to the literature on the Europeanization of member state policies but also contributes both empirically and theoretically to the literature on the foreign policy of democracy promotion. The article theorizes the factors shaping the substance of democracy promotion—how important international ‘best practices’ are and how they interact and compete with donor-level domestic models and recipient democratization needs. Also, this study sheds light on the activities of little-studied regional democracy promoters—the Eastern European members of the EU.     

The Kennedy Administration and the Battle over Foreign Aid: The Untold Story of the Clay Committee

President John Kennedy made foreign aid a key component of his Cold War strategy, introducing it with much fanfare in 1961. He increased funding for aid projects and created several agencies aimed at modernising the under-developed world. A year later, aid was under pressure from elements in Congress that doubted both its value and accomplishments. In late 1962, Kennedy commissioned General Lucius Clay to assemble a committee to review the aims and management of America’s foreign aid programme. Reflecting the president’s desire to ensure optimal value and neutralise opponents, it also indicated Administration belief that the rhetoric of modernisation had overshadowed the relationship between aid and national security. Never intending Clay to assemble a mere rubber stamp Committee, Kennedy specifically tasked the members with investigating aid’s role in supporting the “Free World.” The effort failed. Scholars traditionally assume that it did so because Clay opposed Kennedy’s programme; however, he was supportive of the president’s efforts. Instead, its demise came at the hands of an unusual Congressional coalition that enthusiastically cut the president’s budget.     

Two-Level Negotiations and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Failure of the Johnson Plan for the Palestinian Refugees, 1961–1962

The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Palestine refugee problem in 1961–62 with a plan for compensation, resettlement, or repatriation under the formal auspices of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and negotiated by UN special envoy Dr. Joseph Johnson. The negotiations failed and the plan was canceled by the administration in December 1962. The article utilizes a multi-level conceptual model which examines the links between interstate negotiation, domestic politics and boundary-crossing interactions between foreign states and non-state domestic actors and their impact on foreign policy. It analyzes the multi-level negotiations that were conducted between representatives of the governments of Israel and the United States regarding the Johnson proposals, discussions held between Israel representatives and American Jewish leaders and prominent Jewish individuals, and between American government representatives and these same Jewish leaders and individuals. The study analyzes the factors that contributed to the failure of the plan and illustrates the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making.