Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation： Predicament and the Way Out

Development and use of nuclear energy was undoubtedly one o the greatest accomplishments by mankind in science and technology during the 20th Century. Once discovered, atomic energy, like other technological discoveries, has brought about mixed results: by its military application, man produced deadly nuclear arsenals; but at the same time it became a major energy     

The Changing Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons and Its Implications for the New Nuclear World Order

Ever since the nuclear bombing at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have become one of the defining elements in shaping the world strategic situation for better or worse. The end of the Cold War has led to dramatic changes in the world security landscape. The international     

Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?

Is the nuclear domino theory historically valid? Despite its longstanding centrality to thinking on nuclear proliferation amongst scholars and policymakers, in recent years a revisionist consensus has emerged in opposition to this traditional view. Based on an analysis of historical evidence from the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, this article argues that scholars have gone too far in rejecting the nuclear domino theory. Reactive proliferation has been more prevalent than commonly believed, and while it is true that only India acquired a nuclear arsenal in response to the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Finally, the historical evidence suggests that the nuclear domino theory is compatible with both domestic and prestige motivations for proliferation in addition to the security motives normally associated with the theory.     

The Iran Nuclear Issue and Its Prospects

Since August 2005, Iran on one side and the United States and the European countries on the other have been locked in a rangle over the Iran nuclear issue and tension has steadily escalated to a critical point as both sides stick to an uncompromising position. In earlier June 2006, in order to break the deadlock, the EU, with U.S. blessing, once again offered Iran a new package of incentives in an     

Korean Nuclear Crisis Management Versus China''''s Diplomatic Options

Active Participation in the international management of the second Korean nuclear crisis represents a milestone in New China's diplomatic record — a departure from a hands-off principle toward international controversies observed for more than half a cen…     

The Iran Nuclear Issue and China''''s Diplomatic Choices

Since 2003, the Iran nuclear issue has attracted worldwide attention. This is the world's most protracted and most influential confrontation between a superpower and a big Islamic country since the end of the Cold War. As the Iran nuclear issue has a bearing on the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation system, the United Nations, the International     

To a Nuclear Weapons-Free World——A Chinese Perspective

A nuclear weapons-free world(NWFW) has been advocated and welcomed recently.However,the realization of a NWFW is quite difficult.The author believes that it is more realistic to build a nuclear weapons-free zone(NWFZ) than it is to build a NWFW,at least in the short term.She analyses the significance of NWFZs and issues confronting the existing zones and pointed out how to create more NWFZs.     

Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”     

Frustration and Delay: The Secondary Effects of Supply-Side Proliferation Controls

Abstract

Do trade barriers help slow the spread of nuclear weapons? Supply-side controls on proliferation equipment and material are often dismissed as ineffective because nuclear weapons–seeking states can develop methods to circumvent the controls. However, these global export controls have important secondary effects. By creating barriers to trade, export controls force states to develop costly and inefficient methods that interfere with progress toward nuclear weapons development. Using case evidence beginning with the advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export control regime in 1974, I argue that the resulting delay and frustration can change leaders’ strategic calculations regarding the value of their nuclear weapons programs. These findings demonstrate that proliferation controls do slow the spread of nuclear weapons, both by delaying existing programs, and by decreasing the likelihood that leaders will make decisions to continue with, or even start, nuclear weapons programs.     

Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Theory and a Case Study of Tito's Yugoslavia

Programs of international civil nuclear cooperation—of “Atoms for Peace”—have come under growing criticism for unintentionally fostering nuclear weapons proliferation in developing countries. However, drawing on the literature on international technology transfer and on Albert Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, this article argues that Atoms for Peace efforts may often seriously hamper developing countries’ nuclear weapons ambitions by empowering their scientific workers and by facilitating the brain drain to the developed world. The article then presents a case study of the historical nuclear program of Yugoslavia, which received very generous help from the Atoms for Peace programs of the United States, Soviet Union, and European states at a time when nonproliferation controls were minimal. The international ties of the Yugoslav nuclear program made its scientific workers much less likely to choose simple loyalty to the Tito regime, and much more likely to choose voice or exit, accelerating the program's ultimate collapse.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy

Why do great powers take such different approaches to the issue of nuclear proliferation? Why do states oppose nuclear proliferation more vigorously in some cases than in others? In short, what explains great power nonproliferation policy? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theories of nonproliferation policy. The first, political relationship theory, suggests that states oppose nuclear proliferation to their enemies but are less concerned when friends acquire nuclear weapons. The second, power-projection theory, argues that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to states over which they have the ability to project military power because nuclear proliferation in those situations would constrain their military freedom of action. In contrast, states will be less likely to resist, and more likely to promote, nuclear proliferation to states against which they cannot use force. To test these hypotheses, this article uses evidence from great power nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 2000. While both theories find some support, the power-projection theory performs significantly better. The findings of this article have important implications for international relations theory and US nonproliferation policy.     

Ceci n'est pas une…American nuclear weapon in Belgium

There is hardly anybody in Belgium who publicly defends the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on Belgian territory. The longer these weapons stay, the more the existing nuclear weapons policy and by extension North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself will be regarded as illegitimate. While one should not expect massive demonstrations similar to that at the beginning of the 1980s, the pressure to protest increases. By describing the different societal and political actors in Belgium and their respective views on the possible withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons, this article tries to explain the gap between policymakers and citizens on this issue. The main explanatory variables are a low-profile diplomatic culture and the lack of a strong link between the anti-nuclear movement and the political parties in power, resulting in the absence of political leaders at the governmental level, who clearly speak out in favor of withdrawal.     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

Contested multilateralism

“Contested multilateralism” describes the situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, multilateral organizations, and non-state actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions. It occurs when coalitions dissatisfied with existing institutions combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institutions to pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions. Contested multilateralism takes two principal forms: regime shifting and competitive regime creation. It can be observed across issue areas. It shapes patterns of international cooperation and discord on key security concerns such as combating terrorist financing, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and banning certain conventional weapons. It is also evident on economic issues involving intellectual property, on environmental and energy issues, and in the realm of global public health. The sources of dissatisfaction are primarily exogenous, and the institutions used to challenge the status quo range from traditional treaties or intergovernmental organizations to informal networks, some of which include non-state actors. Some institutions are winners from the process of contested multilateralism; others may lose authority or status. Although we do not propose an explanatory theory of contested multilateralism, we do suggest that this concept provides a useful framework for understanding changes in regime complexes and the strategies that generate such changes.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

Accounting for Extra-Dyadic Sources of International Outcomes

Leaders consider the broader international landscape when making foreign policy choices. This landscape could encompass a single external actor, the local region, or even the whole international system. Quantitative analyses of international outcomes, however, frequently do not account for this broader context. This study suggests a corrective, illustrating the value of incorporating extra-dyadic variables into analyses with dyadic and monadic outcomes. The challenge is to parsimoniously capture theoretically salient elements of the multilateral environment. We contend that a measure that links distributions of power within any k-set of relevant states to uncertainty over conflict outcomes is a promising option for two reasons. First, the measure builds from and accords with canonical theories of international politics. Second, it offers scholars a simple and flexible means to define and account for the set of states that constitute the relevant multilateral landscape. Illustrative applications linking power distributions and outcome uncertainty to alliance formation and pursuit of nuclear weapons demonstrate that extra-dyadic factors consistently influence foreign policy outcomes. This study thus shows that situating such outcomes within their broader context is both feasible and substantively important. Moreover, it contributes to recent efforts to address shortcomings of monadic and dyadic studies.