The "Polish Problem"– American War-Time Perspectives

As one of the initial, and arguably most devastated, casualties of the Second World War, Poland's restoration as a free and independent state was seen as a test case for the viable continuation of the victorious Grand Alliance. Yet seemingly irreconcilable differences between the Western powers and the Soviet Union over intricate territorial and political issues (with the Polish state and people caught firmly in the middle) would signal the end of the working alliance. The US collectively struggled to come to terms with this "Polish problem"– its government failing to deliver to the Poles on those democratic principles enshrined within the Atlantic Charter, and its people finding the very ideals for which they had gone to war compromised. While reflecting the unique complexities of this particular dilemma, American officialsrsquo; perceptions of the conundrum over Poland bear a ringing familiarity to future East European developments and certainly set the tone for the ensuing West-Soviet impasse there. Indeed, this author would not be alone in suggesting that the superpower struggle over Poland at the close of World War II was itself the very genesis of the Cold War conflict.     

Assessing Readiness to Change among Perpetrators of Intimate Partner Violence: Analysis of Two Self-report Measures

Recent interest in the construct of motivation to change among male perpetrators of intimate partner violence (IPV) has led to development of two self-report measures of this construct: the University of Rhode Island Change Assessment for Domestic Violence (URICA-DV; Levesque et al. 2000) and the Safe at Home Inventory (SAH; Begun et al. 2003). We examined the internal structure of these instruments using confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses in a sample of 199 male IPV perpetrators waiting to begin court-mandated batterer intervention programs. Results indicated that the scales had adequate internal consistency. However, using confirmatory factor analyses, the hypothesized structural models of each instrument fit the data poorly. Subsequent models suggested by a series of exploratory factor analyses failed to improve model fit substantially for both scales. For the URICA-DV, a 3-factor model including items from the Precontemplation, Contemplation, and Action subscales fit the data adequately. No acceptable model fit could be found for the SAH. Intercorrelations among similar subscales across the two inventories suggested only a modest degree of intercorrelation (r’s = 0.16–0.52), and a factor structure more dependent on scale of origin than item latent content, suggesting that the scales assess different facets of the readiness to change construct. These results suggest that before the stages of change construct can be fully applied to the IPV area, more research and evaluation are needed on how to accurately assess abuser readiness to change.     

Resilience and Vulnerability in Adolescents: Genetic Influences on Differential Response to Risk for Delinquency

Prior research has identified a vast number of correlates for delinquent behavior during adolescence, yet a considerable number of errors in prediction remain. These errors suggest that behavioral development among a portion of youths is not well understood, with some exhibiting resilience and others a heightened vulnerability to risks. Examining cases that do not confirm prediction outcomes provides an opportunity to achieve a greater understanding of the relationships between risk factors and delinquency, which can be used to improve theoretical explanations of behavior. This study explores the contribution of genetic and environmental factors to differences in individual responses to cumulative risk for delinquency among a sample of adolescent twins (N = 784 pairs, 49 % female) in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. The results indicate that additive genetic and unique environmental factors significantly contribute to variation in responses to cumulative risk across 14 risk factors spanning individual, familial, and environmental domains. When analyzed separately, the majority of the difference between vulnerable youths and the overall population was attributed to genetic influences, while differences between resilient youths and the population were primarily attributed to environmental influences. The findings illustrate the importance of examining both genetic and environmental influences in order to enhance explanations of adolescent offending.     

Foreign threat and political party change: Russia and changes in party manifestos

How do political parties react to foreign security threats? There has been very little attention paid in the literature generally to how parties react to international events, particularly how parties react to foreign policy threats. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, we examine how political parties in countries in Europe have reacted to Russian actions in terms of their emphasis on security issues. Based upon our analysis of the manifestoes from 331 parties in 36 countries we find that, generally, interstate threats have no significant effect on the military position adopted by political parties, although these effects vary by party type and by the type of threat. Russian based threats appear to be associated with the Far Left becoming more dovish (which is consistent with what would be expected by the literature) and the Far Right becoming significantly less hawkish.     

The ideological nationalization of partisan subconstituencies in the American States

Since the mid-twentieth century, elite political behavior in the United States has become much more nationalized. In Congress, for example, within-party geographic cleavages have declined, roll-call voting has become more one-dimensional, and Democrats and Republicans have diverged along this main dimension of national partisan conflict. The existing literature finds that citizens have only weakly and belatedly mimicked elite trends. We show, however, that a different picture emerges if we focus not on individual citizens, but on the aggregate characteristics of geographic constituencies. Using biennial estimates of the economic, racial, and social policy liberalism of the average Democrat and Republican in each state over the past six decades, we demonstrate a surprisingly close correspondence between mass and elite trends. Specifically, we find that: (1) ideological divergence between Democrats and Republicans has widened dramatically within each domain, just as it has in Congress; (2) ideological variation across senators’ partisan subconstituencies is now explained almost completely by party rather than state, closely tracking trends in the Senate; and (3) economic, racial, and social liberalism have become highly correlated across partisan subconstituencies, just as they have across members of Congress. Overall, our findings contradict the reigning consensus that polarization in Congress has proceeded much more rapidly and extensively than polarization in the mass public.     

The Secular State Under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and America

The Secular State Under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and America. By Christian Joppke (Cambridge and Malden: Polity 2015).     

Inequality,democracy and taxation: Lessons from the post-communist transition

Using data for the period 1989 – 2002, we examine the determinants of income inequality in post-communist economies. We find a strong positive association between equality and tax collection but note that this relationship is significantly stronger under authoritarian regimes than under democracies. We also discover that countries introducing sustainable democratic institutions early are characterised by lower inequality. We also confirm that education fosters equality and find that larger countries are prone to higher levels of inequality.