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51.
We investigate whether countries with poor human rights records oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly. An instrumental account of voting would suggest that these countries aim to weaken resolutions since they could be future targets of these policies. We estimate determinants of voting using 13,000 individual voting decisions from 1980 to 2002. Our results from ordered probit estimation show that a country??s human rights situation is irrelevant to voting behavior if regional dependence of voting is controlled for. The results also show that simple rules for aggregating voting choices can lead to misleading results. 相似文献
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Axel Dreher Matthew Gould Matthew D. Rablen James Raymond Vreeland 《Public Choice》2014,158(1-2):51-83
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election. 相似文献
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Perceived injustice can trigger strong emotional reactions and motivate political protest. Although there is vast empirical evidence for this chain of reactions, we know little about individual differences in how perceived injustice can motivate people to engage in political actions. In a survey study with 1,005 German participants, we investigated how justice sensitivity as a personality disposition accounts for individual differences in political engagement. Regression analyses revealed that justice sensitivity from an observer perspective promotes political engagement, whereas justice sensitivity from a victim perspective is not related to political engagement . In the concrete case of a political decision regarding the public transport project “Stuttgart 21” in Germany, our data indicated that perceived procedural injustice of the decision process and moral outrage mediated the relation of justice sensitivity from an observer perspective and political protest. The present findings are in line with research on the behavioral outcomes of justice sensitivity and contribute to the understanding of individual differences in political engagement and its underlying motivational processes. 相似文献
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du Vignaux Hubert; Gouzard Camille; Gehringer Axel; Byers David; Cuccia Stefano; Wagner Henri; Zijp Petra; Cuenca Jose Manuel; Azanza Yolanda; Bushner Daniel; Parry Jonathan 《Capital Markets Law Journal》2006,1(1):89-112
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Sebire Marc-Etienne; Sebastien Julien; Gehringer Axel; Cuccia Stefano; Byers David; Wagner Henri; Thomas Anne-Marie; Zijp Petra; van Straaten Matthieu; Cuenca Jose Manuel; Azanza Yolanda; Bushner Daniel; Parry Jonathan 《Capital Markets Law Journal》2008,3(2):186-216
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Sustainable forest management is a key challenge for local and global governance. The Forest Stewardship Council has emerged as one of the solutions to global forest deterioration and is generally regarded as the prime example of certification as a global governance tool. This article examines the macro-effectiveness of certification on halting deforestation and examines the relationship between certification and governance institutions. The article finds that the macro-effectiveness of certification on halting deforestation is still limited due to the “stuck at the bottom” problem of developing countries, which are kept out of the certification process, and the market-driven nature of certification initiatives. The article does not find a relationship between certification and governance institutions at the macro level. It does find, however, significant variation in certification uptake between countries, pointing to the potential of this policy tool. The implications of the results are discussed. 相似文献
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