‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

ON BEING A CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATOR: PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL CHALLENGES,RISKS, AND REWARDS

Conducting child custody evaluations is one of the most complex, challenging, and sometimes risky professional endeavors that a mental health professional can perform. This article examines the professional and personal challenges which may be encountered by the evaluator. In addition to discussing the role requirements and need to maintain awareness of bias and countertransference, challenges such as coping with state board or ethics complaints and possible risks to personal safety are also addressed. Suggestions for risk management and coping with the demands of these assessments are offered, as well as the benefits and rewards of engaging in this important work.     

Investment-decision criteria and resource allocation in transition

This paper develops an analytical framework tointegrate static and dynamic effects of theoreticallyrelevant and practically applied investment-decisioncriteria on the marginal rate of substitution betweeninvestment and labour. The new propositions are relatedto the ranking of relative present value, Kalecki'sindex of efficiency and the static version ofrecoupment period criteria. Investors in post-communisteconomies have switched from the recoupment period tothe criteria based on discounting. This is aninstitutional change typical for these economies. Itimplies a choice of techniques with lower investmentintensity, which is best supported by government'spolicy to promote labour mobility.     

Forensic neuropsychology and the criminal law

This article explores theoretical and empirical issues in the application of clinical neuropsychological evidence to forensic issues in the criminal law. The nature of forensic neuropsychological evaluations is discussed with reference to issues of competency to stand trial, criminal responsibility, and other competencies in the criminal process. Examples of specific disorders relevant to criminal law standards are presented, together with data estimating the prevalence of brain dysfunction in criminal and forensic populations. Research is also reviewed on the role of neuropsychological brain dysfunction in the etiology of violence and criminally relevant behavior. Finally, empirical and ethical issues concerning the applicability and admissibility of forensic neuropsychological data in the criminal context are discussed.     

Technology policy and defense conversion in Israel, 1967–1995

Technology policies and their effect on technology transfer from defense to civilian industries in Israel from 1967 to 1995 are explored. Defense technology policy is found to drive the growth of the defense industry and to limit defense conversion to commercialization initiatives developed primarily through intra-organizational technology transfer. The case of the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is presented. Also the development of national technology policy in Israel is traced and found wanting. Civilian and defense technology policies are found to be uncoordinated with each other and together are incapable of producing interorganizational technology transfer so as to significantly effect defense conversion on a wide number of economic actors particularly small firms. To achieve a socially effective defense conversion process (in which technologies are transferred from defense firms to many economic actors), the analysis suggests that a national technology policy should be designed and implemented under Prime Minister's leadership.     

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement whenthe government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seekinggovernment seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The articleconcludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth,a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizinggovernment in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parkingviolations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes;(2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and neverworse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choicebetween competitive private enforcement and public enforcementdepends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.     

NETWORK REGULATION: THE MANY FACES OF ACCESS

Telecommunications regulation has experienced a fundamentalshift from rate regulation to increased reliance on compelledaccess, perhaps best exemplified by the Telecommunications Actof 1996's imposition of no fewer than four new access requirements.Unfortunately, each access requirement is governed by a separateset of rules for determining both the scope and the price ofaccess. The resulting ad hoc regime has created difficult definitionalproblems and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In thisarticle we propose a system inspired by the discipline of mathematicsknown as graph theory that integrates all of the different formsof access into a single analytical framework. This system separatesdifferent access regimes into five categories: (1) retail access,(2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access, (4) platformaccess, and (5) unbundled access. It also provides insightsinto how each type of access complicates the already difficultproblems of network configuration and management and introducesinefficient biases into decisions about network capacity anddesign. The approach we propose also provides insights intothe transaction cost implications of the different types ofaccess. Drawing on the Coasean theory of the firm, our approachexamines the tradeoffs between internal governance costs andthe external transaction costs of providing access to offera theory of network boundaries. This framework shows how accessregulation distorts networks' natural boundaries and providesa basis for evaluating whether private ordering through marketswould lead to more efficient network design.     

A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR CHURCH'S REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ON COMPETITION

We discuss Professor Jeffrey Church's report to the EuropeanCommission in 2004 on the effects of vertical restraints andmergers. Although thorough and accurate, the report could bemisinterpreted by practitioners, as it does not emphasize thatmarket power is only a necessary condition for harm to competition,and that most vertical mergers that present the possibilityof competitive harm also present economic efficiencies thatare intrinsic to the integration.