Assessing the Dayton Accord: The structural weaknesses of the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Dayton Accord — brought a formal end to the war in Bosnia, but the prospects for an enduring peace remain uncertain. One of the obstacles to peace is the accord itself. This article outlines the main provisions of the agreement and then examines its structural weaknesses. These weaknesses, it is argued, though significant, may not be insuperable. There is broad scope for interpretation of the treaty's terms and for innovation within its framework. Its effectiveness in the long term will depend in part on whether the implementing powers succeed in exploiting this potential.     

The Road from Dayton to Brussels? The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Politics of War Crimes in Bosnia

Abstract

The tenth anniversary of the massacre of 7–8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995 set in stark relief the continuing salience of war crimes in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the country now firmly on a path ‘from Dayton to Brussels’, dealing with the war crimes legacy is critical to its future development. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is a non-negotiable condition for further progress toward membership of the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace, while in the long-term, dealing with the legacy of war crimes is crucial to establishing lasting peace in Bosnia and in the region. This article examines the potential contribution of the ICTY to the restoration of peace in Bosnia in the context of debates about the role of post-conflict justice in societies in transition from war to peace and in the context of the international community's use of the war crimes issues as a political bargaining tool. It will be argued that the two are inextricably linked as short-term pragmatic advantages brought by cooperation work in tandem with longer-term goals of peace and reconciliation.     

Elections and political change in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina

This article examines attempts to use electoral politics to promote substantive political change in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 1990 elections have been a key part of virtually all negotiated agreements to end civil wars. The utility of democracy for building peace is often asserted but rarely backed with long-term commitment and resources on the ground. Bosnia since 1996 is a rare exception. There, international actors sought not only to establish a democratic political system but to use electoral democracy as a tool with which to transform the nature of politics in Bosnia in short order. This article focuses on efforts to shape the development of political parties and the party system, assesses the degree to which it has succeeded and examines the broader implications of Bosnia's experience for other state-building efforts of its kind.     

Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the Dayton Peace Process

The Bosnian War (1992–1995) was one of the most brutal conflicts in Europe since the end of World War II. Thirty‐four cease‐fires failed to produce peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the late American diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, brokered one that set the stage for a series of negotiations—starting in the Balkans and ending in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton peace process finally terminated the Bosnian War. The interplay of military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and diplomacy by the United States was remarkable. This article highlights thirteen conflict resolution lessons or “Holbrookeisms” that can be learned from the Dayton peace process. Some aspects of Holbrooke's approach toward the peace process helped him to successfully mediate an end to the Bosnian War, while others contributed toward some of the existing cleavages in today's Bosnian society.     

Post-conflict elections and the process of demilitarizing politics: the role of electoral administration

Post-conflict elections are called upon to advance the distinct processes of both war termination and democratization. This article examines the patterns in seven cases where elections served as the final step to implement a peace agreement following a period of civil war. Such elections are shaped in part by the legacy of fear and insecurity that persists in the immediate aftermath of a protracted internal conflict. Comparative analysis suggests that interim regimes in general, and electoral administration in particular, based on joint problem solving and consultation may ‘demilitarize politics’ and help transform the institutions of war into institutions capable of sustaining peace and democratization. In Mozambique, El Salvador and, to an extent, Cambodia, processes to demilitarize politics prior to elections created a context that allowed the elections to advance both peace and democratization. In the other cases, politics remained highly militarized at the time of the vote, leading either to renewed conflict (Angola) or the electoral ratification of the militarized institutions of the civil war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Tajikistan). Interim electoral commissions provide an important opportunity to demilitarize politics by building consultative mechanisms and norms that increase confidence in the peace process and the legitimacy of the post-conflict elections.     

The political economy of stalemate: organised crime,corruption and economic deformation in post-Dayton Bosnia

‘The biggest security threat to this country is not nationalism; it’s criminality, corruption and unemployment'2 More than seven years after the end of the Bosnian war and despite some $5 billion in international reconstruction assistance, Bosnia's economy remains stagnant and dysfunctional, while the country is rapidly gaining a reputation not as an emerging market economy but as a lawless and ungovernable state dominated by organised crime and corruption. This paper assesses Bosnia's post-Dayton political economy, arguing that the nexus between organised crime and corruption, on the one hand, and nationalist political forces, on the other, represents the most significant obstacle to the development of a market economy in Bosnia and poses a growing threat to the country's peace process. This situation is the product of Bosnia's particular post-war and post-socialist environment, which has created a powerful class of elites with an interest in perpetuating the status quo of a largely unreformed economy. In this context, international efforts to impose economic reforms from above, and to encourage local authorities to embrace a reformist marketisation and rule of law agenda, have met with little success. The paper concludes by suggesting that international peace building efforts need to pay greater attention to the ‘enforcement gap’ that has en abled crime and corruption to flourish in Bosnia.     

