论冷战后美国的强制外交

强制外交与威慑一样,主要依靠武力的潜在运用或者说主要通过威胁使用武力,以达成国家的对外政策目标.强制外交是冷战结束后一个引人注目的国际政治现象,该术语也是当前西方国际关系和战略文献中出现频率很高的重要术语之一.本文在剖析西方强制外交理论的基础上,重点研究冷战后美国所实施的两个典型的强制外交案例,着力阐释当代美国强制外交成功或失败的原因，并扼要进行一些评析.     

国际社会对二战后美历次对外战争的态度

有学者称,为确保国家利益和推行全球战略目标,美国从来不惜诉诸战争。其中,战争是否正义与合法、有无联合国授权和国际社会支持,对美国来说并不是最重要的事情,战略目标和国家利益自始终都是美国是否宣战的决定性因素。冷战以来,美国进行了6场大规模的对外战争,其中朝鲜战争和越南战争发生在冷战期间,海湾战争恰逢冷战的尾声,而科索沃战争、阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争则处于世     

国际法上的“使用武力”问题与联合国 集体安全机制的改革和完善*

近20 年来，联合国集体安全机制的法律性质无疑已经发生了重大变化，与1945 年 联合国初创时提出的理念渐行渐远。在国际关系中，西方国家倡导的“人道主义干涉”和“为维护民 主实施的干涉”盛行，严重冲击着国际法上关于使用武力的原则规则；联合国屡次背离长期坚持的 “不偏不倚第三方”立场，强行介入国内武装冲突，招致重大损失；有关国家集团在联合国体制内或 者体制外使用武力产生了极为消极的法律后果；某些国家或者国际组织未经当事国同意实施“强 制和平”行动，个别经济类区域组织越权对会员国采取军事行动；为配合联合国的政治行动国际 刑事法院多次对在任国家元首发出逮捕令。这些做法在使国际法的制裁和强制功能得到加强的同 时，也从理论和实践上试图根本颠覆传统国际法上的一系列原则规则制度。因此，我们必须用一种 批判和反思的态度对待当前的联合国集体安全机制，并在条件许可的情况下与国际社会一道对其 进行改革和重构，使其在强化维持国际和平与安全功能的同时与中国国家安全战略目标相契合， 以最大限度地维护中国国家利益。     

强制外交概念与手段小议

强制外交(coercive diplomacy)与竞争、合作、战争等现象一样,都是国际政治和国际关系的重要组成部分.冷战后,西方学术界在进一步深入研究威慑理论的同时,更重视对强制(或者说威逼compellence)外交的理论研究.鉴于美国在后冷战时期频频使用强制外交对国际关系产生的重要影响,以及中国自身为维护国家核心利益运用强制外交的内在需求,中国学术界已经启动对强制外交的研究,但出于在国际关系中对武力运用持谨慎态度的考虑,研究得尚不充分.     

从国际法视角看冷战后联合国维和行动

联合国维和行动是介于宪章第六章规定的和平方法和第七章规定的强制方法之间的一种维护国际和平与安全的国际干预手段。冷战后,联合国维和行动有了重大变化,对国家主权、不干涉内政、禁止使用武力等国际法基本原则造成了极大的冲击。为了摆脱困境,联合国维和行动必须准确定位,坚持维和三原则,尽快制定专门的联合国维和行动法典,正确对待人道主义干涉,完善国际干预机制,由此才能更好地维护国际和平与安全。     

美国与伊朗构想的海湾安全秩序之争

在当前美国与伊朗核问题冲突的背后,还存在着双方构想的海湾安全秩序之争.冷战结束后,美国一直试图按照其世界新秩序观念,在海湾地区建立以美国军事存在为基础、同时推动当地国家民主化改造和打击恐怖主义的安全秩序.与此同时,伊朗由于自身实力和影响力在伊拉克战争后的不断增强,也设想建立一种由自己主导的伊斯兰海湾安全秩序,以抵制美国对海湾地区的军事干预.由于两种安全秩序在结构、观念和性质方面都有明显的差异,因而造成双方之问长期难以调解的冲突.     

俄罗斯对未来战争的预测及其安全对策

世纪之交俄罗斯对下世纪战争的新特征进行了深入研究.在地缘政治对抗和武装斗争领域出现了许多新现象,动用武力不再是战争惟一和最重要的标志,非军事手段的意义越来越大.在不使用军事手段的情况下,通过有针对性的政治、外交、经济、信息、心理、生态等斗争方式和破坏行动来打击其他国家,并最终实现在经济上和精神上"征服"别国.而且,在现代条件下遂行军事行动时实施"非直接行动战略"的方法显得越来越重要.     

