Narcotics trafficking and the American mafia: The myth of internal prohibition

Numerous books assert that the Mafia long had a prohibition against engaging in narcotics trafficking, either for reasons of morality, or else because of the public stigma attached to drugs. In reality, there are many problems with the belief in voluntary abstention. The mythical nature of internal prohibition, and the far different reality, will be illustrated from the case of Philadelphia, supposedly the base for one of the most powerful and traditional-minded of all the American Mafia groups, the family headed from 1959 to 1980 by don Angelo Bruno. We will attempt to explain the roots of the prohibition myth, both for writers and for the wider public that appears so endlessly enthusiastic about sagas of organized crime. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this myth for policy makers in successive wars on crime.     

The C.T.A. case: A study in political corruption

Between 1984 and 1987, a wide-ranging corruption scandal in Pennsylvania resulted in the conviction and disgrace of a number of high-ranking elected officials, as well as the much publicized suicide of state Treasurer R. Budd Dwyer. This C.T.A. case initially appeared to be a straightforward and almost commonplace affair involving bribes and kickbacks to secure state contracts; but on further examination, this seemingly uncomplicated case can be shown to have involved elaborate conflicts at both state and federal level, and the direction and outcome of the prosecution were heavily influenced by political factors and bureaucratic self-interest.This paper will provide a narrative of the C.T.A. case and related incidents, and also describe the external factors which shaped the investigation. Particular emphasis will be placed on the complex relationship between state-level political interests and the activities of federal prosecutors. The C.T.A. affair offers an excellent illustration of the difficulty of gaining an accurate understanding of even an apparently simple case of political corruption, and the implication is that more elaborate incidents are even less amenable to any kind of academic or social scientific observation. The case can only be understood if full account is taken of the prosecutorial and investigative process which turned the original illegal transactions into a full-blown public scandal, factors which are often insufficiently emphasized in research on political corruption.     

How stable is party identification?

This essay refines and extends our argument (Green and Palmquist, 1990) that net of the distorting effects of measurement error, Americans' partisanship tends to be highly stable over time. Three challenges to this thesis are addressed. In response to doubts about the generalizability of our earlier findings to panel studies of longer duration or from other eras, we show that nine multi-wave panel studies yield similar results. Next, we take up the question of whether our model can account for observed patterns of partisan conversion. The rate of party-switching forces some modifications in the statistical assumptions used to model party identification over time, but a revised model which can account for inter-party change reproduces earlier findings of partisan stability. Third, we grapple with the question of how our findings square with fluctuations in what has been termed macropartisanship. We suggest that aggregate shifts in party identification need not be incompatible with strong over-time correlations at the individual level. Finally, we develop a simulation of micropartisanship to illustrate that over long stretches of time very gradual changes in partisanship can accumulate to produce appreciable levels of micropartisan change.Donald Philip Green, Yale University.Bradley Palmquist, Harvard University.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 3–6, 1992.