埃及变局中的跨阶层动员

跨阶层动员是2011年埃及抗议民众成功推翻穆巴拉克统治的前提。虚拟社交网络、反政府力量联盟及其社会支持网络是形成跨阶层动员的基础,"想象团结"是导致跨阶层动员的直接原因。但"想象团结"具有临时性、短暂性、稀薄性等特征,它没有也不能保障埃及政权更替后的政治稳定。     

乌克兰危机的原因及影响

2013年11月，因政府宣布停止与欧盟签订联系国协定，乌克兰爆发大规模抗议活动。2014年2月18日，相对和平的抗议演变为暴力冲突，乌克兰总统亚努科维奇随后被迫下台；3月16日，克里米亚以公投形式“脱乌人俄”并引发连锁反应，东部的顿涅茨克、哈尔科夫和卢甘斯克纷纷要求“公投入俄”，而乌克兰临时政府则派遣军队围剿亲俄武装力量。新总统波罗申科上台后冲突仍在继续，乌克兰处在大规模内战和分裂的边缘，这是自2004年“橙色革命”以来乌出现的最大的政治危机。     

茶党运动兴起及其对美国政治的影响

金融危机爆发后，美国茶党（Tea Party）迅速崛起，成为保守主义势力的新代表。白2009年崭露头角开始，茶党抗议活动范同不断扩大、人数不断增多、规模不断升级，其最大的一次抗议活动波及全美750个城市，参加人数高达200万。茶党运动迅猛发展，已成为目前美国政坛不可忽视的力量。     

社会运动与智利的民主转型

1990年艾尔文赢得大选 ,由此结束了智利军政府长达 1 7年的统治 ,智利由威权体制过渡到民主体制。智利的民主转型是通过皮诺切特政府开启的选举进程而实现的。但是 ,人们也不能忽视1 983～ 1 986年的社会运动在其中的作用。1 983年 5月 1 1日 ,智利爆发了皮诺切特统治以来的第一次大规模群众抗议。在此后的 3年中 ,几乎每个月的全国抗议日都有大批群众参加游行、示威、罢工等活动 ,人们提出“现在就要民主”的口号 ,要求皮诺切特辞职 ,立即恢复民主制度。虽然由于种种原因 ,社会运动未能实现为智利直接带来民主的目标 ,但是智利的民主转型却…     

从“阿拉伯之春”到“占领”运动——全球抗议周期中的框架转型及其效果

2010年年底以来发生在西亚北非的"阿拉伯之春"以及以美国"占领华尔街"运动为代表的系列"占领"运动,被国内外学术界视为构成新一轮全球抗议周期的组成部分。作者从社会运动理论有关主框架和抗议周期之间的关系出发,考察了"阿拉伯之春"和系列"占领"运动之间的联系与异同。"阿拉伯之春"中一个具有创新性的"变革"主框架的出现,构成此轮抗议周期兴起并具备强大动员能力的重要原因;而当系列"占领"运动在借鉴"阿拉伯之春"的话语和象征体系的基础上提出了一种"占领"主框架时,抗议周期在主框架上经历了从"变革"到"占领"的转型过程。然而,与"变革"主框架相比,"占领"主框架在经验的可信度、经历的可测量度和观念的重要性上存在明显不足,这是系列"占领"运动的动员能力无法与"阿拉伯之春"相比的重要原因。鉴于从"阿拉伯之春"到系列"占领"运动之间的意义和象征体系的转型并不成功,大致可以预料,除非新的社会运动对话语体系进行创造性的改造,否则,这一波全球抗议周期将趋于式微。     

“占领华尔街”：大困局催生大抗争——对美国“占领华尔街”抗议示威活动的分析和思考

9月中旬爆发于美国的民众“占领华尔街”抗议示威活动不仅迅速在全美蔓延，而且不断向世界扩散。比较直观地看。美国民众与金融业的矛盾加剧、贫富差距拉大和阶级矛盾激化、两党政治矛盾和恶斗是引发抗议活动的主要因素。目前，抗议活动尚处于内聚人气、外溢影响的发展阶段，未来能否发展成为具有深远意义的社会活动尚待观察。但从时代背景看，抗议活动暴露了资本主义的深层危机和美国政治经济模式的深层弊端，也反映了全球化时代社会发展的基本规律和新趋势。抗议活动虽不可能发展成为美国大规模社会动乱．但对美国政治、社会乃至内外政策的影响将会逐渐显露。     

