Privacy,the news media,and the courts

Abstract

This article is concerned with the conflict between the news media's position that the public has a ‘'right to know'’ under the free press provision of the First Amendment and the right to privacy under the tort law. The constitutional issue is raised whenever the media print or broadcast accurate, but often embarrassing, facts about a person, or whenever personal information is publicized which an individual prefers not to share with the general public.

In unwanted publicity and public disclosure cases, the courts have accorded greater weight to the defendant defenses of consent, news‐worthiness, and media privilege than to the plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim. To remedy this inequity, a two‐tier judicial model is proposed that would have courts balance the two competing interests in such a manner as to enhance individual privacy without diminishing the informational function of the news media.     

The Future of Political Communication Research: Reflections on the Occasion of Steve Chaffee's Retirement from Stanford University

Based on the psychological model of media priming, we examine the potentially strong link between news content and public opinion about Governor Patten's democratization plan for Hong Kong. Similar to previous priming studies, we hypothesized that an increase in the amount of media coverage of Patten's political reform plan would cause the public to assign more weight to the issue when evaluating the governor's overall performance. To validate the priming hypothesis in a nonexperimental setting, this study uses time‐series data obtained from 52 weekly public opinion polls, coupled with content analysis of three leading newspapers in Hong Kong between October 1992 and October 1993. The findings provide strong evidence supporting the media priming theory on an aggregate data level. Newspaper coverage of Patten's reform plan greatly inflated the relative importance of his proposal in the public's evaluation of his overall performance, with a 1‐week delay. The priming hypothesis survived a stringent test of several rival factors, including autocorrelation, the influence of the economy, and other important real‐world events.     

A journalism quarterly potpourri

Abstract

How do the news media help construct election mandates? By interpreting an election victory broadly, the news media can facilitate the implementation of a newly elected government's program. Conversely, the media can constrain a newly elected government by interpreting the election as influenced by factors other than ideology, primarily retrospective evaluations of the outgoing government's performance. Studies of how the media interpret election results have offered only speculation on why the media choose certain narratives while discarding plausible alternatives. Through a systematic examination of six Canadian elections, this article identifies key variables that explain the media's choices. I found that the media tended to confer a mandate when the victorious party focused on its policy intentions during the campaign and when the party was conservative; they tended to confer a “personal mandate” when newly elected leaders were facing their first election. In general, the news media quickly settled on one narrative, did not support this decision using quantitative data such as exit polls, and tended to depoliticize the public sphere by framing most results as devoid of ideological content.     

The media and terrorism: A reassessment

The author begins by challenging Michel Wieviorka's dismissal of the claim that there is a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. Terrorists' manipulation and exploitation of the media is shown to play a crucial part in their propaganda war. The article concludes by arguing that voluntary self‐restraint and self‐regulation by the media are the best policy options for a democratic society in regard to the media's response to terrorism, but that the mass media need to work harder at devising measures of self‐restraint that are both appropriate and effective.     

Timothy E. Cook: 1954–2006

Abstract

This article describes the organizational and operational aspects of diplomacy's interplay with the news media in Britain. It examines the media's role as a source of information for ministers, officials, and the wider public; the media's effect on official and unofficial thinking; the media's roles in interdepartmental coordination and during international negotiations; and the uses of the media by the government as channels to mold public attitudes at home and abroad. It concludes by considering the implications of advancements in media technology, and greater public interest in international affairs, for media diplomacy.     

A Review of: “Digitizing the News: Innovation in Online Newspapers,by Pablo J. Boczkowski”

This study examines the way in which USA Today used tracking poll data in its strategy‐oriented coverage of the 1992 presidential campaign. Scrutiny of the methodological features of tracking polls suggests the news media's potential misuses of them. Studies on media polling lead to the general hypothesis that tracking polls serve the mass media as a device for generating news accounts that focus on candidate strategy. Using the ARIMA modeling technique, I conclude that as changes in the margin of difference between Bush and Clinton in the Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll increased, USA Today cited the poll results more frequently. The increase in the number of tracking poll references corresponded to an increase in the number of strategy‐oriented words in USA Today's campaign coverage. I discuss the implications within the context of the 1992 election campaign coverage.     

Investigating Frame Strength: The Case of Episodic and Thematic Frames

An impressive body of research shows that the framing of an issue affects citizens' attitudes, but also that some frames are more influential than others. Yet, we have surprisingly limited knowledge of the factors that affect the strength of a frame, that is, the frame's capacity to influence citizens' opinions. Therefore, this study investigates the relative strength of episodic and thematic frames to argue that our understanding of the dynamics of frame strength can be advanced through a better incorporation of citizens' emotional reactions. Based on experimental data, I demonstrate that the relative strength of episodic and thematic frames depends on the intensity of citizens' emotional reactions. When there are no or weak emotional reactions, thematic frames are stronger than episodic frames, whereas the relative strength is increasingly reversed when intense emotional reactions are inflamed in the audience. I conclude by discussing the implications of the findings.     

