同族群平叛优势理论再思考：以印度平息锡克叛乱为例

同族群优势主要包括当地环境、人力情报和民众动员等三个方面,各方都有机会去利用同族群优势,争取在少数族群叛乱与反叛乱斗争态势中的优势。政府平叛策略应强调发挥温和派的作用,从而在同族群因素方面削弱、抵消乃至胜过叛乱组织的相对优势。同族群平叛优势的作用机制在于控制人口和争夺民心两个方面,当政府控制足够多的当地人口时,叛乱组织就无法在族群内部招募到足够的人员,以补充在政府平叛行动中损失的成员;而拥有民众支持的意义则在于,虽然有了民众支持并不必然平息叛乱,但是没有民众支持是无法平息叛乱的,叛乱组织将一直具备持续甚至升级叛乱的民众基础。为了考察同族群平叛优势的效用,根据温和派是否具备相对于叛乱组织的实力优势和是否拥有平叛行动主导权,有四种不同策略下的平叛效果考察框架。结合印度政府治理和平息锡克叛乱各个阶段有代表性的平叛行动,详细解读印度政府、锡克叛乱组织和温和派在各阶段的策略选择,以及如何影响同族群优势的平叛效果。     

圣灵抵抗军的叛乱策略与 北乌干达冲突的复发

北乌干达冲突本质上是一场不同种族之间争夺权力与利益的冲突。1986年，圣灵抵抗军在北乌干达以武力反抗穆塞韦尼政权的名义进行叛乱，迄今仍在南苏丹、刚果民主共和国和中非共和国的边境四处流窜。圣灵抵抗军的叛乱及其暴行不仅对北乌干达地区的和平与发展构成严重威胁和挑战，也深刻地影响着中部非洲地区的和平与稳定以及乌干达同周边国家间关系的发展。乌干达政府的反叛乱战略重点强调军事手段，重视媒体宣传、争取外部对其打击圣灵抵抗军的同情和支持。而圣灵抵抗军叛乱的动机已经从推翻穆塞韦尼政权逐渐演变成为开发“战争经济”和“为生存而战”。简而言之，圣灵抵抗军的叛乱策略是对叛乱成本-收益精心计算的产物。圣灵抵抗军的儿童兵策略、袭击平民策略、争取苏丹政府支持策略以及低程度地参与和平进程策略，既能够有效地打破乌干达政府的反叛乱战略，也导致北乌干达冲突的长期化及其冲突影响的“外溢”。要真正地解决北乌干达冲突以及圣灵抵抗军问题，需要重视武装冲突解决的和平进程、促进北乌干达地区的经济建设与发展以及加强对中部非洲地区的和平建设。     

公共物品供给与国内冲突的复发

根据新制度经济学理论，不同类型的公共物品供给是国家对国民接受现存政治秩序和纳税的回报。长期的政治和社会经济物品供给不妥或不足会导致国民的“怨恨”，破坏统治合法性，从而为反政府武装组织的动员和招募打开机会窗口，激发国内冲突。怨恨不会随着战争的结束而自动消失。对于普通士兵而言，怨恨是否会平息或化解取决于公共物品供给的变化。无论是原统治集团继续掌权，还是反叛集团取而代之，改善公共物品供给都是无法回避的问题，也是决定内战是否死灰复燃的关键因素。基于1947-2008年“武装冲突数据库”的“生存分析”支持了本文的基本假设，那就是公共物品供给显著地降低国内冲突复发的风险。经验研究还发现，战后和平建设主要是一个国内政治过程。国际战争、经济相互依存等国际因素会产生局部的显著影响，但作用并不大。国内政治物品的供给，尤其是政治参与和政治竞争对于冲突复发的遏制作用远比其他类型物品强。相对于经济物品，社会福利物品能够产生及时的作用，和平效果明显。此外，族群冲突的复发受制于更多类型的国内公共物品供给，因此较之非族群冲突，实现持久和平的机会更多，相对更容易化解。     

美国犹太人的渊源、发展及宗教信仰（续）

但是在1900年以后，东欧犹太移民的条件开始慢慢地得到改善。虽然拥挤、噪声、肮脏等情形依然存在，但新的希望冉冉升起。到20世纪初，纽约下东区的犹太人口大大增加，爱尔兰人和德国人逐渐失去了对当地的控制。代表移民利益的犹太组织日趋活跃，出现了像美国希伯来慈善会这样的德国犹太慈善机构，利莲·沃德和雅各·希夫建立的移民居留地也帮助移民们的住宿、医疗和就业问题。而希伯来移民援助协会则帮助新来的犹太移民适应美国的新生活。1903-1910年数千个同胞会涌现出来。这些旨在帮助来自欧洲同一地方的犹太同胞组织，为东欧犹太移民提供了解决现实问题而非意识形态问题的途径。一般人可以在这里找到除自己小家庭之外的社团大家庭，这里也提供医疗和身亡救济，在这里能够听到欧洲的消息。碰到社会交往的同伴。     

Beheading the Hydra: Counterinsurgent Violence and Insurgent Attacks in Iraq

We evaluate the effectiveness of anti-insurgent violence as a means to suppress insurgency with micro-level data from the Iraq War. Our findings suggest that while violence against insurgents increases the incidence of future insurgent attacks, the intensity of this violence can significantly influence the outcome. Rather than shifting monotonically, the effect is actually curvilinear, first rising, and then contracting. We argue that at low to moderate levels, violence against insurgents creates opportunities for these groups to signal strength and resolve, which enables them to build momentum, heighten civilian cooperation, and diminish political support for counterinsurgency efforts in these forces’ home countries. The result is an escalation in insurgent attacks. However, at higher levels, this effect should plateau and taper off as insurgent attrition rises, and as civilian fears over personal safety displace grievances that might otherwise provoke counter-mobilization. Our empirical tests on data from the Iraq War, 2004–2009, demonstrate robust support for this argument.     