Regional involvement in peace operations: an analysis of the debate within the UN Security Council

The paper analyses the debates within the UN Security Council on the role of regional organisations in peace operations and examines associated pro and con arguments. The systemisation of the findings is facilitated through the application of SWOT analysis that requires an insight into the unit and system levels of analysis. The first one looks at regional organisations and studies the strengths and the weaknesses that could promote or obscure their greater involvement in peace operations. The second level studies the international political environment that could provide opportunities for greater regional involvement or pose threats (obstacles) to it. The study indicates that there is a clearly established numerical predominance of supporters of greater regional involvement in peace operations over the regio-sceptics. However, the conclusion is that while the permanent members of the UN Security Council continue to endorse such involvement in the field, they will keep avoiding the formalisation and institutionalisation of the role of regional organisations on a political level.     

Conflict management and conflict resolution

In examining constructive responses to the problems caused by violent ethnic conflict a distinction is often made between the ‘management’ and ‘resolution’ approaches. Indeed, they are often defined so as to make them incompatible with each other. The basic assumptions upon which the differences between these two approaches are based are analysed, and the weaknesses of each are explored. Finally, the assumption of basic incompatibility is questioned, because it is generally unhelpful in promoting conflict resolution; and an attempt is made to show how the two approaches can be combined by introducing the concept of peace‐keeping (management) and peace‐making and peace‐building (resolution).     

‘At least 2001’: US security policy and exit strategy in Bosnia

This article describes and analyzes the United States’ security conduct in Bosnia since the Dayton Accords of November 1995, and its involvement in the multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding effort. From this analysis, the conclusion is that it will be difficult for the US to exit from its engagement in Bosnia. Various explanations are offered for the formulation of American policy: norms and values, alliance politics and the role of NATO, bureaucratic and congressional influence, as well as presidential leadership. The most important factor remains affirmation of US leadership to make the peacebuilding mission in Bosnia a successful one.     

The internal–external security nexus and EU police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans are increasingly guided by externally imposed normative agendas that respond primarily to EU internal security needs rather than functional imperatives or local realities. In line with these needs, EU police reform efforts tend to prioritise effectiveness and crime fighting over longer- term democratic policing and good governance reforms. In practice this means that police reform initiatives are technocratically oriented, yet value ridden fitting EU security concerns and needs. As a result, the police reform process can be—and often is—disconnected from the political and socio-economic reforms necessary for long-term stability and sustainable peace. Police assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been shaped by a determined albeit questionable focus on organised crime and corruption. The focus of EU police reform in Macedonia on primarily crime-fighting aspects of policing has compromised thefunctioning of the Macedonian police. Similarly, the politics of (non-)recognition of Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence and the intrusiveness of EULEX Kosovo's executive mandate contravene meeting local challenges.     

The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare,Culture and Peacebuilding

The key feature of the dominant liberal approach to peacebuilding is the neoliberal marketisation of peace, rather than engagement with civil society and the agents and subjects of this peace. This is a particularly Western, liberal, and Enlightenment-derived discourse of peace, which is far from culturally and socially appropriate or sensitive, and has little chance of establishing a locally self-sustaining peace. This represents a “romanticisation of the local”, of civil society, and of the liberal culture of peacebuilding. Its cultural engagement, including its support for civil society development, is therefore little more than instrumental and is used to defer responsibility for the welfare of the local.     

Peace-building and business elites in Guatemala and El Salvador: explaining the discursive ‘institutional turn’

ABSTRACT

The local business elites of El Salvador were generally in favour of the peace agreement and supported its negotiation and implementation in 1992, while in Guatemala the private sector reluctantly supported the peace process and, after the peace agreements were signed in 1996, the private sector sought to obstruct parts of its implementation. In the aftermath of the peace accords, business elites united around an ideology espousing a minimal state and a focus on market solutions to social problems. Although welcoming the security-related measures in the peace accords, business elites have often obstructed transformations towards more inclusive and democratic societies. However, in recent years there has been a change in discourse among influential business associations towards recognition of the need for strong state institutions and the need for institutionalised mechanisms for dialogue to find solutions to social problems. In this article, we seek to shed light on the significance of this discursive turn for continued peace-building.     

Foreign affairs in the Italian party congresses; the PCI

Incentives are capable of creating favourable environments in which peace processes can make progress. This is especially true for mega incentives, which can assist in overcoming political and socio-psychological barriers to peace. In Israeli–Arab peacemaking, incentives have not yet proven efficient. To date, they have been used in a limited and inefficient manner. In 2010, the US offered Israel incentives in return for an extension of Israel's settlement freeze. This move failed due to unfavourable political conditions and scepticism regarding its ability to bring about a major breakthrough. Nevertheless, it signaled that incentives are now an integral tool in US diplomacy and could serve as a step towards crafting a multi-national mega incentive package for Middle East peace.     

Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: A challenge to the liberal peace?

