On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions

In the winter 1978 issue of International Security, Raymond L. Garthoff authored a seminal article outlining common fallacies in United States government estimates of enemy intentions during the Cold War. Now, given the significant changes in threat over the past 30 years, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look at fallacies – evaluating old ones and introducing new ones – in enemy intentions estimates pertaining to post-Cold War (and post-9/11) security dangers. Based on its assessment, this article concludes that the challenges to accurate intelligence assessment of enemy intentions, and the need to move away from dysfunctional standard operating procedures, have never been higher.     

The business of a secret war: Operation ‘Remorse’ and SOE salesmanship in Wartime China

The prime British objective in China during the Pacific War was the re-establishment of pre-war trade and influence and the recovery of Hong Kong. Through Operation ‘Remorse’ (1944–45) the Special Operations Executive covertly established a wide network of distributors and buyers throughout occupied and unoccupied China for high-value low-bulk goods and currencies, using the returns acccruing to buy influence, information, safety and food for Allied prisoners, subsidise politically problematic operations, and smooth the British path back into Hong Kong. ‘Remorse’ epitomised the concerns and demonstrated the methods of the British presence in China generally: a readiness to innovate and adapt, market sensitivity and a capacity for making unlikely local alliances, all held together through a strong focus on a fixed target – a secure China base for Sino-British trade.     

Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? The Impact of Information on Mass Attitudes toward Congress

Two features of citizen response to Congress can be taken as grounds for concern. First, Americans know relatively little about Congress, and especially about congressional procedures and policy output. Second, Congress typically emerges as the least respected political institution. Although these matters are troubling when viewed individually, more disturbing is the dilemma posed when knowledge and attitudes toward Congress are viewed in tandem. It appears that citizens who know Congress the best like Congress the least. Consequently, a sophisticated polity and a well-respected legislature seem fundamentally incompatible. This article seeks to resolve this dilemma, contending that there is nothing about knowledge per se that leads citizens to view Congress unfavorably. Rather, differences in knowledge levels alter the considerations citizens bring to bear when evaluating Congress, with the best-informed individuals constructing judgments on the basis of the most relevant Congress-specific criteria while less knowledgeable citizens employ readily available but more peripheral criteria.     

Unanimity, Discord, and the Communication of Public Opinion

This article is concerned with the political communication of opinion that occurs through networks of associated citizens. Its primary attention focuses on opinion variance within populations and networks and how such variance affects communication among and between individuals. Particularly in the context of ambiguous or infrequent communication, people may experience difficulty in forming judgments regarding the opinions of others. In such situations, environmental priors become useful devices for reaching these judgments, but a problem arises related to the utility of these environmental priors when discord rather than unanimity characterizes the contextual distribution of opinion. The article's argument is that dyadic discussions between two citizens are most enlightening, and environmental priors least enlightening, when surrounding opinion is marked by higher levels of disagreement. The analyses are based on data taken from the 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis study .