Numerous,Capable, and Well-Funded Rebels: Insurgent Military Effectiveness and Deadly Attacks in Afghanistan

Why do some of Afghanistan's provinces experience more deadly attacks on counterinsurgents than others? We argue that provinces with more militarily effective insurgents will be deadlier for the forces of the counterinsurgency. We posit that insurgent military effectiveness is an interactive function of the rebel group's size, the quality of its recruits, and the group's operational budget. More militarily effective insurgents should, in turn, produce more deadly violence against Coalition forces. We model this relationship at the provincial level in Afghanistan using negative binomial regressions. Ultimately, we find that in provinces where the insurgency is more militarily effective, deadly attacks against counterinsurgent forces occur more often. Based on this finding, we conclude with directions for future research and policy recommendations for both the current operations in Afghanistan and for future counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.     

The Urban Environment and its Influences on Insurgent Campaigns

For a long time, insurgency was a rural affair. The growing modernization of the modern world, however, shifts conflicts to the cities and requires us to explore the logics of armed struggle in urban environments. This article explores how the urban environment shapes armed conflicts, and argues that insurgents face severe practical constraints when acting in the cities. The urban environment offers the insurgents alternative ways of financing and of operating while close state control impedes them in pursuing a classic strategy of insurgency. Although state control cannot prevent attacks as such, it particularly hampers insurgents in relating to the population and organizing opposition. However, without massive and active support, armed struggle will remain sectarian and, thus, fail to achieve major political changes. This article argues that urban insurgents face a paradoxical relationship with society. While urban insurgents become independent of social support on an operational level, they depend more than ever on spontaneous massive and active social support on a strategic level.     

Terrorism,Counterterrorism, and the Rule of Law

While fighting insurgency, both state and non-state groups depend on the local population for valuable resources such as food, intelligence, and security. By using a repertoire of subsistence coping mechanisms available to households in the context of the local political economy as an indicator of grievances and mechanisms of interactions between local households and the state and insurgents, district level data from Nepal on Maoist conflict is used to test hypotheses regarding state and insurgent violence. The analysis confirms that the state was more likely to kill people in a district where the number of households that borrowed to cope with subsistence was high. The Maoists were more likely to kill in a district with a higher number of subsistence sufficient households.     

Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine

How does manpower affect counterinsurgency? Important debates about counterinsurgency theory, military doctrine, force planning, and ongoing military operations revolve around assumptions about the role manpower plays in determining counterinsurgency outcomes. But these assumptions have not, by and large, been subjected to large-n analysis. This paper helps serve that role by examining new data on counterinsurgents’ deployments across 171 campaigns since World War I. These data provide insight into a range of important issues, such as how force size should be measured, whether it is related to counterinsurgent success, whether troop nationality matters, and whether the role of manpower varies across contexts. Of these findings, the most notable is that conventional rules of thumb for force sizing, including the recommendation put forth in official US military doctrine, receive no empirical support. These findings therefore challenge the prevailing wisdom, while laying the groundwork for a range of future scholarship.     

Coming to Terms with Separatist Insurgencies

Although insurgencies may begin their rebellions with expressed desires for outcomes unacceptable to opposing governments, the desired insurgent outcomes sometimes undergo modification, creating conditions that can make governments more amenable to external mediation. In certain separatist conflicts, the likelihood of external mediation increases when the political redefinition of the state insisted upon by the insurgents undergoes a revision, from secession to self‐determination, understood as a variant of autonomy. In the same vein, although it may not happen concurrently, insurgent movements become more amenable to external mediation if and when opposing governments revise the preferred conflict outcome from a military defeat of the insurgents to a containment of the movement. These two developments can serve as objective referents helping external parties to identify a ripe moment in the conflict and initiate mediation. But the implementation of an agreement ending separatist conflict may not occur if the government fails to submit the proposed territorial bounds of autonomy to prior review by constituents. Potential spoilers among government constituents should be identified and recruited to participate in the negotiations so that the likelihood of agreement rejection is reduced. In some states, however, the legal mechanisms and political opportunities for constituents to act as spoilers do not exist.     

国家认同与族群认同:以马来西亚为例

国家与族群具有不同的结构与功能,因而国家认同与族群认同的要素,特别是二者的认同基础存在较大的差异。正是这种差异决定着二者关系的基本形态。国家的公共性要求它不应该将政治政策偏向任何一个族群。族群平等是国家认同与族群认同的平衡点,否则,可能会导致政策所损害的族群对国家存在意义的质疑。马来西亚独立后,特别是20世纪70年代后,实施的正是偏向马来人的政策,从而造成非马来人对国家的不满。     

Insurgency theory and the conflict in Algeria: A theoretical analysis

In the early nineties it was widely feared that Algeria was on the verge of an Islamic revolution. These fears proved to be unfounded. This article seeks to explain the failure of the insurgency to topple the current government through the use of three models of successful insurgency movements: urban insurrection, peasant‐based guerrilla warfare and focoism. Analysis shows that the first two of these models cannot be applied to the situation in Algeria because of the nature of the Algerian topography, the lack of foreign sanctuaries for the insurgents and the authoritarian nature of the Algerian regime. The single success of the third model is a historical anomaly, unlikely to lead to the overthrow of the current Algerian government, but leading to a fourth and final model; urban terror. It is the clandestine nature of this fourth model which provides for the longevity of the current insurgency, yet because of its inability to meaningfully challenge the state, gain recruits, and maintain centralized control over the movement, the insurgency degenerates, perpetrating the seemingly senseless acts of violence currently occurring in Algeria today, the natural aftermath of a failed insurgency.