This piece uses the example of reconstruction following the July–August 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war in Lebanon to reflect on the existence of alternatives to the liberal peace. The term ‘liberal peace’ is used as shorthand for internationally-sponsored peace-support and reconstruction interventions and it is marked by its increasingly formulaic, top–down and ethnocentric nature. Two significant non-western actors were apparent in Lebanon's post-war reconstruction: the Gulf States and Jihad Al Bina (the reconstruction wing of Hezbollah). Using fieldwork, this article examines the extent to which the reconstruction activities of these non-western actors constitute an alternative to the liberal peace. It finds that these activities do not have the critical mass or ambition to form a fully-fledged alternative but argues that they reveal serious limitations in the liberal peace approach to post-war reconstruction.     

Security sector reform: The building of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This article addresses the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Bosnia and examines whether the reform of security structures has enhanced security of Bosnia as a whole. The experience of recent armed conflict, and fragmentation and ethnicization of security structures have created special challenges for SSR in Bosnia. Transformation of the security sector in Bosnia is made even more complicated by the plethora of international actors involved in the process. The article argues that, despite the complexity of the task, SSR has produced some notable results, particularly in redressing the balance of power between the state and entities in the spheres of defence, policing and intelligence. However, while some of the SSR initiatives appear to be very successful in their main objective, they have inadvertently created some new security risks and/or displaced problems into another area. Thus, the question remains whether Bosnia's security has been enhanced in the process. The article identifies two main obstacles which block further progress in the building of security in Bosnia: first, the lack of local ‘ownership’ of SSR, and second, the Dayton constitutional arrangements. The article concludes that until these two fundamental issues are effectively addressed Bosnia will remain a weak, marginalized country filled with insecurity, divisions and adversity.     

Legitimate peace in post-civil war states: towards attaining the unattainable

Within the literature on conflict resolution and peace-building, there is a growing awareness about the need to move beyond ‘minimalist’ (absence of war) and ‘maximalist’ (absence of different types of structural violence) notions of peace. While the first concept is too narrow—it conceals much human suffering and does not take into account the root causes of armed conflict—the latter is too inclusive, open-ended and difficult to measure. There is, despite this growing consciousness, a lack of midterm definitions of peace that can help peacemakers assess whether a peace process is on the right track, say 10 or 15 years after a civil war has been terminated. In fact, when operationalising and empirically measuring how ‘peaceful’ post-civil war societies are, many scholars continue to employ indicators based on minimalist or maximalist visions of peace. In this article we introduce the concept of ‘legitimate peace’, which we argue can function as a midterm benchmark for peacemakers, and outline the benefits associated with its use.     

Japanese diplomacy during the Cambodian peace process and Japan's post-Cold War role in Southeast Asia: the legacy of the Fukuda Doctrine, 1989–1993

Japan's role during the Cambodian peace process after 1989 is often considered a successful case of post-Second World War Japanese diplomacy. In contrast to claims in the existing literature that Japan began to consider and initiated its involvement in the settlement only beginning in the late 1980s, this article demonstrates that Tokyo's role built upon a diplomatic platform that the Japanese had constructed through peace efforts since the Cambodian conflict erupted in 1979. The policy framework, objectives and initiatives of Japan's Cambodia diplomacy during the peace process represented the culmination of a ten-year diplomatic endeavour. Ultimately, Japan's involvement in the Cambodian settlement, guided by its Southeast Asia strategy of promoting coexistence and cooperation between ASEAN and Indochina, legitimated and favoured Japan's attempts to expand its post-Cold War role in regional political and security affairs.     

Measuring peace using household-level data from post-conflict Solomon Islands

The definition of peace and its quantification has challenged many researchers. The extant literature defines and measures peace in contradistinction to violence, thereby making the measure an indirect one. There is scope for the alternative of a direct measure of peace in the form of a Peace Perception Index (PPI) as revealed here. We use household-level survey data from Guadalcanal Province in the Solomon Islands to compute the PPI. Our analysis shows that the once conflict-affected communities on Guadalcanal have attained a PPI of 88 per cent of the level of peace prior to the conflict. That is, the perception of the level of peace in the sampled community has improved to 88 per cent since the installation of a peacekeeping mission a decade back. We argue that recognising the people’s perceptions, rather than the use of the absolute minimalist or maximalist notion of peace provides nuances on the levels of peace reached in a post-conflict situation.     

Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation*

International Relations (IR) and related social science disciplines focusing on peace and conflict studies have enabled a bureaucratic understanding of peacebuilding and a liberal form of peace. This has extended into a neoliberal type of statebuilding. There is now an impressive international architecture for peace, but its engagement with its subjects in everyday contexts has been less impressive. An earlier group of conflict researchers, grouped around John Burton and later A.J.R. Groom, have long argued that this is partly because IR has concentrated on elite power, problem-solving methodology and positivist epistemologies. It has failed to understand the dynamics, agency and hybridity of human society and institutions when it comes to peace, or that inequality is conflict inducing. Rescuing peacebuilding from neoliberal epistemological frameworks requires an anthropological and ethnographic sensitivity.