Media and the institutional perspective: U.S. and Canadian coverage of terrorism

Abstract

This paper reports data from a content analysis of television news coverage of terrorism. A proposed typology of terrorism and media coverage is tested with stories from network news in the United States and Canada. The typology posits that media coverage of terrorism depends on the act's relation to institutional power bases. The two types of terrorism outlined either seek out or avoid media coverage, depending on whether they challenge or reinforce institutional power. Because of media's interrelationship with the economic and political institutions, coverage of terrorism will take on the flavor of these institutions’ perspective. The data show that although media cover terrorist acts that are linked to U.S. institutional interests, the tone of such coverage casts uncritical perspective. The implications for the general message system of news, with particular regard to the media's contribution to international understanding, are explored.     

Exploring FDR'S relationship with the press: A historical agenda‐setting study

This historical agenda‐setting study examined the extent to which Franklin Roosevelt's issue agenda, as expressed in his first seven State of the Union speeches, correlated with subsequent coverage in seven major newspapers and the degree to which newspaper coverage correlated with FDR's issue agenda. While past works have emphasized Roosevelt's ability to influence media coverage, this study suggests that Roosevelt reacted to previous coverage more than he influenced subsequent coverage. Past researchers contend that Roosevelt's strong support early in his first term deteriorated subsequently. By contrast, our study found stronger correlations between FDR's issue agenda and subsequent coverage later in his presidency. FDR reacted to, rather than influenced, coverage in newspapers he read and influenced coverage in newspapers he did not read. Roosevelt's issue agenda posted stronger correlations for the papers that supported him than those that opposed him. This study suggests, then, that historical conditions, amount of exposure to the newspaper, and political leanings of the newspaper are contingent conditions influencing the agenda‐setting process and should be considered in future agenda‐setting studies.     

Questioning the media and democracy relationship: the case of South Africa

This article addresses normative ideas around the role of journalism and the news media's links to the democratic process in South Africa and many other post-colonial societies in the Global South. In particular, the article addresses questions around the news media's role as the Fourth Estate and its claims to public representation, as well as the role that new media and social media in particular play in the media-politics nexus and in the strengthening of democracy (in its many guises). The article assesses the contextual factors that need to be considered in the analysis of media development and the roles and functions ascribed to the news media from within the context of the post-colony and young democracies in the Global South.     

Emerging political narratives on Malawian digital spaces

Social media platforms are being considered new podiums for political transformation as political dictatorships supposedly convert to overnight democracies, and many more people are not only able to gain access to information, but also gather and disseminate news from their own perspective. When looking at the situation in several sub-Saharan African countries, it becomes clear there are various challenges restricting social media and its palpable yet considerably constrained ability to influence political and social changes. Access to the internet, or lack thereof, is a recognised social stratification causing a “digital divide” thanks to existing inequalities within African and several other societies throughout the world. This article reports on a study that analysed a popular Facebook page in Malawi using a discursive online ethnographic examination of interactions among social media participants seeking to determine the level of activism and democratic participation taking shape on the Malawian digital space. The study also examined potential bottlenecks restraining effective digital participation in Malawi. The article argues that while social media's potential to transform societies is palpable, keeping up with the pace of transformation is no easy task for both digital and non-digital citizens. The study demonstrated social media's potential but also highlighted the problems facing online activists in Malawi, including chief among them digital illiteracy. Therefore, the digital sphere is not a political podium for everyone in Malawi as shown by the analysis of digital narratives emerging from the country's online environment, which opens its doors to only a tiny fraction of the population.     

Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age,by Alasdair Roberts

This article uses Ross Perot's campaign for president in 1992 as a case study in how two key political institutions—the conventional political press and the party system—mediate the effects of political communication. Reporters allocated positive and negative coverage to Perot according to the same rules that they normally follow, and voters were as responsive to this coverage as they were to media coverage of two earlier “outsider” candidates for president, Jimmy Carter and Gary Hart. Part I of this article, which appeared in the previous issue of Political Communication, dealt with the earliest, relatively unmediated phase of Perot's campaign and the takeoff phase of the mediated campaign. Part II deals with the remainder of the campaign, including the general election.     

Image formation,the low involvement viewer,and televised political advertising

Political observers have extensively documented the national media's focus on committee and party leaders. Legislators' local coverage, in contrast, remains largely unexplored and unexplained. This article examines 40 local newspapers to explore how these factors may influence legislators' local newspaper coverage. We find that local newspapers do not provide more coverage to congressional leaders and that independent papers write more frequently than chain-owned competitors about the local House delegation. Additionally, the extent to which a legislator's district geographically overlaps with the newspaper's market has a strong effect on legislators' mentions.     

