When random assignment fails: Some lessons from the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment

In this paper, we consider what may be done when researchers anticipate that in the implementation of field experiments, random assignment to experimental and control groups is likely to be flawed. We then reanalyze data from the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment in a manner that explicitly models violations of random assignment. As anticipated, we find far larger treatment effects than previously reported. The techniques developed should be useful in a wide variety of settings when random assignment is implemented imperfectly.     

On Leo Katz,double jeopardy,and the blockburger test

Associate, Stoel Rives Boley Jones &; Grey, Portland, Oregon; J.D., Yale Law School, April 1989; B.A., Philosophy, Reed College, 1979.     

The cases of Alfred Dreyfus,Mendel Beilis,and Leo Frank

B.A., City College of New York 1973; J.D., American University 1976; LL.M., New York University 1980.     

Making just decisions in magistrates' courts

Professional magistrates' sentencing procedures were examined as prototypic cases of expert processes involved in making just decisions, with analysis of their attention to information and the inferences they drew from case details and their own patterned knowledge. Magistrates' sorting and verbalized sentencing of six shoplifting cases revealed that they were accessing and using three schemas for categorizing shoplifters, with different emphases and valences, and different penalties. The schemas categorized shoplifters as cases of greed, need, or troubled persons. Tough magistrates followed the greed schema more than the lenient who followed the need and troubled schemas more consistently. Information use and inferences in a sample case illustrate schema differences.     

Controlling School Crime: An Examination of Interorganizational Relations of School and Juvenile Justice Professionals

Abstract Crime in and around schools creates a climate of fear among students and teachers, and disrupts the learning environment. Effective control of school crime demands the cooperative efforts of school and juvenile justice officials. This paper examines the interorganizational relations between school principals, teachers, and juvenile probation officers by comparing survey results from three cities. Findings reveal significant differences onmethods for controlling school crime; and on due process and sharing of school and court records. School and court officials do cooperate in working with students who are under probation supervision; but the extent of their interaction is characterized by a low level of interorganizational relations.     

GASB's Survival Potential: An Agency Theory Perspective

The primary objective of this article is to develop a framework for examining the survival or demise of an accounting standards setting body, with specific emphasis on analyzing the survival potential of the proposed GASB (Government Accounting Standards Board). In meeting this objective, we will first contrast the survival of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the demise of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASE), based on a framework derived from recent developments in agency theory.
The position taken in this article is neither that of an advocate nor an adversary of the various accounting regulatory bodies discussed. Instead, the authors' intent is to shed light on the complex issues surrounding the potential for survival of such bodies. An improved understanding of these issues should, in turn, permit a more enlightened analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of such bodies.     

EXPECTATIONS AND WELFARE WORK: WIN IN NEW YORK CITY

Work requirements for welfare recipients have done l i t t l e to reduce the welfare rolls. The usual explanation that limited skills and openings prevent recipients working is unpersuasive, since low-skilled work seems to be quite widely available. This study of the Work Incentive (WIN) program, the main welfare work program, in New York City found that whether recipients work depends mainly on whether WIN seriously expects them to. Thus, the welfare work problem is more political than economic.
It lies in our reluctance to obligate recipients to function socially as we would other people.