The contractual alternative to patents

A patent grants the holder a monopoly over the use of the patented invention for a specified time period. Although economists are generally opposed to monopoly, there seems to be a general consensus that the patent system is desirable.¹ The rationale for the patent system is that without ownership rights in inventions, there would not be optimal allocation of resources to inventive activities, just as with any other valuable resource over which there are not well-defined property rights. However, the patent system, since it confers monopoly rights, has its drawbacks as well. If independent parties are working simultaneously toward an invention, the first to produce the invention will receive a monopoly over its use, even though others may have been only a month behind. This may encourage inventors to work too intensively toward a patent, and could also have the effect of producing monopoly in a market that was characterized by competition before the patent was issued. In addition, competitors have an incentive to develop substitute processes to avoid infringement of the patent, when the use of the patented process would be more economical. A substitute for patents which provides ownership rights in an invention without governmental grant of a monopoly is the trade secret. The purpose of this paper is to introduce and develop the idea of the law of trade secrets as a contractual alternative to patents.     

A social psychological approach to the study of police corruption

Police corruption is herein defined as a mode of behavior that is chosen because it will lead to money or other personally desirable rewards and involves a misuse of the authority of a police officer's occupational role. In recognition of the importance of explanation to the development of effective control techniques, a clearly explicated theoretical model is offered. Elaboration of this model involves an inclusion of the propositions of theories of social learning, role theory, and anomie in an attempt to provide a more thorough understanding of the various processes involved in police corruption. The model suggests that corruption arises through a process of interaction during which the individual police officer learns such behavior in accordance with the responses of others. Role theory is used to account for the motivating forces behind corrupt behavior. Following a discussion of the proposed theoretical basis for corruption, various research suggestions are offered.