Peacebuilding does not build peace

The concept of peacebuilding is a buzzword of the development policy and practice mainstream. The recent introduction of managerial tools and the focus on measuring the ‘effectiveness’ of peacebuilding have marginalised and depoliticised critical questions about the causes of violent conflict, and have replaced them with comforting notions for donors that peace can be built and measured without challenging Western understanding of economy, governance, and social aspirations of people.     

The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes

Coup-proofing pertains to political leaders’ strategies that will prevent groups inside or outside the state apparatus from seizing power via a coup d’état. One particular form of these strategies divides a country’s military into rivaling organizations, thereby creating an artificial balance between and structural obstacles for the armed forces. Despite the general claim that this institutional coup-proofing is indeed effective, a recent empirical study does not obtain evidence for a negative impact on the risk of coup attempts or coup outcomes. The authors take this finding as a motivation for their re-evaluation of the effect of institutional coup-proofing on coup risk and outcomes. By developing an argument that rests on the concepts of collective action and polarization, it is contended that institutional coup-proofing and coups are characterized by a U-shaped relationship: Institutional coup-proofing is likely to lower the likelihood of coup onsets and successful outcomes, yet only until a tipping point of about two equally strong military organizations. After this turning point, the risk of coup onset as well as coup success may increase again. Using time-series cross-section data for 1975–1999, the authors find strong and robust support for their claims in terms of coup onset, but not coup outcomes.     

What price makes a good a status good? Results from a mating game

This contribution provides a game theoretical derivation of market demand for status goods as a function of the level and distribution of income: if (1) the price is sufficiently low, everyone buys the good; if (2) the price is sufficiently high, only the rich buy the good (a status good in a narrow sense). If (3) the price is located in very high or in middle range, demand collapses. Thereby, we explain the critical price from which a status good acts as a distinctive signal. In addition, this approach shows the potential welfare-improving impact of conspicuous consumption.     

The role of national problems in European air quality regulation: the process of amplification

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - Recurring themes in the literature on European environmental policy-making is the leader–laggard spectrum and regulatory...     

Buying stolen goods: the ambiguity in trading consumer-to-consumer

This study investigates the buying of stolen goods in Denmark. The study consists of a self-report survey based on a representative sample of the general Danish population (n = 2311) and six focus group interviews consisting of both informants experienced with buying stolen goods and of those with no experience (n = 37). The survey showed that 4.8% had bought stolen goods, while 15.7% were uncertain whether they had bought stolen goods. Young people, males, and unemployed were more likely to purchase stolen goods. No clear correlation between income and buying stolen goods was found. Focus groups suggest the buyers of stolen goods did not buy stolen goods because they could not afford legitimate products. We recommend targeting consumers not interested in buying stolen goods with information about how to avoid such activity.     

Amsterdam as a Global City: Restructuring,Identity Rearticulation,and Resistance in the Service Sector

This article explores the interconnections between political‐economic transformations of Amsterdam into a second‐tier global city and the rearticulation of (gender) identities and resistance practices in the service sector. The research focuses on both the high and low ends of the service sector, i.e., banking and cleaning. Given different positionalities of employees in respective sectors, the article shows that their responses to changes in their work environment take on different modalities. Women managers in the banking sector resort to a strategy of “hiding” their gender identity and individualized responses, while Moroccan (male) cleaners tend to underscore the masculine nature of their work and are joining labor unions in greater numbers than before.     

“State ineffectiveness in deterring organized crime style homicide in Mexico: a vicious cycle”

Institutional weaknesses in the criminal justice system (limited court capacity and the increasingly sophisticated armament of splintering drug trafficking organizations) limit the effectivity of Mexican states to deter organized crime style homicide. Court capacity, expressed by increasing sentencing rates in states where the oral court system was institutionalized, remains insufficient against the post-2006 organized crime related homicide epidemic. The illegal arms market, combined with long-standing deficits in firepower between organized crime and municipal police forces, limit the state’s capacity to alter the arms balance toward policing forces. Taken together, limited court capacity and the tactical imbalance of weapons held by drug trafficking organizations create a vicious cycle which continually perpetuates state ineffectiveness to deter and punish organized crime style homicide.

     

Estimating damages from price-fixing: the value of transaction data

We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.