试析民主援助

缘起于冷战时期的民主援助成为冷战结束后国际政治的重要现象,也日益成为以美国为首的西方国家在国际社会推进其民主文化进程的重要工具.分析民主援助的内涵、路径可以发现,民主援助的本质并不是帮助受援国巩固和发展民主,而是一种民主霸权主义,它正成为西方国家干涉别国主权和内政的外交工具.这也是形成世界范围反西方民主援助潮流的根本原因.     

从禁飞区实践看人道主义干涉的效力与局限性

《联合国宪章》禁止在国际关系中侵犯主权和使用武力,但将一国“威胁国际或地区和平与安全”规定为例外,同时又高度重视对人权的尊重和保护.冷战结束以来,西方国家在鼓吹“人权高于主权”论调的同时,推动安理会将一些国家内部侵犯人权的行为解释为“对国际或地区和平与安全的威胁”,进而在它们的领土上设立了禁飞区.作为国际人道主义干涉的新模式,设立禁飞区已经在伊拉克、波黑和利比亚进行了三次实践,显示其正在演变成一种国际规范,但它的适用条件非常严格,因而所能发挥的作用是有限的.     

评巴美关系和美国对巴拿马的武装干涉

1989年美国布什总统上台后,继续实行公开干涉巴拿马内政的政策,在使用各种手段胁迫巴拿马国防军司令诺列加下台未果后,于12月20日悍然出兵入侵巴拿马。美国公然使用武力、粗暴地践踏一个国家的主权,充分暴露了它的霸权主义面目。巴拿马政治危机已经持续两年多。两年来,这个国家反对军事独裁、争取民主化的斗争和反对美国干涉、维护国家主权的斗争相互交错,使局势复杂多变。 1987年6月,巴拿马实权人物诺列加操纵大选、排斥异已,参与国际毒品走私等问题揭发出来后,激起人民群众的不满情绪,国内掀起要求诺列加辞职、争取民主的浪潮。美国里     

Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes

Although the United States has been the most prolific intervener in the international system since the end of World War II, there has been little consensus among scholars regarding the motivations of U.S. interventions in domestic political disputes abroad. In addition, scholars do not agree on the relative effects of international factors and domestic factors on intervention decisions by the U.S. Previous research on the motivations of U.S. interventions has occurred within at least two distinctive “streams” of literature: (1) studies of state interventions; and (2) studies of the use of military force by the U.S. Hypotheses regarding U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes are derived from the previous literature, and the hypotheses are tested using recently-compiled data on intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes occurring between 1945 and 2002. The results suggest a combination of international factors, including geographic proximity and ideological linkage, significantly influence the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes. The results also suggest international factors are generally more important than domestic factors, and the effects of both domestic factors and international factors on U.S. intervention decisions may differ depending on the specific type of intervention and the time period.     

Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusionliterature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucialdeterminants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990,1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interestin war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliancestudies connect coalition participation problems with the reliabilityof allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question;however, they are not free of problems. In particular, theystudy only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputesbut ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can beformed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002).There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article showshow difference in operation-types and collective legitimacyaffect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions.A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear tobe a legitimate international ‘police’ act and attractmore partner states. A coalition for intervention into domesticaffairs may be less attractive to possible participants becauseof the violation of the noninterference norm of internationallaw. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partnersfrom 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitionsare formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation isnot fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusionliterature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke‘the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy’. Received for publication November 16, 2005. Accepted for publication April 20, 2006.     

Responsibility to Protect: Emerging Rules on Humanitarian Intervention?

This article discusses different forms of military force under or linked to the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in relation to international law, with particular emphasis on humanitarian intervention. It contributes to the ongoing debate by analysing and separating the lawful forms of military force falling under Pillars II and III of the R2P from unlawful claims and extensive interpretations of R2P. Apart from the already existing legal right of the Security Council to authorise humanitarian interventions, it is argued that there are no ongoing legal customary developments of similar rights or obligations for other actors to intervene in another state (without consent) to protect populations by military force against grave crimes under the principle of R2P. The argumentation is based on a series of case studies of humanitarian interventions by the Security Council, regional organisations and “coalitions of willing states”. The article also includes legal analysis on the Uniting for Peace Procedure and the prior treaty-based consented rights to intervention under the African Union Act and the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention.     

Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses of Force

Research on questions such as whether national leaders use force in the international arena to divert attention from problems at home depends on a valid and reliable list of the incidents in which various states have used military force. In the case of the United States, several data sets have been used for this purpose. This research note compares two widely used data sets, the militarized interstate disputes (MID) data, which cover disputes involving all states between 1816 and 1992, and the data originally compiled by Stephen Kaplan and Barry Blechman, which cover only the United States since World War II. This comparison indicates that, in spite of its usefulness for other conflict research, the MID data are not appropriate for analyses of U.S. decisions to use force, including tests of the diversionary hypothesis. The MID data set excludes several categories of incidents relevant to major theoretical arguments about the use of force and includes many irrelevant incidents. These problems are likely to apply to similar analyses of other states as well. The Blechman and Kaplan data set also excludes some relevant events, but its omissions are less consequential. We offer a revised list of United States uses of force between 1870 and 1995.     

Self-Defense and the Use of Force: Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules, or Both?

This article examines shifts in international law regarding the use of force—the jus ad bellum —that emerged in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequently were invoked in part by the United States and United Kingdom to justify military intervention in Iraq. These shifts import some elasticity—in time, space, and place—into the preexisting legal understanding of self-defense. To be sure, the general consensus that supported the use of force in Afghanistan as a legitimate exercise of self-defense has diluted as the use of that force expanded into other theaters of operation. It is therefore unsurprising that considerable controversy envelops claims by some states that international law entitles them to use force in self-defense in a preemptory manner. This article explores the articulation of this and other justifications for the military intervention in Iraq. It also unpacks the difficult question whether these entitlements are constitutive of inchoate legal rules or simply deviations from the still operational old rules. Moreover, this article encourages scholars and students of international law and relations to consider why a movement is afoot to change the rules and how this affects the architecture of collective security. To facilitate this process of reflection, this article explores the policy implications of retaining the old rules or adopting the newly alleged rules.     

Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities

The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.     

U.S. Grand Strategy Following the George W. Bush Presidency

Debates over U.S. grand strategy have devoted a disproportionate level of attention to the War on Terror itself rather than the evolving strategic environment. Challenges including an impending shift in the balance of power, structural deficits, and divided public opinion will significantly impact the policy options available to government leaders, but they have not been adequately addressed. This article analyzes the options available for U.S. grand strategy following the George W. Bush presidency by relating key U.S. national interests with domestic and international policy constraints on the horizon. The analysis concludes that the United States must adopt a defensive grand strategy to rebuild popular consensus, to prevent further strain on the military, and to consolidate its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this strategy will require flexible coalitions, not formal international organizations, because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with its European allies.     

Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes1

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Yet what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed is poorly understood. We argue that the quality of multinational military coalitions—in terms of the coalition’s skill, coordination, and legitimacy—can provide better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing conflict aims. Empirical testing reveals that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success: a history of success, both alone and with the same coalition partners, predicts military success. Moreover, increasing a coalition’s legitimacy via more diverse members has a weak effect, indicating that diversity comes at the expense of coordination and cooperation challenges. Last, we find that elements of coalition quality affect initiating and defending coalitions differently.     

Can Europe Fill the Void in U.S. Military Leadership?

This article lays out the case for why Washington's European allies are incapable, both now and in the foreseeable future, of replacing American military leadership. Despite recent substantial force contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan and small-scale interventions in Africa, European military capabilities are limited, declining, and unlikely to rebound, regardless of whether the United States is in strategic retreat. As a result, the United States faces a bleak choice: not whether to trade American global leadership for an equally benevolent European world order, but whether to give up its mantle of leadership and thereby create a void that may be filled by unfriendly, if not overtly hostile, actors.     

The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law,norms and political calculation

Abstract

The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has raised significant questions about Russian thinking and practice on the legitimate use of military force abroad, especially in relation to neighbour states. The arguments advanced by Russia to justify this campaign show how Russian interpretations of customary international law as well as norms related to the use of force have served as an instrument of state policy, rather than being rooted in any broader international consensus. The Russian discourse in this context about sovereignty, self-determination and the legitimacy of recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states appears similarly to be strongly influenced by political self-interest and Russian views about its entitlement within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Among Russian claims, Moscow's commitment to support its ‘citizens’ abroad has been particularly controversial. This article examines these issues and also the possibility that, through its justifications for waging war against Georgia, Russia is more broadly contesting the interpretation of certain international norms, that it regards as essentially constructed by Western states. Some potential implications of these legal and normative arguments for future Russian policy in the CIS region, including Ukraine, are also examined.