Book reviews

A. L. Meiendorf, Optimizatsiya khozyaistvennykh reshenii: metod analiza prirashchenii. Series: Aktual'nye problemy sel'skogo khozyaistva. Moscow: ‘Ekonomika’, 1976.

Oliver H. Radkey, The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia. A Study of the Green Movement in the Tambov Region, 1920–21. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1976. xiv+457 pp. $12.95.

Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev—The Years in Power. London: OUP, 1977. xi+198 pp. £3.95.

Daniel F. Calhoun, The United Front: the TUC and the Russians, 1923–1928. Cambridge: CUP, 1976. 450 pp. £10.50.

Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce. Anglo‐Soviet Relations 1924–27. Cambridge: CUP, 1977. 289 pp. £9.00.

Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976. 302 pp. $14.95.

Donald R. Kelley, Kenneth R. Stunkel, Richard R. Wescott, The Economic Superpowers and the Environment: The United States, The Soviet Union, and Japan. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1976. 335 pp.

Fred Singleton (ed.), Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1976. xvii+103 pp. $13.50. £8.80.

Peter H. Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order. Politics and Social Change in the USSR. New York: The Free Press, and London: Collier MacMillan, 1976. xii+274 pp. £11.05.

Richard Szawlowski, The System of the International Organizations of the Communist Countries. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1976. 322 pp.

Jürg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second World War. London: Macdonald & Jane, 1977. 348 pp. £7.95.     

Book reviews

Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Une Révolution, une victoire. L'union soviétique de Lénine à Staline 1917–1953. Paris: Editions Richelieu, 1972. 446 pp. 60 F.

Joel C. Moses, Regional Party Leadership and Policy‐Making in the USSR. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, and London: Pall Mall Press, 1975. xv+263 pp. £8.00.

Robert J. Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics. Homewood, Ill. and London: The Dorsey Press, 1974. xiii+574 pp. $10.95.

Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy. (Russian Research Center Studies, 74.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1974. x+338 pp. £7.50.

Lloyd G. Churchward, Contemporary Soviet Government. Second Edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. 368 pp. £6.95.

Otto Ul?, Politics in Czechoslovakia. San Francisco and Reading: W. H. Freeman, 1975. xi+181 pp. £4.70.

Ivan Volgyes (ed.), Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) New York: Praeger, 1974, and London: Pall Mall Press, 1975. xiii+168 pp. $14.00. £6.00.

Rolf Freund, Investitionskriterien als Mittel zur Realisierung eines Entwick‐lungspfades. Dargestellt am Beispiel der UdSSR. Berlin: Osteuropa‐Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, 1974. v+202 pp. DM 12.00.

László Szamuely, First Models of the Socialist Economic Systems. Principles and Theories. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiádó, 1974. 109 pp. £2.60.

Iain F. Elliot, The Soviet Energy Balance. Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and Alternative Power Sources. (Praeger Special Studies in Economics and Development.) New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, and London: Pall Mall Press, 1975. xv+277 pp. £8.00.     

Stammwähler und die opportunistische Wahl parteipolitischer Programme

This article explains political radicalism by the number of voters who are biased towards a party. With little voters biased in favor of a party, this party has to rely more heavily on its programmatic distance to other parties. Because large parties – i.e.: parties with a high number of biased voters – gain votes when they move to the center of the political spectrum, parties with a lower number of voters that are biased in their favor are forced to the edges of the policy space. We draw on a computational model of political competition between four parties in a two‐dimensional policy space to investigate this relationship. We use panel corrected OLS estimates to analyze the data generated by the computer simulation. Our results substantiate the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the number of biased voters and the inclination of a party to adopt a more extreme policy stance.     

Institutional Change in Swiss Cantons: A Contribution to Describing and Explaining Institutional Reforms

Most accounts of Swiss federal institutions are unable to explain institutional change. In this contribution the authors trace change in Cantonal reforms and then use multivariate explanation models to account for institutional reforms such as New Public Management reforms. The multivariate analyses used rely on an “event count model” to explain the frequency of institutional reforms and a “binary response model” to explain why Cantons adopt New Public Management reforms. This research demonstrates that policy research as well as innovation and diffusion theories can contribute to explaining institutional reform.     

Corruption, Reform, and Virtue Ethics

Books reviewed in this article:
Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi, and Joseph Jabbra (eds.), Where Corruption Lies
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform
Peter Kobrak, Cozy Politics: Political Parties, Campaign Finance, and Compromised Governance
Raymond J. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks     

Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions

The concept of responsibility lies at the heart of theories of democratic accountability. This article represents the first attempt to explicitly model attributions of presidential versus congressional responsibility for the economy. The article investigates the extent to which contextual and individual-level factors influence citizens' attributions of responsibility for the economy and how, in turn, such judgments shape their political evaluations. Employing a multinomial probit model of attributional choice, I find that responsibility judgments are shaped to varying degrees by economic ideology, perceptions of institutional context, and partisanship, although the effects of partisanship are not uniform across political parties. The results demonstrate that responsibility attributions are politically consequential and moderate the effects of economic perceptions on presidential and congressional approval. Finally, the results suggest that the effects of responsibility attributions in the sanctioning process are not invariant across the target of institutional evaluation .