论日本“政治大国”战略

“政治大国”战略是８０年代以来日本政府所确立、推行的国家发展的总体战略。其战略目标主要有三,提出了形成以“美日欧”三级为主导的世界新秩序的主张。以重点推行“大国外交”和欧亚大陆外交。推行政治改革、向军事大国迈进、巩固经济大国地位、向世界推行“文化输出”战略等为推进政治大国战略的手段。日本实现其政治大国的战略目标并非易事,受许多因素的制约。     

中国的国际定位问题与“韬光养晦、有所作为”的战略思想

坚持"韬光养晦"的战略思想,并不意味着墨守成规;只有准确把握中国在国际事务中的地位与"韬光养晦"战略思想的关系,重新思考"韬光养晦"的概念和提法,与时俱进地发展"韬光养晦",使其精神实质得以延续,才能实现中国从人口大国、经济大国、政治大国演进到和谐大国、教育大国、科技大国、文化大国的梦想.     

日本军事安全战略及其前景

近几年作为经济大国的日本采取多种措施，加快了走向政治大国的步伐。其中，确立新的军事安全战略，加强军事力量，扩大军事影响力是其重要手段。一、冷战时期日本军事安全战略的演变（一）吉田战略５０年代，由于冷战的形成，美国改变了使日本非军事化的政策，“变日本为...     

日本的政治大国战略动向及前景展望

日本在大国战略中的积极进取姿态体现在 :鼓噪修宪 ,为实现政治军事大国的目标奠定基础 ;在完善日美军事同盟体制的同时 ,发展独立的军事力量 ;外交方面 ,既积极谋求成为安理会常任理事国 ,又要巩固在八国集团中的地位 ;既把外交重点放在亚洲 ,又不失时机地拓展活动空间 ,提高自身的国际地位。     

对日本从“经济大国”走向“政治大国”问题的探讨

80年代以来,日本领导层不满足于“经济大国”的现状,努力谋求成为“政治大国”,其具体目标:与西欧大国平起平坐,在亚太地区起主导作用,进而最终成为“世界政治大国”。主要手段是,以加强经济活动为主,辅之以“创造性外交”。日本国内出现的一些倾向和问题,已引起国际社会,特别是受日本军国主义侵略之害的国家和人民的强烈不满和严重警惕。     

印度力争成为下世纪的经济大国

印度力争成为下世纪的经济大国华碧云印度的大国思想根深蒂固。独立初，尼赫鲁在《印度的发现》一书中说：“印度以它现在的地位，是不能在世界上扮演二等角色的。要么做一个有声有色的大国，要么销声匿迹。”他把到本世纪末实现工业化作为奋斗目标。英·甘地和拉·甘地继...     

日本的联合国外交

经济大国的实力和“政治大国”的目标,使日本对它在联合国中的现有地位和作用不满。日本外交转为大国外交,并同美欧一起建立国际新秩序是90年代日本外交的新构图,也是日本的联合国外交的核心。日本的联合国外交的主要做法是:为出任安理会常任理事国大造舆论;删除“敌国”条款;派遣自卫队参加联合国的维持和平活动;加强联合国的人员合作。     

国家地位信号释放与俄罗斯军事干预叙利亚

俄罗斯自2015年9月开始军事干预叙利亚危机。对于俄罗斯为何进行军事干预以及采取空袭的干预方式,国内外学术界尚存争议。俄罗斯军事干预叙利亚的主要目标是通过干预行动向不同的目标观众——包括叙利亚巴沙尔政权、叙反对派、"伊斯兰国"等恐怖组织和以美国为首的西方国家等——发出一系列的地位信号,以巩固和重塑俄罗斯的大国地位。针对不同的目标观众,俄罗斯使用了"炫耀性消费""分享性给予""倾向性解释"和"寻求性斗争"四种信号传导策略。就效果来看,俄罗斯的军事干预大致实现了其预期目标。通过地位信号这一视角分析俄罗斯军事干预叙利亚的目标与策略,不仅提供了一种理解国家行为的分析框架,也能为推动叙利亚问题的解决提供一定启发。     

试论新世纪日本对东盟的外交政策

新世纪日本对东盟的外交政策,摆脱了经济外交的单一性,在发展经济关系的基础上,取得了区域合作的突破性进展,并加强与东盟的政治对话、安全合作以及军事交流,旨在主导亚洲经济一体化,扩大在东南亚地区的政治势力和军事安全影响,并争取成为安理会常任理事国和国际社会的重要一极,逐步实现政治大国的目标。     

新世纪日本谋求大国地位的努力

二战后，日本从废墟上成长为仅次于美国的世界第二经济大国，成为与美欧鼎立的“经济三极”，进而要求在各领域发挥与其经济地位相称的国际作用，这就是所谓“日本的崛起”。冷战结束以后，日本把谋求大国地位作为主要外交目标之一，在21世纪将继续这一努力。一、重筑经济实力基础，发挥经济大国作用　　日本要谋求大国地位，首先要重振经济。自进入90年代以来，日本泡沫经济崩溃，复苏乏力，舆论称90年代是“失去的10年”。1999年春季，日本经济总算走出谷底，但失业率居高不下，消费不振，经济增速缓慢，又背负巨额债务(到2000年底预计公…     

