Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins and development of the African Union's security culture

This article employs the concepts of security culture and normlocalization to explore some of the cultural dimensions of theAfrican Union's (AU) security policies. After providing an overviewof constructivist accounts of norm socialization in internationalrelations, I use these insights to analyse the origins and developmentof the AU's security culture. The final two sections explorethe ongoing process of norm localization in relation to thetwo most recent tenets of the AU's security culture: intoleranceof unconstitutional changes of government and the responsibilityto protect principle. An awareness of the uneven and contestednature of this process helps account for the fact that althoughthese two transnational norms have been institutionalized inthe AU Charter and endorsed by the United Nations, they havebeen internalized unevenly by the AU's member states. Externaladvocates of these two norms would thus do well to help thecontinent's norm entrepreneurs build congruence between thesenorms and the AU's security culture.