新兴和发展中国家社会政治安全新动向

近一年多来，不少新兴和发展中国家接连爆发社会抗议事件，有些引发了严重的社会动荡，危及社会政治安全。本文在介绍社会抗议事件频发的背景及各国的应对措施基础上，分析了它对社会政治安全的影响，并认为其具有鲜明的金融危机时代特征，恐将长期影响社会政治安全。一、社会抗议事件频发的背景近年来，一些新兴和发展中国家接连爆发的社会抗议事件，有着复杂的内外背景。     

论19世纪末20世纪初伊朗巴扎商人政治参与地位的嬗变

巴扎商人是伊朗历史上除王权、教权、知识分子阶层之外影响伊朗历史发展的第四大力量，该经济群体的政治参与也是伊朗近代社会政治运动中的突出现象。巴扎商人作为伊朗传统社会的经济中心角色，构成该群体政治参与的经济基础。从1891～1892年烟草抗议运动到1905～1911年立宪革命，巴扎商人均通过大规模罢工、抗议示威等方式深度参与其中，但该群体在这一过程中的政治参与地位也经历了从领导中心走向政治边缘的位移。巴扎商人自身政治参与的局限性和逐利本质、国际力量对比的变化以及现代知识分子的兴起，构成了巴扎商人群体政治边缘化的内在逻辑。而巴扎商人政治参与从中心到边缘的位移，则体现了传统经济阶层在伊朗现代化进程中发挥作用的深度与限度。     

土耳其大规模抗议活动浅议

2013年5月27日,土耳其50多名环保人士在伊斯坦布尔举行抗议活动,并在公园安营扎寨,发起"占领加齐公园运动"。此后,抗议活动迅速蔓延,发展为持续13天的大规模抗议活动。这次抗议示威活动具有怎样的特点,作为西方国家眼中"民主典范"的土耳其为何出现大规模抗议示威活动,成为近期国际社会关注的焦点问题。     

解读“颜色革命”

一、“颜色革命”的由来与特征2003年11月2日格鲁吉亚国会大选结束后,反对党领导人萨卡什维利因不满选举结果,带领数千抗议者手持玫瑰走上街头,要求时任总统谢瓦尔德纳泽下台,被媒体称之为“玫瑰革命”。自此拉开了独联体国家和中亚地区“颜色革命”的序幕。一年之后,乌克兰爆发了“橙色革命”。近10万反对派支持者带着橙色栗子花作标志,在首都基辅举行抗议活动,谴责总统选举舞弊。2004年12月31日,乌克兰总理亚努科维奇被迫宣布辞职,反对党领导人尤先科当选为新一届总统。2005年3月,吉尔吉斯斯坦反对党指责政府在议会选举中有重大舞弊现象,…     

Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence

Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary.     

From victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties: prospects for post-war democratization

ABSTRACT

In a number of cases, rebel movements that won civil wars transformed into powerful authoritarian political parties that dominated post-war politics. Parties whose origins are as victorious insurgent groups have different legacies and hence different institutional structures and patterns of behaviour than those that originated in breakaway factions of ruling parties, labour unions, non-violent social movements, or identity groups. Unlike classic definitions of political parties, post-rebel parties are not created around the need to win elections but rather as military organizations focused on winning an armed struggle. Key attributes of victorious rebel movements, such as cohesive leadership, discipline, hierarchy, and patterns of military administration of liberated territory, shape post-insurgent political parties and help explain why post-insurgent parties are often strong and authoritarian. This article seeks to identify the mechanisms that link rebel victory in three East African countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda) to post-war authoritarian rule. These processes suggest that how a civil war ends changes the potential for post-war democratization.     

Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992

Policymakers often trumpet the potential for third parties to stop the killing associated with civil wars, yet third parties as strategic actors also have incentives to encourage longer civil wars. We argue that in order to assess the influence of third parties on civil war duration, it is necessary to consider the interdependent nature of third party interventions as they are distributed across the set of civil war combatants. We also argue that it is important to consider the geopolitical context in which civil wars occur, rather than focusing solely on characteristics internal to these conflicts. To test our hypotheses about the impact of third parties and geopolitical factors on civil war duration, we rely on event history analysis and a sample of 152 civil wars for the period 1820–1992. We find empirical support for the idea that extremely long civil wars correspond to the equitable distribution of third party interventions—stalemates prolong wars. The analysis also indicates that separatist civil wars and ongoing civil wars in states proximate to the civil war state result in civil wars of longer duration. Finally, we find that when third parties raise the stakes of the conflict by engaging in the use of militarized force against the civil war state, the duration of these conflicts is reduced. In general, our analysis underscores the importance of modeling the interdependent and dynamic aspects of third party intervention as well as the world politics of civil wars when forecasting their duration and formulating policy.     

Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

Ideas in Conflict: The Nationalism Literature and the Comparative Study of Civil War

The comparative study of civil war has recently gone through a “structural turn,” towards large-n quantitative studies that explain the variation in the incidence of civil wars in terms of structural factors. The alternatives have been a return to case studies and a constructivist critique that emphasizes the role of ideas in conflict. While there is no a priori reason to reconcile these approaches, it remains a practical task for those who want to understand how a given social situation escalates into civil war. After reviewing the two poles in the debate, we mine the literature on nationalism for insights into this issue.     

A tale of two wars: great expectations,hard times

This article compares two very different wars—the civil war in Sierra Leone and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq—and finds some significant similarities. It notes that both wars can be seen as systems which promise (and deliver) benefits for relatively privileged actors and promise (but do not deliver) benefits for ordinary combatants. The article also examines the extent to which the recruitment of Sierra Leoneans and the recruitment of Americans were made possible by the existence of ‘failing states’.     

The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002

Research has long abandoned the view that only states wage war. On the contrary, civil war research has produced an impressive body of literature on violent non-state actors. Still, a particular group of actors—mercenaries—has been widely neglected so far, although they have participated in numerous conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether their presence aggravated or improved the situation is a matter of dispute. Some believe that the additional military capabilities provided by mercenaries help to end civil wars quickly without increased bloodshed, while others deem mercenaries greedy and bloodthirsty combatants who contribute to making civil wars more brutal, while a third opinion differentiates between different types of mercenaries. This article tests the impact of mercenaries on civil war severity. The evidence indicates that the presence of both mercenaries and private military and security contractors increases its severity.     

Resource Curse in Reverse: How Civil Wars Influence Natural Resource Production

Conflict scholars have argued that natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and gemstones, may increase the chances for civil wars because rebels can sustain their organizations by looting resources and because certain types of resources, such as oil, create weaker state governments that are less capable of putting down insurgencies. Natural resources like oil also raise the value of capturing the state through war. However, empirical studies typically treat natural resources as exogenous variables, failing to consider the possibility that war alters the production levels of various natural resources. This endogenous relationship may help to explain the inconsistent empirical results linking natural resources and civil war onset. This article examines the two-way relationship between natural resources and civil war, focusing on oil, diamonds, and fisheries. The empirical findings suggest that most of the relationships run in the direction from war to resources, with no significant effects of resources on the onset of civil war. States with civil wars experience lower oil and diamond production, while marine fisheries production recovers in civil war–torn states.     

Defining Civil War by Examining Post-Soviet Conflicts

Great many violent events happened during 1991–2005 in the 12 states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR but only a few civil wars are registered in the major datasets. That brings up a number of questions about the operational definitions of civil war that generally point in the direction of shifting the research attention from refining the quantitative parameters to grasping the essense of the phenomena in question. It is proposed that civil war partially overlaps with several other type of violent crisis: inter-state wars, civil unrest and revolutions, internal repression, military coups and mutinies, banditry and organized crime, and terrorism. These overlaps create six ‘gray zones’ where only very nuanced examination rather than application of rigid criteria could help in distinguishing civil wars from other crises. Therefore, data collection based on a single “robust” definition, which incorporates several verifiable parameters, is not necessarily the only path to scientific knowledge about civil wars.     

Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars

Why do multiple rebel groups form in some civil wars but not others? Since 1946, only half of all civil wars were fought by a single rebel group; the rest were fought by multiple groups. This article argues that this variation is determined by the incentives political entrepreneurs have to enter a war. The higher the demand for political change and the lower the costs of fighting, the more incentives entrepreneurs have to form their own group. Analyzing UCDP data for all civil wars between 1946 and 2015 I find that the two measures of demand – the number of identifiable ethnic or religious groups in a country and the size of the disgruntled population – have the most consistent effects, but that key measures of costs such as the size of the government military also matter. A detailed analysis of the Ethiopian case further reveals the influence of external intervention on the formation of rebel groups. These results suggest that rebel groups emerge in civil wars in rational, predictable ways related to the ease by which rebel elites can mobilize separate groups for fighting.