战后日本国家战略演进及岸田内阁战略走向

二战后日本不得不放弃武力扩张的国家战略,但伴随形势变化,日本不同当政者的治国方略则不相同。围绕是维护宪法、优先发展经济、重视国际协调,还是修改宪法、增强军事力量、成为政治军事大国等,存在两种不同国家战略倾向。其背后则是两种不同的历史观。战后,日本在《日本国宪法》下走和平发展道路,经济、科技取得令世界瞩目的成就,但外交则受制于美国而缺乏自主性。日本成为经济大国后,开始借助美国,努力成为亚洲领导国家和联合国常任理事国,而非所谓摆脱美国的"正常国家"。21世纪以来,安倍晋三的国家战略目标是对内推动修宪,使日本成为"能战国家";对外构筑"自由开放的印太",制衡中国。菅义伟内阁继承了安倍的国家战略。岸田文雄执政后在延续同一国家战略的同时,会展现何种特色,值得关注。     

浅析东盟——日本经济关系——以东盟经济发展中日本投资因素为研究重点

20世纪下半个世纪以来，东盟国家与日本建立了联系紧密的经济关系。但自2000年以来，随着东盟与中国经济关系的迅速发展，特别是2002年东盟与中国签订了建立《中国-东盟自由贸易区》协定以后，东盟与中国之间的贸易额急剧增长，与此同时，中国对东盟国家投资也在不断地扩大与深化（如2005年以后中国成为对老挝投资的最大国）。     

从“国际经济政治化”角度看日本对东盟的经济援助

日本在二战后对东南亚国家实施的经济援助除了商业上的动机外 ,还带有很强的战略性。日本在战后对东盟国家的经济援助分 3个阶段 :第 1阶段是从战后初期到上世纪的 6 0年代末 ,日本对东盟经济援助处于初始阶段 ,这一时期经济援助的经济意义占很大比重 ,但也含有一定的政治含义 ,且比较隐蔽 ;第 2阶段是从上世纪70年代的“福田主义”的出笼到贯穿整个 80年代的“综合安全保障”战略 ,这一阶段日本在外交上倾向独立 ,对东盟经济援助的政治化开始显现 ;第 3阶段是从冷战结束到现在 ,这个阶段日本对东盟经济援助的政治意图明显 ,直接服务于其政治大国战略。     

试论“地震天谴论”与“日本暧昧论”——两种截然不同的对日本“国家定位”和“未来走向”的诉求

石原慎太郎的"地震天谴论"和大江健三郎"日本暧昧论"代表了"三一一"巨大地震后日本两种截然不同的对"国家定位"和"未来走向"的诉求。前者的民族主义话语本意和后者的理想主义追求形成鲜明对照。它们的相同点是均要面对沉重的历史负资产和日美同盟关系等尖锐的现实问题,两者构成了极其矛盾即"暧昧"的两极。今后日本在"国家定位"等问题上将在这两极之间摇摆。在这样的情况之下,中国因素将起到重要的作用。     

日本对非洲外交及其发展趋向

基于"政治大国"目标的总体考虑,日本对非洲外交逐步由注重经济利益转向全面介入,日本主要战略目标在于拓展经济权益、提升政治大国地位、增进软实力.为此,日本长期向非洲国家提供大量经济援助,积极创制关乎非洲和平与发展的多边合作机制,并适时推销日本发展模式和价值观念.未来日非关系在一定程度上会继续向前发展,日本对非洲外交的政治色彩还会有所增强,但重视程度仍将是有限的.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

A Nested Game Approach to Political and Economic Liberalization in Democratizing States: The Case of South Korea

South Korea enjoyed high rates of economic growth until the mid–1990s. However in mid–1997 the country went into a severe economic crisis which ultimately resulted in a request for an IMF bailout. Leading up to the crisis, the government had embarked upon democratic liberalization but not much economic liberalization. This research explores why the government would lay the foundation for political reform without creating institutions capable of imposing economic reform on the politically powerful business sector. The absence of such institutions put the government in a position where it could not respond to the emerging economic crisis. The government's inability to act eroded its own position of power and governance. From this perspective, the government's inattention to economic reform appears irrational as it led to a weakening of its own position. We build a model of political and economic liberalization showing that the government was engaged in nested games (i.e., games in multiple arenas) with the political opposition, the labor unions, and the powerful business sector. We develop an argument that strong, antiliberal economic actors create incentive for the government in a democratizing state to refrain from economic liberalization, even while moving forward with democratic liberalization.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britain's commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britain's industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.