Terminating federal research and development programs

The barriers to terminating federal research and development vary with the type of program (manpower resource creation, basic or applied research, hardware development) and the functional sector in which it is lodged (defense or civilian). Each has a public/private constituency of sponsors and performers. Some constituencies are much more potent than others. Hence, to kill an R&D program, one must weaken the constituency behind it. Useful strategies for would-be terminators include decremental funding and the amalgamation of competing R&D programs within the same agency.     

The logic of ‘Policy’ and successful policies

Developed on the premise that how we conceive of ‘policy’ and ‘successful policy’ guides policy sciences' research and evaluation, this paper responds to the conceptual questions of “what is a policy?” and “when is a policy successful?” Formal or logical conditions are established to distinguish ‘policy’ from related concepts. The notion ‘relevant public’ is introduced to distinguish public policies from private policies and to identify fairly-declared policies. Further, conditions are developed that can be used as logical tests for three types of policy success: implementation success, instrumental success and success in normative justification.     

Techniques and processes of administration

Abstract. Since the Glassco Commission in the early sixties there has been a plethora of administrative changes: Program Planning and Budgeting, Operational Performance Measurement Systems, Management by Objectives, and Cost/Benefit Analysis have all been introduced as technical panaceas. In terms of processes, some should probably have been changed but remain the same(such as the personnel selection-promotion process), while others have been circumvented (the regular budgetary process). Still others have been changed (the cabinet committee process) but have produced results of questionable value and perhaps positive harm to majority governments. It is contended that the Glassco injunction ‘let the manager manage’ and the assumption that private sector practices should be adopted by government, virtually without modification, ignore fundamental differences between the two sectors. The war between competing interest groups is inevitable and hence perpetual. Governments engage in a rolling set of compromises between factions in an essentially adversarial process under rules, formal and informal, that restrict the field of battle. Frequently, those who advocate administrative changes are in pursuit of their personal interests. They frequently find themselves in alliances with one or more of the contending parties who look upon them as guns for hire to be used or rejected on strategic grounds. After an impressionistic critique of each of the processes and techniques previously cited, the paper ends on a more positive note. There is a plea that the powers of the auditor general be expanded to encompass reporting upon (as distinct from undertaking) the extent to which a ministry is carrying out efficiency and effectiveness studies, where there is a consensus about the validity of the data and methodology. It is also suggested that the auditor general report upon the disposition of these studies with the aim of breaking down present secrecy barriers. A better informed public would change the incentive structure within which ministers, aided by officials, reach their decisions. Sommaire. Depuis la Commission Glasscoe, au début des années 60, il y a eu une pléthore de changements administratifs. La Planification et l'établissement des budgets par programme, les systèmes de mesure des performances opérationnelles, la gestion en function des objectifs, l'analyse des coûts et avantages, tous ces systèmes ont été utilisés comme panacées techniques. Du point de vue des processus, certains, qui auraient dû sans doute être changés ne l'ont pas été (comme par exemple la sélection du personnel et le processus de l'avancement) alors que d'autres ont été contournés (le processus budgétaire normal). D'autres encore ont été changEeAs (le processus des comités de cabinet) mais pour produire des résultats de valeur douteuse et parfois franchement défavorables pour les gouvernements majoritaires. L'auteur soutient que l'impératif de la Commission Glasscoe « laisser gérer les gestionnaires » et le postulat suivant lequel les pratiques du secteur privé devraien être adoptées pratiquement sans modification par les gouvernements ignorent les différences fondamentales qui existent entre les deux secteurs. La lutte entre des groupes aux intérêts divergents est inévitable, et done perpétuelle. Les gouvernements s'engagent dans tout un jeu de compromis dynamiques entre les différentes factions dans ce qui essentiellement un processus antagoniste, à l'intérieur de règies formelles ou non formelles, qui réduisent la portée du conflit. Fréquemment, ceux qui réclament des changements administratifs le font dans leur propre intérêt et ils se trouvent souvent alliés à un ou plusueurs des partis d'opposition qui les considèrent comme des mercenaires à utiliser ou rejeter pour des raisons stratégiques. Après une critique subjective des divers processus et techniques cités précédemment, l'auteur conclut sur une note plus positive. Il demande que les pouvoirs de l'Auditeur général soient étendus pour qu'il fasse connaître (et non pas pour qu'il étudie) la mesure dans laquelle les ministères effectuent des études sur l'efficience et l'efficacité, là où il existe un consensus quant à la validité des données et de la méthodologie. Il propose aussi que l'Auditeur général fasse rapport sur l'usage qui est fait de ces études, afin de supprimer le secret qui l'entoure actuellement. Un public mieux informé transformerait la structure de la motivation qui entoure actuellement les ministres qui prennent des decisions et leurs fonctionnaires.     

Radical Islam: The Death of an Ideology?

Dr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Gvosdev is a senior fellow at the Nixon Center. The following is adapted from the conclusion of their recent book, The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam (Praeger, 2004), reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT.     

China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia

While its economic dynamism stimulates continued growth in Asia, China's increasing demand for energy is creating intense competition, particularly with Japan, over international sources of supply. Domestic fields have generally been disappointing, as have efforts to pipe gas from Central Asia and Russia to the east coast. Consequently, China is not only paying greater attention to potential petroleum resources in the East and South China Seas, but also considering the vulnerability of its sea-lanes to the Middle East and beyond. Its need to diversify has promoted closer relations with Central Asia, the Middle East, and the oil producing countries of Africa and Latin America, but the jury is out on whether China's concerns for secure energy supply will lead to international cooperation against terrorism or fuel the already heated competition for oil and gas. As China continues to assure its future energy security in Asia and many areas of the world, sustained bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to reconcile disputes and avoid conflict will become more important than ever.     

Stammwähler und die opportunistische Wahl parteipolitischer Programme

This article explains political radicalism by the number of voters who are biased towards a party. With little voters biased in favor of a party, this party has to rely more heavily on its programmatic distance to other parties. Because large parties – i.e.: parties with a high number of biased voters – gain votes when they move to the center of the political spectrum, parties with a lower number of voters that are biased in their favor are forced to the edges of the policy space. We draw on a computational model of political competition between four parties in a two‐dimensional policy space to investigate this relationship. We use panel corrected OLS estimates to analyze the data generated by the computer simulation. Our results substantiate the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the number of biased voters and the inclination of a party to adopt a more extreme policy stance.     

Finanzpolitik als Nachahmungswettbewerb: Empirische Ergebnisse zu Budgetinterdependenzen unter den Schweizer Kantonen

This article examines whether spending decisions in Swiss cantons are interdependent, that is, whether the spending decisions of a canton are influenced by those of other cantons. Theoretically, fiscal policy imitation among cantons can be interpreted as a process of policy and innovation diffusion, as a result of tax competition or as a consequence of federalism as a policy laboratory. The panel analysis presented in this article provides evidence of the existence of budget spillovers among neighbouring cantons. Cantonal governments do not take spending decisions in isolation, but by systematically comparing the fiscal policies in neighbouring cantons.