The Appointment and Removal Process for judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence

This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control—defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party—permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals.     

Civil wars,party politics and the consolidation of regimes in twentieth century Europe

The present article explores how winners' and losers' strategies for competition influence the possibility of democratization after civil war. Civil wars have been pivotal events in many states, but there has been little analysis of how they affect democratization. Since most have been won by the political right in twentieth century Europe one expects a correlation between civil war and the imposition of authoritarian solution to political conflicts. However, an analysis of five civil wars shows a wide variety in the patterns of political dominance achieved by the winners, ranging from total clampdown in Spain to the winners relinquishing power, as in Ireland. In between, Finland, Greece and Hungary combined various degrees of open competition with restrictions on the losers. In effect democratization can be as likely an outcome of civil war as regression to authoritarianism. Explaining the variation in outcomes of the five cases is the objective of this article.     

The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on Municipal Bond Interest Rates: An Empirical Analysis

The authors use data on municipal bond sales in Oregon from 1994 to 1997 to explore whether population (as a proxy for financial-management capacity) and sale type (competitive or negotiated sale) influence interest rates. They find that smaller jurisdictions pay an interest cost penalty in the municipal bond market, and that competitive sales result in significantly lower interest rates compared to negotiated sales. The authors suggest that measures to enhance the financial-management capacity of small governments are warranted and that state laws requiring justification for negotiated sales are appropriate.     

The diffusion of mediated state public affairs information

• The strength of a democracy rests with having an informed public. The relatively recent advent of C‐Span at the national level and the state‐based equivalents such as CT‐N in Connecticut now provide the most thorough and unbiased coverage of public affairs information that has ever been disseminated in the U.S. The importance of these networks rests with the word of mouth influence that the smaller, demographically diverse, opinion leader audience for these stations have on the rest of society. A series of surveys of CT‐N viewers over three years provides a good picture of what their opinion leader audience looks like and how it is evolving. This information may be useful for other public affairs television networks.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.