Bargaining,Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007

From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003–2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logics—bargaining, fear, and denial—that are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the “localization” of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.     

U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq in Perspective: Year 4

As year five begins, the prospects for a successful conclusion of the Iraq war - one that would repair the deep seated and deadly animosities throughout civil society, establish a foundation for a sustainable democratic government, and stop the inexorable climb of U.S. fatalities above 3,000 and of total casualties toward 30,000 and beyond - are remote. The U.S. is embroiled in a conflict in three dimensions, military political and civil, that defies solution. Our military and its leaders have tended to underestimate the enemy and engage it half-heartedly, while the insurgents have retained freedom of action and repeatedly seized the initiative. The fourth dimension, the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds, essential for bringing hostilities to an end, has not even begun.     

近期美国升高西太平洋紧张局势的战略意图及其影响

随着美国全球战略重心加速东移,特别是在近期美国从伊拉克撤军与从阿富汗准备抽身而退之时,美国在亚太地区频频举行军事演习,尤其是美借天安舰之机,趁势强化美韩与美日同盟,并高调介入南海争端,与东南亚伙伴强化军事互动,积极谋求南海争端的国际化。美国正沿太平洋,从东北亚至东南亚一线,事实上形成了针对中国的战略围堵。美国近期升高西太平洋紧张局势的一系列举动并不是偶然的,而是冷战后美国全球战略重心从大西洋向太平洋转移的重要组成部分。奥巴马加速重返亚太的战略调整将对中国实施远海战略与拓展战略纵深以及推行和谐周边的外交战略产生冲击。     

U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq: A Perspective on Year 5

President Bush's surge strategy intends to use the might of the U.S. military to establish secure conditions in Iraq under which the promise of political progress will be realized. The U.S. military used this approach in the past when the U.S. Fallujah Offensive of late 2004 established security for the Iraqi Election Cycle in 2005. But the promise of political progress for insurgents was not fulfilled in 2006 upon formation of the Maliki government, and they resorted to extreme levels of violence in response, killing 1,080 U.S. troops during the 12 months ending September 2007, more than in any other comparable period. In the second half of Year 5, from September 2007 through the fifth anniversary of the war on March 19, 2008, U.S. forces in cooperation with Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias helped improve security conditions once again. But unless the surge's promise of political progress is fulfilled, the patience of the insurgents and militias is likely to dissipate and violence will increase once again in Year 6.     

An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?

This article examines whether the outbreak of an insurgency after the U.S. invasion of Iraq was an avoidable policy failure or whether the structural conditions surrounding the occupation made such an outbreak inevitable. Several U.S. policy mistakes, in particular the deployment of too few troops, a lack of comprehensive political and military planning for the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi military, the failure to establish a government in waiting, and overly aggressive de-Baathification, greatly exacerbated rather than ameliorated the various structural problems. More fundamentally, structure and policy choices interacted at all levels to explain the Iraq failure. The unavoidable conditions that coalition forces encountered in Iraq—a divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule—and the political context in the United States made the challenge for successful policy execution difficult. This structure constrained and delimited the options open to U.S. policy makers but, even within those narrow limits, the United States made many bad choices that further diminished the chances of success.

A particularly important series of policy mistakes occurred well in advance of the buildup to war itself. The orientation of the U.S. armed forces away from counterinsurgency, the failure to establish a political settlement before invasion, and other controllable policy choices in the prewar period all led to enormous difficulties during the occupation itself. Thus, by the time of the invasion, these policy choices had become almost like structural constraints and the failures had a snowballing effect, making policy corrections far more difficult.     

Response to Clea Bunch's Review of Engaging Iran

President Ronald Reagan's White House leaned toward Baghdad during the Iran–Iraq War because it sought to prevent an Iraqi defeat. Though the White House deemed Iraqi chemical weapons use abhorrent, it found the implications of an Iranian victory or expanded Soviet influence in the Middle East far more alarming. Newly released documents from the Iraqi state archives now allow an exploration of the chemical weapons controversy from both Iraqi and American perspectives. This evidence, along with sources from American archives, demonstrates that Washington and Baghdad had radically different assessments of the Iran–Iraq War. American officials hoped to mould Iraq into a useful ally, but Saddam interpreted American support as subterfuge. Saddam's hostile view of American intentions indicates that Washington had less influence over Iraqi behaviour during the 1980s than both contemporary American officials and many scholars writing since have realised. To insist that Washington could have deterred Iraqi chemical weapons use overstates American clout.     

The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq

Images of private forces in Iraq—killed and mutilated in Fallujah, implicated in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and shooting up civilian vehicles—have provided a dramatic illustration of the role private security companies (pscs) now play in U.S. military operations. Though the United States’ use of contractors on the battlefield is not entirely new, the increased number of contractors deployed and the use of private security forces to perform an escalating number of tasks has created a new environment that poses important trade-offs for U.S. policy and military effectiveness and for U.S. relations with other states. This article outlines the history of U.S. contractors on the battlefield, compares that with the use of private security in Iraq, discusses the benefits and risks associated with their use, and proposes some trade-offs that decision-makers in the United States should consider while contemplating their use in the future.     

Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan

The effort to raise host nation security forces was central to the U.S. strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. poured massive resources into both countries. Unfortunately, U.S. planners failed to understand the cultural and political environments in which these forces would have to operate. Thus, the United States attempted to build ministries and forces based on U.S. models that simply were not appropriate for those nations. Although the training teams successfully recruited, trained, and deployed almost a million Afghans and Iraqis, Iraqi forces have collapsed and the Afghans are struggling to keep the insurgents at bay.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

In the eye of the storm: Ambassador James Richards' mission to Iraq in April 1957

This article discusses the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special emissary to the Middle East, to Iraq in April 1957 following the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. An analysis of the Richards Mission encompasses a range of specific issues, including the relationship in Iraq between the US and UK and American assessments of the stability of the Iraqi government. Moreover, this article examines the American strategy for navigating the rising tide of Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq after the Suez War. This article explores the ways in which US policy-makers privileged the notions of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in Iraqi political affairs and reflects on the critical dilemmas and contradictions underlying American policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the 1956 Suez War.     

Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan

Over the last 20 years, Taiwan has witnessed an impressive transition from authoritarian one-party rule to liberal democracy. This included considerable changes in the relations between the civilian political elites and the armed forces. While under the emergency laws of the authoritarian regime the military had been a powerful political force, during democratization the elected civilians have managed to curb military political power and have successively widened their influence over former exclusively military prerogatives. This article argues that the development of Taiwan's civil–military relations can be explained as the result of civilians using increasingly robust strategies to enhance their influence over the military. This was made possible by a highly beneficial combination of historical conditions and factors inside and outside the military that strengthened the political power of the civilian elites and weakened the military's bargaining power. The article finds that even though partisan exploitation of civilian control instruments could potentially arouse civil–military conflict in the future, civil–military relations in general will most likely remain supportive of the further consolidation of Taiwan's democracy.     

Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World

The quality of the U.S. military has improved steadily since the end of the Cold War, but technological and managerial advancements cannot compensate for the inadequate size of the American armed forces. The post–Cold War years saw a shift from the Westphalian, state-ordered world to one where Western states are at war with transnational, substate terrorist groups. This requires adjustments in the American military establishment. Improvements in quality must be matched by an increase in quantity in order to meet U.S. security needs. As interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, a minimalist force may be sufficient to win a war, but where nation-building is required, it will find it difficult to win the peace.     

Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency

Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the U.S. military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to “high-intensity” or “conventional” combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the U.S. military ‘learning counterinsurgency’? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the U.S. campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fall-out from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the U.S. military.     

What Strategic Outlook Holds for America in Iraq?

Agreat controversy is stirring up the world opinion over the future direction of developments in Iraq, a matter affecting overall U.S. foreign policy and even the international power configuration as well. An accurate assessment, however, requires analyzing the relevance of the issue to U.S. vital interests, the results of its current policy over there and its ability to cope with further potential challenges. The author rules out U. S. giving up its cause in Iraq or the likelihood of any drastic modifications in its present policy. He also concedes its ability to achieve partial successful reconstruction in the war-torn country, albeit in a scaled-down version, far short of its original much-vaunted expectations. In sum, Washington will naturally make constant policy adjustments to meet challenges for realization of its dynamic phased goals and maintain its continued military presence there in a certain form so as to ensure its strategic interests in Iraq,the Greater Middle East and even the entire "arc of instability."     

U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq: Year 3

With year four of the Iraq War under way, this article focuses on the sources, patterns, and effects of fatalities. It shows how trends in fatalities correlate with nine distinct phases since the war's inception and analyzes in detail the last two, which prevailed during year 3, ending March 19, 2006: the Iraqi election cycle (which encompassed the election of the National Assembly, establishment of the transnational government, drafting of the Constitution, approval of the Constitution, and the election of parliament) and the start of U.S. efforts to disengage from the conflict. U.S. intentions to scale down its involvement while increasing Iraqi self-sufficiency have been hampered by the persistence of fatalities inflicted by the insurgency, which bifurcated its efforts during year 3, matching hostilities toward U.S. troops with organized civil strife involving Iraqis. Ultimately, only the Iraqi people and their new government can defeat the insurgency and bring U.S. involvement in the war to an end.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953–1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.     

Why “Best Military Advice” is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civilians

This article contends that “best military advice” is a problematic construct for both the military and civilians alike. Yet, the increasing resonance of this construct across the Joint Force cannot—and should not—be summarily dismissed. Instead, it merits reflection about why the term has grown in popularity, how its continued use is influencing the development of defense strategy, and perhaps above all, how it will affect American civil-military relations. As best military advice infuses the U.S. military, it will increasingly become normalized and held up as desirable, particularly among the younger generation. Short of serious near-term steps to neutralize this construct, its deleterious influence will only increase.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.     

Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq

The need to demonstrate America's resolve is a major argument among those who oppose a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and embolden the forces of radical Islam in their war against the United States. This article assesses this “reputational” argument and concludes that evidence from radical Islamists’ pronouncements gives the argument significant and unprecedented forcefulness. These pronouncements unmistakably call into question the United States’ resoluteness by pointing to America's past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq as the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument is also unprecedented when it is compared to its similar formulation during the Vietnam War, when it was vague and short of supporting evidence. The reputational argument may play an important rationale in maintaining a substantial level of American forces in Iraq for years to come.     

Wolfowitz Conjecture: A Research Note on Civil War and News Coverage

How news coverage is affected by dangerous security environments is an important issue for political scientists who rely upon journalistic accounts of political events. It is also a controversial issue in the policy arena. In June of 2004, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz attributed the American public's pessimism regarding U.S. efforts at stabilizing Iraq to the manner in which Iraq was covered by the U.S. media, suggesting that journalists in Iraq were holed up in hotels rather than in the field. This statement was conjecture, but if there is indeed a link between news coverage and violence, then this would be important for social scientists to understand. In this article, I probe this link by examining how conflict intensity and journalist deaths affect both the volume and length of news coverage in civil wars from 1992 to 1999. This paper shows that news coverage is largely unaffected by violence, except in the most extreme circumstances.