Elite Messages and Source Cues: Moving Beyond Partisanship

According to previous studies, women in the U.S. Congress are often cast by the media and by voters as quite distinct from men, with a unique focus on women's issues and an outsider approach to governing. Contrary to the media's depiction and voters' expectations, however, an analysis of Congressional web sites reveals that women members, just as men in Congress do, portray themselves as having diverse interests and participating zealously in the Washington power struggle. Thus, women's self-presentations on the web do not support the notion that the images proffered by members contribute to media and voter stereotypes of women representatives.     

On a Sociology of the Media

This article presents a detailed examination of the mass media's influence on candidate visibility and candidate awareness in House elections, using media markets as the vehicle for analysis. Simple comparisons reveal striking media market effects on both visibility and awareness: Voters are much more likely to report contact with the candidates in “media market districts"—House districts where there is a close fit between the local television market and the district's boundaries. Candidate recognition figures are also markedly higher in the media market setting. These findings indicate that the mass media have the potential to strongly influence competition in House races: Challengers are able to use the media advantages in media market districts to overcome the exposure gap associated with the incumbency advantage. Closer inspection reveals that these effects hold true even after controlling for other factors, most notably the spending activities of the candidates. These results suggest a substantial media influence on candidate awareness and thus on competition in House races.     

Assessing Americans' Opinions About the News Media's Fairness in 1996 and 1998

This article reports an analysis of Americans' opinions about the news media's fairness in covering public affairs. The data come from the 1996 and 1998 National Election Studies, which contained variables tapping exposure to and opinions about the news media, as well as key political dispositions?partisanship, ideology, and opinion about presidential and congressional job performance?and a plethora of demographic variables. The data show that people who adhere to traditional moral codes and are misanthropic tend not to trust the news media to cover politics fairly. In a presidential election year, opinion about the president's job performance affects perceptions of the press's fairness. In an off-year election, however, opinion about the president's job performance is replaced by opinion about how the Congress has been doing its job. In addition, perception of how the media covered the Lewinsky scandal also influenced opinion about the press's fairness in general.     

The Agenda-Setting Impact of Major Presidential TV Addresses

New media dramatically increase citizens' access to information and decrease governments' ability to control the flow of communication. Although human rights nongovernmental organizations have advocated that access to independent news media will improve government respect for human rights, recent empirical studies have shown this is not always the case. We posit that media independence and the presence or absence of democratic characteristics, in particular political competition, have substantial effects on government repression because these factors determine the degree to which the government is vulnerable to public pressures. The model developed here includes three equations that encompass the impact of interaction between and among the news media, citizens, and government. The first equation specifies the influences on the news media's decision whether or not to perform a “watchdog” role regarding government repression. The second equation represents public reaction to the news media's coverage of government repression (i.e., protest). Here access to news media via traditional and new media is an important factor. The third equation represents government repression. Solutions to the system of equations are derived for four scenarios (a) Democracy and media independence are both present, (b) democracy is present but media independence is absent, (c) democracy is absent (autocracy) and media independence is present, and (d) democracy is absent (autocracy) and media independence is absent. We then consider interesting properties of the anticipated behavior from the government, media, and general public through case illustrations for the Netherlands and Myanmar/Burma.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Political Communication for the following free supplemental resource: two additional case illustrations (Tanzania and Brazil).]     

The Supreme Court and Issue Attention: The Case of Homosexuality

Previous studies have shown that a small number of Supreme Court decisions that “rearrange[d] the … distribution of political benefits” have drawn the media's attention to the underlying issues involved in those cases. This article provides an additional test of that empirical claim, examining the effects of the Supreme Court's gay rights cases on media coverage of homosexuality from 1990 to 2005. The data indicate that Supreme Court decisions that expanded the scope of gay rights increased coverage of homosexuality in both The New York Times and USA Today, while cases that affirmed the existing scope of gay rights had no such effect.     

Examining the Distinct Effects of Emotive Triggers on Public Reactions to International Terrorism

In recent years, a growing body of research has set out to examine the role that emotions play in shaping political attitudes and behaviors regarding terrorism. However, one major issue that is generally overlooked is whether the thematic relevance of emotive triggers leads to differential effects on people's reactions to international terrorism. Specifically, does anger—regardless of its source—tend to drive people towards supporting an aggressive foreign policy option to counter terrorism, or do the thematic underpinnings of anger (i.e., the specific contents that trigger this particular emotion, such as watching a news story about a recent terrorist attack) matter vis-à-vis the policy choice? To address this gap, this study experimentally examines the impact of anger—induced by thematically relevant versus irrelevant emotive triggers—on people's cognitive processing and foreign policy preferences regarding international terrorism. Overall, we find that the induction of anger via thematically relevant emotive triggers leads to a higher tendency for selecting a military option, a lower amount of information acquisition, and a shorter processing time in response to terror-related incidents.     

Soviet propaganda and the neutron bomb decision

Abstract

In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority.

Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon.

During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb.

Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon.

With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb.