On the reliability of Chinese economic data

China is no exception to the rule that economic data for developing countries suffer from substantial margins of error. R. P. Sinha, however, exaggerates the shortcomings of Chinese economic data. A brief review of evidence regarding statistical capacity and statistical veracity supports the view that economic data emanating from the People's Republic represent the fruits of Peking's increasingly effective efforts to monitor China's economy. For China, as for India, Meiji Japan or pre‐industrial Europe, careful empirical research can and does produce results which are not guesses, but estimates of actual economic magnitudes.     

Palestine under the mandate

Asia's First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims Its Independence in 1911. Urgunge Onon and Derek Pritchatt. Leiden, E. J. Brill. 1990. Pp. 203, Appendices, Gloss. Bibliog. Notes, Index, Map. $59.00.     

The political economy of sales taxes and sales tax exemptions

I analyze the choice politicians face when seeking votes from groups that lobby for sales tax rate decreases or tax exemptions, given the constraint that politicians want to raise a certain amount of revenue. Using data on sales taxes, I develop a model predicting a positive relationship between the number of exemptions and the sales tax rate. The estimation results provide support for this prediction. Each additional exemption is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points in the tax rate.

     

Security Providers: Obstacles to Effectiveness in Democracies

To usefully discuss security, one must analyze the security providers states utilize to enhance international and domestic security. These are the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies. This paper analyzes the implications of democratization on the requirements—posited as strategies, resources, and coordination institutions—these providers require in order to achieve the goals civilian leaders set for them. In analyzing case studies of how nations implement six different tasks, it becomes clear that the absence, or weakness, in any of the requirements leads to serious weakness in implementation. Two findings from the case studies are particularly important for policy. First, presidents, who are elected directly and for fixed terms, may ignore or even abolish institutions, including national security councils, that are created to coordinate policy. Second, as civilians are in control, if they lack clear incentives they are not willing to provide the necessary requirements for the security providers.