DOES DISPERSED PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IMPAIR EFFICIENCY? THE CASE OF REFUSE COLLECTION IN NORWAY

Corporate governance theory suggests that companies with dispersed and indirect ownership suffer from agency costs. A worst case is where several political authorities jointly own a company, which allows managers to operate with inferior efficiency. In political economy, the manager is not the major agency problem. Elected politicians may impair efficiency to improve their re‐election prospects. Since politicians have less influence in jointly owned firms, such companies are expected to perform better than those owned by a single public authority. Consistent with corporate governance – but not political economy – the empirical analysis suggests that dispersed municipal ownership impairs cost efficiency. In the Norwegian case of municipal refuse collection presented here, costs of dispersed ownership often outstrip gains from economies of scale. Use of jointly owned companies is not necessarily a proper response to efficiency problems inherent a fragmented local government structure.     

DNA commission of the International Society of Forensic Genetics: Recommendations on the interpretation of mixtures

The DNA commission of the International Society of Forensic Genetics (ISFG) was convened at the 21st congress of the International Society for Forensic Genetics held between 13 and 17 September in the Azores, Portugal. The purpose of the group was to agree on guidelines to encourage best practice that can be universally applied to assist with mixture interpretation. In addition the commission was tasked to provide guidance on low copy number (LCN) reporting. Our discussions have highlighted a significant need for continuing education and research into this area. We have attempted to present a consensus from experts but to be practical we do not claim to have conveyed a clear vision in every respect in this difficult subject. For this reason, we propose to allow a period of time for feedback and reflection by the scientific community. Then the DNA commission will meet again to consider further recommendations.     

The sentencing reform act of 1984: A bold approach to the unwarranted sentencing disparity problem

Conclusion In 1984, after years of study and thorough debate, a bipartisan majority of the Congress enacted perhaps the most far-reaching reform of the federal criminal justice system in the history of the United States. The Sentencing Reform Act and the federal sentencing guidelines are now beginning to produce data indicating that the objectives of avoiding unwarranted disparity and invidious discrimination are being achieved.After an uncertain beginning, the guidelines are gaining acceptance by courts and criminal justice practitioners. As one appellate court observed in admonishing lower courts that the guidelines must be respected:We have embarked on a new course. Only time will tell whether the use of the guidelines will result in an improvement over the old system. But unless we follow the spirit and written directions of the guidelines, we will never know if they have been given a fair test. They at least deserve that.Indeed, the bold new approach to sentencing that is being followed today in federal courthouses throughout the United States deserves an opportunity to succeed, given its many beneficial features and the lofty goals toward which the reforms are directed. While ample work remains for the United States Sentencing Commission to monitor and improve the guidelines, indications at this still early date are that the experiment is succeeding.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the fifth conference of the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, Parliament House, Edinburgh, Scotland, August 5–9, 1990. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Sentencing Commission.B.A., Davidson College 1964; J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law 1967.B.A., Ohio State University 1974; M.S., Arizona State University 1980; M.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1983.B.S., Clemson University 1971; M.S., Clemson University 1975; J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law 1978.     

Environmental dispute resolution and hazardous waste cleanups: A cautionary tale of policy implementation

New York State experimented with replacing their litigation-oriented system for achieving toxic dump site cleanup with one promising to lower transaction costs through alternative dispute resolution. Our analysis of outcomes is informed by three generations of implementation work focusing on (1) the motivations and incentives shaping individual behavior, (2) the larger organizational and political factors associated with variation across cases, and (3) the generic properties of policy implements. This mosaic approach to explanation produces, we believe, a more lifelike picture of use to policy makers for understanding the dynamic and interrelated nature of their choices.     

The impact of a gasoline tax on auto exhaust emissions

The EPA implements its policy of exhaust emission control by setting standards specified in terms of grams of pollutants per mile traveled. As a result, the tax must first restrain the vehicle miles traveled (VMT) if it is to have an impact on emission at all. EPA's choice of miles traveled as the medium through which its policy of pollution control must run is unfortunate, because travel is an activity that people resist giving up. This is reflected in a low long-run price elasticity of travel demand. Consequently, it takes substantial increases in the gasoline tax to make an impact on long-run travel demand. Simulation results show that under an alternative policy option, where EPA's standards are specified in terms of grams of pollutant per gallon of fuel burned, the same long-run reduction in exhaust emissions achievable today can be achieved (at an even higher level of confidence) with less than one-tenth of the increase in gasoline price required under the existing policy regime.     

THE BEHAVIOUR OF LEGISLATORS AND BUREAUCRATS AND POLICING EXPENDITURES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS*

Abstract: This paper is concerned with an analysis of legislation, public administration and government expenditure decisions on policing activities. These three dimensions of government can be used as mechanisms of social control. Whether they are or not is an empirical question that has to be determined in each case. It is shown that there are no strict relationships between the three dimensions of government activity: separate decision-making is undertaken for each of the three dimensions. It is indicated that there are eight possible combinations of the three dimensions, assuming that the three dimensions of government activity are bivariate and discrete. The empirical analysis relates to the state of Queensland and it is concluded that Queensland can be described as a case consisting of authoritarian legislation, public administration contrary to the rule of law, and low policing expenditures.