Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policy in Contests

The proposal of an inefficient policyusually stimulates a political strugglebetween the affected interest groups. Theresulting wasteful lobbying activities mayreduce welfare, even if the proposed policyis not approved. In this paper weshow that sufficient asymmetry in payoffsnot only tends to reduce lobbying effortsin standard rent-seeking contests, as iswell known, but it is, in fact, a necessarycondition for the implementation of asuccessful effective correctivetax-transfer policy that complements theproposal of the inefficient policy. Such apolicy induces an efficient equilibriumoutcome which is, in addition, optimal fromthe viewpoint of the players that take partin the public-policy game.     

Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging

We explore the role of sex in judging by addressing two questions of long‐standing interest to political scientists: whether and in what ways male and female judges decide cases distinctly—“individual effects”—and whether and in what ways serving with a female judge causes males to behave differently—“panel effects.” While we attend to the dominant theoretical accounts of why we might expect to observe either or both effects, we do not use the predominant statistical tools to assess them. Instead, we deploy a more appropriate methodology: semiparametric matching, which follows from a formal framework for causal inference. Applying matching methods to 13 areas of law, we observe consistent gender effects in only one—sex discrimination. For these disputes, the probability of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases by about 10 percentage points when the judge is a male. Likewise, when a woman serves on a panel with men, the men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant. These results are consistent with an informational account of gendered judging and are inconsistent with several others.     

A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability

Examining onsets of political instability in countries worldwide from 1955 to 2003, we develop a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification. The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic reversals, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the Polity components. This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability.